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THE 

POLITICAL SHAME 

OF MEXICO 



BY 

EDWARD L BELL 

Formerly Editor and Publisher of "La Prensa" and the 
"The Daily Mexican" of Mexico City 



NEW YORK 

McBRIDE, NAST & COMPANY 

1914 



Copyright, 1914, by 
McBkide, Nast & Co. 



Published,- June, 1914 



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INTRODUCTION 

IN this book are described many occurrences which 
the writer saw and the characters and acts of many 
persons whom he knew more or less intimately. The 
knowledge which came through direct observation was sup- 
plemented, while it was being acquired and afterwards, by 
very fortunate investigations undertaken in the beginning 
as a business necessity. During the time when the respon- 
sibility for Mexico was so securely fastened upon the 
United States that it could not be shaken off, the author 
of this volume was most favorably situated for the ac- 
quirement of information — and by that word is meant the 
core and not the rind. 

The distinction is vitally important, for in Mexico things 
are never what they seem. This general truth seems there 
to have a particular manifestation, for though Mexico is 
next neighbor to the United States, the government at 
Washington, if one may judge by its acts, has seen on the 
far side of the Rio Grande nothing but a series of illusions 
many of them artificially produced in a manner which I 
have here attempted to describe. 

It may , be asserted with confidence that the mere out- 
ward and visible story of Mexico, a record of what hap- 
pened on the surface from the last days of Diaz to the 
most recent incident of American interference, would 
puzzle rather than enlighten the usual reader, even though 
accurately told. A view of the events more interesting 
and influential which took place behind the scenes is requi- 



INTRODUCTION 

site for just judgment of the actors. This view I have tried 
to give by offering material which I have had the oppor- 
tunity to gather not from books, for none contain it, but 
from men. The vast outpourings of the daily press have 
contained much important truth which the person already 
well informed could recognize ; but it is fair to say that the 
paths by which the United States and Mexico reached the 
point where collision was inevitable have never been dis- 
closed. 

In the recent astonishing relations between the two coun- 
tries the part played by President Wilson has been so 
puzzling and so prominent that the antecedent characters 
and events have lost something of their proper value. Jus- 
tice to the President demands more than an analysis of 
his own acts and intents. He received the Mexican trouble, 
loaded with a high explosive charge, from the hands of his 
predecessor, and no right judgment of his course can be 
formed unless one knows the contents of the sealed parcel 
and how that contents came to be within. In order to re- 
veal this it is necessary to get close to the actual human 
interplay, beyond the obvious, behind the conjurer, where 
the eggs are actually broken for the omelet which later 
seems to come out of a borrowed hat. 

Keeping faith with facts will involve criticism, implied 
or open, of the men who guided the devious policy of the 
United States in this affair, a policy almost invariably 
honest, almost invariably mistaken, sometimes innocently, 
sometimes grimly amusing, as destiny or the hidden acts of 
men determined. The situation calls for an interpreter of 
facts, for a teller of the story. The difficulties which have 
beset President Wilson, the problems of the recent past and 
of the unfolding future, are unsolvable without a knowledge 
of it. 

The promptings to constructive statesmanship unheeded 



INTRODUCTION 

by President Taft, the evidences of official irritation, the 
errors due to complacent misconception of the Mexican 
people — these and other vital phases of a course that seems 
inexplicable, need to be opened to view so that broad and 
practical application of American ideals may take recog- 
nizable form in a fixed and comprehensive policy toward 
Mexico and Latin America which shall not be subject to 
political bias or official whim, but shall stand unchanged in 
vital principle from year to year and from term to term. 

With understanding, this may be possible ; without it, the 
recent past may be repeated with increasingly deplorable 
results, and our country may go on indefinitely from one 
blunder to the next, guided by impulse and the varying dic- 
tates of political expediency. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I Behind the scenes in the last days of Diaz — Septem- 
ber-November, 1910 I 

11 Jose Yves Limantour, the arbiter of Mexico's destiny 

— Paris, December, 1910-March 7, 1911 . . . .32 

III Decisive battle of the Madero revolution is fought at 

the Plaza Hotel, New York — March T-2'j, 191 1 . . 43 

IV The fatal sixty-six days — Mexico City, March 20-May 

26, 1911 66 

V How Gustavo Madero financed his brother's revolu- 
tion; a fantastic gamble 85 

VI The de la Barra interim ; five months of futile intrigue 

against Madero — May 26-November 6, 1911 . . 97 

VII President Taft's misinformation about Mexico, and 

how he got it 123 

Vni The American ambassador; his power in Mexico, and ^ 
how he used it — November, 191 1,- February, 1912 , 134 

IX President Taft's unexplained order for 100,000 troops; 
its distressing effect in Mexico, and what Madero 
thought of it — February 4-March 24, 1912 . . . 149 

X Madero's uphill game, and how he played it — March 

25-May I, 1912 178 

XI Huerta takes the chance Madero gave him; crushes 
the revolt of Orozco, the traitor; and becomes a 
military hero — May i-July 15, 1912 200 

XII The triple intrigue, military, Cientifico, and financial, 
directed against Madero from Paris — July-Decem- 
ber, 1912 215 

XIII How Gustavo Madero relieved the necessities of a 

colonel, and was rewarded with the secret of the 
military plot — February 4, 1913 234 

XIV Premature outbreak of the conspiracy — Gustavo Ma- 

dero, virtually unaided, invades the Palacio Nacional 
held by 400 mutineers, wins back half of them, im- 
prisons the other half and the traitorous comman- 
dant, and saves the seat of government in the small 
hours of Sunday, February 9, 191 3 . . . . . . 261 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

XV Expose of the tragic farce of the ten days' cannonade 
in Mexico City — Huerta seizes the presidency with 
the approval of the Cientificos and the American 
ambassador — February 9-18, 1913 281 

XVI Checking off the unwritten items of the conspirators' 
peace-pact: Gustavo Madero, Adolf o Basso, Pino 
Suarez and the deposed President are shot — Feb- 
ruary 19-22, 1913 304 

•rXVII Setting up the Huerta tyranny — Revolt of northern 
and northwestern Mexico — Efforts of Ambassador 
Wilson in support of Huerta — February 23-March 
4, 1913 318 

XVin Inactivity at Washington while Europe recognizes and 
finances Huerta, and Mexico drifts toward chaos — 
Rise of Venustiano Carranza, First Chief of the 
Constitutionalists — March 4- July 15, 1913 . . . 338 

XIX Steps by which President Wilson's policy developed 
from " pressure of moral force " to watchful wait- 
ing, and then to active support of the Constitution- 
alist leaders, Carranza and Villa — July 16, 1913- 
April I, 1914 355 

XX Evolution of Pancho Villa from a bandit to a general, 
and from an individual to a syndicate — The Tam- 
pico insult and the occupation of Vera Cruz — The 
A.B.C. mediation and its various veiled advantages 
— " The last stand of the Cientificos " 382 

XXI President Wilson's Mexican policy reviewed — Appar- 
ent reasons for its adoption — Errors of the Taft 
administration — A circle drawn in blood on the map 
of Mexico — Duty of the United States with respect 
to Mexico — The only way to maintain a stable 
policy towards Latin America 407 



THE ILLUSTRATIONS 

Fac-simile of a part of a repudiated bond . . Frontispiece' 

FACING PAGE 

Jose Yves Limantour 34' 

Francisco I. Madero, Sr 88 

Francisco I. Madero, Jr 88 

Francisco Leon de la Barra 100 

General Victoriana Huerta 204 

Gustavo Madero 262 

Letterhead (Fac-simile) 262 

Heading of stock-subscription form 262' 

Lord Cowdray 346' 

Rafael Hernandez 390 "^ 



THE POLITICAL SHAME 
OF MEXICO 



CHAPTER I 

IN order to justify the text that in Mexico things are 
never what they seem, let us cite an instance very con- 
spicuous. This will necessitate glancing back a little 
way, four years or thereabouts, along the panorama of that 
country's recent history. So glancing, the observer's 
eye is naturally attracted to a brilliant spot, in a physical 
sense surely the best lighted scene of Mexico's drama. The 
reference is to the great Diaz celebration with its myriad 
lamps. There we shall come upon a clue which will lead 
us to the end of the story, out of the brilliance into the 
shadow, and through paths exceedingly obscure, hopelessly 
difficult for those that have no guide. 

The centenary of Mexico's independence was celebrated 
in September, that dazzling September of 1910. For the 
entire month the " asphalt section " of Mexico's capital 
was cleared of its twelve hundred beggars and dressed in its 
party clothes. Receptions, banquets, parades — all the spec- 
tacular extravagances of a nation's festival — filled the days 
and nights with obvious rejoicing. The most beautiful 
women from interior and coast cities and from the haci- 
endas of the " hot country " were gathered in Mexico 
City and distributed like flowers to grace a thousand enter- 
tainments. 



2 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Special envoys from all the great nations and most of 
the little ones of Europe, Asia, Africa and every variety 
of America — torrid, temperate and frozen — were present 
to participate in the events that marked the realization in 
Mexico of the fabled golden age, the season of prosperity 
and peace. Such honors as come only to the exalted were 
heaped upon Porfirio Diaz. He was "The Moses and 
Joshua of his people " by the phrase of Andrew Carnegie, 
" The prodigy of nature " according to Tolstoy, a personage 
" to be held up to the hero worship of mankind," as Elihu 
Root expressed it. 

The thirty September days of bunting and glitter and 
military show, the thirty blazing nights of electrical efful- 
gence toned to tenderness in the seclusion of patio and 
boudoir — the never-to-be-forgotten Centennial nights — 
floated away at last upon the river of time whose somber 
bosom they had brightened for a space. The President's 
ball, that Belshazzar feast of the Diaz regime, at which 
Mexico's monarch aided by seven thousand of his richly at- 
tired people received the gold-laced diplomats of the world 
— that revel where twenty carloads of champagne were 
poured out by five hundred picturesquely costumed serv- 
itors in rivers and lakes of wine flooding the Palacio Na- 
cional and overflowing into the Plaza de la Constltucion — 
that gorgeous celebration went flaring into the past. And 
in the light of ordinary day the government of Porfirio 
Diaz loomed as large as it had seemed amid the torches, 
and the voice of his authority was as loud as the innumer- 
able instruments of music which had just performed an 
anthem to his glory. 

All these things surely happened, and there was no un- 
usual lack of sincerity among the participants; but what 
is the truth that lay behind? The way to discover it is 
to forget for the moment all the personages present at 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 3 

this remarkable celebration, and concentrate our attention 
upon one who was not there, the most powerful man con- 
nected with the Mexican government at that time, the man 
upon whom, far more than upon the aged dictator, the 
safety of the State had for some years depended. His ab- 
sence, rightly understood, may rank among the most notable 
features of the occasion and provide us with an essential 
clue to the long train of subsequent disasters. The man 
was Jose Yves Limantour. 

The name is well known to financiers in Europe and 
America, but for the information of the general reader 
a few words of introduction will be necessary. Jose Yves 
Limantour is of French parentage, the son of that Jose 
Yves Limantour who in the eighteen-forties attempted to 
establish claims to important parcels of land on the coast 
of California, including four square leagues now covered 
by the city of San Francisco. The claims were based on 
grants dated in 1843, ^^^ bearing the name of Manuel 
Micheltorena, governor of California while it was a Mexi- 
can province, prior to the cession of 1848. 

More than six hundred thousand acres were in contro- 
versy, and the parcels had been judiciously marked out 
along the shores of bays that would be harbors populous 
with shipping. The grants purported to have been be- 
stowed in consideration of certain moneys, supplies and 
services furnished and rendered by Limantour. They were, 
however, disallowed in their entirety by a decision of the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California in 1858 after much complaint of inconvenience 
suffered and expense incurred by persons desiring to trans- 
fer property situated within the area. If the grants had 
been sustained, the present Jose Yves Limantour might be 
now the richest man in the world. Judge Ogden Hoffman, 
who rendered the decision in a paper exceeding 25,000 



4 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

words, estimated the value of the San Francisco property 
alone at $15,000,000, and that was fifty-six years ago. 
The document printed on paper now yellowed by time, is 
to be found by the curious in the public library of the city 
of New York. 

To the authentic and recorded story of the Limantour 
claim, sufficiently romantic in the coldest recital, tradition 
has appended a tragic sequel. Appeal, so runs the tale, was 
to be taken from the judgment of the court, and two im- 
portant witnesses were brought from Mexico to aid the new 
contention. These witnesses are said to have been waylaid 
in San Francisco, with consequences mortal to the men and 
to the cause which they would have supported with their 
voices. Thus it died, and the courts knew it no more. 

Jose Yves Limantour, the son, did not inherit the me- 
trc^olis and other choice bits of California. He did in- 
herit, or at any rate he has disclosed, a marked ability in 
finance. His gifts, if one may judge by his management of 
personal affairs, did not include his father's very distin- 
guished temerity, but refined and modernized they became 
one of Mexico's strongest assets. 

His heritage of talent was not his only portion, for al- 
though the elder Limantour suffered defeat in San Fran- 
cisco, he was more successful at Mexico City. When 
Benito Juarez closed the nunneries and monasteries of 
Mexico, and sold the church property at auction and ap- 
praisal, Seiior Limantour was very favorably placed for 
profit, and he laid the foundations of a comfortable fortune. 

Jose Yves, the son, was born on March 19, 1855, and 
therefore took no part in these ventures which later fur- 
nished him with capital which he has jealously guarded. 
Close scrutiny of his administration of the property which 
thus came to him fails to reveal the slightest tendency to 
financial hazard on his own account. It may also be defi- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 5 

nitely stated that those who did business with him in his 
official capacity found him a hard bargainer. His early 
career as a lawyer need not be detailed. The law did not 
attract him, and he was speedily drawn away from it by 
the superior fascination of financial study. 

The financial problems of Mexico, as that country strug- 
gled into cohesion and order, afforded a broad and fertile 
field for Limantour's talents, and the attention of Porfirio 
Diaz was drawn to him. He was made Sub-Secretary of 
Finance in 1893, and succeeded to the portfolio in 1894, and 
it was as Minister of Finance that he carried out the plan 
which placed Mexico on a fifty per cent, gold basis — a plan 
which bears his name. Values had for a long time been 
shifting up and down with the unceasing fluctuations of the 
silver market. The Limantour plan introduced a kind of 
stability by which the nation profited. Individuals also were 
benefited, none more conspicuously than the business man- 
agers of the circle which had developed from the Society 
of the Friends of Porfirio Diaz, and which came to be 
known as the Cientificos. 

The significance of the name, Cientifico, is difficult to 
convey ; it was not in every instance a brand of odium. The 
Cientificos who were members of the Diaz cabinet accepted 
the title as a distinction. They were proud of their posi- 
tions and jealous of their personal honor. They were over- 
rated men with two exceptions, Limantour and Ramon 
Corral. Limantour possessed even a greater brain than 
popular estimates credited him with ; Corral was quite cor- 
rectly placed as unfit for preferment. 

Outside of the cabinet the term Cientifico stood for scien- 
tific business. The science lay in methods similar to those 
which have been followed by political rings in the United 
States and elsewhere, and the ring had existed several years 
before it was christened. Its chief source of profit was 



6 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

government patronage. By means of this it became well 
entrenched throughout the length and breadth of the land, 
and grew to dominate the government of Porfirio Diaz 
more fully than the head of that government was aware 
of. Thus the Cientificos from 1903 onward became 
increasingly powerful, and popular judgment drew no fine 
distinction between those who were Cientificos for personal 
profit and those whom higher motives actuated. 

The leading spirits of the Cientifico ring met fortnightly 
to plan current and prospective business and to maintain 
the equilibrium of their affairs by means of the suppression, 
the dissemination, the coloring of news, the division of 
profits, and the distribution of rewards and punishments to 
friends and enemies. The men who so met included Reyes 
Spindola, then owner and editor of El Imparcial, the lead- 
ing daily newspaper of Mexico, and Francisco Bulnes, the 
cleverest parliamentarian of Mexico and most effective 
writer, whose function it was to direct the so-called " inde- 
pendent " element in the Mexican Congress, a spurious 
opposition party which was in reality as subservient to Diaz 
as any other factor in the government. One of these men 
operated the Diaz press agency, and the other did the " floor 
work " in Congress for the ring. 

There were fourteen other men in this inner circle, in- 
cluding officials of the Banco Nacional, the Banco Central, 
and the Banco de Londres y Mexico; the Governor of the 
Federal District and a few men of influential families with 
powerful business connections. The Paper Trust, or the 
San Rafael Paper Company, which held a monopoly of 
news-print paper by means of protective tariff amounting 
to about two American cents per pound, was one of the 
great interests represented. Another was the Cigarette 
Trust, " El Buen Tono," which made practically all the 
cigarettes of Mexico, and was managed by a shrewd French- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 7 

man. The Pulque Trust which included many of the great 
pulque growers, and dominated the distribution of Mexico's 
national beverage, had its delegate among the Friends of 
Diaz, the Cientificos. 

The active manipulators of the Bancaria were members. 
This institution carried departments for banking and con- 
tracting, and was the clearing house through which big 
business was carried on, and the profits thereof divided. 
The Bancaria took the contracts for internal construction 
work throughout Mexico, for buildings, sewers, paving, 
waterworks, etc. It subcontracted to favored men, who 
frequently again subcontracted to local companies or indi- 
viduals. The last price received by the contractor who did 
the work was generally a very small fraction of the original 
figure secured by the Bancaria — as low as four forty- 
ninths in one instance. 

No city or town in any state of Mexico could lay a gas 
pipe, or pave a street, or remodel or erect a public building 
without the consent of the governor of the state. If the 
project was approved such press matter as was deemed de- 
sirable for preparing the public mind was printed in El Im- 
parcial, and the contract for the work was arranged between 
the governor and the Bancaria. The major part of the 
" graft " was provided for in this transaction ; the minor 
state and district officials arranged for their shares with the 
subcontractor. 

Close observation of the business morals of the Diaz 
regime disclosed strange contradictions. Most of the oper- 
ations carried on by the governors of the various states 
reeked with graft, and it is certain that deals were made 
by some of the departments of the central government it- 
self which brought larcenous profits to the parties thereto 
at the expense of the treasury. On the other hand that 
government, as revealed to foreign gentlemen in heavy 



8 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

transactions covering many years, was characterized by re- 
markable integrity. " The most scrupulously honest of 
modern governments," is the certificate of character be- 
stowed upon it in personal statements to me by men whose 
opinions are among the first that would be sought by any 
competent inquirer. It is a hard saying, to be interpreted 
only through some difference of definition, or perhaps 
through the more intimate acquaintance which these seem- 
ing eulogists of Diaz have with the other governments to 
which they referred. 

It should be noted, also, that these distinguished wit- 
nesses dealt usually with Porfirio Diaz direct, or with his 
ministers who feared his wrath ; not with the Cientificos of 
business whose operations were openly for revenue with 
little regard for scruples. The dictator was not a grafter 
in the ordinary sense, nor was he tolerant of this iniquity ; 
yet there was vast and various grafting in Mexico, ac- 
cruing to the temporary benefit of Diaz politically if not 
pecuniarily, for these operations steadily widening in scope 
were used to weld a nation-wide interest in support of the 
political system which the Society of the Friends of Diaz 
was thus enabled to maintain. 

The Cientifico business circle had a highly developed sys- 
tem to prevent intrusion upon its field. This central 
organization came to be known as the " Full Car," but the 
term Cientifico was broadly used to designate any person 
actually or supposedly connected with these operations, even 
in a state remote from the capital. The great combination 
was spread over the whole country ; its members were held 
together by what has been called in America the cohesive 
power of public plunder. They were shouters for Diaz, a 
great army of the bandits of business, a strong defense 
for the throne so long as he who sat thereon could manage 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 9 

them or could avail himself of the services of a grand 
vizier equal to that task. No one else was ever so success- 
ful in this role as Limantour. 

It would be absurd to say that the ring had no corrupt 
point of contact with the central government; but I should 
be sorry for any one who would assert and try to prove that 
the point of contact lay in the Department of Finance under 
the eye of Limantour. This gentleman was not in the cabi- 
net for profit, but for reputation, for enduring fame. He 
was rich already ; he was not to be bought. What he had 
set his heart upon was to make his genius shine upon the 
pages of his country's history, so that the record would 
inevitably survive his mortal body. The more immediate 
reward he hoped for is to some extent a secret of his own 
bosom, and may be permitted to remain there without seri- 
ous detriment to the exposition which I am here attempt- 
ing; but the miore important of those labors by which he 
expected to achieve a permanent distinction are essential 
features of any clear statement of the Mexican problem as 
presented for solution to the United States. 

The greatest of these labors, and the one that is likely to 
have the gravest consequences, is the merger of Mexico's 
railways, a piece of high finance not unworthy of compari- 
son with even the welding together of the United States 
Steel Corporation. There were staggering difficulties in 
the way of this consolidation which placed under the con- 
trol of the ]\Iexican government nearly 8,000 miles of rail- 
way, and .brought the diversified interests controlling the 
various companies under one management. No man in 
Mexico but Limantour could have accomplished it. The 
total authorization of new securities provided for in the 
resulting corporation was $1,270,000,000 (Mexican). And 
this colossal affair was placed upon a practical operating 



lo THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

basis by the sale of only thirty-three millions of bonds to 
pay floating debts and provide for organization expenses 
and working capital. 

This merger influenced the course of Mexico's fortunes 
in various ways, and the end is not yet, as I shall show in 
a subsequent page. The matter is important here because 
in the inwards of it will be found the chief reason for Sefior 
Limantour's absence from the Diaz Centennial, and from 
his country for some months before and after that extraor- 
dinary festival. During that absence the mischief -which 
the United States and Mexico are now paying for was 
hatched, and it is necessary to follow up the clues which 
promise an explanation of what took place. 

The idea of the merger was not Limantour's; it origi- 
nated in the brain of Edward H. Harriman — unless some 
mute, inglorious clerk conceived it while his skull happened 
to be in the range of his great master's vision. Let Harri- 
man stand as the real author. He perceived in the dis- 
jointed railways of Mexico an opportunity to extend his 
own dominion, and secure a very valuable permanent ad- 
vantage for the Southern Pacific which runs alongside the 
Mexican frontier from the Gulf to the Western ocean. He 
studied the subject with characteristic thoroughness, and 
was deeply impressed. Then he opened communication 
with Mexico City, making his approach not to Porfirio Diaz 
but to Finance Minister Limantour. This was in 1902. 

Harriman wasted no time with the mails or in sending a 
representative to prepare the way. He cabled to Limantour 
asking for a secret interview upon important matters whose 
nature he did not state. The Minister of Finance replied 
agreeably, and a few days thereafter Harriman arrived at 
Mexico City incognito, proceeding at once to Limantour's 
house on Avenida Juarez, where the two men held a long 
conference. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO ii 

Harriman set forth the situation with intelHgence and 
power. He made it clear that railway traffic arrangements 
in the Mexican republic were ill contrived and inefficient. 
Between certain points there were lines engaged in wasteful 
competition, while many promising regions were wholly 
destitute of railway facilities. He instanced the Mexican 
Central, controlled by Henry Clay Pierce, which operated 
over the 1,200 miles from Mexico City to El Paso, and was 
waterlogged with debt. This line, said Harriman, if ad- 
ministered properly in a community of interest with others 
which then competed over a large part of the mileage would 
become a dividend-payer. He could secure control of the 
Central at any moment, but it would be useless to do so 
while the Mexican government held the National Line to 
Laredo and could make or break the Central at the whim 
of those who might come into power. 

Under existing conditions, Harriman argued, none of 
the railways could be operated with efficiency or made to 
yield the profit which modern methods could extract. Until 
these methods should be applied the development of Mex- 
ico's resources must be greatly retarded. Mexico with its 
millions of acres of untilled land was importing wheat and 
cotton ; its manufacturers of woolen and cotton fabrics 
were hampered by excessive costs of raw material. Flour 
was an untasted luxury for nine-tenths of the population. 
Native sugar was supplied in great cones unrefined. Many 
rich mines were remote from transportation. Stock rais- 
ing, except in the northern states, was haphazard and unre- 
munerative; and within fifty miles of Mexico City native 
farmers were plowing with a crooked stick. 

The remedy lay with the railways, and the only practical 
solution of the problem which their inefficiency presented 
was a general consolidation. This he was prepared to un- 
dertake at once ; he would guarantee its success, and would 



12 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

carry through all necessary financial negotiations, in return 
for stock control of the merger. 

Jose Yves Limantour is not an impulsive man. He ab- 
sorbed all the wisdom that fell from Harriman's lips, under- 
stood fully that the proposals did not transcend the Ameri- 
can railway wizard's power, and perceived the material 
benefits which Mexico would derive from accepting them; 
but he was not led by enthusiasm into the giving of any 
hasty assurances. He asked for ten days' time, and Har- 
riman was forced to consent, reluctantly, and to leave 
Limantour unpledged. 

Harriman went from Mexico City to California where 
an attack of acute appendicitis necessitated an immediate 
resort to surgery. When he had rallied sufficiently to at- 
tend to business, he received Limantour's regretful declina- 
tion, expressed so definitely as to close the incident. Not 
long afterwards Harriman learned to his astonishment that 
from the day of their conference Limantour had applied 
himself to the great railway problem, utilizing the plans 
which the American had so exhaustively outlined. There 
seems to have been nothing questionable in this appropri- 
ation. Harriman was past his majority and his wisdom 
teeth were cut. He had sought the interview, had exacted 
no promises, and the bulk of what he had said consisted 
of facts open to any man's observation. 

It was natural that Limantour should desire to do this 
important work sO' attractive to an ambitious financier. 
Patriotism doubtless urged him to put the achievement on 
the scroll of history to the credit of a Mexican. But rea- 
soned distrust of American control of the railways could 
hardly have been the determining factor with him, despite 
his well known opposition to monopolistic tendencies of 
^Americans. In this affair the real hazard would have been 
Harriman's, the Mexican government being in a position 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 13 

fully to protect its interests through the concession which 
Harriman must secure. It suffices here that the Finance 
Minister himself assumed the task, and that his labors re- 
sulted six years afterwards in the Limantour merger, the 
National Railways of Mexico. 

Six years would have seemed a long time to Harriman 
for the completion of this bit of business, but aside from 
any difference of ability and experience, there were obstacles 
which multiplied as Limantour advanced, and of course he 
lacked the pecuniary resources which the American would 
have had at command. Sharp criticism was inevitable; 
scandal was to be expected, for when have they failed to 
follow a consolidation of such magnitude? It was every- 
body's business, for the government was involved as the 
ultimate holder of voting control which necessitated a large 
capitalization, and as guarantor of the issue of second or 
general mortgage bonds of which three hundred and twenty 
millions (Mexican) were authorized. Critics thought the 
sum excessive, and they attacked the plan of the merger at 
various points as being burdensome and perilous. Scandal 
mongers found material in the array of counsel which Li- 
mantour employed, and in the distribution of fees — a mat- 
ter out of which more trouble was manufactured than might 
have seemed possible. 

Three prominent law firms of New York, Strong & Cad- 
walader, Cravath, Henderson & De Gersdorff, and Under- 
wood, Van Vorst & Hoyt, received $125,000 apiece for 
services which were said to have been the reverse of ardu- 
ous. George W. Wickersham received $20,000 for getting 
the New York end of the work done by a man under his 
supervision. Two lawyers of Mexico City, among the 
leaders of that bar, and of nearly equal rank, were en- 
gaged upon the intricate practical details of the immense 
consolidation. The fee paid to one of them, Pablo Macedo, 



14 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

was $150,000. The other, Pablo Martinez del Rio, died in 
1909 while the work was still unfinished though the merger 
itself had been effected. To his estate was paid only 
$25,000 in requital of his services which were said to have 
been quite as valuable as Macedo's. 

This discrimination wears even now a somewhat mys- 
terious aspect, but there could be no mysteries for the 
critics of Limantour and his merger. These persons must 
know all, or cover the deficit with ingenious fiction, and 
consequently they drew upon their very competent imagina- 
tions and brought forth a tale. There had been a private 
arrangement, so they said, among Limantour, Martinez del 
Rio and certain other men whereby a block of some thirty 
millions (Mexican) of National Railway bonds was to be 
sequestered and divided, but this proceeding had not been 
completed during Martinez del Rio's life. His widow, ac- 
cording to this legend, was aware of the agreement whose 
terms were in a written instrument, but she encountered 
dijfficulties in persuading Limantour to deliver her late hus- 
band's share of the bonds or even to set right the inequi- 
table fee. Vain efforts to obtain a satisfactory adjustment 
brought her to the end of her patience, and she laid her 
wrongs before Porfirio Diaz, who was incensed by the in- 
justice of Limantour in the matter of the fee, and shocked 
by the disclosure as to the bonds. Immediately he called 
the Minister into his presence, and a violent scene ensued 
wherein their friendship of so many years' endurance was 
disrupted. 

If the story had stopped there, and nothing out of the 
ordinary had been visible in the course of affairs at Mexi- 
co's capital, the effect would have been inappreciable; for 
in the sixteen years that Limantour had served Diaz and the 
State as Minister of Finance, opportunities for his personal 
profit had been innumerable, yet his record was clean. But 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 15 

the scandal was set going at a time when enmities were 
ripening on every hand, and bitter feeling was the order of 
the day. It was relished by many, and magnified in the 
retelling. The dictator was said to have thrown his cane 
at Limantour as he drove him from his presence with threats 
which put the minister in fear of death, so that he hid four 
days at Tlanepantla, a suburb of the capital, and finally 
fled disguised as a priest across the frontier into the United 
States. That he still retained his cabinet office could not 
be denied, even by the least responsible of his detractors, 
but it was asserted that the quarrel with Diaz was a final 
breach, and that some months later Limantour joined with 
the enemies of the tottering dictator to ensure his over- 
throw. 

In the course of a thorough investigation I have found 
no proof of any part of this story which assails Li- 
mantour's integrity or charges him with disloyalty to Porfi- 
rio Diaz. Much of it is pure myth, defying obvious truth 
with an audacity to which the climate of the Mexican capi- 
tal seems peculiarly favorable. For example, Limantour's 
departure from Mexico City, July 11, 1910, was anything 
but secret. He and his wife who made the journey with 
him set out from the Colonia Station to which they were 
accompanied by President Diaz, Donna Carmen Diaz, and 
many prominent Mexicans. Hundreds of citizens were In 
and around the station ; vivas were shouted in Limantour's 
honor, and the popular favor was amply shown. 

At the risk of seeming to digress and to confuse the 
narrative with dates beyond its present stage, I must here 
permit certain documents to throw their light upon the in- 
jurious rumors which I have thought it unwise to ignore. 
The fiction as to Martinez del Rio and the railway bonds 
must not be suffered to obscure the relations between Li- 
mantour and Diaz, for too much depends upon an accurate 



i6 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

comprehension of them. Indeed the dates themselves may 
indicate that this scandal was a hardy weed difficult to root 
out of the public mind. 

On March i8, 191 2, the attorneys for Senora Martinez 
del Rio made a statement in the columns of El Imparcial 
of Mexico City, which translated runs thus : 

Mexico, May 18, 1912. 
Sr. Lie. D. Fausto Moguel, 

Director of El Imparcial. 
My dear friend and colleague: — 

In No. 31 of the Diario del Ho gar, of April 26 last, 
there appeared an article referring to the consolidation 
of the National Railways of Mexico. It is alleged 
that the widow of Sr. Lie. Don Pablo Martinez del 
Rio was on the point of not being able to receive the 
commission of 3,000,000 pesos, which, it is stated in 
the article referred to, was due to Sr. Martinez del 
Rio on account of the fusion of the railroad lines. 

As the assertions of the said article are false and 
inexact, we, as legal agents of Seiiora Vinent Mar- 
tinez del Rio, believe it our duty to contradict them, 
because neither Sr. Martinez del Rio, nor his heirs, 
received any commission whatever, and therefore there 
could have been no difficulty in regard to the pay- 
ment of a commission. 

The distinguished lawyer gave his professional 
services to the reorganization of the railways, and the 
fee agreed upon, which of course was nothing like 3,- 
000,000 pesos as it is said, was paid to his estate with- 
out any difficulty whatever and without it being neces- 
sary to have recourse to the schemes referred to in 
the Diario del Hogar nor any others of that kind. 

With a view to having the facts established, and in 
justice to truth, we request you to give publicity to 
this letter in your popular newspaper. 

,We thank you in advance and remain, your friends, 

Luis Riba, 
Salvador M. Cancino. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 17 

This statement was confirmed on March 24, 1914, by 
the Senora herself, in a cablegram of which the following 
is a translation : 

Mexico City, March 24, 1914. 
Jose Yves Limantour, 

8 rue Presbourg, Paris, 
Confirm in every detail letter eighteen May one 
thousand nineteen hundred twelve subscribed by my 
legal agents Luis Riba and Salvador Cancino addressed 
to the directors of the newspapers Nueva Era and El 
Imparcial of the city of Mexico relative to the inter- 
est of my husband in the organization of the National 
Railways of Mexico. 

B. ViNENT DE Martinez del Rio. 

It should be added that cordial relations exist between 
Limantour and these persons whom it is alleged he 
wronged. On the occasion of his fifty-ninth birthday, 
jMarch 19, 1914, among the callers at his house in Paris, 
8 Rue de Presbourg, were ex-President and Madam Diaz. 
Pablo Martinez del Rio, son of the deceased lawyer, is the 
chum at Oxford, England, of Guillermo Limantour, son 
of the former Minister of Finance. 

As for the bond sequestration story itself, careful read- 
ing of the disposition made of the issues of the merger 
discloses no open seam through which any of the bonds 
could well have slipped. Moreover there is no evidence 
that Limantour's fortune was augmented at this time. His 
great wealth, so far as I can discover, is a myth ; if it exists, 
where is it, and in what form? I have heard the sum 
variously estimated at ten, twenty, forty millions in gold, 
but my own investigations have disclosed no holdings and 
no interests of consequence, except the real estate in Mexico 
City. His own property there, combined with that of his 
wife, seems to fall short of five million pesos in value. To 



i8 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

be exact the schedule prepared in his business office in the 
Mexican capital on January i, 1913, showed a total of 
$4,791,885.18 (Mexican). 

It would appear, therefore, that the story of a violent 
quarrel with Diaz over the Martinez del Rio aflfair must be 
disregarded, and that another explanation must be found 
for Limantour's absence from Mexico City for more than 
eight months — July 11, 1910, to March 20, 191 1 — in 
which period the revolution of Francisco Madero became a 
serious peril to the State, and the attitude of the government 
at Washington toward that of Diaz underwent so great and 
significant a change. 

Never before during his tenure of office had Limantour 
absented himself for so long a time, and never had his 
government so needed his guiding hand. He was in close 
touch with Mexican affairs during the entire period. 
Seventy-one neatly labelled letter files standing side by side 
on the topmost row of shelves in his library — with its red 
leather fittings, its beautiful Gobelin tapestries, and pleasant 
windows overlooking the Avenue Victor Hugo in Paris — 
are filled with Mexican correspondence, by cable and mail, 
for those months. It is surely remarkable that thus in- 
formed he should have remained abroad, even upon an 
errand important to his country's credit, while influences 
were at work on the other side of the ocean to undermine 
the government on whose stability that credit in a great 
measure depended. 

The truth seems to be that the departure and protracted 
absence of the ablest financier and statesman that Mexico 
ever possessed were due to a sense of injury. There is a 
kind of self esteem which partakes of the nature of vanity 
without descending to the trivial; and Limantour is full 
of it. He was influenced thereby to choose the task abroad 
which would round out his own career, and to abandon 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 19 

other tasks at home which involved humiliations and the 
unbearable annoyance of small, daily defeats at the hands 
of inferiors. Such contention often induces in men of 
large capacity and fine fiber a nauseating discouragement 
which causes them to fail by default, while success lies 
easily within the scope of their powers. There had been 
no mortal quarrel between Limantour and Diaz, though I 
scent a graver disagreement than I am able to substantiate 
by proof; but what certainly had taken place was quite as 
influential with the Finance Minister as the fabled threats 
of vengeance and hurling of canes would have been. 

Limantours hold upon the dictator as his one really capa- 
ble adviser had been weakening for many months, and early 
in the year 19 10 the truth became too plain to be ignored. 
It was then that he laid his plans for an extended absence. 
The railwa}^ merger was completed; he would undertake a 
new labor in the refunding of the national debt to a four 
per cent, basis, putting the credit of his countr}'- on a par 
with that of leading nations, and by the same stroke estab- 
lishing his own fame — for the bankers with whom he 
must deal would represent the world's financial judgment, 
and their acceptance of the refunding plan would be in 
effect an endorsement of Limantour's life work, his record 
of sixteen years as Minister of Finance. It was along the 
lines of his policy that Mexico had advanced to so strong 
a position in the money market of the world. His three 
conspicuous achievements, the method by which the parity 
of the peso was maintained, the system for the issue and 
control of the circulating medium, and the merger of the 
railways would all be covered by this certificate of approval. 
Here was undoubtedly a tempting prospect, with small risk 
of misadventure. 

His position as chief counselor to Diaz had become so 
difficult that some of his most loyal friends had advised him 



20 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

to resign from the cabinet and give the dictator a chance to 
find out who was the strong man in Mexico. By others he 
had been urged to offer himself as a candidate in the elec- 
tions of 1910 in opposition to the perennial president. 
There is no evidence that he considered seriously either of 
these courses, surely not the latter. More definitely than 
his friends were aware of he had made up his mind to 
leave Mexico for a while. Doubtless the weaker part of 
him ached for rest ; he had toiled more than seven years on 
the merger and its numerous sequels, with plenty of work 
besides, all the time ; but his own unwavering assertion that 
the need of relaxation and change was the determining 
factor of his choice to go away must be taken with many 
grains of salt. 

As has already been said he desired to escape from little 
enemies who had gained the ear of the aged chief of the 
state. Among the opposing advisers were certain relatives 
of Madam Diaz, persons newly arisen to appreciable in- 
fluence, and with them desiccated veterans who had long 
been impotently jealous of the Finance Minister's power 
at court. The merger had been a great help to all of them, 
because it touched upon a weakness in the dictator, to 
whom all matters pertaining to finance on a large scale were 
an impenetrable mystery. He had never in all his long life 
been able to set down ten million pesos in figures that could 
be depended upon for accuracy and legibility; they would 
fail in one or the other particular, often in both, if a de- 
cision on such a point might be hazarded ; and for this rea- 
son the discussion of the merger with him had been attended 
by difficulties. These interminable problems with their 
prodigious sums rising beyond a billion were sources of 
infinite irritation to Porfirio Diaz; and if ever he really 
threw his cane at Limantour it was probably upon some 
question of arithmetic. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 21 

When he gave his consent to placing the government's 
guarantee on three hundred and twenty milHon pesos of 
National Railway bonds, he made a leap into the unknown 
which startled him, and his misgivings with regard to this 
act were used by Limantour's malicious critics to lower the 
Finance Minister in the dictator's esteem. The result of 
this was made manifest in certain acts of Diaz affecting 
state governments, executed without consulting Limantour, 
a slight which the latter felt very keenly. 

For these reasons, Limantour, in the beginning of the 
summer of 1910, was not well disposed toward participating 
in the Centennial celebrations of September, and no doubt 
he hurried his departure because of these coming events. 
In the official etiquette of Mexico the Finance Minister 
ranks seventh in the order of precedence. There were 
many banquets and receptions on the centennial program 
at which special ambassadors and dignitaries from all over 
the world would be present, and it is said that Limantour 
was not pleased at the prospect of being constantly on exhi- 
bition seven covers distant from the chief. Moreover, 
there were features of the celebration as planned which did 
not meet with Limantour's approval, wholly apart from his 
disinclination to figure in them in a minor role. 

There is reason to believe that Porfirio Diaz saw his 
Finance Minister depart on his refunding errand with sen- 
timents akin to those which a man who looms large in busi- 
ness affairs experiences at parting with a mother-in-law 
who has made his house her home. For a time at least the 
relief from restraint would be gratifying. Diaz could do 
as he pleased without speculating on the thought behind the 
penetrating eyes of Jose Yves Limantour. 

It is beyond doubt that Diaz failed to understand 
his position. He was in his eightieth year and the thir- 
tieth of his reign. His powers had greatly declined, far 



22 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

more than he himself was aware, for he was no less de- 
ceived than the outside world by the incessant chorus 
of flattery which had so long sounded in his ears. The 
spectacle of a ruler surrounded by sycophants is one of the 
most familiar in history, but the courtiers of Diaz possessed 
the immense advantage of modern business methods; they 
were in effect a corporation, a trust, admirably compact 
as to the central body, and for a long time fortunate in 
the weakness and incoherence of the opposition. To exalt 
Porfirio Diaz was a business policy, which had been carried 
out with such ability and persistence that it deceived all 
nations including the one which was being exploited, and 
the man who sat upon its throne. 

The truth is that Mexico began to outgrow Diaz in the 
nineties. Let it be admitted that as a ruler of a monarchy 
masquerading as a republic he showed distinguished ability ; 
that his system of Diaz-appointed state governors, and 
governor- appointed jefes politicos resulted in the preserva- 
tion of order, so that men's lives and property were safe 
from open violence, and there dawned in due season a new 
era of commercial progress. By that same token it was not 
the era of Diaz, for he was no business man. Stories of 
his wealth are common; only the other day a learned pro- 
fessor at Harvard endorsed them in a newspaper article. 
But Diaz is not rich and never has been; he did not put 
away vast sums in Europe, nor carry two millions in gold 
out of Mexico when he departed. His ambition was for 
power, not for money; and as for his capacity to under- 
stand large pecuniary transactions, it may be inferred from 
what I have said, in all seriousness, about his childish blun- 
dering with figures. 

The organization of the Cientifico, though it was never 
so advanced as its members supposed it to be, was yet so 
much more modern than Diaz, that he was wholly incapable 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 23 

of understanding its performances. Looking back upon him 
now one sees him like a rough old fort, conspicuous and 
picturesque but out of date, surrounded by the pits of dis- 
appearing guns and other mechanism of scientific warfare. 
It was essential, however, to defend the old fort, for its 
fall would involve the gravest consequences. Therefore, 
the Friends of Their Own Pockets enrolled themselves with 
the Friends of Porfirio Diaz and helped to develop his sys- 
tem of government. It is undeniable that the political appa- 
ratus of the Diaz rule was brought to a remarkable effi- 
ciency, and that for some years there was maintained over 
every square inch of Mexico's 765,535 square miles, an 
accurately adjusted machine which worked for the preser- 
vation of the existing order of things. 

That is precisely what was wrong with it, the same fault 
that has invariably been found in similar organizations using 
the mechanism of government for personal profit. The 
truth that capital favorably situated can always increase 
abundantly, if conditions can be held unchanged, seems to 
be too plain ; it deceives men of strong minds and apparently 
excellent foresight. There never has been and there never 
will be a condition on earth or elsewhere that can be kept 
at a standstill, for science knows no section of the universal 
code which tolerates a state of rest. The lack of a con- 
structive policy to cope with inevitable change has been the 
weakness of big business in its relations with the govern- 
ment of the United States. This folly might very well have 
wrecked the country, but that the ship was too strong for 
the rocks and drove clean over them. As to this matter 
Limantour once said of the United States : " Its bad gov- 
ernment is the surest evidence of its greatness." Unwise 
conservatism of able men throws constructive work into the 
hands of inferiors. The need of renovation is perpetual, 
and the only question is, who shall undertake it. 



24 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

That need was very urgent in Mexico during the last 
years of Diaz; it became imperative early in 1910. The 
doctrines of Francisco Madero, Jr., were beginning to 
spread, and they included some solid truths which the 
masses were too ignorant to comprehend; but if the people 
learned nothing else, they learned discontent and ways of 
expressing it in crude argument. 

Business relations were daily more complex, and the 
problems introduced by the increasing entry of foreign capi- 
tal were further beyond the comprehension of Diaz with 
every set of sun. It was obvious that the government must 
advance, and equally obvious that the propulsive force was 
not in Diaz. The proposal that he should reelect himself 
for an eighth term was reactionary, and should have been 
resisted ; but if the dictator and the ring which hoodwinked 
and used him were too strong to be defeated on this issue, 
a compromise at least was possible. This should have in- 
cluded the elimination of Corral as Vice President and 
Minister of Gobernacion, and the formation of a progres- 
sive cabinet. 

Nothing whatever was done. The Cientificos continued 
noisily to clamp all their machinery to Diaz, thus inviting 
complete disaster when he should fall. The bankers, the 
business men, the lawyers, the big grafters and the little 
politicians joined in a kind of conspiracy — in which the 
few were active and the many passive — to make right 
progress impossible; and the climax was reached in Sep- 
tember with the apotheosis of Diaz at which the world ap- 
plauded. A few months later the ancient fabric fell with 
every evidence of its inherent weakness, and those who 
would not be builders of new walls while there was time, 
saw the work of reconstructing the Mexican government 
devolve upon Francisco Madero, Jr., the last man they 
would have chosen. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 25 

He would not have been my last choice because he was 
honest, nor would he have been my first because he lacked 
certain qualifications. His character and capacity, and his 
unmerited misfortunes are to be considered in their place. 
LTpon one point there can be no difference of opinion; it 
was a lamentable thing for Mexico that he should come to 
power through revolution, and revive the habit. He did 
not win by conquest, yet armed revolt was to some extent 
encouraged. He disturbed northern Mexico and that was 
regrettable for particular reasons which will be pointed out 
by and by. Moreover he failed ; he was overthrown, with 
every circumstance of treachery and villainy, and with con- 
sequences ruinous to his country. 

The alternative to all this should have been sought by 
Mexican patriots in 1910, if not earlier, and it would have 
consisted, as I have already said, in a progressive govern- 
ment. What would have been the sign of it, admitting that 
the substitution of a progressive man for Diaz was not 
practicable ? It would have been the development of strong 
support behind the most advanced and capable person who 
could be found. The choice would have been easy. I am 
no eulogist of Limantour, as will readily be discovered, but 
he was the man. 

No other Mexican had a record of constructive work 
that was comparable to his. He was the author of the bank- 
ing system which had been in operation since 1897, and was 
generally approved. His long service as Minister of 
Finance had been successful beyond precedent in the his- 
tory of the country ; it had been of immense value to Mexico 
and had won for Limantour a reputation abroad which was 
an important national asset. Mexico's government had 
shown retarded development in other branches, but in that 
of finance it had been healthily progressive from the date 
when Limantour took hold. 



26 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

But the Minister of Finance was out of favor with the 
Cientifico business ring because he had urged upon Diaz 
the cleaning up of the states, Puebla for example, with 
Mucio Martinez as governor and Joaquin Pita as his jefe 
politico at the state capital. By far the greater part of the 
corrupt profits of the ring came from its dealings with the 
states, and depended upon the retention of such men as 
Martinez in office. The large works undertaken for the 
national government were not scandalously remunerative to 
the contractors. S. Pearson & Son-, Limited, got the most 
important contracts at figures reasonable in the circum- 
stances, and gave a fair return for the money. But the jobs 
that were done by the Cientificos for the states involved 
graft, far beyond what would have been possible except 
through utterly shameless corruption. It was useless for 
Limantour to attempt to explain the details of these trans- 
actions to Diaz, but he was often able to convince his chief 
that one or another of the state governors was unfit. 

" Yes, Limantour, that is so," Diaz would say. " The 
man is bad and ought to be removed. We will attend to it 
to-morrow." 

And though to-morrow rarely came, the influence of 
Limantour was felt upon the side of decency, and he was 
more and more distrusted by the Cientificos of plunder who 
naturally did not lose a chance to stir up and disseminate 
scandal as to the railway merger. 

This was the state of things early in 19 lo when it became 
known that Diaz intended to be president for another six- 
year term, and that he would reelect Ramon Corral as vice 
president. It was not well for Mexico that Diaz should 
continue in office, but every peril in that obstinate blunder 
was intensified by the addition of Corral. Here was a man 
tainted morally and physically, the chief protector of vice 
in the capital; no secret sinner, for the worst parts of his 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 27 

record were the most widely known, and those redeeming 
traits, which I have recently been told that he possessed, 
so hidden that my own eyes never saw a trace of them. 
And to cap the climax the disease with which Corral was 
afflicted was mortal, so that it might be guessed he would 
outstrip Diaz to the grave despite the difference in their 
years. " Diaz and Death " was the phrase made by an 
American resident of Mexico City when the ticket was an- 
nounced to him. 

Limantour supported Corral. His own explanation of 
this is twofold: first. Corral was not so black as he was 
painted ; he had recondite merits ; was not altogether unfit 
for office ; and second, it was entirely futile to oppose him, 
because Diaz would not accept anybody else. 

Diaz was not jealous of Corral — how was it possible that 
he should be? But to find another man of whom the great 
dictator was not jealous transcended the ability of his coun- 
selors. There had been a time when Diaz had looked with 
favor upon Limantour as his successor, and had expressed 
this view to those who had his confidence. Influences which 
worked to make him change his mind have already been 
indicated, but jealousy was more potent than any of them. 
The situation was undoubtedly difficult, yet the weakness of 
Limantour's resistance makes a singular contrast with the 
power he disclosed a year later. It is true that the con- 
ditions had greatly changed in the meantime; but in my 
judgment he is not excused for the compliance which he 
showed in the months immediately preceding his departure 
from his country. 

If he could be regarded merely as an ambitious man 
shrewdly choosing the path to power which seemed the 
easiest, the safest and the surest, his course might be ex- 
plained without injurious reflection upon his sagacity. To 
avoid dangerous contention with Diaz; to support Corral 



28 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

from motives similar to the dictator's ; to silence criticism 
by withdrawing from the arena; to win favor by the re- 
funding of the national debt, while retaining and strengthen- 
ing a hold upon the nation's credit; and all the time to be 
waiting for the inevitable wreck of the old regime, and for 
the frightened call of Mexico to her most powerful son for 
help in that hour of disaster: these would seem to be the 
elements of a consistent policy whose failure in the spring 
of 191 1 might be ascribed to alteration of circumstances 
beyond control or prevision ; but I can not find that it was 
Limantour's policy, or that he went abroad from any other 
motives than those which have been mentioned already — 
to escape from an unpleasant situation, and to round out 
his career with an achiefvement in finance. He must be 
blamed 'for removing himself as a prop of the Diaz govern- 
ment, lacking which it would be the more likely to fall ; but 
he can not be accused of any design to hasten the disaster 
or to profit by it. I am told that he was so far from plan- 
ning to return and" take the chair of Diaz when it should 
be vacant, as to be dubious about returning ever. 

And yet the presidency might have been well within his 
range of reasonable ambition. The allegation that he was 
ineligible, that he was not born on Mexican soil, as the 
constitution prescribes, would not have been used effectively 
against him, had he openly aspired to the first place in the 
government. Contrary to current report the subject of his 
eligibility was never brought before the Mexican Congress. 

Whatever may have been his private hopes and personal 
desires, it is certain that he should not have left Mexico 
in 1 9 10. Nothing that he could do in Europe was to be 
compared in importance with the things to be done at home. 
The prime necessity was to strengthen the central govern- 
ment so that its continuity should not depend on Diaz alone. 
AH who had the good of the nation at heart should have 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 29 

perceived this need, and should have made sacrifices of 
their interests and animosities to avert the curse of dis- 
order. Diaz should have put aside his jealousy without 
waiting for the compulsion which came so soon; but the 
old Indian was incapable of it, until swayed by the more 
primitive impulse of fear whose whisperings were inaud- 
ible amidst the tumult of flattery culminating in Septem- 
ber. The corrupt men in the Cientifico ring who were 
afraid that Limantour would instigate reforms injurious 
to their pockets should have faced that danger to escape 
a worse, bethinking them that though the state governments 
should be intrusted to the cleanest hands in Mexico there 
would still be cakes and ale. Men engaged in legitimate 
business, and leaders in the professions should have shown 
political sense and courage, but they utterly failed to do it. 

And to one who understood the inside of affairs in Mex- 
ico this failure, and predatory folly, and suicidal jealousy 
— the drunken confidence in what was old, outworn and 
trembling to its fall — were typified at the Centennial fes- 
tivities by a vacant chair which the mind's eye could see, 
seventh from that of Diaz. The whole glittering fabric 
was undermined, and a good ear could hear the clockwork 
ticking toward the moment when all should be blown sky- 
ward; but the man most capable of detecting and averting 
the disaster was five thousand miles away across the seas. 
Understanding what his absence implied, I repeat with con- 
fidence my statement that it was the most notable feature 
of the celebration. 

It is not to be understood that Limantour and his errand 
were hidden by any veil of secrecy during his absence. 
On the contrary the public was kept constantly informed 
that he was in Europe negotiating the new loan of twenty- 
two millions sterling at four per cent, to replace a like 
amount at five, the transaction covering half the national 



30 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

debt. Reports of his progress were studiously dissemi- 
nated by the press agents of the government, and helped 
to exalt Diaz, as the fount of all good works from whose 
beneficent rule this well considered measure of finance 
flowed naturally. The refunding operation was not per- 
mitted to escape the knowledge of the twenty-one news- 
paper and magazine writers from the United States who 
attended the Centennial by special invitation as the guests 
of Diaz. A solid credit was thus seen by them to underlie 
the lavish festival, and if they saw nothing of a contra- 
dictory nature it is not surprising. They were personally 
conducted to the capital, and throughout the asphalted cen- 
ter of the city; then to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and 
back; then to the frontier whence they were sent home, 
with all expenses from the outset royally paid. There 
could be no doubt as to the prosperity of Mexico, or if 
any may have been excited, it must be charged to the 
shrewdness of the guests, not to inadvertence on the part 
of the entertainers. 

On the tenth day after the close of the Centennial cele- 
brations Francisco Madero, Jr., who had been in prison 
for his opinions, was released. At this time his cause had 
no visible organization worth considering, nor any known 
support which could excite the alarm of Diaz. The re- 
former, being free, crossed the northern border, and re- 
mained in the United States for forty days, but the Ma- 
dero Idea was in Mexico, spreading fast. At the end of 
the forty days the little leader returned to his native land, 
and marshalled the peon rabble that had been waiting for 
him into a grotesque semblance of military array against 
the mighty Diaz, the solidity of whose government was still 
being trumpeted through the world. Here was a very 
small David to challenge so great a Goliath. 

The news of this outbreak came promptly to Limantour 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 31 

in Paris, and no man alive was better equipped to under- 
stand all the issues involved. At the least, it meant dis- 
turbances in northern Mexico which would certainly be 
followed by friction with the United States. As to the 
revolt itself, he understood perfectly that it was based upon 
the fabric of a vision, and built of promises impossible 
of fulfilment. Yet it had seized upon the imagination of 
the peons, and was gaining steadily in open opposition to 
Diaz. Sharp measures would suffice to put it down, but 
Limantour saw reason to doubt that they would be ef- 
fectively employed. 

The old fogies of the cabinet, grown stiff with age and 
inaction, were worse than useless. The army was honey- 
combed with padded muster rolls and petty larceny. More 
than half the roster were men of straw who were clothed 
and armed at regular rates, but from whom no bugler, not 
even Gabriel himself, could bring forth an answering 
" here." 

Porfirio Diaz, dependent for many years on the word 
of others, and believing all faithful who extolled his name, 
could not cope with a condition demanding real vigor and 
penetrating sight. The " Cientificos " lacked at this crisis 
a broad-minded leader capable of apprehending larger things 
than the immediate profits of their schemes ; they were too 
busy with their contracts and their privileges to bother 
about the " crazy " Madero. In no direction that one might 
turn was there a practical man of brains and initiative upon 
whom Diaz in his moments of uneasiness as to the future 
could rely to act with zeal and faithfulness and judgment. 
Surrounded by thousands of flatterers, the man of the 
" iron hand " was helpless and alone. 



CHAPTER II 

THE appearance of Madero as a leader of armed 
revolt in Mexico was on November 20th. At this 
time Limantour in Paris was closing the negotia- 
tion of the " Loan of 1910," amounting to more than 200,- 
000,000 pesos, which was taken by a syndicate of French, 
English and German bankers. The beginning of Decem- 
ber saw the task completed. Conditions at home did not 
warrant further refunding operations, in the financier's . 
opinion ; but he was not yet ready to return. In that month 
of December Diaz first invited, then urged him to come. 
Without Limantour, the dictator wrote, he was drifting 
he knew not whither. The Minister of Finance replied 
with every expression of loyalty and an obedient spirit, 
but he gave excellent reasons for remaining abroad, not 
touching upon the subject of the unsatisfactory conditions 
which had made him wish to leave Mexico, though these 
were still in a great measure unchanged, and were doubt- 
less influential against his going back. 

No language can exaggerate the dictator's need of a 
competent adviser at this time; it was vital. Behind the 
Madero revolt were mysteries far beyond the analytical 
powers of Diaz. Even in the purely administrative prob- 
lems, the paralysis of the military arm of the government, 
the impossibility of getting anything done, there was more 
than he could understand. Those of his advisers who 
might have enlightened him were busy organizing a cabal 
of liars for their own protection, rather than an army of 
soldiers for the preservation of the state. Diaz needed an 

32 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 33 

interpreter of the situation; and he turned to Limantour 
who had so often acted in that capacity. 

Whoever has sought the truth about the origin and seem- 
ingly impossible success of the Madero revolt will have 
found abundant reason why Diaz did not understand it. 
The influences which proceeded from the United States 
were tangled and obscure; they were not comprehended 
even by those who were exerting them. The Washington 
government complained of the revolt as a disorder in Mex- 
ico which Diaz was commanded to put down, yet the pres- 
sure exerted was contradictory of the desire expressed, 
and promoted insurrection and brigandage by weakening 
the central authority opposed to them. In the innumerable 
contradictory tales that are told to-day, by those who at- 
tempt to explain the Mexican muddle, one may hear oc- 
casionally the bare and meaningless assertion that the 
United States government overthrew Diaz. One may hear 
also that the Waters Pierce Oil Company financed Ma- 
dero's operations, and that a document proving this is on 
file at Washington. It is needless to say that the docu- 
ment, as described by ex-Ambassador Wilson, would fall 
far short of proving anything. 

The truth about Madero's pecuniary backing will be 
stated presently. It is sufficient to say here that Diaz could 
see no reason why American corporations should support 
Madero in preference to himself. In their own country 
they certainly showed no good will toward ranting reform- 
ers; and in that class Diaz would certainly have placed 
young Madero. And, moreover, he saw the revolt in the 
same light in which it was really seen by American cor- 
porate interests, as a thing not worth support because it 
was destined to fail, and the money spent would never come 
back. Yet Diaz knew something of the political situation 
in the United States, and could not suppose that the Taft 



34 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

administration would assume so hostile an attitude toward 
him if the Guggenheims, the Rockefellers and the Aldriches 
who stood so close to it were not advising measures of co- 
ercion for business reasons. 

The dictator's true relation to these interests was be- 
yond his comprehension. He did not know that they had 
always regarded him merely as a good policeman, the best 
that could be found in Mexico, yet decidedly inferior to 
Uncle Sam in that capacity. He seemed to himself to have 
dealt fairly and amicably with American capitalists. He 
understood that they could get more favors from their 
own government, and would be glad to see its authority 
extended over at least the northern half of Mexico, if the 
thing could be done without too serious and too protracted 
a disturbance; but this situation had rather amused than 
alarmed him hitherto, so confident had he been of his abil- 
ity to hold the Gringos in check. It was no longer easy 
to deal with them or with their rulers, and Diaz did not 
know why. He believed that Limantour was the one man 
who could tell him what was wrong and what to do. 

In every respect the situation became more perplexing 
and more menacing in the month of December. To Li- 
mantour in Paris came reports from many sources, the 
news generally disquieting, ample in volume yet imper- 
fect, because there were secrets still locked in the bosom 
of destiny. He perceived in part the lessening cordiality 
between Washington and Mexico City, and was at no loss 
for a reason ; the heavy American interests in the northern 
states of Mexico were exerting their influence. These in- 
terests were close observers of conditions ; they saw the 
government of Porfirio Diaz seriously threatened and were 
preparing to gain such advantage as the situation afforded. 

A good understanding gathered from many years' deal- 
ings with the men controlling the American mining and 




JOSE YVES LIMANTOUR 

"Arliiter of Mexico's destiny." Finance Minister of Mexico from 

1894 to May 25, 1911. The man wlio assumed charge of Mexico's 

tiuances when that country was insolvent, and in 1910 placed them 

on a four per cent, basis. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 35 

rubber enterprises aided Limantour in interpreting their 
desires with accuracy. Intervention in Mexico by the 
United States government would result in immense gains 
for them ; it would be their first choice. But if interven- 
tion should not come, they hoped for a government to suc- 
ceed Diaz which would be amenable to the propositions 
which Diaz, ever encouraged by Limantour, had steadily 
rejected. The American corporations which had invested 
heavily in Mexico, were managed by men who had accom- 
plished sensational results in the United States by methods 
which Mexico, thus far, had not permitted them to use. 
With Limantour out, and Diaz deposed or resigned, they 
could barter Washington recognition of the succeeding 
Mexican government in exchange for the privileges they 
coveted. 

It was not conceivable to Limantour that these interests 
were satisfied with looking forward to a Mexico presided 
over by an idealist reformer such as Francisco Madero, 
Jr., but it was quite credible that they viewed with com- 
posure the efforts that young man was making to disrupt 
the Diaz government. While this was going on, the pros- 
pects for intervention were good. But failing this great 
desideratum, which would be the precursor of annexation 
of a large part of Mexico's territory, a new government 
must be set up. That new government the American cor- 
porations were planning to dominate, but they must have 
some other man in view than Madero. 

Francisco Leon de la Barra, Ambassador of Mexico at 
Washington, was in the best position to learn what was 
afoot, and to be a source of information to Diaz and Li- 
mantour, so far as direct, confidential communication with 
the latter might consist with diplomatic decorum. His re- 
ports to his Government at home confirmed the impression 
which Diaz gained from Henry Lane Wilson, the Amer- 



36 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

ican Ambassador in Mexico City : namely, that the United 
States was increasingly unfriendly. The Zelaya incident 
offered itself as an assignable cause of irritation. Zelaya, 
dictator of Nicaragua, had been overthrown, and in the 
course of the warfare which preceded that event his troops 
had captured two Americans name Groce and Cannon, who 
were presently executed for having given aid and comfort 
to the rebels. The United States sent a warship to Nic- 
aragua with designs upon Zelaya's freedom, but he es- 
caped through Guatemala to Mexico, where he was received 
at the capital and treated with more consideration than 
Washington thought right. Between friendly govern- 
ments this matter would have been adjusted readily, but 
in the existing situation it caused friction. 

Far more serious was the controversy over the alleged 
alliance — or attempt to form one — between Mexico and 
Japan. The Mikado was supposed to have his eye on the 
shores of Magdalena Bay as a good place for a coaling 
station, a naval depot, a Japanese colony, whatever you 
please. A story went the rounds that Ambassador Wilson 
forced Diaz to tear up the draft of a treaty with Japan. 
These rumors were perhaps more important than the facts 
they tended to obscure, for they were seized upon and made 
the most of, by those who hoped to see the United States 
encroach upon the sovereign rights of Mexico. That in- 
fluence, all the time at work, yet without consistency or 
definite purpose, baffled not only Diaz, but everybody else, 
including those who were exerting it, and the officials at 
Washington who were affected by it. 

De la Barra's communications and the outgivings of 
Henry Lane Wilson brought darkness rather than illumina- 
tion to the mind of Diaz. He was aware of hostility in- 
explicable and therefore the more dangerous, and there 
were many adverse omens in Mexico. Governors of states 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO zy 

in whom Diaz had reposed especial confidence now held 
aloof from him, showing no zeal. He detected in the press 
a new and harsh tone. Newspapers which had observed 
an unwritten law against printing the dictator's name with- 
out a title, " General " or " President," now became lax 
in their observance and began to deal fearlessly with a 
Diaz unadorned. He saw his own anxiety for Limantour's 
return spread through the upper circles of the capital. In 
January this feeling became widespread, as I had special 
means of knowing, and many urgent messages were sent 
to Paris. All these signs indicated a waning confidence in 
the strength of the Diaz autocracy. 

Limantour's advices must have been sufficiently full and 
accurate to enable him to understand that the situation was 
grave, and that some of his forebodings in the previous 
year were being justified. The error which Diaz had made 
in taking the reelection in the summer of 1910 was re- 
vealing itself even more promptly than might have been 
expected. Diaz had said at that time that he did not in- 
tend to retain the presidency until the end of the term; 
that he would resign when satisfactory arrangements for 
the succession should have been made. These arrange- 
ments, to be acceptable to any prudent person, must exclude 
Corral, who might live a year qr even two, but no more. 
As for Diaz himself, he would never resign voluntarily; 
his words, even though he uttered them sincerely, were not to 
be relied on. He would hold the presidential office till death 
or some other irresistible exigency should delete his name 
from the scroll of reigning potentates. 

Meanwhile Mexico was suffering severely from the 
world's perception of the uncertainty of her future. Li- 
mantour had received plain intimations of this fact in the 
course of his refunding operations. That he was able to 
carry through the transaction just closed, had been due to 



38 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

his own standing with the bankers more than to any other 
element of strength in the Mexican situation, except the 
recognized value of the country's natural resources. It 
would be useless for Limantour to return merely to tem- 
porize with evils which could be remedied only by stable 
adjustment. He was a man very jealous of his reputa- 
tion, with a long record of honorable successes, and he 
had a strong disinclination to go back to Mexico and 
be swept away by the tide that was setting against 
Diaz. 

There is no evidence that he then believed that tide to 
be irresistible. His sentiments were expressed on Janu- 
ary 27th in two letters which will be of interest here, be- 
fore we pass on to an account of the remarkable negotia- 
tions which he presently conducted. It must be borne in 
mind that Limantour was very kindly disposed toward cer- 
tain of the Maderos, and especially toward Evaristo, head 
of the family, then far advanced in years. Evaristo 
viewed the proceedings of his grandson, the reformer, with 
unmitigated disfavor and acute alarm. Early in January 
he addressed a long letter to Limantour, setting forth the 
troubles that had come upon the family through young 
Francisco's war upon the constituted authorities, and beg- 
ging for advice and assistance. To this appeal the Minister 
of Finance responded as follows: 

Paris, Jan. 27, 191 1. 
Senor Don Evaristo Madero, 

Monterey, N. L. 
My dear old friend: — 

I should like to treat the subject of your esteemed 
letter of Jan. 11 with the fullness which the matter 
calls for; but I am extremely busy these days and I 
shall not delay in returning to Mexico, these being the 
reasons why I prefer to leave until after my return 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 39 

the many reflections suggested to me by the subject 
referred to. 

Each day I regret more and more what is happen- 
ing and the impossibihty on my part of helping in any 
manner to prevent the evils which are derived from the 
situation created for the country in general and espe- 
cially for your family, by the foolish acts of your 
grandson, who, as you well say, by taking the part of 
redeemer, has sacrificed everybody. I understand 
perfectly how delicate and annoying is the situation in 
which you find yourself in respect to the government 
and also in respect to the men of order and good judg- 
ment. It must, however, be understood that this 
straining of relations is the fatal consequence of the 
disturbance of public order, responsibility for which 
does not assuredly rest on the government, and of 
certain acts which would not have been interpreted 
in a manner unfavorable to you and your family if 
from the beginning, and even now, all the members of 
the family had adopted a resolute and energetic atti- 
tude which would have allayed even the suspicion of 
sympathy, if not with the cause, at least with the per- 
sons who have initiated and upheld sedition. 

It is not my purpose, nor would it be of any practical 
value, to indicate to you what you could have done to 
avoid the consequences for which you are now suffer- 
ing. Nor am I going to excuse from all responsibility 
those persons whom you refer to as " gratuitous ene- 
mies of the family." These are things of the past. 
My intentions for the future, or rather my desires, 
cannot be otherwise than, on my return to Mexico, to 
work with all my heart to prevent the evils, already 
too great for the fatherland, from increasing and to 
prevent,, if it be possible, the prolongation of the pres- 
ent distracted condition and the outbreak of new dis- 
order. For this task it is necessary to count on the 
loyal and decided cooperation of all who represent or 
may represent a serious and judicious factor in our 
political life and I count on you and the principal mem- 
bers of your family for sincere and effective collabora- 
tion to that end. In the meantime I pray for your good 



40 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

health and for the decrease each day of those evils re- 
ferred to which embitter your existence and ours. 
Your old friend who esteems you highly, 

(Signed) J. Y. Limantour. 

On the same day the Minister of Finance addressed a 
note to Rafael Hernandez, who though quite closely as- 
sociated with the Cientificos of Mexico City was a valued 
friend of Limantour's. To complete the connection of 
Hernandez with all important threads of the Mexican tan- 
gle, he was cousin to Francisco Madero, Jr., the reformer, 
the trouble-maker, the man who came to be the president 
of that great country and was murdered to clear the way 
for the regime of Huerta. The note to Hernandez ran 
thus: 

Paris, Jan. 2'j, 191 1. 
Sr. Lie. Don Rafael L. Hernandez, 

Mexico. 
My dear colleague and friend: — 

Inclosed you will find copy of a reply which I wrote 
to a letter which was written to me by Don Evaristo 
at the same time as your letter of Jan. 12. I cannot 
say more at present than I said in the letter to which 
I refer. I hope that while I wait to see you the whole 
Madero family will demonstrate the greatest prudence 
in regard to the government and show their firm in- 
tention to combat by every means in their power the 
promoters and supporters of sedition. In that hope 
I remain, as always, your affectionate friend. 

(Signed) J. Y. Limantour. 

Direct communication with members of the Madero fam- 
ily who deplored the revolt but were well informed as to 
its meaning and its progress, supplemented Limantour's 
other advices, and gave him to know that the movement 
could not be halted by means of any influence that could 
be brought to bear upon its leader. It had attained a meas- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 41 

ure of organization. There were centers of its influence 
at many points in Mexico, even in the capital itself. It 
had a junta in Washington, ill sustained and not very able, 
with Dr. Francisco Vasquez Gomez at its head. The mil- 
itary aspect was not formidable, yet the attempt to put it 
down by force of arms would result at best in long guerilla 
warfare and the spread of banditry throughout the north 
of Mexico, disturbing the relations with the United States 
and involving constant peril of aggressions by the power- 
ful and petulant neighbor. The conclusion seemed to be 
that if the Madero revolt was not to be suppressed, and 
could not be restrained through influence, it must be traded 
with. 

Limantour knew in advance that the terms which the 
revolutionists would demand would be unconditional sur- 
render to them of the Mexican government. This surren- 
der he must prevent. He might not be able to stop blood- 
shed in Mexico by flat refusal, but he hoped to accomplish 
it by strategy. In that strategy the attitude of the Amer- 
ican government was an essential feature. For a further 
knowledge of that attitude he must depend on de la Barra. 

During the few days immediately following the receipt 
of the answers to his letters of January 27th, he was busily 
occupied in cabling to Mexico, to New York and to Wash- 
ington. On the 27th of February he left Paris in response 
to his country's call, and on the 7th of March, stepped 
from the French Liner to the New York pier. 

He made the fifth in an oddly assorted company assem- 
bled in the American metropolis to play out a game of 
cards with Mexico as the stake. In a suite on the fourth 
floor of the Hotel Astor were Francisco Madero, Senior, 
and his son Gustavo, brother of the reformer. They were 
the financial managers of the Madero revolt. In another 
apartment under the same roof was Francisco Leon de la 



42 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Barra, Ambassador of Mexico to the United States. At 
the Hotel Imperial was Dr. Francisco Vasquez Gomez, 
chief of the Madero junta at Washington. Jose Yves Li- 
mantour, Minister of Finance to Porfirio Diaz, went to the 
Hotel Plaza, and as soon as he was properly installed, he 
sent out for the newspapers of the day. The headlines 
startled him, as in various forms they had startled the 
people of the United States from ocean to ocean. Seiior 
Limantour saw in those lines of heavy type a threat that 
the game of cards which has been mentioned would be in- 
terrupted by the great policeman of the Western World, 
and the stake confiscated. For by an odd coincidence that 
was the day when the news was published that President 
Taft had ordered twenty thousand troops to be sent at 
once from their widely scattered posts to San Antonio, 
Texas, ready for active service. 

The Minister of Finance was too wise, however, to infer 
that this meant intervention. He was inclined to believe 
that de la Barra would be able to assure him that it was 
only a threat intended to favor one side or the other in 
that game of cards, not to break it up altogether. 



CHAPTER III 

AFFAIRS of moment to Mexico, and as events have 
proved, to the United States as well, were to be ar- 
ranged by Finance Minister Limantour while in 
New York, but he showed no haste. Except to drive in 
Central Park with his wife whose health was not of the 
best, he went out but little. In his apartments at the Plaza 
he received numerous visitors, nearly all of whom were 
bankers. Ambassador de la Barra called, as was appro- 
priate, and indeed the list included only one man whose 
coming to see a high official of the Diaz Government might 
have excited remark. This was Francisco Madero, Senior. 

But the visits of Madero were brief and far from satis- 
factory to himself. Several times he was not admitted. In 
all respects, ostensibly and actually, the attitudes of the 
two men were strictly in character — Limantour the sought 
and Francisco Madero the unsuccessful and perturbed 
seeker. 

On March 1 1 a sharp disagreement between the Maderos 
and Doctor Vasquez Gomez occurred in Room 411 at the 
Hotel Astor, and an open break was narrowly averted. 
Vasquez Gomez criticized the elder Madero for attempting 
to usurp the functions of chief of the Madero junta in the 
United States. He complained also that his bill for board 
in Washington remained unpaid for lack of funds, and 
that he was being restrained from seeing Limantour which 
was the object of his coming to New York. 

The Maderos took counsel of expediency and gave 
ground; they consented to pay the bill, and to inform 

43 



44 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Limantour of the desire of Vasquez Gomez without delay. 
A refusal was expected, but to the surprise of the Maderos, 
Limantour readily consented to meet the man who at that 
time was slated as provisional vice president of Mexico 
to succeed Corral when the revolt should have triumphed. 
The Minister of Finance would receive Doctor Vasquez 
Gomez at the Hotel Plaza, he said, or would call upon him 
at the Hotel Imperial. 

Vasquez Gomez declined both proposals. He would not 
place himself in the position of suppliant to the Minister 
of Diaz by calling upon him, and he would not receive him 
at the Imperial because the rooms he occupied were not 
suitable. Francisco Madero did not offer to engage more 
stately apartments for the head of the junta; instead he 
politely conveyed the doctor's objections to Limantour who 
was very amiable. He would meet Doctor Vasquez Gomez 
at the rooms of Ambassador de la Barra in the Hotel Astor. 

The meeting took place on the following day, March 12, 
and its result was that Vasquez Gomez wrote a letter ad- 
dressed to Limantour, in which were set forth the demands 
which the Madero party at that time made upon the Diaz 
government. It was mildly expressed and quite informal; 
it summarized the reforms for which the revolution stood, 
and asked for the resignation of Corral as Minister of 
Gobernacion. Neither the resignation of Diaz as presi- 
dent, nor that of Corral as vice president was mentioned. 

Doctor Vasquez Gomez was not a man of the first im- 
portance in Mexican affairs, but it might have been possible 
at that time to rank him with the most ambitious. He un- 
doubtedly felt that his services to the Madero cause would 
entitle him to honorable rewards in the day when these 
should be distributed. A close perusal of his letter, which 
he wrote as a summing up of the verbal statements he had 
made in the interview with Limantour, provokes the thought 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 45 

that it was written for exhibition, and in support of some 
purpose with which the person addressed was acquainted. 
It was notable principally for that which it did not contain ; 
and I find some difficulty in accepting it as covering fully 
the substance of the preceding conversation. 

Limantour occupied himself on the 13th of March with 
carefully analyzing the situation. It differed materially 
from his previous understanding of it only in the weakness 
of the Madero enterprise. As a military rebellion against 
the solvent and well entrenched government of Porfirio 
Diaz it was too flimsy to be seriously considered. There 
had been no battles worthy to be so named. The Maderistas 
held a few towns in the North, but they lacked arms, or- 
ganization, and competent leaders ; and they had no money, 
if the information wliich had come to Limantour from 
banking circles was to be relied upon. As a military 
menace to the existing government of Mexico it was 
grotesque. 

The social features were more impressive. Disaffection 
had spread through many states of the Mexican republic, 
and the Madero Idea had taken hold of the ignorant. Re- 
duced to simplest terms the Idea which had caught the 
peons might be expressed by the words. Freedom and Land. 
Laborers more or less skilled, clerks, students — all the 
classes from which come recruits for popular rebellions 
against vested interests and the established order — had 
been attracted to the cause. An accurate estimate of the 
disaffection was impossible, but Limantour saw reason to 
believe that the number of excited dreamers was sufficient 
for an uprising formidable at this unfortunate moment when 
the harassing of Diaz by the United States already consti- 
tuted a crisis for Mexico. Francisco Madero, Junior, had 
sown the seed of national disaster, and designing men were 
preparing to reap benefits for themselves. This must not 



46 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

be permitted. The popular discontent could not be met at 
such a perilous time by harsh repressive action ; it must be 
discreetly guided into circuitous channels where it might 
expend its forces without harm to Mexico. 

Such work would require extremely deft manipula- 
tion, but somebody must do it, answering whatever was 
reasonable in the demands of the dissatisfied by the accom- 
plishment of essential reforms. An arrangement for or- 
derly succession in the presidential office was undoubtedly 
one of these. It would tend to placate the United States, 
and to weaken the arguments of Madero and his partizans 
whose violence was a constant menace to Mexico's credit 
and to the reputation of the Minister of Finance who had 
built that credit up, and had so recently put what may 
be called his personal endorsement upon it in the refunding 
operations. 

The first thing to be sought was order in Mexico, to 
which end the Madero Idea must be deprived of its force. 
In the more decorous parts of the world similar emergencies 
were met by strategy, by concessions more apparent than 
real, by laws which temporized, yet seemed progressive. 
Mexico must be saved by the same means, and keep its 
place in the family of advanced nations capable of dealing 
with political and economic problems. 

The sense of injury which had driven Limantour abroad 
in July of the previous year had been succeeded by a feeling 
of triumph ; for Diaz had now given him a free hand. His 
plan called for delicate negotiations but he was ready for 
them. They should be so conducted that his loyalty to 
Diaz could never be questioned. He knew the name of the 
man who must succeed Diaz, if it should come to that, but 
he was determined that no act of his own should lay him 
open to the imputation of having consented to the shorten- 
ing of the Diaz rule by so much as one minute. The fact 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 47 

that Washington knew the successor's name and had ap- 
proved it must be regarded as affecting the situation, but 
Limantour was not thereby constrained to do anything 
which did not seem to him consistent with the strategy de- 
manded of a cabinet minister of Diaz charged with the duty 
of defending the government against its enemies. 

On that day, the 13th of March, Francisco Madero, 
Senior, received from Finance Minister Limantour a sug- 
gestion that on the morrow they should hold a conference. 
The invitation came to the father of the revolutionary leader 
with ominous import. For a week he had been dancing 
attendance on the great man, and as a result he was in a 
state bordering on nervous collapse. When he had seen 
Limantour during the preceding days, he found him cold 
and reproachful. Limantour's private interview with Vas- 
quez Gomez had contributed to Madero's uneasiness. He 
did not repose implicit confidence in the junta chief. Who 
could tell what disclosures he had made or what secret bar- 
gain might have been reached ? 

The importance of the meeting now to be held was em- 
phasized by the fact that Francisco's son, Gustavo, was to 
accompany him to the Plaza and be included in the confer- 
ence. 

Limantour would undoubtedly make some important 
proposal, perhaps of a coercive character, and it was exceed- 
ingly improbable that Madero could meet the terms. If 
total failure of agreement should result, the active and 
immediate antagonism of Limantour must be accepted as an 
element of a situation already bad enough, and precisely of 
the sort that could be made impossible by the maneuvers 
of an adversary having influence with so many channels 
of finance. For the fatal weakness behind the Madero rev- 
olutionary array was the empty treasure chest, and no op- 
ponent would be so likely as Limantour to know its empti- 



48 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

ness and to count upon his own power to prevent its ever 
being replenished. 

The Maderos were very rich in property rights, but poor 
in cash. Barely fifteen hundred dollars remained of the 
money which Gustavo Madero had been able to extract 
from a railway deal and had devoted to the revolution in a 
manner not rigidly scrupulous. The total fund so secured 
had been but $375,000, advanced by the Paris branch of a 
Madrid banking house against an underwriting of bonds for 
the construction of a railway across the Mexican state of 
Zacatecas. And Gustavo's achievement in finance had been 
the last. Not another dollar had the Maderos managed to 
obtain. 

An embargo had been laid in Mexico on every industrial, 
mining, agricultural and banking activity of the entire 
Madero clan. Their estates aggregating several million 
acres were valueless in this emergency ; they could be neither 
sold nor mortgaged. No railway would transport their 
goods. No bank would forward to them drafts made in 
their favor for goods previously delivered. Their own 
bank in Monterrey was in charge of a government " inter- 
ventor " and not a peso could go from it tO' a Madero. 

Francisco I. Madero, Junior, the leader of the cause, had 
previously mortgaged his house in Monterrey, and since 
that time had sustained his " army of ragamuffins " on 
small loans or contributions from sympathizing friends, 
and by preempting supplies from captured towns and 
haciendas. Arms and ammunition to the value of 50,000 
American dollars had been bought by Gustavo, but only a 
part had been received. There was no money to pay the 
army which consisted of not more than 1500 men in the 
main body. The other small bands throughout Mexico 
were subsisting on forced loans for which they gave re- 
ceipts. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 49 

With such slender resources he was attacking the long 
established government of Diaz, a government perfectly 
solvent, with a $63,000,000 (Mexican) cash balance to its 
credit, and with the vast private interests of the Cientificos 
pledged to its support. His best hope of success lay, of 
course, in natural processes, chiefly the mere lapse of years, 
which had brought Mexico to the point of inevitable transi- 
tion. Diaz was falling before the scythe of Time, the car 
of progress rumbling close behind. Already the dictator 
had made futile plans for one who was to follow him ; and 
it was a knowledge of these facts which had made Secre- 
tary Knox so facile in the hands of those who had large 
investments at stake. Somebody must follow Diaz shortly. 

Francisco Madero, Senior, was fighting for the success of 
his family and his own personal interests, in a period of 
governmental disintegration and change, — a familiar situa- 
tion. But it was of little moment to him that Diaz must 
fall. The thing must be brought about by the agency of 
the Maderos, and there were a thousand chances that the 
Diaz regime would outlive the present revolution. It would 
certainly do so unless more money could be found, or some 
strong influence arise to hasten the culmination of the 
struggle. Madero, Senior, was shrewd enough to perceive 
the instability of every hope, the uncertainty of every plan, 
the cruel pressure of pecuniary need ; and as he prepared to 
meet the cool and formidable man with whom he must 
contend in this emergency it Is no wonder that he walked 
the floor, groaning, with his nervous hands pressed to the 
sides of his head. 

He was all fiddle strings, tense to the breaking point, 
when he went to the Hotel Plaza at the appointed hour in 
the afternoon of March 14; but Gustavo seemed steady 
enough, though his stake on the rebellion was as great as 
anybody's since it included his honor. He was already 



50 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

under criminal charges for the use he had made o£ the rail- 
way funds, and the agents of the law were close upon his 
heels, though of that he was unaware. He knew that he 
and his father had the Mexican revolution in their pockets, 
so to speak, and that they were about to be searched by a 
high officer of Diaz. But Gustavo possessed a gambler's 
nerve; he had made his play and would abide the turn of 
the card. 

There was no delay at the hotel; Limantour was ready 
for them. Imagine him the picture of a French aristocrat, 
a man of good height and unspoiled figure, admirably 
dressed. He has steel gray eyes — eyes which in the his- 
tory of the world, even among dark: races, have so often 
been the natural insignia of distinction. His head broadens 
above the line of the gray eyebrows, and is perhaps a little 
fiat on top ; his hair has turned silver, and is somewhat thin. 
He expresses his personality through the medium of a man- 
ner quietly engaging, yet not altogether open when one 
studies it closely. An interview with him which has in- 
volved contention may leave upon the other person's mind 
the impression of an unobtrusive, baffling reserve. 

The elder Madero, at that time on the shady side of sixty, 
might have been mistaken for a prosperous farmer from 
the western parts of the United States. He had iron gray 
hair and a chin whisker ; was short of stature, vigorous, and 
inclined to be emotional, as I have already intimated. His 
eyes were Mexican. 

Gustavo was larger than his father, and of the blonde 
type. The one thing to say of him is that he looked like a 
good fellow ; that was his first trait, to the eye. As for any 
racial sign, he would have passed on Broadway without re- 
mark for an American, whatever that may be in these days. 

The two guests, who were the business managers and 
press agents of the Mexican revolt, were received by the 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 51 

Finance Minister of Diaz with a cordiality in which no flaw 
could be detected. The elder Madero's previous visits to 
the Plaza, both those that had been abortive and those that 
had resulted only in brief and disappointing interchanges, 
seemed now to be ignored by Limantour whose manner dis- 
closed no burden of a business purpose, no hint of possible 
disagreement, but only the most exquisite sincerity and 
kindness. Indeed he appeared to have so little on his mind 
and to be so simply desirous of placing his guests at their 
ease, that the excited father of the rebel leader felt a 
sinking sensation within his bosom as if he were falling 
into the unimportant from the apex of a thrilling situa- 
tion. 

Passing on from the formalities of greeting, Limantour 
deftly reverted to an incident of old days. Long ago, when 
he began the practise of the law, his first client was Evar- 
isto Madero, father of Francisco, Senior. Of this earliest 
case and fee of three thousand pesos, valued also as an 
expression of confidence, he now spoke pleasantly, saying 
that it constituted a debt of gratitude to the family which 
he had always gladly remembered. 

This extreme suavity at the outset tended to increase 
rather than allay Francisco's fears. He knew the Mexican 
method with the intimacy of a veteran practitioner; it be- 
gins with your excellency's very good health, and ends with 
a thrust under the fifth rib. Nothing was to be gained, 
however, by hastening the transition, and therefore he re- 
plied smoothly, saying that the legal work for his father, 
like everything else to which Seiior Limantour consented 
to devote his mind, must have been exceedingly well done 
so that the debt of gratitude was laid upon the client. 
Pleasant and inconsequential exchanges followed ; then 
Limantour touched for the first time upon the business of 
the hour by asking the elder Madero somewhat suddenly 



52 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

what it was that he had most seriously in mind. What 
did he desire the most? 

Francisco answered without pause. 

" The success of the revolution," he said. 

" What are the so-called reforms that are demanded ? " 
Limantour asked. " I would like to have a list of them, 
verbally from you." 

Madero knew what to say, and he gave the headings 
promptly : — 

" Effective suffrage, no reelection to the presidency, state 
autonomy, abolition of jefes politicos, land for the poor — 
the opening of the public lands and the cutting up of the 
great estates." 

The Minister of Finance seemed somewhat amused, as 
he ran over in his mind the glibly recited items. He under- 
stood the situation of the Madero family with respect to 
land; he was well acquainted with Francisco, Senior, and 
had been learning many things about Gustavo. They were 
not precisely the men he would have selected to manage a 
sincere political movement directed towards accomplishing 
the ends that had been specified. 

That Francisco Madero, Junior, was a sincere man, he 
might have been willing to admit, but that was not the point. 
Limantour's object was to learn whether the leaders of the 
movement had gone beyond catch words, whether any plans 
whatever had been laid to make the reforms effective, if the 
revolutionists should find themselves possessed of power. 
He now questioned Francisco, and Gustavo too, as to this 
matter, and their answers seemed to confirm the gist of his 
gleanings from Vasquez Gomez. No practical system of 
conducting a government along new lines had been formed, 
not even an outline of such a system could be sketched. 
" Effective suffrage " provided no well ordered method of 
nomination ; it was election without safeguards. " No re- 



\ 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 53 

election " was the same shelf-worn article Diaz had used 
in his campaigns against Benito Juarez more than forty 
years ago. " State autonomy " as the Maderos thought of 
it was an open invitation to anarchy, and no workable 
alternative to the jefe politico system had been devised. 

The land distribution idea, so prominent in the " Plan of 
San Luis Potosi " and so perfect a slogan for promoting 
social unrest, was vague and impracticable. The educa- 
tional program was no better. Only the exercise of ar- 
bitrar}' force could effect these reforms speedily, as the 
followers of Madero expected them to be brought about. 
The chances were that instead of the beneficiaries being the 
poor, the men who secured the prizes would be the rich. 
Limantour had never distinguished himself in inventing or 
advocating methods for extending the school system among 
the peons, or for facilitating their acquisition of land. 
Those departments were not under his jurisdiction, and his 
studies of government needs for Mexico had not gone far 
in such fields. He was not strongly in sympathy with the 
Madero theories on these subjects, and he was intensely 
critical of the course the revolutionary leaders were pursu- 
ing in promising to the peon land they could not give him. 

As he questioned Francisco, Senior, with now and then 
a turn to Gustavo, he saw the emptiness of the pretense as 
never before. The actual head of the revolution doubtless 
believed that in some way not yet determined, the success 
of the movement would provide the power to do all things. 
But these men before him were business men and the elder 
of them possessed a reputation for thrift. It was with 
difficulty that Limantour restrained a smile at the thought of 
Francisco Madero, Senior, one of Mexico's great land- 
owners, advocating a plan which contemplated dismember- 
ment of estates at government condemnation rates. 

No clue to what was passing in Limantour's mind could 



54 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

be found in the expression of his face or in his words. 
The Maderos were puzzled ; they knew that they were being 
weighed in the balance, but the result was a mystery, hidden 
behind the agreeable but perplexing manner of their ques- 
tioner. 

Discussion of the revolutionary demands had taken a 
long time, and the Maderos were still uncertain of Liman- 
tour's intentions when he startled them by saying that he 
purposed giving all the assistance in his power to effect the 
reforms which they desired. H.e was convinced, he said, 
that the movement they represented was entitled to con- 
sideration because it evidently was becoming popular. 
What he could do to bring about a peaceful solution should 
be done. 

Concealing his astonishment and joy as well as he was 
able FranciscO', Senior, accepted the statement literally and 
proceeded at once to practical details. Diaz must resign; 
a provisional president must be placed in office, and a fair 
election held. 

Limantour stopped Madero's flow of words by emphati- 
cally declining to say or to hear anything whatever upon 
the subject of the resignation of Porfirio Diaz. Even from 
Madero's standpoint the resignation of Diaz should be seen 
to be an error, Limantour asserted, adding that he himself 
would view it as a calamity. He spoke sharply, in a tone 
of command. The words seemed more than a rebuke ; they 
warned that it was the friend of Diaz to whom the Made- 
ros were talking and not a conspirator. Father and son 
looked at each other in dismay. Without the resignation 
of Diaz their hopes were vain. 

There was a silence that seemed long: then Limantour 
spoke. The sharpness had gone from his voice; his man- 
ner was calm and dignified. He could not but recognize 
the possibility, he said, that a vacancy might occur in the 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 55 

presidential office. What might bring it about he did not 
know. One thing he knew; it would not be due to his 
agency or consent. But it was necessary that he should 
consider the results to INIexico of such a lamentable event. 
Had Don Pancho a suggestion to make as to a provisional 
president in such an emergency and pending an election? 

Don Pancho had a certain person in mind for that posi- 
tion, but he was diplomatic. 

" I can think of no one," he said, " so admirably fitted 
for it as the present Minister of Finance." 

Gustavo Madero, who reported this conversation to a 
friend that night, declared that he was never so proud of 
his father as at that moment. He also said that Limantour 
was either greatly embarrassed or very angry because his 
face flushed and paled by turns, and it was some moments 
before he could speak. 

When he did speak, his utterance was smooth and de- 
liberate as he expressed the hope that the offense Don 
Pancho had just committed would not be repeated. To 
prevent such a possibility he would make a suggestion him- 
self by mentioning the present ambassador of Mexico at 
Washington. , 

" De la Barra ! " The two Maderos made the exclama- 
tion simultaneously, and rose from their chairs. Liman- 
tour also rose, intimating by a gesture that private consulta- 
tion was permissible ; and with that he walked to the win- 
dow. When he returned, his guests had finished taking 
counsel together, and had resumed their seats. 

" The suggestion is wisely made," said Francisco. " If 
a provisional president shall be demanded, de la Barra will 
be acceptable under suitable pledges." 

Both Gustavo and his father were watching Limantour 
narrowly as this announcement was made but neither could 
detect an indication of the relief which the Minister of 



56 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Finance must have experienced. Discussion passed to 
methods by which, always premising that there should be 
need, such a result could be effected by orderly process. 
Arrangements for communication by private code were then 
outlined, and the Maderos rose to go. 

Limantour was now more than the kindly host ; he placed 
his hand on Gustavo's shoulder, and said in a tone of fath- 
erly admonition: 

" Young man, you have committed grave errors. You 
have converted to improper use funds entrusted to you, and 
you have attempted to sell repudiated bonds. For your 
family's sake and for the sake of your aged grandfather 
I counsel you to mend your ways." 

While Limantour was yet speaking the telephone rang. 
Having answered it he came rapidly across the room and 
spoke a few words in Gustavo's ear. For an instant the 
young man stood motionless, recovering from a very con- 
siderable shock. Then, without giving Limantour time to 
offer his hand — if he should wish to do it — Gustavo 
turned away with a gesture of gratitude and farewell, and 
hurried from the room. 

Ten minutes later, from a booth at the chemist's on 
Sixth Avenue at the corner of Fifty-seventh Street, he 
called by telephone a friend of his, an American who speaks 
Spanish. 

" The secret service men are after me," said Gustavo, in 
that tongue. " I have just had a rather narrow escape. 
Somebody has made an application at Washington to have 
me extradited to France." 

That night and the two succeeding days Gustavo remained 
in hiding at his friend's home on Sixty-ninth Street. 

Shortly after Gustavo's abrupt departure from Liman- 
tour's rooms, Francisco Madero returned to the Hotel Astor 
where three of his younger sons awaited him with informa- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 57 

tion as to Gustavo's safety and present whereabouts. This 
immediate anxiety disposed of, Seiior Madero immured 
himself alone in number 411 of the suite, and behind locked 
doors reviewed the extraordinary scene through which he 
had just passed. It was necessary that he should analyze 
the true inwardness of the somewhat vague understanding 
that seemingly had been reached. 

On the surface the gains seemed entirely on the side of 
the Maderos. Limantour would go at once to Mexico City 
and effect the cabinet changes which would place de la 
Barra in the constitutional order of succession, and he 
would use his influence to further the reforms which the 
revolutionists demanded. Limantour's reasons for recog- 
nizing the principles of the revolution — whether he would 
do it to secure peace in Mexico or for his own secret in- 
terests, or for those of Porfirio Diaz — mattered little, so 
far as Madero could see. Advocacy by the Diaz govern- 
ment of such principles could not be other than a Madero 
triumph. The value of the conference to the Madero cause 
depended not at all upon Limantour's apparent friendliness, 
which easily might have been assumed, but upon the genu- 
ineness of his intent to do the things he had said he would 
try to do. 

Madero had as much faith in Limantour's pledged word 
as in anybody's ; but he could recall no pledge which had 
been .made without qualification. The Finance Minister 
had admitted being impressed with the spread of the idea 
known as Maderism ; he had spoken easily and generously 
and without reproaches. But what had he said ? He 
would use his influence to effect the reforms the revolu- 
tion demanded. This statement had been so unexpected 
and had seemed to imply so much that it had carried Madero 
into a tactical error which Limantour at once had made 
plain. The utterances had then become guarded and diplo- 



58 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

matic on both sides. Singularly enough, progress after that 
had been more rapid, and the concluding arrangements had 
seemed to bring them closer together than ever before. But 
had they? 

Francisco Madero was too emotional to be a really first 
rate analyst. He had come from the interview possessed 
of the belief that the Madero revolution had that afternoon 
been fought and won. As he now thought it over he was 
oppressed with doubts and unable to resolve them. The 
great desideratum, the retirement of Diaz, Limantour had 
emphatically declined to discuss. 

Yet he had admitted such a possibility by agreeing with 
the Maderos upon a temporary successor, one whose in- 
trusion would entirely set aside the plan Diaz had arranged 
with Corral as its beneficiary. Even this, as Madero ex- 
amined it closely, did not imply the least unfriendliness to 
Diaz. The dictator was known to be eighty years old and 
might be much older, for no record of his birth was in 
existence. He had been baptized on September 30, 1830, 
and his age for convenience and by courtesy, was reckoned 
from September 15 of that same year. Accepting the age 
of Diaz as slightly more than eighty, it seemed unlikely 
that, even with normal conditions in the country, he would 
live out this, his eighth term as president of Mexico. The 
" Unspeakable Corral," if still alive, would then succeed to 
the chief place in the government. 

Limantour was not known to have opposed Corral, but 
had probably decided against being his Finance Minister. 
It did not seem reasonable that a man of Limantour's quali- 
ties and great reputation would be disposed to act as a 
cabinet m-inister in the government of a slave trader. And 
surely all the world knew that Corral had trafficked in the 
freedom of the Yaqui Indians, embittering this historic 
tribe against the Mexican nation. Not only had he seized 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 59 

their fertile lands along the rivers of Sonora, which they 
had held for centuries, but he had captured the peaceful 
Yaqui to the number of thousands, had shipped them like 
cattle in box cars two thousand miles across Mexico, and 
had sold them into peonage or virtual slavery to the henne- 
quen growers of Yucatan. 

Madero knew how the people of Mexico hated this Cien- 
tifico leader who roamed the capital streets at night, and 
protected its vice and crime. He also knew that the thrust- 
ing of such a man upon Mexico as the successor of Diaz 
had powerfully helped to incline the ears of the poor to the 
doctrines which Francisco Madero, Junior, had been teach- 
ing; and he could understand why the polished and re- 
sourceful Limantour would not be disposed to support with 
active service the dangerous rule of one so viciously and 
openly corrupt. 

But the probability that Corral would not outlive Diaz 
was now generally accepted, and Limantour, in his negotia- 
tions in Europe for refunding the national debt, doubtless 
had been urged to make better provision for Mexico's fu- 
ture. As he had learned of the growing strength of the 
new movement he had become convinced that any arrange- 
ment to safeguard Mexico must include an agreement with 
the Maderistas. This interpretation of his motives would 
answer the description of being in the interest of Mexico 
without being disloyal to Diaz. 

By no stretch of imagination, however, could Limantour 
be conceived of as believing Francisco Madero, Junior, to 
be a desirable candidate for the presidency. Francisco, 
Senior, had quite visibly ignored this Item when he stated 
the revolution's demands, although he knew that it was the 
actual aim of the entire movement as viewed by its mana- 
gers, and an Indispensable feature of it in the eyes of his 
idealist son himself. As the elder Madero walked the floor 



6o THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

and thought upon this matter he seemed to see a vision of 
de la Barra, well guarded by competent advisers, becoming 
the buffer against which the Maderista movement was to 
be thrust so that it might be softly stopped. 

As ambassador at Washington the amiable de la Barra 
had doubtless acquired a good understanding of the Ameri- 
can government's real purpose in sending the army into 
Texas, where the troops by thousands were now arriving 
from all parts of the United States. It seemed quite be- 
lievable that Pancho de la Barra had sounded the American 
State Department on the subject of the Mexican presiden- 
tial succession and had reported his findings to Limantour. 
If this was so, was it unlikely that something had been 
contrived " for Mexico's good " which in practical applica- 
tion might mean the good of Jose Yves Limantour and 
Francisco Leon de la Barra to the exclusion of Francisco I. 
Madero, Junior, and the one hundred and seventy-three 
acknowledged male members of the Madero family? 

The line of argument which has been indicated was 
supported in Madero's mind by a thousand considerations 
impossible to reproduce. He was alone with his thoughts 
for almost two hours, and not till long afterwards did he 
make known to any person the conviction which he had 
attained, or, the steps which had led to it. 

This conviction was that Limantour intended to assist 
the Madero revolution up to a certain point, in the hope 
that the government which should succeed Diaz would be 
satisfactory to conservative men. A government with 
Francisco Madero, Junior, at its head would hardly meet 
the requirements of this definition. The understanding 
with Limantour was therefore transitory and illusive, and 
must inevitably lead to cross purposes and conflicting inter- 
ests. But for the present it was of enormous, of decisive 
value. The struggle with Limantour would come after- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 6i 

wards, and must be faced when it could no longer be post- 
poned. The thing now to be done was to trim the sails for 
the strong favoring wind that had so suddenly arisen, and 
to steer a bold course since there was no safe one possible. 

Meanwhile, in his refuge in Sixty-ninth Street, Gustavo 
Madero and an American friend were arranging a cipher 
to be used in secret communication with Limantour, who 
was to depart next day for the Mexican capital. No or- 
dinary cryptogram would serve ; something must be devised 
that might be counted on to baffle the acutest puzzle-solvers 
of real life or fiction. Beyond question the attempt com- 
pletely succeeded. The cipher was based on the little used 
Spanish version of the Fifth Edition A. B. C. Code but ran 
to arbitrary deviations beyond human power to trace with- 
out a key. It was not a method which could be used for 
messages of quick-acting commerce, as its interpretation 
involved time and painstaking accuracy. 

I have held this cipher in my hand but was not permitted 
to copy or photograph it. It consisted of nine numbers and 
eighteen words placed in squares. As prepared, it occupied 
a space about two and a half inches high by six inches 
broad, with the numbers in the squares at the left. The 
figures were not to be used in the despatches but indicated 
the positions of the actual code word carrying the meaning 
intended to be conveyed. As a cipher for limited use it 
answered all purposes, being hopelessly untranslatable by 
any person not equipped with the key, and thus was quite 
in keeping with the grave importance of the information 
which Limantour supposedly would send from the inner 
chambers of the Diaz government at Mexico City. 

The cipher when exhibited to Limantour the following 
morning received his approval. Of the three copies which 
had been prepared, one was given to him and the other two 
were retained by Gustavo Madero and his father. That day 



62 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Seiior Limantour, his business in New York completed, set 
forth for Mexico City, planning to make one brief stop on 
the way. On March 19 at Laredo, Texas, he received a 
telegram from Francisco Madero, Senior. It advised him 
of the shipment to Mexico City of the Fifth Edition Code 
to be used in connection with the cipher previously fur- 
nished, and ended with the words " my cable address is 
Wardnot." It carried no signature. 

The system of private communication had, in fact, been 
completed by registering on March 16 this cable address 
which was made known to Limantour alone. Messages 
addressed to " Wardnot " were to be delivered to Edward 
Ward, a clerk in an office at 69 Wall Street, room 65. This 
office was occupied by friends of the Maderos, and had been 
used occasionally by Gustavo in his work pertaining to busi- 
ness features of the Madero revolution. At this writing 
the " Wardnot " card of registry is still on file at the general 
cable office under the New York Stock Exchange. 

But the four or five days immediately following Liman- 
tour's departure were not without anxieties to the father 
and brother of the man who was " campaigning " in north- 
ern Mexico for his idealistic cause. After supplying the 
members of the party with small sums of expense money, 
less than thirteen hundred dollars remained of their revo- 
lutionary capital, to which no additions could be made by 
any method their Ingenuity could devise. Francisco Madero 
possessed properties in Mexico normally valued in the mil- 
lions, but useless at the moment as a basis for credit. 
Neither in America nor Europe could he place a loan for 
any sum whatever. Gustavo was still dodging the police. 
Without funds to defend himself, or friends who could 
furnish bonds, the outlook in event of being apprehended 
was not bright. 

Their negotiations with Limantour they dared not attempt 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 63 

to communicate to Francisco, Junior. They were, in fact, 
not quite certain that the entire Limantour episode was not 
a trap to learn their strength. Might not the Finance 
Minister of Porfirio Diaz, having discovered that their 
supposed strength was utter weakness, return to Mexico 
and overwhelm them? If the Diaz government, awakened 
from its lethargy by Limantour, should send a real army 
of no more than 3000 men against their forces in Chihua- 
hua, the Madero revolution would resolve itself into small 
bands of hunted men hiding in the mountains of the land 
they had planned to rule. 

Advices from Mexico indicated steady growth of senti- 
ment in favor of the Madero Idea, but as yet there was no 
real strength in the field. One sharp experience of modern 
warfare with a strong government force would fill the peons 
with dismay. Yet even so small a military array, living 
largely off the country and by its own wits, was costly to 
maintain. Barely four months had passed since Francisco, 
the younger, had taken up arms against Diaz, but the little 
revolutionary fund was gone, and there was no hope of 
replenishing it. Not a man in the United States would risk 
a dime on Madero's chances. The last card had been 
played ; they were in the hands of Jose Yves Limantour. 

On the twenty-fifth of March, Gustavo Madero and his 
father, with twelve hundred dollars in their treasure chest, 
left New York for El Paso, Texas. They were to stop 
a few days in San Antonio to await developments and to 
arrange for a meeting with Francisco, Junior, at some 
point on the border. Their work was ended. The 
" Madero Idea " and the influence of Limantour must do 
the rest. 

Several anxious days were spent by the Maderos in San 
Antonio. The newspapers of that city on the morning of 
April 2 reported the convening of the Mexican Congress 



64 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

on the previous day, and the strange pronouncements in the 
message of President Diaz. Puzzled and apprehensive the 
Maderos awaited developments. They were not kept long 
in doubt. On April 3 they received a telegram which had 
been repeated verbatim by their friend in New York from 
an unsigned cable despatch dated that day at Mexico, ad- 
dressed to " Wardnot " and delivered at 69 Wall Street. 
The name Adolph Gonzalez, which appears at the head of 
the telegram repeating the cable despatch, had been taken 
by Gustavo Madero; it was an adaptation of his mother's 
maiden name. The message from Mexico City came to 
Gustavo in this form : — 

" New York, April 3, 191 1. 
Adolph Gonzalez, Esq., 

437 Main Street, San Antonio, Texas. 
Largitate maieneust backbeest hablome desu con- 
versation hackbank feltrader desarrellando demarch- 
ing reformas confie en sincere winsome parippo 
detidos. 

This strange mixture of code and cipher, with ordinary- 
words from the English and Spanish languages — further 
complicated by the errors incident to two transmissions and 
several relays — required a long time to translate compre- 
hensively, but it was worth the trouble. Backed by the 
publicly reported changes in the Mexican government it 
was in the highest degree reassuring. The steps had been 
taken which placed de la Barra in direct order of succes- 
sion, and the Maderos already counted upon providing a 
successor to de la Barra. They were confident that the 
message came from Limantour because they had given the 
cable address " Wardnot " to no one else, and the cipher 
also was possessed by Limantour alone. In this they were 
not deceived; the Minister of Finance was the author — 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 65 

which means only that he was still adhering to the method 
of procedure heretofore described. 

A verbally accurate rendering of the message was never 
made, because of the errors above referred to. A free 
translation is as follows : 

" Received your letter of March 27. De la Barra 
spoke to me of his conversation with you. Govern- 
ment reforms continue developing in sincere accord- 
ance with the understanding." 



CHAPTER IV 

JOSE Yves Limantour had reached Mexico City on the 
evening of March 20, 191 1, and the writer was among 
the thousands who gathered in and about the Colonial 
station to greet him. Many other Americans were present. 
It was the most pronouncedly personal ovation ever ac- 
corded the Finance Minister of Porfirio Diaz in all his 
career. 

Officials of the government, and cientificos of all stripes, 
were in the welcoming throng admitted to the trainshed. 
Those who prayed for remission of sins, those who hoped 
that their sins were unknown, and those who dreamed that 
their merits might command preferment were conspicuous 
in the foremost ranks of that assemblage. From the inner 
gateway, through the station and across the station yard to 
his waiting automobile, two rows of federal soldiers formed 
an avenue through which the great man walked. The 
famous Police Band was playing " La Paloma," but the 
music that sounded sweetest to the ears of the returned trav- 
eler was made by the onlooking crowd as it raised in swell- 
ing volume its tumultuous shouts of " Viva Limantour ! " 

Outside the station yard, in the little park and along the 
street to the Paseo de la Reforma, his slowly moving car 
passed through throngs of people — Europeans, Americans 
and Mexicans — from whose throats rose the spontaneous 
cheer of the multitude for the man of the hour. The spell" 
that had seemed to hold the government inactive would 
now be broken and the fossils in the Diaz cabinet would 
take on the semblance of life. Limantour, the magician, the 

66 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 67 

worker of miracles, had come. Viva el Ministro! Viva 
Limantoiir ! 

It is not likely that even the Government itself at that 
time understood the conditions existing throughout the 
Mexican Republic, and it is certain that few others at the 
capital believed that the Madero movement had assumed 
proportions of real menace. Only six months had elapsed 
since the great centennial celebration of September, 191 o. 
Newspaper reports had been closely censored for many 
weeks, and every encounter between rebels and federals 
in the North had been chronicled as a federal victory. 
Despatches giving a different version were not delivered at 
newspaper offices. A government censor sat in the re- 
ceiving room of the Associated Press. Private correspond- 
ence was opened and examined at the post office. If harm- 
less it was marked with a cross and delivered; if it con- 
tained contraband news it was destroyed ; if disloyal to the 
Diaz government the addressee was placed under arrest. 

Newspapers from the " States " gave meager accounts 
of military activities in northern Mexico, but telegraphic 
items bearing date lines of border towns had ever been un- 
reliable, and few credited them in preference to the oppos- 
ing reports in the dailies of the capital. Travelers from 
the States of Coahuila and Chihuahua brought varying ver- 
sions. Bands of rebels were operating not far from 
Mexico City, in the South and East, but actual violence, 
except at the hands of Zapata and his men, was rare. 
Whatever was appropriated by the " legitimate revoltosos " 
was solemnly receipted for. 

Yet all was mystifying and alarming to those who for 
many years had found Mexico peaceful and secure. The 
suggestion of challenge to the Diaz government which Diaz 
soldiers did not instantly dispose of was puzzling. The 
fact that incorrect reports appeared in the newspapers 



68 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

leaked out and bred anxiety. Business was suffering 
through the uncertainty which hung over the capital. All 
were expecting the " iron hand " of Diaz to descend in a 
blow, swift and sure, that would end the agitation for good 
and all. 

Few persons at the capital understood the Madero enter- 
prise. When the man himself had been in Mexico City in 
1909 and had lectured to the poor, he had been looked upon 
as a harmless enthusiast who was tolerated by a strong gov- 
ernment. Scarcely any of the poor to whom he preached 
his doctrines knew that he belonged to a great" land-owning 
family. The Madero name was associated with certain 
brands of cognac and wine. For a long time Madero was 
referred to as " the cantini keeper." Not one American 
in fifty comprehended the seriousness of his undertaking. 
His book, " The Presidential Succession," had not then 
been translated into English, and I have never known an 
American who had read it in the original Spanish. 

It was the offense of this book, aggravated by Madero's 
speeches criticizing the government, which caused his ar- 
rest in the spring of 1910, and his imprisonment until Octo- 
ber, when an Italian of Mexico City furnished the bond of 
8000 pesos on which he was released. 

It was only since then that the condition of things had 
developed, which, four months later, caused the insist- 
ent call for Limantour's return — the call which brought 
him that night in March, 191 1, to the aid of Mexico's 
inertia-ridden government and to a demonstration quite fit- 
ting for a conqueror. 

And it seemed as if Diaz had handed him the scepter, 
for it was as a conqueror that he gave his orders. The 
fruit they bore was obvious. On the third night a special 
railway track was laid from the arsenal, through the quiet 
residence street called General Prin, and across the Paseo 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 69 

to connect with the main line of the " National." The 
following day every member of the Diaz cabinet, including 
Limantour himself, handed in his resignation. This was 
action ; it was almost revolution. Not in twenty years had 
such a significant housecleaning taken place. 

The capital of Diaz the Benevolent Despot was visibly 
shaken with expectancy. With new men to the fore, new 
things would be done. The days of dalliance were over 
and the strength of the Diaz system was about to be made 
manifest. 

Announcement of the new cabinet came quickly. It was 
made up of perfect gentlemen who were politically color- 
less. Certain ones were specialists in the fields of work to 
which they were assigned ; others were wornout veterans. 
It was a cabinet for fair weather and smooth seas ; as a 
council to guide a government during a period of stress it 
was picturesquely useless. Aside from Limantour himself 
who reappeared as Minister of Finance, the new organiza- 
tion was a fair mark for scoffers. 

And scoffers there were in plenty. The business men of 
Mexico City, mostly Americans and Europeans, were revel- 
ing in a new freedom of speech, and had become open 
critics of the government. Many of them now challenged 
Limantour's motives, and his defenders could urge only that 
he was ignorant of the change which had taken place in his 
absence. Especially unkind remarks were elicited by the 
puzzle involved in the new appointment to the State port- 
folio, but not a man in the capital, other than Limantour 
and possibly Diaz, understood the significance of recalling 
de la Barra from Washington to take the chief place of 
the cabinet. 

There followed quickly concessions to the people which 
have been likened to those of Louis XVI of France. Pro- 
nouncements came from the Diaz throne at the opening of 



70 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Congress on April i which confessed government help- 
lessness. The social and economic demands of the revolu- 
tion were adopted and solemnly put forth as government 
policy. Diaz, who had served seven terms as president — 
six of four years each and one of six years — and was be- 
ginning his eighth, declared for " no reelection." The 
" suffrage " which had been a myth, could not well be so 
acknowledged ; but " effective suffrage " was now to be 
guaranteed. The public lands were to be opened for small 
buyers on liberal terms. Arrangements were to be made 
for the vast, unproductive, privately-owned tracts to be cut 
up and offered for sale and settlement. The government, so 
it declared, in its concern for the welfare of its people, had 
long contemplated these reforms of a system which Mexico 
had outgrown. Mexico had become a great nation. The 
economic systems of the world had been studied to discover 
the fairest and most successful for the citizens of the Mexi- 
can Republic. Viva Mexico ! 

It is difficult to comprehend the amazement of the Mexi- 
can people, and of the resident foreigners, at these mani- 
festos of a government which had ruled by fear. If this 
was the best that the great Limantour could provide, the 
Diaz regime must be tottering and the revolution of " Don 
Panchito " was indeed a serious matter. Americans who 
had manifested no outward anxiety, rather had been amused 
at government inaction, now wore a troubled air. Was the 
Diaz government then but a bubble? 

The subsidized press of the capital lauded the govern- 
ment's liberal attitude. Everything the people had de- 
manded had been granted them. If the little Francisco, 
the Diaz organs piped, was honest In his statements, he 
would now cease making trouble. If he continued, he 
could no longer claim to be a patriot. Nothing remained 
for him to fight for, except to further his own evil ambi- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 71 

tions. Many columns of this argument were printed and 
no voice was louder for the government than that of the 
one American daily, which was a loyal supporter of Diaz 
and of Limantour — for a just and true consideration of 
1 100 pesos a month. El Iniparcial was getting 5400. 

A government which had thus publicly adopted a paternal 
and benevolent attitude toward its people could not at once 
reverse itself by summary treatment of those who argued 
the case. Meetings were held in the streets, in which the 
government was accused of double dealing by speakers 
who were not jailed. This made the people bolder. The 
meetings were broken up by the police, but the methods 
employed did not possess their old snap. The mounted 
gendarmes rode through and told them to disperse. To 
those who did not move they applied the flat of their sabers 
instead of the edge or the point as formerly. What did the 
people want? the newspapers asked, now that the govern- 
ment had conceded their open demands. Presently the 
answer came : " The resignation of Porfirio Diaz," 

It was a faint murmur at first, but day by day it grew 
louder. Posters demanding the Diaz resignation were 
pasted at night on fences and buildings. Processions car- 
rying rudely painted banners to the same effect marched 
through the streets. Opposition newspapers ventured out 
with similar demands. Nothing happened to them. One 
newspaper made a blunder: it attacked the War Depart- 
ment and Limantour, and was promptly sealed up. Its 
editors were jailed. The name of Diaz no longer was 
sacred, but some other name was. Limantour said it was 
that of the Minister of War. The Minister of War said 
nothing. 

On April 20 a five-days' armistice was arranged, but 
nothing came of it. As the month of April neared its close, 
it became generally understood that the Maderistas were 



72 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

winning their battles in the North. Almost bloodless battles 
they were, for the federal troops refused to fight against 
them. Surrender or evacuation of positions was the usual 
outcome of a hostile meeting. Cheers for Madero were 
beginning to be heard on Mexico City streets, but not, as 
yet, in close proximity to the police. The Diaz yoke was 
being slowly lifted from the people's necks. 

Then Diaz made another pronouncement, not without 
pathos. He would resign when he could do so " conscien- 
tiously." Let the insurgents lay down their arms, let peace 
reign throughout the country — his resignation would then 
be forthcoming. He could not desert his people in the hour 
of their need. He must pilot them into smoother waters. 
Then he would go. 

It was before the Chamber of Deputies that he made 
these statements, having ridden there in his state carriage 
for the purpose, and it was my fortune to stand at the 
corner of Avenida San Francisco as he passed. He was 
attended by twelve outriders of his presidential guard. As 
usual their blue uniforms were spick-and-span, their silver 
helmets polished to glistening brightness. With difficulty 
they held their spirited horses to the deliberate pace of the 
coach. 

The top of the coach was lowered, and contrary to his 
custom, Diaz sat alone. He wore a black civilian suit and 
tall hat. The few people who had halted at the street in- 
tersection, waiting for passage through, were all that had 
gathered. Not a cheer was uttered. There was none who 
bowed or uncovered. Straight ahead, with his stern fea- 
tures set in grim determination, the aged dictator stared as 
he rode along on what proved to be his last visit to the 
Chamber. When he had gone by, the people on the street 
passed unconcernedly on about their business. The man 
who but a few weeks before would have been greeted with 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 73 

outbursts of applause wherever he moved, had ceased to 
interest them. 

His latest announcement was openly jeered. Since when 
had Porfirio Diaz possessed a conscience? the people asked. 
What of the despicable Corral, his vice-president? Would 
Diaz carry Corral with him in the same satchel with his 
conscience? What of the Cientificos, the ring of blood- 
suckers which had absorbed the nation's wealth and con- 
trolled every good place in the government? What of the 
governors of states, those one time retail bandits promoted 
to the wholesale grade and made immune from the law? 
The " smoother water " he and his crew were guiding them 
to was the river of death. Abajo Diaz ! Viva Madero ! 

In the Chamber of Deputies farcical and fierce debates 
were held in which members loudly proclaimed their inde- 
pendence. Recriminating charges were freely exchanged. 
" Thou also wert of those who haunted the ante-rooms of 
' Cadena Street ' " was a frequent retort between members 
as the rats scampered to desert the Diaz ship. All Mexico 
knew that every member of the Chamber wore the Diaz 
tag. It laughed at these antics. Diaz sycophants of good 
and regular standing pointed the finger of scorn at " Por- 
firistas." Men who had done valiant service for the com- 
mercial ring hurled the word " Cientifico " at orators who 
ranted of a square deal. It was the open season for vaude- 
ville at the Chamber. 

The opposition press grew more and more outspoken. 
One satirist in a Mexico City journal declared that no one 
was more astonished than Diaz himself to discover that the 
iron hand was a hand of putty. Proceeding, he said that 
Diaz awoke one morning and peeping through the slats saw 
the people making a demonstration. Listening, the great 
dictator heard shouts of " Viva Madero ! " and waited for 
the rattle of musketry with which his troops would avenge 



74 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

the insult to himself. The cheers continuing, he called his 
chiefs of departments together and wild with rage de- 
manded the truth. Informed for the first time of the 
Madero gains, he bellowed orders that his entire army be 
called into immediate action. 

Alas, the facts could no longer be concealed. Every 
available man had gone to the front. The force retained 
at the capital was already insufficient for defense. Stunned 
to speechlessness he sat for minutes staring at one and 
another about him, his dark Indian eyes narrowing in the 
heat of an anger that all his life had called for the shedding 
of blood. In cold, sharp, incisive tones, he asked his ques- 
tions. Each answer was a stab. There were 50,000 men 
on the rolls of the standing army, but 36,000 were men of 
straw. They had been equipped and maintained, but they 
were myths. The great sums expended had gone into pri- 
vate pockets. Those whom he had befriended had betrayed 
him for personal gain. It was retribution, said the satirist, 
for his own evil deeds. 

This picture is too simple to be veracious. Obviously 
Diaz must have been awake to many of the pressing diffi- 
culties of his situation when Limantour in response to re- 
peated calls returned from Europe. It is believed, how- 
ever, by those best qualified to judge, that Diaz still 
hoped to control Mexico, arrange the presidential succes- 
sion, and dictate the policies to be pursued, until the vanity 
of those hopes was revealed to him in the first conference 
with the returned Minister. Some say that Limantour 
exaggerated the difficulties, but if so Diaz could not dis- 
prove the statements, and circumstances were corrobora- 
tive. 

A great change had taken place in the relative positions 
of the President and the Minister since their last interview, 
eight months previously. Then Diaz was looking forward 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 75 

to the new glories which the centennial celebrations would 
add to his name and the advice of Limantour, already im- 
paired in inOuence, had fallen upon inattentive ears ; but now 
the dictator's hope for the solution of vexing problems rested 
in the Finance Minister, and his words must be heeded. 
Beyond question Limantour used his advantage ; he had 
planned his course, and his reception by the people con- 
firmed him in it. Immediate action had been called for and 
he did not hesitate to make known what form that action 
must take. Concessions to the people, already recorded, 
were the sum and substance of the Limantour policy. 

On May 10, the Madero " army " advanced upon Cuidad 
Juarez, opposite El Paso, Texas, and occupied that import- 
ant port of entry after the federals had made a brief show 
of resistance. Censorship at Mexico City having been 
practically suspended, news of the fall of Juarez was 
promptly printed in all newspapers and the capital did not 
attempt to restrain its enthusiasm. Open and unchecked 
cheers for Madero rang through Mexico City streets, 
coupled with demand for the resignation of Diaz. 

A conference was held on May 15 alongside the Guggen- 
heim smelter at El Paso, between commissioners of the 
Diaz government and the Madero managers. A protocol 
of peace was drawn up and was signed on May 21. Few 
of those participating knew that they were carrying out a 
program previously cut and dried. Maderistas de- 
murred at the Diaz suggestion of de la Barra for interim 
president pending an election. But Francisco Madero, 
Senior, and his two sons, overcame the opposition of the 
others and the bargain was struck. The cabinet was to be 
made up of Maderistas, but the provisional presidency was 
to follow the order of succession which the constitution 
prescribed. De la Barra, who had been made Minister of 
Foreign Relations in the Diaz cabinet changes of the pre- 



^(, THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

ceding month, would automatically become acting president 
when the resignations of Diaz and Corral should be placed 
before Congress and accepted. 

The plan did not please the bulk of the people. They 
could see no reason why Madero should not at once take 
office. That this would have been a high-handed measure 
and unconstitutional did not impress them. They smelled 
a Diaz trick, de la Barra being an aristocrat of the Diaz 
plutocracy. Their idea of the constitution was more than 
vague. They had heard that Madero was wedded to it and 
some of them took the statement literally. In my pres- 
ence a peon servant was asked by his employer in the 
plainest terms, what the Mexican constitution was, and 
his answer " La esposa de Madero " — the wife of Madero 
— was illuminating in its ingenuousness. 

But Maderista leaders and Maderistas of intelligence all 
through Mexico took the cue from the consent of the 
Maderos themselves and helped the unlettered to under- 
stand. By the 20th of May while yet the peace agreement 
was not signed there was general acceptance of the ar- 
rangements that had been made, and clamor for the Diaz 
resignation was loud and insistent. Parades of pa jama- 
clothed peons marched everywhere by day and by night 
through the streets of the capital. Small bodies they were 
of men and boys, sometimes fifty, sometimes two or three 
hundred. Occasionally there was a drum, but usually the 
music for the march was made on a tin vessel normally for 
domestic uses. 

They did no damage except to buildings in course of 
construction. From these they wrested rude staves which 
they carried at their shoulders. Poverty in the last degree 
was evident in the peon parades, but the paraders knew 
what they wanted and they said so fearlessly — the resig- 
nation of Porfirio Diaz. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 'JJ 

Foreign residents of Mexico City who had passed 
through various degrees of anxiety, and who had been re- 
assured by the outcome of the El Paso conference, were 
alarmed at these demonstrations. Every place of business 
was barricaded. At any moment the parading hundreds 
might combine, and there was no knowing what a peon 
mob would do just then to force recognition of their de- 
mands. Few Americans or Europeans believed that the 
" renouncement " of Diaz would ever be written. The fic- 
tion of the dictator's " iron hand " and his indomitable cour- 
age had taken deep root and was generally accepted as fact. 
" The old warrior will die with his back against the wall," 
they said, " but he will never resign." 

Day after day passed and the resignation was not forth- 
coming, though each day rumors of its delivery to Con- 
gress ran from mouth to mouth. The tension constantly 
tightened. Parades held the right of way through the 
city. Foreigners were threatened because they owned the 
great stores. Cientificos were threatened because of their 
beautiful homes. Impending calamity was in the air. So 
the fever culminated in the great riot of May 24. 

The Plaza de la Constitucion, in which the riot occurred, 
is an open space in the heart of the City of Mexico about 
twice as large as Union Square in the City of New York 
or Trafalgar Square in London. It is bounded on the 
north by the Cathedral, on the east by the Palacio Nacional, 
on the south by the Palacio Municipal and business struc- 
tures, and on the west by business structures only. The 
most important street of the city, Avenida San Francisco, 
leads from the center of the western side in a straight line 
west for half a mile to the uncompleted National Theater. 
Here it widens into the Avenida Benito Juarez, which at 
the end of another half mile curves majestically at the 
equestrian statue of Carlos IV of Spain — best known to 



78 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Americans as " The Iron Horse " — into the broad and 
beautiful Paseo de la Reforma, the exquisitely kept and 
shaded boulevard extending for a mile and a half to the 
historic Castle and Park at Chepultepec. 

In the middle of the Plaza de la Constitucion is a little 
park called the zocalo with the band-stand in its center. 
North, south and east of the plaza lie the more ancient 
parts of the city, wherein bands of paraders formed all day 
long on that 24th of May. With a new alacrity in their 
movement they spread over the streets of the center and 
western portions, sweeping along the Paseo, overrunning 
the new foreign residence sections or Colonias, and circling 
back in long detours to " old Mexico " at the far eastern 
end. As they marched, the paraders were recruited to 
many times their original numbers. How many distinct 
bodies were parading one could but guess. At no time 
that day was there a moment when a squad of Maderistas 
was not in sight or within hearing of the Alameda, the 
park of unfailing green alongside Avenida Juarez, west of 
the National Theater. 

The rainy season was well under way and ominous clouds 
made the afternoon dismal, but the rain held off. Those 
in the center of the city toward nightfall could hear volleys 
of musketry over in the north and east. Along Avenida 
San Francisco all business houses were closed, shuttered 
and barred. In narrow, central openings of the barricades 
stood managers or clerks watching the crowds and the 
paraders pressing toward the zocalo. Balconies, roofs and 
windows were crowded with people. In all streets leading 
to the plaza similar conditions prevailed. In front of the 
Diaz residence on Cadena Street, two streets south from 
Avenida San Francisco, was a strong military guard. The 
tension of the town was near the breaking point. 

By six o'clock the noise in the streets had become an in- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 79 

cessant din of catcalls and discordant sounds of pounding 
on tin. By seven the macadam space between the zocalo 
and the Palacio Nacional was filled with peons calling 
aloud upon Diaz to " renounce." The side streets toward 
the east upon which the Palacio abutted for two hundred 
yards were jammed. From all directions the crowd was 
gathering. By eight o'clock the entire plaza seemed filled 
with Mexicans, and the streets from north and west and 
south were a solid mass of people moving toward their goal 
— the Plaza de la Constitucion and the Palacio Nacional. 

On the roof of the Palacio Nacional a dozen machine 
guns stood ready for action. In the towers and on the roof 
of the great cathedral, on the north, were several companies 
of riflemen. On the roofs of the Palacio Municipal and 
the adjoining structures on the south side, a regiment 
crouched behind the parapets waiting for the word of com- 
mand. The long flat roof of the Centro Mercantile, a large 
business building on the west, was manned by two com- 
panies of sharpshooters. Below, in the open square, and 
wedged in the tributary streets was the mob. How many 
were in the mob could not be guessed, but seventy-five 
thousand must fall short of the total. 

Between nine and ten o'clock three separate attempts 
were made by mounted police, issuing from the main en- 
trance of the Palacio Nacional, to effect a passage through 
the clamoring crowd, and each time they were forced back. 
Many of the mob were trampled, many were struck by 
sabers, but the jam was too dense; it would not be pene- 
trated. At each sally quite one-third of the police were 
unhorsed. The mob was armed only with staves; with 
these weapons they made the horses unmanageable. At 
each retreat of the police yells of derision followed them. 

It was about ten o'clock that carnage began. The police 
on the fourth advance began shooting over the heads of 



8o THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

the mob and the mob charged them in earnest. Unmind- 
ful of the many who went down, the peons dragged the 
police from their horses and the real battle was on. All 
across the great arc-lighted square staves were madly wav- 
ing. From a multitude of throats went up blood-curdling 
cries of vengeance. Then into the center of that surging 
mass of human beings the riflemen in the cathedral towers 
poured their fire. No need to aim ; to miss was impossible. 
Almost immediately afterward three of the machine guns 
on the roof of the Palacio Nacional let loose a shower of 
bullets. The peon hosts in the immense square, cursing, 
groaning and dying, were but rats in a trap of death. 

A miracle saved Mexico that night from what bade fair 
to prove a scene of unparalleled butchery. For five min- 
utes the Maxims on the Palacio directed their devastating 
fire full into the mob. It killed and maimed and maddened 
but did not effect a stampede. Yells were fierce but there 
were no deserters, when the heavens opened and a deluge 
of rain drenched the crowd to the skin. The firing ceased, 
but the rain did the work more effectively than the rifles ; 
it cleared the plaza. The storm was several hours over- 
due and it came with accumulated violence. A torrent of 
water fell from the sky that drove the mob in all directions. 
In an incredibly short time the vast crowd had vanished to 
its holes and its hovels, and the thrice-blessed storm was 
raging over a deserted scene. 

Soon through the rain came soldiers with litters and 
carts for the disabled and the dead. Without delay all evi- 
dence of the melee must be hidden. Published accounts 
admitted seven killed and forty wounded. A better esti- 
mate is thirty times those numbers. One reliable person of 
my acquaintance counted a hundred and forty-six bodies 
in one " comiseria " — police station — another had seen a 
heap of dead piled under the portales by the Palacio 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 8i 

]\Iunicipal. Still another man, hemmed in his office back 
of the Palacio Nacional had seen forty-two men killed in 
front of his windows before nightfall — shot down, two 
and three at a time, as they hurried toward the zocalo. 
Including the dead carried away on the backs of friends, 
and the wounded disposed of by the police to save trouble, 
it is probable that two hundred is a moderate estimate of 
the number slain in that riot, before Providence interfered 
with its gentle weapons and stopped the deadly hail. 

And in what manner did Diaz pass these final hours, while 
the nation he had ruled so long was breaking from his grip ? 
In complete oblivion, save for a few minutes of partial con- 
sciousness. He had been contending with a foe closer than 
the mob that rose against his rule, no other than the most 
ancient enemy of man, sheer pain. His delay in signing his 
resignation had not been due wholly to natural reluctance or 
to lingering hope. For some days he had suffered tortures 
from a tooth which, it is said, had been unskilfully treated by 
his dentist. The resignation of Corral, conditional upon the 
president's, came to hand on May 23, but Diaz between 
pain and opiates was incapable of considerate action, and 
the business was put off. 

On the afternoon of the 24th, while the nation waited, and 
the rioters were gathering in the city, the dictator, who had 
at last gained relief from his physical distress tottered feebly 
into the library of his house on Cadena street, and sat down 
at his desk to sign away the power that was so dear to him. 
His wife who had assisted him into the room withdrew to 
avoid the sight of his humiliation. How long he stared at 
that paper, or what attempts he made to set his name to it, 
no one knows, not even himself. Probably quite soon the 
sleep, of which his aged body had been cruelly deprived of 
late, enfolded him irresistibly, and he passed to where lost 
kingdoms, and even youth itself, are won again in dreams. 



82 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Three times his wife looked in upon him as he slept. She 
would not rouse him, and it was after nightfall — when the 
mob had overrun the plaza, and the mischief was under way 
— that he opened his eyes. Still but half awake he was led 
away to bed, and for the whole night he lay in profound 
slumber. It was next morning that he wrote the name of 
Diaz for the last time on an official document. His wife 
stood by his side, steadying his hand. 

On that day, May 25, the City of Mexico was as quiet 
as on any ordinary day of normal times, except for one 
small disturbance in front of the house of Julio Lemantour, 
on Avenida Juarez. There were no parades or demonstra- 
tions. But the silence was not reassuring; it carried a hint 
of the mysterious. In squads of twenty-five, mounted police 
stood for hours at one block's distance from the Chamber of 
Deputies in all directions, and guarded every approach to the 
building where the session was going on. 

Business of importance was being transacted in that 
chamber; actual history was in the making. The resigna- 
tions of Porfirio Diaz as President and of Ramon Corral 
as Vice President of the Mexican Republic v/ere being 
acted upon. The formalities were brief. They were dis- 
posed of in silence and despatch. It was the subsequent 
proceedings that carried the interest, that stirred enthusi- 
asm. Diaz was a dead cock in the pit, but his successor 
was at hand. To him the oath of office must be admin- 
istered. Briefly and solemnly the puppets performed their 
parts ; then came the mighty cheer for Mexico's new Chief 
of State. Viva El Presidente! Viva de la Barra! Viva 
Mexico ! The first act of the comedy was over. 

Within an hour the news had traveled to the furthest 
corner of the capital and the peons who had been quiet all 
day now mustered into line. There was management in 
this, not accident, not spontaneous movement; yet all was 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 83 

joy. By eight o'clock that night a monster parade wound 
through the capital streets. Police, military bodies, stu- 
dents, peons, clerks, participated. Soldiers fraternized 
with the men upon whom the night before they had poured 
a murderous fire. The lion and the lamb walked side by 
side in peace. Cheers for Madero rent the heavens. The 
revolution had won. 

Both nights I had dined at a restaurant on Avenida San 
Francisco, three squares from the zocalo. The second 
night at midnight I walked with a friend along the now 
almost deserted street to its ending at the plaza, scene of 
the vast assemblage and the cruel massacre, so little while 
ago. Perfect peace reigned everywhere ; the square and its 
environs lay deserted under a brilliant moon. 

But even as we moralized over a people who faced bullets 
but who ran from rain, a new sensation was brewing. At 
that hour Diaz in disguise was making his way from his 
town house on Cadena Street to the residence of Governor 
Gonzalez of the State of Mexico. Over beyond the zocalo 
to the east, well past the San Lazaro station of the nar- 
row gauge railway to Vera Cruz, stood a train that had 
been waiting for three days. On the train, watchful and 
ready, was a crew of trusted men. Out on the line ahead 
was an " advance guard " locomotive. On a siding was a 
" follower " train filled with troops, under the command of 
General Victoriano Huerta. 

At two o'clock the Diaz family began to arrive in motor 
cars — Donna Carmen and her maids, Porfirio Diaz, Junior, 
and his father's chief secretary, eight household servants 
and endless baggage. Quick work was made in loading. 
Soon there came two motor cars bearing sympathizing 
friends to say farewell. 

At half past two the big yellow automobile of Governor 
Gonzalez showing but one small path-finding headlight. 



84 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

dashed alongside. From it emerged a muffled figure. 
There were hasty embraces with the waiting friends, and 
as the figure mounted the steps of the Pullman, the wheels 
of the train began to revolve. Porfirio Diaz, dictator of 
Mexico, had fled from his capital. 



CHAPTER V 

SO the grandson of Evaristo Madero rose to power in 
jNIexico and lifted the Madero clan to a disconcerting 
eminence; and it is quite certain that few persons in 
that country or out of it were more astonished than the 
clan itself at the success of Francisco's stupendous adven- 
ture. 

The aged grandfather, founder of the family, had suc- 
cumbed under the strain of anxiety; he died seven weeks 
before the flight of Diaz, in the belief that the entire clan 
was doomed to disaster and its princely possessions to con- 
fiscation. He had been a very notable figure, old Evaristo 
Madero, a man of sterling integrity, a builder in every sense 
of the word; prudent, and energetic, ambitious for the 
Madero name, that it should neither perish nor be associ- 
ated with failure. When he died at Monterrey on April 6, 
191 1, at the age of eighty-two, he left fourteen children, 
thirty-four grandchildren, and fifty-six great grandchildren. 
His property in land was three hundred square leagues 
(about 1,728,000 acres). 

Most of the land he had purchased as early as 1872 at 
eight or ten cents an acre and had used for cattle raising 
and agriculture on a large scale. The building of the 
National and International railways between 1880 and 1889 
opened the resources of Northern Mexico for develop- 
ment, and Evaristo's holdings became very valuable. 
Since his death they have been divided among the imme- 
diate heirs. His sons and grandsons have acquired land 
on their own account; the daughters and granddaughters 

8s 



86 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

have married men who owned or have purchased large 
tracts, and many parcels in the guayule rubber districts 
have been taken under lease. Altogether the area now 
controlled by the Maderos and the families that have inter- 
married with them is three or four times that owned in fee 
by the head of the family at his death. 

Evaristo Madero was interested quite heavily in bank- 
ing and industrial enterprises, but spent nearly all his time 
in his country home at Parras, Coahuila, from which place 
he supervised the management of the extensive rubber 
properties, factories, vineyards, wine-presses, ranches and 
cotton plantations which steadily broadened as his sons 
joined him in the various enterprises. 

He held aloof from politics as far as he was able, and 
steadily counseled his sons to do likewise. His one politi- 
cal experience, three years as governor of Coahuila, had 
been thrust upon him, and had proved so disagreeable that, 
although elected for four years, he declined to serve out 
his term. The four years were the same as those in which 
Manuel Gonzales was nominal president of Mexico from 
1880 to 1884, but in 1883 Evaristo Madero resigned his 
ofifice and returned to his home in Parras. 

It was a shock to him when his grandson Francisco be- 
came inspired with a sense of political duty and began to 
give voice to his advanced theories of government. Fran- 
cisco had been educated in the United States and he drew 
comparisons unfavorable to Mexico. He was convinced, 
he said, that Mexico could never become a really great 
nation unless the lower classes should be allowed fairer 
opportunities. A nation, eighty-five per cent, of whose 
people were illiterate was out of place in the twentieth 
century, said he; it must progress or it would lose its 
identity. 

Upon this foundation he built his plan of a government 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 87 

in which oppression of the poor, injustice of courts and 
despotic militarism should have no part. The rule of Por- 
firio Diaz, he said, was more than monarchial, it was a 
tyranny which none dared oppose. As long as the central 
power could dictate the government of states, no better- 
ment need be expected. While a president of the nation 
could perpetuate himself in office, the people of the nation 
would be slaves. 

All this was understood by the grandfather ; but that old 
gentleman had seen Mexico grow from a chaotic mass to 
a well coordinated system, and he believed that another 
generation or two must pass before radical reforms could 
be introduced. The patriarch, and his sons too, were in- 
clined to be conservative, but young Francisco was of the 
third generation more open to modern influences, and he 
could not be satisfied to see progress wait till tyranny had 
exhausted itself. His studies and his reading made clear 
to him that the spirit of freedom was stirring oppressed 
people everywhere in the old world; why must Mexico be 
content? More and more the need for action became a 
personal demand upon him ; what better thing could he do 
with his life, he asked, than devote it to the regeneration 
of his country? 

His first active opposition to the established order was 
in 1905 when he applied himself to furthering the candi- 
dacy of Doctor Garcia Fuentes, a man of progressive ideas, 
for the governorship of Coahuila. He canvassed the state 
in the interest of Fuentes and aroused great enthusiasm for 
his man, ' while Governor Cardenas, who desired reelec- 
tion was very generally hated and despised. Nevertheless 
Cardenas was renominated and, after the Mexican fashion, 
elected unanimously. 

The system did it. Nominations were made by the vari- 
ous jefes politicos of the state who were the governor's 



88 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

own appointees. Elections were carried on under their 
supervision. Doctor Garcia Fuentes merely achieved the 
result of making himself ridiculous — and a marked man. 

The experience, however, was illuminating to Francisco 
Madero, Junior, who understood now more clearly than be- 
fore the absolute power of the political machine which 
ruled the country. With this system in operation every- 
where, no reform was possible. 

The only remedy was a complete national overturn. Por- 
firio Diaz and the Cientificos must give place. They boasted 
that the byways of Mexico were safer than Hyde Park 
in London, that the burglar and the brigand had gone out 
of business. There was truth in this, said Madero; it was 
not the highwayman or the housebreaker that was feared; 
it was the Diaz bandit in office. 

He enlarged the scope of his labors and in doing so used 
all his own available funds. His father and grandfather, 
alarmed by his audacity, would not aid him. He owned a 
house in Monterrey which he had bought with money re- 
alized from cotton raised on land allotted to his use from 
the Madero estate. He mortgaged this house and spent 
the meager proceeds in his enormous task of assailing an 
intrenched and powerful tyranny. His wife, Sara Perez 
Madero, entered into his plans with her whole heart. They 
had no children; they would adopt the oppressed children 
of Mexico. 

The apprehension of the elders of the clan was well 
founded. As has already been told, the widespread inter- 
ests of the family were embargoed early in 1910 by the 
Diaz government. Against their convictions, and to their 
infinite distress of mind, the Maderos found themselves 
committed to the hopeless revolutionary enterprise of Fran- 
cisco, Junior, and believed themselves doomed to ruin. 
Francisco, Senior, eldest son of Evaristo, gave up hope. 




FRANCISCO I. MADEKO, SR. 

Father of President Madero. Eldest son of the late Evaristo 
Madero, founder of the family. 




FRANCISCO I. ]MADERO, JR. 

Inaugurated President of Mexico, Nov. 6, 1911. Deposed by 
vlolenee Feb. 18, 1913. Murdered Feb. 22, 191.3. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 89 

He wrote to those of his younger sons who were away at- 
tending college, that they all must face poverty and be pre- 
pared to go to work, for the family property was irre- 
trievably lost. One son, Carlos, at college in Geneva, 
Switzerland, studying forestry, expressed the loyal senti- 
ment of himself and brothers. 

" Never mind, father," he wrote in answer. " We will 
all work hard and support you and mother. I am ready to 
begin at once." 

Gustavo Madero, the reformer's brother, was the only 
member of the family to join the black sheep who had 
brought all this trouble about, and to risk, so early, his life 
for the cause. He was naturally an adventurous person, 
though he had attained the age of thirty-five without dis- 
playing this trait in any large way. He looked very unlike 
a Mexican, with his smooth shaven face, light brown hair 
and blue eyes — the left eye made of glass, a fact uncom- 
monly difficult to detect. 

He was in a printing business in Monterrey at this time. 
The money to buy it had been obtained from a cotton 
acreage set apart for him by his father. This business was 
now included in the general embargo by virtue of which 
nothing a Madero owned could be sold or mortgaged. 
Lands, factories, crops, mines, cattle, merchandise, all these 
the Maderos possessed, but no cash. 

It was then that Gustavo took the lead; the situation 
was desperate and some one must act. But the project he 
engaged in was as fantastic a gamble in long chances as any 
ever undertaken. 

In January, 1910, a man named Henri Rochette was car- 
rying on at No. i Rue St. Georges in Paris, a branch of the 
Banco Franco-Espanol of Madrid. Rochette, who has at- 
tained since then a wide notoriety, was at that date in dis- 
favor with the Paris Bourse on account of the disastrous 



90 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

collapse of certain mining and industrial companies which 
he had floated with capitalizations reaching to many millions 
of francs, and was desirous of securing some well authenti- 
cated offering as a card of reentry to public and official 
favor. 

A mining company in Mexico had been corresponding 
with Rochette in an endeavor to interest him in a large 
bond issue on its properties, and Rochette despatched an 
agent, one M. Carbonneau, to look the proposition over. 
M. Carbonneau was not long in discovering that he could 
not, at that juncture, recommend to his principal the big 
issue of bonds which the mining company wished to float, 
and was about to return home when Gustavo encountered 
him in Monterrey and asked him to look into a railway con- 
cession in the state of Zacatecas. 

Gustavo had secured this concession from an English- 
man named Cooper. It carried the right to build and op- 
erate a railway from Gomez Farias, a station on the Na- 
tional Railway, to Comacho on the Mexican Central, on the 
opposite side of the state of Zacatecas, thus connecting the 
two great trunk lines of Mexico. 

The country to be crossed by the railway offered no 
great engineering difficulties, but it produced little except 
cactus, while inhabitants, other than jack rabbits, it had 
none. Still it was a short cut between two productive sec- 
tions and might assist in developing the state; and Gustavo, 
with the cooperation of the governor of Zacatecas, secured 
a guarantee by the state of the interest charges on a bond 
issue of 27,000 Mexican pesos a kilometer, or 6,210,000 
pesos for the two hundred and thirty kilometers — one 
hundred and forty-three miles — of the line, sufficient to 
build the road and provide it with a modest equipment. 

This interested M. Carbonneau, who took up the matter 
by cable with Henri Rochette and closed for 3,900,000 pesos 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 91 

of the issue at 72. A railway company called " The Mexi- 
can Railway of the Center," capitalized at 3,000,000 pesos, 
was promptly formed by Gustavo, with his father as presi- 
dent, his cousin, Rafael Hernandez, as vice-president, him- 
self and his uncle, Alfonso Madero, as directors, the other 
two being the manager and a clerk of the Bank of Nuevo 
Leon in Monterrey, an institution controlled by the Madero 
family. Matters were at this stage when Francisco Ma- 
dero, Junior, was imprisoned for sedition and members of 
the Madero clan were at their wits' end. 

Gustavo looked the situation squarely in the face and 
promptly decided what to do. The bond underwriting of 
the railway provided cash — that cash must be applied to 
save the family and win the revolution. The revolutionary 
project was entirely without organization as yet and the 
soul of the movement was the imprisoned brother. But 
organization involved little besides labor, and Francisco 
would presently be released, so Gustavo argued as he made 
his plans. -The really important thing was to secure physi- 
cal possession of money and by means which would involve 
no one's honor except his own. With money, all things 
were possible. 

The bond underwriting of 3,900,000 pesos at ^2 would 
net 2,800,000 pesos. Gustavo succeeded in persuading him- 
self that with this fund in hand or any approximate sum in 
actual cash, the revolution could be carried to success, and 
that the treasury of Mexico would reimburse him for all 
outlays. The money could then be restored to the treasury 
of the railway which would go forward to completion with 
increased rapidity as the favorite of the government, and 
to operation which that government could easily make 
abundantly profitable. But how could he secure personal 
control of the money without committing the others ? 

This question he solved by means of a construction com- 



92 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

pany in which no member of the family appeared. The 
cash would be paid to the railway company by the under- 
writing bankers and must then be transferred to the con- 
struction company. This he must manage without co;qi- 
mitting the railway company's officers. Withdrawing the 
funds from the construction company would then be easy. 
And as for restoration, the revolution would take care of 
that. 

Avoiding a full disclosure of his plans to those of his 
relatives who were directors in the railway, Gustavo, in 
May, 1910, accompanied M. Carbonneau to New York, to 
which point drafts from Paris to the amount of $375,000 
or 750,000 pesos had been forwarded by Henri Rochette 
as the first payment on account of the underwriting. This 
sum appearing wholly inadequate to Gustavo, he induced 
Carbonneau to go with him to Paris to see Rochette. 

Early in June the two men arrived in Paris, where they 
remained for two fruitless months. Rochette would not or 
could not advance a larger amount until actual construction 
of the railway was begun. The first week of August found 
Gustavo and Carbonneau returning to New York, where 
they arrived on the 13th. The following day Carbonneau 
turned over to Gustavo the $375,000, which the latter de- 
posited in a New York trust company to his own credit, 
dispensing with all the formalities he had originally planned. 
Four days afterwards he was in Mexico. 

He was well assured in his own mind that the sum he 
had received was too small for the bold operation he had 
planned; with millions all could be accomplished, but with 
a third of a million the effort would be a fruitless hazard 
of his honor and reputation. But twenty-four hours later 
he threw discretion to the winds. The family situation 
was more desperate than ever ; it must be relieved at all haz- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 93 

ards, and the only effective way to do this was by utterly 
destroying the Diaz government. 

The Madero Idea had made much progress during the 
three months he had been away. Francisco was still in 
prison, but that very fact had been an eloquent pleader. 
Wherever two or three peons gathered, the talk was all of 
Madero. When he should be released all the oppressed in 
Mexico would rally around him with any weapons they 
could find. Let some one in whom they had confidence 
help them prepare. 

All this was explained to Gustavo as soon as he reached 
Monterrey and he was not proof against the demand. Come 
what would the revolution should go on ; he would back the 
popular sentiment of Mexico with the pitiful sum of money 
in his possession against the Cientificos, the army, and the 
treasury of Diaz, the despot. 

He loaned a third of his small capital to relieve the fam- 
ily distress; then he took the road from town to town. 
Traveling steadily through Mexico while the Centennial 
celebration was in progress at the capital in the month of 
September, he organized Madero clubs in all sections. 
There is no doubt of Gustavo's personal magnetism or his 
ability as a political organizer. The secret of his move- 
ments was well guarded and the thoroughness of his work 
was unsuspected. On October i Gustavo was arrested in 
Mexico City charged with attempted bribery of an army 
officer. The charge was a subterfuge and three days later 
he was released. After arranging with an Italian gentle- 
man of the capital to offer bail for Francisco, Gustavo made 
all speed for the border and on October 14 met his brother 
in San Antonio, whither the latter had traveled in disguise 
as soon as the bail, eight thousand pesos, had been accepted. 
From that time forward Gustavo and his father were the 



94 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

active financial managers of the revolution, with headquar- 
ters in New York. 

■^ Many stories have been printed and direct charges made 
that revolutionary capital to the amount of millions was 
furnished by American corporations to aid Madero. The 

v^ stories were fables and the charges unfounded. There was 
logic behind them but no facts. This was not due to Gus- 
tavo's unwillingness to receive such help or his failure to 
solicit it, since for many weeks he besought bankers and cor- 
poration men in vain. Not one of them would take the 
risk of being charged later on with having contributed to 
this cause. Perhaps a more potent reason for their declina- 
tion was the apparent hopelessness of the Madero move- 
ment. 

/ To the Standard Oil Company, Gustavo offered five mil- 
lions of repudiated bonds which had been issued nearly 
half a century ago by General Carbajal, who served under 
Benito Juarez. The general was held to have exceeded his 
authority, and the issue became worthless. The bonds were 
to be recognized at face value by the Mexican government if 
Madero won. All the junta at Washington were to sign the 
agreement to this effect. One million dollars, or one-fifth of 
the par value, was the sum Gustavo asked of the Standard 
Oil Company. The same offer he made to the Waters 
Pierce Oil Company in St. Louis, and to various other cor- 
porations and bankers with present or prospective interests 
in Mexico. Not one of them would rise to the bait. Not 
a dollar of American money, or any other money, except 
\ that belonging to the railway did Gustavo secure. 

The committee of the United States Senate appointed to 
investigate this matter searched for two years in vain for 
evidence to fasten financial assistance to Madero upon 
" persons or firms or corporations of the United States." 
The committee learned something of the railway fund, but 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 95 

the amount seemed utterly inadequate. The thing which 
had been accompHshed by the ]\Iadero revolution had cost 
millions, the committee argued. Such a sweeping overturn 
must have involved an immense outlay for arms alone. If 
the gentlemen of the committee had known the inner his- 
tory of the fall of Diaz, the affair would not have ap- 
peared in so mysterious a light. 

A Canadian lumber company admitted to a representa- 
tive of the committee that it had contributed $30,000 to 
Pino Suarez for certain rights to mahogany in Yucatan, 
but it could not be established that even this sum was used in 
the interests of the Madero cause. It is certain that none 
of it passed through Gustavo's hands. 

Gustavo paid $55,000 for arms and $50,000 to Sherbourne 
G. Hopkins of Washington as counsel for the revolution. 
The arms were sent forward in three shipments, the larg- 
est of which did not arrive till after peace had been estab- 
lished. The two smaller shipments were all that were 
received from sources outside of Mexico itself. Hopkins 
accomplished nothing of importance in return for his fee. 

Organization expenses in Mexico, junta expenses in San 
Antonio and Washington, publicity costs in the United 
States, and the thousand and one incidentals of the enter- 
prise used up Gustavo's little fund. As has been stated the 
balance in hand was only $1,500 at the time when the 
meeting with Limantour took place, and it had dwindled 
to $1,200 at the end. 

The repayment of the funds abstracted from the railway 
treasury by Gustavo was included in the peace agreement 
signed by the delegates of Diaz and Madero at El Paso 
on May 21, 191 1, but the source from which Gustavo had 
secured the money was not named. Giving this item such 
importance seemed to stamp the Maderos as greedy men; 
it could not be openly set forth that warrants were out for 



96 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Gustavo in the United States in connection with these funds, 
and that no time must be lost in repayment of them. 

An appropriation to refund 700,000 pesos to Gustavo 
Madero for advances he had made was passed by the 
Mexican Congress among its first acts after de la Barra 
succeeded to the presidency. This evoked comment from 
one end of Mexico to the other and was the foundation 
upon which Gustavo's reputation as a grafter was built. 

Among the injudicious acts of the Maderos this hasty 
and obvious reimbursing of Gustavo takes high rank. The 
family owed this brother of Francisco Madero a debt of 
gratitude. It would have been easy for them to arrange 
a loan at the moment of their victory to shield Gustavo's 
character from attack. Later on an adjustment of the mat- 
ter could have been made. Much adverse peon sentiment 
was based upon this badly managed affair, which was never 
allowed to disappear from view while Madero ruled. 



CHAPTER VI 

IN describing the overthrow of Diaz I have dealt very 
hghtly with the influences exerted by and through the 
State Department at Washington. There is no doubt 
that the framers of poHcy, both official and unofficial, had 
lost in a few months their good will toward the Mexican 
dictator, and had come to desire that he should be deposed 
and that a man more amenable to control should take his 
place; but de la Barra was their candidate, not Madero. 
De la Barra had given satisfactory assurances on the 
Japanese question, and was acceptable to business interests. 
He was not the man to involve his country in trouble with 
the United States, but there was no longer any confidence 
to be reposed in Diaz. The latter might force interven- 
tion which many desired, but which no one in authority 
dared undertake. 

Francisco Madero, the younger, was undesirable for 
many reasons, in regard to some of which the views of 
Washington statesmen and their advisers were contradic- 
tory. It was said that Madero was a reformer of the 
type peculiarly obnoxious to the Taft administration and 
to Americans having large investments in Mexico. On the 
other hand it was asserted that he and his family — espe- 
cially the latter — were seeking to control the government 
from purely selfish motives, and would inaugurate an era 
of graft. There were those who even went so far as to 
view the prospect of Madero's ascendency with com- 
placence, because of their belief that he and the men who 
would serve him could be bought. 

97 



98 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

But what Washington hoped for was that de la Barra 
might retain the presidential seat for a considerable time, 
and that the Madero upheaval might subside, so that when 
an " election " should finally be held, a safe and sane man 
would be counted in. It is alleged that there was an un- 
derstanding between Diaz and de la Barra, with the ap- 
proval of the Taft administration, prior to March 7, 191 1, 
but so far as Diaz is concerned this is an error, De la 
Barra knew that he would have the approval of the United 
States, if he should succeed to the Mexican presidency as 
provisional incumbent, but Diaz was not a party to the 
bargain. He meant to remain in office, and if the proper 
measures had been taken in his behalf he might have held 
the place against anything except armed intervention by 
the United States. 

I have described his government as undermined, and 
as falling with every evidence of its inherent weakness ; 
and I have elsewhere spoken of it as solvent and as power- 
ful beyond comparison with the rebellion that assailed it. 
There is no real contradiction in this. The Diaz autocracy 
was doomed, in default of vigorous and radical action in 
its defense. Fraud and incompetency had weakened the 
military arm. But money can recruit soldiers, buy muni- 
tions, and even hire competent officers, and Limantour 
could have secured all the funds that Mexico needed for 
these purposes. Beyond question the Madero revolt might 
have been conquered in the field, if the central government 
could have been protected from external foes. And if 
de la Barra could give pledges satisfactory to the Taft 
administration, Limantour could have given them equally 
well, and could have forced their acceptance upon Diaz. 
Washington would then have been left with no cause for 
aggression except that which has since proved to be so 
embarrassing — resentment toward an individual. It is 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 99 

obvious that Diaz, as an object of personal disfavor, would 
have attracted far more sympathy than has accrued to 
Huerta. 

The Madero movement, considered as a political wave, 
rolled up by agitation against economic abuses, need not 
have been permitted to overwhelm the government. It is 
my opinion that the elimination of Corral alone would 
have sufficed. Unquestionably it was essential, and no 
plan to save Diaz which did not have this as its first article, 
can be said to have been good. In fact I have the greatest 
difficulty in understanding how a plan which lacked this 
feature could have been conceived in sincerity. Everybody 
knew that Corral must be thrown overboard. No other 
Jonah was ever so reliably guaranteed to sink a ship of state. 

The land question which many American observers be- 
lieve to be the simple root of Mexican revolts is in reality 
so complicated that it lends itself to policies of delay and 
subterfuge. Seriously considered, the merit of any pro- 
gram depends upon the method of solution which it con- 
tains. The mere proposal to take land from large holders 
and give it to landless men would never prevail, even in 
such a country of general ignorance as Mexico. Persons 
having some regard for property rights and legal procedure 
would exercise a controlling influence, though outnum- 
bered. The distribution of so-called public lands is con- 
fused by state rights, and involves reform of state govern- 
ments. Whether public or private lands are considered, 
there is no validity in promises unbacked by a good work- 
ing plan, hostile alike to existing wrongs and to sentimental 
clamor for spoliation. Even in so poor a field for intel- 
ligent discussion the too enthusiastic land scheme of 
Madero could have been beaten, if the government had met 
the issue boldly and sincerely. 

But affectation of sincerity was useless and nonsensical 



100 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

while Corral and all he stood for were retained, and a 
cabinet which stood for nothing in particular was installed. 
The timidity of the proceeding was so obvious that it 
evoked laughter, even from business men who were disap- 
pointed and alarmed. Every Maderista from the leader 
to the humblest of his followers felt a sense of personal 
triumph as the government's weakness was exposed more 
and more thoroughly to view. Direct antagonism to Diaz 
was enormously stimulated, and his fall was made inevita- 
ble. 

It came, and the suave Minister of Foreign Relations 
took the vacant chair; but this seeming victory was really 
a defeat for those who had hoped to prolong de la Barra's 
provisional term, and to evolve from that situation some- 
thing more agreeable than the presidency of Madero. The 
manner in which Diaz was unseated had so strengthened 
the Madero Idea that the Washington Idea had no 
chance against it in the Mexican political arena. 
And with de la Barra in the seat of Diaz there was 
no excuse for forcible interference. Recognition and a 
show of friendliness toward Mexico could not be 
avoided without such obvious double dealing as would 
have turned the stomach of the world. The enemies of 
Madero worked hard, as will be shown more fully here- 
after, but his cause had been too greatly helped and 
had gained too much headway to be quelled in a few 
months. 

These events took place under my observation, and ex- 
cited my interest and amazement. I had great faith in 
Limantour's ability, and still retain it. I saw him come 
to the Mexican capital to extricate Diaz from his troubles, 
with the visible result that every measure which seemed 
to me essential was neglected, almost every possible folly 
was committed, and complete disaster was achieved in 




FRANCISCO LEON DE LA BAERA 

Minister of Foreign Relations and Provisional President of Mexico, 
^Nlay 2o-Nov. 6, 1911. Minister of Foreign Relations in the Huerta 
Cabinet, Feb. 19-July 30, 1913. Since then Minister to France. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO loi 

sixty-six days. This seemed clearly to indicate the exist- 
ence of obstacles unperceived and causes too obscure for 
my discernment. 

And yet it was plain that in some respects Limantour's 
position was difficult. Here was a man preeminent in 
ability, and quietly but very earnestly ambitious of dis- 
tinction, who was playing the leading role, at a crisis of 
the Mexican drama, with no rewards offered him whether 
by men or destiny. He could not then aspire to the presi- 
dency as the immediate successor of Diaz without exciting 
suspicion of disloyalty. Even had this been possible to 
a man of his character, the thing could not have been ac- 
complished, except through directly antagonizing those in- 
fluences at Washington which were behind de la Barra. 

It would seem to have been wise for the State Depart- 
ment at Washington, when conveying to de la Barra the 
intimation that he would be acceptable as provisional presi- 
dent, to send with it a stipulation that Limantour should be 
Minister of Finance. This would not have been agree- 
able to Limantour, but it is probable that his consent could 
have been extorted, if he had seen the autonomy of Mexico 
depending upon it. And if Limantour had in this manner 
been chained to the de la Barra regime, he might have per- 
mitted less to be done that would weaken it, and have 
devised some means by which it could be strengthened. 
In the actual event, de la Barra was left without adequate 
visible support, and the fight against Madero had to be 
made chiefly by secret methods. 

But to some of those divided and uncertain counselors 
who exerted their influence at Washington, the well re- 
membered Limantour was persona non grata. Despite his 
Cientifico affiliation, and good standing with the bankers, 
his too close connection with the new government in 
Mexico would not have been favorably viewed by certain 



102 TriE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

great business interests. There had been notable instances 
of his opposition to the plans of Americans, when they 
seemed to tend toward monopoly — none more telling than 
his rejection of Harriman's ofifer to take over the control of 
the railways. Wherefore there were commercial powers 
standing close to the Taft administration which preferred 
a Mexico without the opposing force of Limantour for 
them to cope with. If they could not have a Mexico with 
the American flag over it, to multiply the value of their 
holdings there by two or three, a president possessing de la 
Barra's amiable qualities would be the best available sub- 
stitute. And this is not to be taken as alleging against 
de la Barra anything worse than weakness. 

It will be seen that Limantour was seriously handicapped 
in his efforts to save Diaz from the consequences of his 
quarrel with the United States and from the menace of a 
revolt which it might be unwise forcibly to put down. Yet 
his procedure seemed to me to be open to severe criticism 
and to involve besides an element of mystery. The truth 
of my text that in Mexico things are never what they seem 
is here borne in upon my own mind potently, for though 
I am entirely persuaded that Limantour was loyal to Diaz, 
his conduct wears an aspect so perverse as to deceive my 
eyes if not my judgment. Following upon his interviews 
with Maderista leaders in New York between March 7 
and March 15, 191 1, his acts in Mexico as reflected in the 
policy of the government from March 20 till Diaz fell, 
curiously resemble the accomplishment of a definite under- 
taking. The cabinet changes, and the hasty, ill managed 
adoption of the revolution's economic platform lifted Ma- 
dero to a position of such advantage that he became almost 
unassailable. Failure to force action in the cases of Corral 
and the bandit governors, together with silence on the 
s^ubject of the jefe politico system, robbed the Diaz pro- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 103 

nouncements of their last claim to credence. As an invita- 
tion to disaster this was truly masterly. 

The foregoing statements charge Limantour with grave 
errors, not with improper motives. I have expressed an 
opinion as to the appearance of his conduct. It astonishes 
me that a man so acute and so jealous of his reputation 
should not have known what his performance looked like, 
while he was about it. 

Criticism was not lacking at the time. Limantour was 
severely censured by the " Porfiristas " for the measures 
which he caused Diaz to adopt, and simultaneously he was 
assailed as a Cientifico by those who were threatening the 
men of the old regime with retribution, declared to be 
long overdue. Scandal mongers revived the stories of the 
railway merger, and added fantastic embellishments. 
When, in the relish of new freedom, harmless but vo- 
ciferous mobs of Maderistas marched in the streets, shout- 
ing vivas for their leader, and muerras for " Los Cien- 
tificos," they often added a special muerra for Limantour. 
It may seem that they should have cheered him for his 
recent acts, even if they were too ignorant to appreciate his 
distinguished services to his country. 

It is possible that his departure was somewhat hastened 
by fears for his personal safety, but popular applause could 
not have induced him to remain. He now saw de la Barra 
as a passing, unimportant figure, with Madero already 
treading on his heels. Despite the muerras of the mob he 
might have been Minister of Finance in the Madero 
Cabinet. The little reformer invited him, but Limantour 
was not tempted. He preferred to view from a distance 
the unfolding of the scroll of fate. 

Limantour's explanation of his course in the spring of 
191 1 is that nothing better could have been done in the 
circumstances ; or, to be more exact, that he was unable 



104 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

at that time to devise and put in operation any measures 
that seemed more promising. To have opposed the Madero 
revolt by military force would have bathed Mexico in blood, 
and might have involved other lamentable consequences 
which no patriot could bring himself to contemplate. 
Peace was essential. 

The elimination of Corral was a subject useless to dis- 
cuss with Diaz, indeed impossible to broach. The adoption 
of the Maderist program of reforms seemed unavoidable 
because of the widespread and aggressive popular support. 
The cabinet was the best that could be brought together. 
Its members were able; they were politically inoffensive, 
and suitable to the obviously correct policy which was con- 
ciliatory. A good government would have resulted, but 
adverse influences were too strong in that hour of excite- 
ment, and the structure was overthrown. He had done 
what he could, actuated by love of country and loyalty 
to its constitutional ruler under whom he served. The 
situation passed beyond his control, beyond the stage 
where his immediate influence could be of value. He with- 
drew, therefore, from contact with public affairs, and 
did not voluntarily exercise his influence upon them after- 
wards, — so he assured me late in the winter of 1914, in 
Paris. 

About three )^ears had elapsed since his departure from 
his native land, seven days after the fall of Diaz. Mexico's 
disordered condition had become the foremost topic for 
the world to talk about, and intervention by the United 
States seemed close at hand. To my request for light upon 
his policy Senor Limantour responded with the question, 
" What would you have done ? " 

Proof sheets of a portion of this book were before him, 
but obviously he addressed all his critics with that ques- 
tion, not myself alone; wherefore I was not unduly flat- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 105 

tered. My reply followed the lines of what I had written, 
and resulted in a protracted discussion. Five hours a day 
for five successive days that man of inexhaustible patience 
listened and spoke, with never a flaw in courtesy. And in 
the end I was unconvinced; the policy still seemed to me 
to have been erroneous, and the constraining power of cir- 
cumstances insufficient to excuse it. For that reason I 
have given only a brief summary of the case from Liman- 
tour's point of view, leaving an extended statement to 
some chronicler possessed of the requisite sympathy and 
conviction. 

After the cause of Diaz was lost Limantour prepared 
for permanent residence abroad, and if this involved a real 
detachment from Mexico's affairs, the decision was ex- 
traordinary. The financial structure which he had built with 
so much devotion and with such pride in the work, he must 
leave to inexperienced men in whom he could have had but 
little confidence. The railway merger whose continuing 
success would depend upon the peace of the country and 
the development of its resources, must be subjected to all 
the hazards faced by the incoming government, whose pre- 
carious existence no one was better qualified than Liman- 
tour to foresee. 

This seems incredible. A man of Limantour's talents 
and character would naturally plan unceasingly for the fu- 
ture. He must have perceived that though the Madero 
Idea had captured Mexico, its exponents in the government 
were confronted by the alternative of carrying out the 
violent economic changes which they had promised or of 
abandoning them with the result of losing popular sup- 
port. An era of treachery and plots was plainly dawn- 
ing. The de la Barra episode would last barely six months, 
but even in that space much trouble would be brewing ; and 
afterwards would come Madero, new to his task, visionary. 



io6 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

sure to be deceived by conspiring enemies and by some of 
his associates who were unscrupulous and hungry. 

Limantour had been too long the chief factor in Mexico's 
commercial advancement to abandon all interest in that 
country's future. The financial world still looked to him 
as the only authority on the national credit. His active 
brain must have been filled with thoughts of possible com- 
binations of men and events that would develop after 
the Madero Idea should have spent itself. Many active 
brains in Mexico were already busy with these problems, 
and many hands were secretly at work to hasten the dis- 
integrating processes which would bring about new situa- 
tions and disclose attractive opportunities. It was in such 
conditions that the de la Barra interlude began. 

With commendable lack of ostentation the prominent 
Cientificos of the Diaz regime removed themselves from the 
local jurisdiction. They were confident of de la Barra's 
intent to protect them, but they did not care to take long 
chances with the sentiment of the people which they doubted 
de la Barra's ability to control. Finance Minister Liman- 
tour, General Mondragon, Cientifico Chief Pineda, Federal 
District Governor Landa y Escandon and various others 
departed from Mexico without ceremony for Paris, London 
and New York. The " Bancaria," the Cientifico clearing 
house and contracting concern, organized a subsidiary com- 
pany in the United States, to which it could transfer its 
property at a moment's notice if threatened with revocation 
of its concessions, and began to look for business in Cuba. 
The handsomest automobiles and the finest teams of high- 
stepping, imported horses were no longer in evidence in the 
Sunday parades. The great change in Mexico had begun. 

The Diaz bubble had burst. No longer did the Diaz 
bugaboo perch above the chamber door or listen through the 
walls or sit beside one at table or walk with one along the 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 107 

street. Not now did the gendarme, that outward and visible 
sign of Diaz omnipotence, poUtely beckon forward those 
who loitered in converse on Avenida San Francisco or 
halted a moment in the doorway or on the steps of a public 
building. The Mexican National Anthem could now be 
sung at will ; it could even be whistled without fine or im- 
prisonment. The days of Diaz the tyrant were over. 

Madero, the people's friend, had freed all Mexico from 
espionage and placed the Mexicans on their honor. De la 
Barra was the man who rode through the streets escorted 
by the outriding, resplendent presidential guard, mounted 
on imported, matched bays ; de la Barra was the grave, 
handsome occupant of the presidential coach who bowed 
politely to the feeble salute as he passed, but Madero the 
comrade of the poor, was now the real god within the 
machine, soon to step forth. Muerra los Cientificos! 
Viva Madero! 

Yet it was not until a week after Limantour's departure 
that Madero's hpld upon the imagination of Mexico's 
ignorant masses was fully made manifest. Not in the 
history of the modern world has such an exhibition of 
idolatry been given as that of Mexico's lower orders for 
Madero as he traveled from his home in Parras, in the 
State of Coahuila, to Mexico's capital. His train was four 
days making the seven hundred miles journey. Starting 
on the third of June, 191 1, nine days after de la Barra 
had been made provisional president, he did not reach 
Mexico City until the seventh, after a triumphal progress 
to the music of a ceaseless shout of " Viva Madero ! " By 
day and by night this chorus rolled from the throats of 
multitudes gathered along the track at crossings, at water 
tanks, at bridges, at culverts, at trestles, and in all the towns 
and cities to do him honor. 

It was more than honor this primitive people bestowed 



io8 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

upon Madero; it was worship. From great distances the 
peons came to greet him, to hsten to his voice, to look upon 
his face, to touch the hem of his garment. He was heralded 
as the savior of his people; not a human, but as a god. 
The date of this journey was unknown even to Madero 
himself until three days before his departure from the 
home of the Madero clan. Yet all across northern and 
central Mexico the word was carried, by letter, by telegraph, 
by grapevine ; and those who were not bedridden arose and 
made their way at the best possible speed to the nearest 
point on the railv/ay along which the Deliverer was to 
come. 

Those who had money traveled by train from distant 
points, but immense numbers who had no money came on 
foot, on burros, on mules, on horses, and in ramshackle 
carts, from as far as two hundred miles, by forced marches, 
praying that they might arrive in time. They came in rags 
and bare of foot. They brought their baby children in zer- 
apes swung upon their backs. The aged came with bent 
shoulders and quaking limbs. The lame and halt came 
hobbling with cane and crutch. Over mountain trails, 
across cactus-grown wastes, the strong carrying the weak, 
children of tender years, like suckling calves, toddling be- 
side their mothers — in every manner by which a primitive 
people of all conditions of age and action could move about, 
the poor of Mexico's northern and central states made their 
way from their customary abiding places to a point on the 
railroad through which Madero, the peon Messiah, the con- 
queror of the great Diaz, would pass. 

At lonely stations in the mountains where one train a 
day might stop and where the only human being in sight 
would normally be the sleepy agent of the line — at such 
places hundreds gathered from everywhere and nowhere for 
the great event, and when the train bearing the man who 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 109 

had performed the miracle of deposing the tyrant steamed 
into view, its noise was inaudible for shouts of " Viva 
Madero ! " The man with the '* spirit call " to free Mexico 
appeared, and magically the tumult ceased as he prepared 
to speak. God knows what those poor creatures, children 
in all but years, fancied that they heard their liberator say. 
They never failed to be attentive or to accept the words of 
hope and promise as a gospel of immediate salvation. At 
the conclusion shouts broke forth anew; the crowd surged 
forward to grasp his hand, to touch his clothing — and 
the train moved on, leaving across Mexico a trail of 
dreams as unsubstantial as the steam that vanished in the 
air. 

From an eye witness only, of such scenes, can a true 
measure of peon devotion to Erancisco Madero be drawn. 
In Mexico City there were fully three hundred thousand 
visitors added to the city's normal four hundred thousand, 
and the entry of Madero on that seventh of June was 
greeted with a testimonial of popular rejoicing beyond any- 
thing in the city's history. The severe earthquake of the 
early morning by which 207 persons lost their lives was 
forgotten two hours later when the Madero train was due. 
The streets and plazas were jammed with people without 
police or military guard. Foreigners of all nations mixed 
freely with natives. Exemplary good nature and good 
order marked the day. A new order of affairs had taken 
possession of Mexico. The people were " on honor " and 
they bore their dignity well. 

From the day Madero entered Mexico City, de la Barra 
was president in name only. Maderistas filled the cabinet 
offices. Madero's uncle was now Minister of Finance. 
Madero's ideas of personal freedom and freedom of the 
press had free rein. Madero's measures were put through 
Congress. Madero's office at number 99 Paseo de la Re- 



no THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

forma was the real seat of government. De la Barra at 
the Palacio Nacional was a figurehead. 

Promptly came Washington's recognition of the de la 
Barra government. Followed quickly that of France, Eng- 
land and Spain. Ready made diplomacy performed its 
evolutions in the open with smoothness and despatch. No 
annoying demands were pressed in an unfriendly way by 
any government. Washington was considerate and kindly. 
Madero sat down to dinner at the American Club beside 
Ambassador Wilson who, but a few months before, at that 
same table, had publicly denounced him as " imbecile." Be- 
lief was general among Americans in Mexico that the Wash- 
ington government was extremely cordial to the Madero 
cause and was preparing to aid " the little fellow " when 
he should become president, with its full moral support. It 
had seemed clear that to Madero had been granted unusual 
privileges while he was perfecting, on American soil, his 
plans for revolution in Mexico, and it was thought that 
Washington's extreme courtesy to de la Barra was earnest of 
its intent, when Madero should come into his own, to second 
his efforts toward real democracy by every influence 
within the range of its far reaching power. 

The United States troops which had been " maneuvering " 
in Texas were presently withdrawn to their various posts. 
This pleased and reassured the Mexicans whose attitude 
toward Americans took on an unwonted friendliness. 
Americans were thought to be in high favor with the new 
ruling powers in the country, and Mexicans in general took 
the cue. Uncle Sam was not such a bad fellow after all — • 
he had had a chance to walk over and " take " their country 
and he had let it pass. 

Many resident Americans laid plans for enlarging the 
scope of their activities. They were close observers of 
sentiment and movement and were not deceived by surface 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO iii 

smoothness. They saw the indications of intrigue and 
double-dealing which bubbled through the crust. But they 
expressed full confidence in Washington's vigilance and 
did not believe that any political moves of material moment 
could be made without their significance being understood 
by the American government and provided for. An open- 
ing was in sight to advance American interests and pave 
the way for large increases of trade in staples across the 
border. Strong American support for Madero, the advance 
agent of democracy in Mexico, was the key to the com- 
mercial situation and to the well being of all concerned. 

The Madero clan moved their active business head- 
quarters from northern Mexico to the capital. Plans were 
quietly made to modernize the supply departments of the 
government. The diversity of manufacturing carried on 
by the Maderos at their own towns and haciendas of Coa- 
huila and adjacent states afforded facilities for the read- 
justment of government patronage on practical lines. 
Materials and provisions for the equipment and sustenance 
of the army had previously been purchased of favorites 
on a basis unduly profitable to those directly concerned, 
and the result had been scandal. The business men of the 
Madero family now took charge of these affairs, and they 
had not far to look for honest people with whom to deal 
— they found them in themselves. 

Francisco Madero, Junior, occupied in efforts to harm- 
onize contending social and political interests, paid little 
attention to these sordid details. There is no doubt that he 
was honestly devoted to the cause of good government in 
Mexico. He held substantially the same opinions that he 
used to express in those curbstone lectures which Diaz did 
not take the trouble to interrupt. Upon this point of con- 
sistency in doctrine I may presume to speak, for I was often 
an auditor of Madero's in the days when the revolution 



112 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

was only a dream. The apostle to the lowly occupied for 
some months, in 1909, a rented white house on the 3a 
Calle Berlin, corner of the Calle Liverpool, and many of 
his orations were delivered before his own door. 

I lived but a block distant and would sometimes hear the 
applause of the rabble assembled in front of the white house, 
and be led to stroll that way. I was not greatly moved 
by the matter of " the little man's " discourses, but they 
never failed to interest and thrill the peons in pajamas who 
made up the overwhelming majority of the audience. 
Tense silences would testify to the speaker's hold upon his 
hearers. Then would come, perhaps, a choked cry of ap- 
plause from a single person, the sound seeming to be forced 
out of an overburdened bosom through clenched teeth, and 
the whole assemblage would burst forth into a chorus that 
sounded sometimes as if it were made up chiefly of sobs 
that could no longer be suppressed. 

The orator must have had a certain gift, but it defies 
analysis. He had no personal magnetism that an American 
could discover, unless it may have lain in an effect of cour- 
age. He was always a brave man; no good observer ever 
doubted it ; and in his sympathy with the oppressed he was 
sincere. Let no one persuade you to the contrary. But in 
appearance and manner he was the reverse of impressive; 
barely five feet four in height, with nothing especially dis- 
tinctive in the face or figure; with little fire in the brown 
eyes. The caricaturists found his beard the salient feature, 
but it was really very ordinary, a plain, small beard of a 
brownish tinge, a little lighter than his hair. 

His social and political theories were set forth in a book, 
" The Presidential Succession," which a few months later 
was translated into English and printed in the Mexican 
Herald. The work aimed to show that the evils which 
the nation suffered were due to an unchanging government 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 113 

hostile to progress. It attacked the Cientificos very justly, 
and was in that part an anti-trust argument stated with 
considerable intelligence. Now that his theories had won 
political success he still held to his ideals, strove vainly to 
make them into realities, and in the end gave his life for 
them, not cowardly, as every honest man who knew him will 
admit. 

His uncle, Ernesto Madero, the ablest and most active 
business man of the Madero clan, was Minister of Finance 
in the de la Barra cabinet. His father, Francisco Madero, 
Senior, held no office, but was diligently cooperating with 
Ernesto in all practical matters. Other members of the 
elder generation of the Madero family were aiding in the 
work. Confident that the provisional government was 
being well guarded in its routine business affairs, Fran- 
cisco Madero, Junior, applied himself to his own special 
problems. His knowledge of business was limited to pay- 
ing his own debts scrupulously. He congratulated himself 
on being a member of a practical family. 

President de la Barra looked smilingly on as the Maderos 
arranged the government patronage. He understood that 
the Madero clan had been made to endure material hard- 
ships, and that it should now have an opportunity to recoup 
its losses. He himself had three deserving brothers ; these 
he placed as comfortably as he could in departments of 
the close corporation government, and let the Maderos have 
their way. 

De la Barra soon found the ready-made cabinet which 
had been handed in from the El Paso conference a sore 
trial to his delicately adjusted organism. He was politically 
opposed to many of its members, and only his infinite tact 
prevented frequent clashes. With Ernesto Madero, with 
his cousin Rafael Hernandez, who was Minister of Fo- 
mento and with Jorge Vera Estafiol, Minister of Public 



114 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Instruction, surface contact was smooth because they were 
gentlemen, but confidence was lacking on all sides. The 
schemes of the others were harder to manage. One of 
the Vasquez Gomez brothers was dismissed by common 
consent for sufficient reasons ; the other was frozen out. 
Not till to Garcia Granados was given the important cab- 
inet position of Minister of Gobernacion did de la Barra 
possess a friend, a man of his own kind, in his official fam- 
ily. In one respect he was fortunate. As Acting Presi- 
dent only, he still retained his former office — he was his 
own Secretary of State. 

Gustavo Madero promptly became the most talked of 
unofficial member of the Madero family. Much of the 
gossip affecting him had its origin in business enterprises 
which might well be described as escapades. He was in- 
different to public opinion and the public took its ven- 
geance ; it pilloried him for the sins of the family. 

Too open in his dealings to be shrewd; too emphatically 
a man of his word to succeed against the double dealing 
about him, Gustavo Madero was ever being referred to as 
a grafter, yet was never known to achieve practical grafting 
results. That he was a gambler in long chances, that his 
undertakings were ill-advised, and that his operations were 
not guided by the rules of conventional business cannot 
be denied; but he was unselfish, true to his friends, and 
of undaunted personal courage. His father and uncles 
were jealous of his influence with his brother and they 
presently weakened it. In none of their dealmgs with the 
government did he participate. 

Socially, the Maderos introduced a new and refreshing 
element into the life of the capital. In the Madero inva- 
sion of Mexico City their women folk were a notable fea- 
ture. Unsophisticated and prudish, but fresh-looking and 
attractive, they made a distinct impression as they moved 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 115 

about the asphalt section of the city and became good buy- 
ers at the French shops downtown. Flocking in from their 
haciendas and villages, they provided a sharp contrast to the 
liberally powdered women of social prominence in capital 
affairs. The Paris-gowned beauties of the old regime 
looked at them with amusement. It was a social inundation 
from the northern provinces which must not be allowed 
to rise too high. 

The schemes of Madero's enemies to discredit him dur- 
ing the de la Barra interim were comprehensively planned 
and tactically correct in execution, but the reformer's hold 
upon the people was too strong to be shaken loose in the 
allotted time. There was nothing dilatory however in the 
work of the trouble makers. Within forty-eight hours 
from the day Madero entered Mexico City the conspiring 
against him began. It progressed steadily to the day elec- 
tions were held, October second, and it developed more 
rapidly still from that day onward. Traps without num- 
ber were laid for him, many of which were frustrated by 
the vigilance of his family or by his own bravery. Wher- 
ever there was a manifestation of discontent, there Madero 
appeared in person, and the threats, which in his absence 
had been uttered against his life, melted into cheers at his 
approach. 

Among his enemies there were some quite capable of ar- 
ranging for his secret assassination, but they recoiled from 
the frightful conditions which would result. The only ef- 
fective and safe way to dispose of Madero was to have 
him killed by his own followers. To stir up sufficient resent- 
ment among them to cause this to be done was the aim of 
certain men who had been shorn of power. Many of these 
were absent from Mexico, but their emissaries were every- 
where active. 

Tricks to discredit the new government, to foment trouble 



ii6 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

and to disgust the people were played by holdover clerks 
and officials of the post, the telegraph, the railways, the 
customs and the departments of government both federal 
and state. These men knew that their employment would 
soon pass to others and be permanently lost, if Madero 
actually succeeded to the presidency, and they let no op- 
portunity escape to complicate and disarrange what had be- 
come a ponderous but exceedingly effective and precise 
operation of civil routine. 

Disbanding the Madero forces also afforded openings for 
the trouble makers. When all the various bands were 
reckoned up, the number reached to nearly twenty thousand 
men, many of whom had fought for loot rather than democ- 
racy, while many others had not fought at all. The hold- 
over Diaz congress made difficulties about payment for the 
" military " service of these men. Every proposition to 
this end was fought. The final award was meager in the 
extreme. With a few pesos each the Maderist " soldiers " 
were asked to go home and lay down their arms, while the 
soldiers of the federal army which they had defeated were 
left with jobs and the pay. 

Madero's mountaineer officers who had won battles 
against generals of Diaz educated at Chepultepec Academy 
were a distinctly menacing element to- deal with, because 
each had partisans and followers standing ready to resent 
any slight put upon their leaders whose deeds were now, 
in the general exultation of complete success, magnified 
to prodigies of personal valor and military skill. The old 
line officers would not consort with the new and uncouth 
Maderist victors, yet the old officers could not be dispensed 
with, else the troops would mutiny. 

In these difficulties the trading and the pacifying were 
done by Madero in person, while de la Barra sat calmly 
on the presidential seat, apparently aiding Madero's ef- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 117 

forts to solve the riddles. The Maderist cabinet officers 
were jealous of the members of the Madero family and con- 
nections, whose influence constantly interfered with official 
routine. V'ague charges of graft were spread through the 
country to promote disgust among the fanatical followers 
of Madero who had received scanty rewards. 

Also during these months Madero's wild promises came 
home for fulfilment and added to his burdens. He had 
promised freedom, and the lower classes had taken the 
promise literally. To pick up that which they desired in 
the public markets, to " squat " upon private lands they 
coveted — • this was the peon idea of freedom. For ap- 
propriating market stuffs they went to jail ; for squatting on 
private lands they received the prod of the bayonet. Dis- 
gust, disenchantment and dismay resulted — and de la Barra 
looked politely on. 

The most winning argument of Madero, as he had lec- 
tured from town to town prior to the actual opening of 
military operations, had been his promise to cut up the great 
estates and open them for settlement by the peons. Mil- 
lions on millions of acres were lying fallow but held tight 
in ownership by rich men who had secured them through 
favor or by extravagant grant for real or supposed service 
to a previous government of Mexico. The titles of these 
estates were to be attacked, and the peon, to whom posses- 
sion of a few acres was wealth untold, was to have his 
chance. 

Fulfilment of these promises was now demanded, and 
their emptiness exposed. What had seemed feasible to 
the dreamer on fire with zeal to benefit his people was 
found to be practically impossible. In no way without dis- 
ruption of the social order could Madero bring about con- 
fiscation of estates. There were government lands which 
were more open to treatment, but the process of arranging 



ii8 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

for their cutting up was slow. It must await a new con- 
gress. 

These demands upon Madero for land were insistent, in- 
sulting, denunciatory, but he was helpless. He sparred for 
time until he himself should be in office, but found it dif- 
ficult to pacify the impatience of the peons for fields to 
call their own. The fact that the Madero family held mil- 
lions of acres in the north of Mexico was alleged to be 
a reason for Madero's failure to seize private lands for 
the benefit of the poor. Also the charge was made that 
members of the Madero family were affiliating with the 
Cientificos and other big landowners whom Madero had 
sworn to destroy. The Cientificos themselves took care 
that the reports should be spread. So discontent and dis- 
illusionment worked their way to the remotest corners of 
Mexico. 

Madero's own errors contributed to the disquiet among 
his followers. Selecting Jose Maria Pino Suarez as his vice 
president was a costly blunder which aroused strenuous 
opposition, especially from those who held that Doctor 
Francisco Vasquez Gomez, former head of the Madero 
junta in Washington, was entitled to the place. Both men 
were unfit for the position but Pino Suarez, an obscure 
editor from Yucatan who had taken no part in the revolu- 
tion, was a dead weight. Also the enmity of Vasquez 
Gomez partizans added to the complications, and played into 
the hands of those who were trying to ruin Madero in the 
estimation of the people. 

While these unsettling agencies were at work, Madero 
himself was confident. That he was losing ground as the 
elections approached was clear to him, but he was certain 
that his margin of safety was sufficient to withstand all 
inroads upon it. So convinced was he of winning that he 
scorned all suggestions of a party organization to system- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 119 

atize and moderize election arrangements and act as support 
to his administration of afifairs. 

L^ntutored in the political necessity of party mechanism 
operating from the center to remotest sections, he looked 
upon such a device as a means to thwart popular will. His 
ideas of practical democracy were as vague as they were 
visionary. He would not consider the possibility that the 
people whom he hoped to serve faithfully would become so 
distrustful as to turn against him in great numbers. To 
him, even then, the presidency seemed omnipotence, but 
he declared that he would use his power for the public good 
which could not fail of appreciation by a grateful people. 
He maintained that the Mexicans were gentle in disposi- 
tion, and under fair treatment would give a good account 
of themselves. He saw the disintegrating influences at work 
but was confident that he could cope with them, once he was 
seated in the presidential chair. 

The elections were held on October second and, as all 
the world knows, he was successful. Those who have 
stated that his total vote was but 20,000 out of a possible 
3,000,000 are in error. They have taken the numbers of 
electors chosen at primaries, not those of the whole elec- 
torate. As a spectator of a curious phenomenon, I watched 
the voting operations that day in two small districts of 
Mexico City. Nearly one thousand votes were cast in these 
districts. It was an interesting exhibit, being the first free 
election ever held in Mexico. There were scattering votes 
for barbers, for bullfighters, for brigands. There were 
votes for Porfirio Diaz, for Limantour, for de la Barra, 
for Zapata the bandit, for Orozco, a Maderist officer. But 
Madero, though steadily intrigued against for months and 
discredited by every means his enemies could contrive and 
his own errors invite, Madero, " the peon Messiah," re- 
ceived more than ninety per cent, of the total in these " pri- 



120 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

mary " election districts, and there were more than 14,000 
such districts in the republic of Mexico. 

Election, however, in Mexico, is one thing ; and inaugura- 
tion, as Madero discovered, is another. For a few days 
Madero cheers rang through the streets with something of 
the early enthusiasm, and Madero himself caused a demon- 
stration whenever he appeared. But the undermining in- 
fluences were working now with increased vigor, and began 
to make themselves felt in vituperative articles of the scur- 
rilous press, in obscene and disgusting pictures of comic 
weeklies, and in real or manufactured scandals which were 
bruited about. 

Business and banking circles in Mexico were solidly 
against Madero and all who sympathized with him. To be 
a Maderista was to lose credit at all big banks except one, 
which declined to be influenced by the political affiliation of 
its customers. Partizans of Madero, during the month 
succeeding his election, were objects of open ridicule. The 
Maderista was scoffed at for expecting that " the little 
chap " would be allowed to take his seat. 

In the closing days of October an incident occurred which 
brought suspicion on de la Barra and put Madero on his 
guard. Zapata, who has since achieved world-wide fame 
as bandit chief of southern Mexico, was not then so deeply 
dyed in outrageous villainy and innocent blood. Like many 
Maderista leaders he was charged with brigandage, but 
until that time, he had asserted that he maintained his 
marauding bands only to enforce delivery of certain agreed- 
upon property rights for the poor of the State of Morelos. 
He had been an ally of Madero, and the latter declined to 
credit the charges of wanton outrage and killing laid against 
the " Attila of the South," insisting that, if a fair treaty 
should be made with him, the bandit would become a good 
Indian and disband his men. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 121 

Zapata would treat with none but Madero, and, declining 
a proposal that he visit Mexico City, suggested that he 
might meet Senor Madero at the ancient town of Cuautla, 
eighty-five miles distant from the City of Mexico, in the 
State of ]\Iorelos. Both men were to be without escort, 
and government pursuit of Zapata's band was to be sus- 
pended for the two days he would be absent from his 
camp. This arrangement was agreed to in precise terms, 
IMadero giving his written word that no hostile move should 
be made during the stipulated term, relying upon President 
de la Barra to issue the necessary orders. 

Apparently the orders were not made sufficiently ex- 
plicit, for Zapata, who had secreted twenty men about the 
plaza in Cuautla to guard against a possible misadventure, 
was awaiting Madero's arrival at the appointed hour, when 
a hard-riding courier dashed into the town and informed 
him that their main body had been attacked by federal 
forces, several men had been killed, and the band chased 
over the mountains ; also that several hundred federals 
were at that moment waiting outside Cuautla to capture 
Zapata on his return to camp. 

As Madero was without military guard, the presumed 
expectation had been that Zapata would either accuse him 
of treachery and kill him outright, or would carry him 
off as a hostage. In the latter case an attempted " rescue " 
by federal forces might result in an accident to Madero 
which would ever remain charged to Zapata's account. 

This elaborate plan miscarried. Zapata understood its 
animus and laughed at its absurdity. There was a tie be- 
tween these two men which placed killing out of the ques- 
tion. Those who had framed the trap had been ignorant 
of conditions. Madero alive and president of Mexico was 
a Zapata asset. Madero killed or in his custody was a 
liability of the deadliest sort. 



122 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

The interview was held and a treaty made which Zapata 
did not attempt to keep. Madero returned to Mexico City- 
unharmed. Zapata made a detour and reached his men in 
safety. 

But the disclosure of double dealing was so complete 
that Madero took steps to protect himself. Through a 
hastily organized secret service squad of ten of his most 
trusted followers he learned on November third, that on 
the tenth he was to be docoyed into a suburb and disposed 
of in a way that would tend to throw suspicion upon cer- 
tain men who would call upon Madero that day and make 
demands which he could not grant. This information de- 
termined his course of action. He now saw that his enemies 
were desperate. Tricks and traps having failed, they would 
take long chances — his death by violence had been de- 
creed. Porfirio Diaz methods were to be used — kill first 
and argue afterward. 

Inauguration was slated for November twentieth. On 
November sixth, without ostentation and without prior 
notice to any except those trusted ones having to do with 
the legal formalities, Francisco I. Madero, Junior, to the 
discomfiture of all those who had intrigued against his am- 
bitions and his life, took the sweeping oath and became 
constitutional President of the Mexican Republic, in place 
of Francisco de la Barra, retired with thanks to private 
life. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE Taft Administration had various points of con- 
tact with men interested in Mexico, and its poHcy 
toward Madero seemed to result logically from in- 
formation so acquired. The prominent interests repre- 
sented in these contacts were the Rockefeller-Aldrich rubber 
enterprises, the S. Pearson and Son, Limited, contracting, 
and the Lord Cowdray petroleum concerns, and the Gug- 
genheim mining, smelting and allied companies. None 
of these interests had desired the success of Madero ; none 
could discern in his ideals the promise of any business ad- 
vantage for themselves; none believed him to possess the 
qualities of a ruler. Some of the interests were active 
business competitors of the Madero family. 

The Rockefeller-Aldrich group needed no special con- 
ductor to the inner circles of the Taft Administration, but 
a convenient one existed. The active head of the Rocke- 
feller-Aldrich rubber interests, which operated heavily in 
the Mexican State of Durango, was Nelson W. Aldrich, 
one of whose many titles to fame was the Payne-Aldrich 
tariff law in which rubber was not neglected. 

The rubber interests of the Rockefeller-Aldrich Mexican 
Continental Company were directly opposed to those of the 
Maderos which extended over several million acres of 
northern and central Mexico, and included factories con- 
veniently placed for transportation of their product to the 
border. If the Madero government should become firmly 
intrenched, and should choose to exert its influence upon 
the State of Durango, the Rockefeller-Aldrich rubber in- 

123 



124 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

terests in that State might be placed at a disadvantage and 
be coerced to buy, at an excessive price, the properties 
\ of the Maderos in adjacent states. 

The contact of S. Pearson and Son, Limited, with the 
Taft Administration was intimate. For several years the 
American counsel of this big English contracting concern 
had been the great New York law firm of Strong & Cad- 
walader with which Henry W. Taft, brother of President 
Taft, and George W. Wickersham, Attorney General in 
the Taft Cabinet, were allied, Henry W. Taft being a mem- 
ber of the board of directors of the English company. 
Prior to Mr. Wickersham's appointment as Attorney Gen- 
eral, he had been the one who appeared as the active and 
visible representative of the law firm in the affairs of S. 
Pearson and Son, Limited, with Henry Taft directing as- 
sociate. While Mr. Wickersham was Attorney General of 
the United States, his law firm continued to represent the 
British contracting house in American matters. At this 
""^ writing the relationship remains unchanged. 

That a company of international importance should select 
an eminent law firm in the city of New York as its counsel 
in America is in every way fitting. The selection was made 
long before William Howard Taft was thought of as a prob- 
able candidate for the Presidency, and came about, it is said, 
through the connection of Henry W. Taft with various 
Mexican concerns, including his directorship in the old 
Mexican National Railroad over which the Mexican Govern- 
ment under Diaz held a protectorate, and which was ab- 
y sorbed in Senor Limantour's railway merger. 

That the New York law firm, through the periodical 
shift of American politics, was brought so close to the 
Washington government could not have been foreseen. It 
was Weetman Pearson luck. But the channel which this 
close relationship opened to the Taft Administration could 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 125 

hardly have been neglected when information about Mexico 
was sought, nor can any just person blame Mr. Taft or his 
associates if that information seemed reliable. It must 
have coincided very accurately with that which came from 
Rockef eller-Aldrich sources ; and none of it was calculated 
to inspire confidence in the government which " The Little 
Reformer " had set up in Mexico. 

The house of S. Pearson and Son, Limited, whose head, 
Sir Weetman Pearson, was raised to the English peerage 
as Lord Cowdray in 1908, ranks very high in both hemi- 
spheres. Its fame has been spread, by achievements of 
engineering and construction, from East India to the East 
River, as the greatest and most successful contracting com- 
pany in the world. But the undertakings of Lord Cowdray 
have not been confined to the engineering of notable works ; 
in recent years they have reached out to oil operations in 
various lands on a scale so vast as to stagger the imagina- 
tion. 

Its engineering conquests have usually followed the Eng- 
lish flag, but it has long been engaged in large operations 
in Mexico growing out of negotiations with Porfirio Diaz. 
The great drainage system of the broad valley of Mexico in 
whose center stands the capital, the harbor works at Vera 
Cruz, and the Tehuantepec Railway across the Isthmus of 
that name are among its notable achievements in the Aztec 
land. 

The Mexico operations of S. Pearson & Son, Limited, 
have been so constant and so varied, that permanent head- 
quarters have been maintained in Mexico City, with 
branches at various points. Sir Weetman Pearson enjoyed 
a nearness to Porfirio Diaz and to his Finance Minister, 
Jose Yves Limantour, which no other foreign gentleman 
ever attained, and was able, in 1907, to secure a concession 
for fifty-seven year prior rights to bore for oil in the vacant 



126 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

government lands and along the water courses and lagunas 
of the 75,000 square miles of area comprised in the two 
Gulf of Mexico States of Tamaulipas and Vera Cruz, and 
the intersecting but mostly inland State of San Luis Potosi. 
Boring rights in " hot country " lands south of the Isthmus 
of Tehuantepec were also conveyed. 

Granted at a time when little demonstration had been 
made of oil land values in Mexico, the concession did not 
then possess the significance which it has assumed in more 
recent days. These fields are at this date regarded as the 
richest yet discovered, having an immediate possibility of 
output equal to the combined yield of all other present 
productive sources. 

The Pearson concession was a move approved by Liman- 
tour to prevent Standard Oil domination. The Waters- 
Pierce Oil Company, then a subsidiary of Standard Oil, 
had held a monopoly of the oil trade of Mexico, and at the 
time of the concession was engaged in bringing in oil from 
the United States and selling twenty-liter cans of good 
illuminating grade at $3.59 Mexico money, a price equiva- 
lent to thirty-five American cents a gallon. 

If there was one thing that Limantour objected to more 
than monopoly in general, it was American monopoly; and 
the Waters-Pierce Oil Company had forced the retail 
prices for oil of all grades beyond the limit known in the 
parlance of trade as " all the traffic will bear." If Lord 
Cowdray, in the guise of a Mexican corporation, could be 
encouraged to compete with the Waters-Pierce Company, 
the results must be beneficial. It may have been on this 
account that the concession to the English nobleman who 
speedily associated himself with prominent Cientificos pre- 
sented to critics the appearance of excessive liberality. 

The competition thus introduced presently became the 
" great oil war in Mexico," commonly so called. The 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 127 

result was not agreeable to Lord Cowdray, as prices 
dropped below the level at which he could do business at 
a profit. Pierce, with his more efifective organization, was 
less seriously hurt, although the figure of $3.59, above 
quoted, was cut to eighty cents, Mexican, or about eight 
American cents a gallon. The Mexican people were the 
gainers ; for the first time they were getting oil at a fair 
price. After a year or more of this extreme competition, 
the warfare assumed a more moderate form, and rates 
gradually stiffened to $2. 

The real value of the Pearson oil concession from a 
practical business standpoint will be discussed in another 
part of this book. At this point it is enough to say that 
among the definite and difficult things which the Maderista 
leaders had promised was the curtailment of Lord Cow- 
dray's privileges. As recited by political agitators and 
enthusiasts, and by Lord Cowdray's competitors in the oil 
war, the provisions of the grant had not been well observed 
and grounds for revocation existed. Whether there was 
actual justification for such revocation is less important 
than the fact that reports to this effect were in circulation, 
and could not well have promoted sentiments of regard for 
the Maderist rule in the English oil man's bosom. The 
advice of his American counsel was essential in such circum- 
stances, and whatever influence the counsel could properly 
wield to protect his client Lord Cowdray was entitled to. 
If the counsel's sense of propriety was outraged by the 
peculiarities of his position, the remedy was at hand: he 
could either withdraw from the service of Lord Cowdray 
or request his brother to resign the presidency of the 
United States. 

By 191 1 the Mexican oil affair had lost few of its spec- 
tacular features, and had gained in international importance. 
The stupendous quantities of crude petroleum which the 



128 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Mexican fields could produce had been indicated by the 
" bringing in " of certain record-breaking " gushers " — one 
under perfect control flowing upward of four million gal- 
lons a day — and the Lord Cowdray plan to furnish fuel 
oil to the British Navy had been formed. If the Washing- 
ton Government should stand too strongly behind Madero 
and permit him to carry into effect his concession-wreck- 
ing program, such an attitude might be misunderstood by 
the British Government, and unpleasant complications re- 
sult. 
' The Tehuantepec National Railway was another item in 
the relations of S. Pearson & Son, Limited, with the Mex- 
ican Government. With that government assuming a 
critical attitude toward Lord Cowdray and his Cientifico 
associates in the oil rights, it might be difficult for S. Pear- 
son & Son, Limited, to unload their heavy investment in 
this trans-isthmian railway upon the Mexican national 
\ treasury before the completion of the Panama Canal. The 
railway at that time was a liberally patronized short-cut 
for transporting Hawaiian sugar and other Pacific Ocean 
freights bound eastward, but the ease and economy of the 
canal route would be likely to divert this trade, and the 
railway, in consequence, assume the physical appearance 
of two winding streaks of rust in a region not over popular 
as a place of residence or conspicuous for its industrial 
activity. 
-^ Also as S. Pearson & Son, Limited, were under contract 
to operate the road for fifty-one years from July, 1902, 
and to receive but thirty-five per cent, of its net profits for 
the first thirty-six years, the prospects were not brilliant, 
and desire to realize on the investment in exchange for sur- 
x.^ render of the operating contract was keen. 

There were other projected works in Mexico which S. 
Pearson and Son, Limited, had planned to execute on a 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 129 

basis approximately as liberal as in the Diaz days, and it 
suited them ill to contemplate bidding for the business 
against American contractors. With no friends near the 
source of Mexican patronage to take adequate account of 
the eminence of their position and the excellence of their 
services, S. Pearson & Son, Limited, could see but a poor 
prospect of contracts on the satisfactory terms to which 
they had been accustomed. Madero was likely to prove 
an incompetent trader and a bad judge of competing con- 
cerns. The new inspectors and interventors for the gov- 
ernment might be oppressive in their demands when de- 
tails of plans were submitted for approval. For which 
reasons any pressure from Washington that might re- 
strict Madero's freedom would be welcome, and there were 
no American contractors who stood so close to the power 
which could exert that pressure as the English firm. 

The Guggenheim contact with the Taft Cabinet has been 
the theme of volumes. Even the briefest summary would 
be superfluous here. Richard Achilles Ballinger, who was 
Secretary of the Interior in the Taft Cabinet as originally 
constituted, was in various ways closely connected with the 
Guggenheim interests; and there is no evidence that the 
Ballinger-Pinchot disclosures alienated the Guggenheims 
from the Administration. 

The Guggenheim name is associated with the modern 
development of mining affairs in Mexico quite as it has 
been in the United States. It does not imply that a man 
should know overmuch of Mexican matters that he should 
be familiar with the common phrase " when you think real 
Mexico mines, think Guggenheim," which is intended to be 
a way of hinting that the Guggenheim operations have 
reached out to the best mining and smelting properties in 
that country and gobbled them up. 

This epigram is too sweeping, but that is not the fault 



130 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

of the Guggenheims whose endeavors to control mining 
matters in Mexico have been constant. In 191 1 these enter- 
prising persons had reached the zenith of their power in 
Mexico's mining affairs. It is true, nevertheless, that many 
great mines owned by the English, French and Belgians, 
with stockholders all across Europe drawing dividends 
therefrom, were still free of the Guggenheim yoke, and 
many independent American companies were operating 
profitable mines in which neither the Guggenheims nor their 
Exploration Company, nor yet their American Smelting & 
Refining Company, held ownership. But as compared with 
any other group of mining operators in Mexico, the Gug- 
genheims were far in the lead, and where they could not 
secure ownership on a satisfactory basis, they managed, 
more or less effectively, to extract toll through the opera- 
tion of a chain of smelters to which the ore of many in- 
dependents was shipped and sold. 

The Guggenheim method of utilizing their smelting plants 
to facilitate acquisition of mining properties at attractive 
rates is too well known to require explanation here. The 
method was not more conspicuously in use in Mexico than 
it has been in the United States. But the Guggenheim way 
with a miner in northern Mexico who shipped ore to a 
Guggenheim smelter was unfavorably compared with the 
way of the Maderos at their antiquated smelting plant in 
the city of Torreon, and the kings of the smelting world 
were not pleased with the local impression which these 
comparisons created. 

The experiences of the Maderos with the Guggenheims 
make a good story, necessary to be told. In 1906, the 
Madero smelter, lacking modern equipment, was not highly 
remunerative. In that year it was offered for sale to various 
persons and corporations of which the American Smelting 
& Refining Company was the most likely buyer, as it 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 131 

needed the Torreon plant and business to complete its grip 
on mining in northern Mexico. But for two excellent 
reasons the Guggenheims did not intend at that time to buy 
the Madero smelter. One reason was that to do so would 
tend to sustain the charge of monopoly, which, singular as 
it may seem, was a disturbing business factor more potent 
in Mexico, even in the Diaz days, than it had been in the 
United States. The other reason was that purchase of this 
Madero property at any price seemed unprofitable, because 
the plant was out of date and would have to be replaced by 
a new one. 

But the Guggenheims were not ignoring opportunity for 
acquiring information, and when the Madero smelter was 
offered to them they made a thorough examination of the 
business, including its ore contracts with mining companies 
thereabouts, and then declined to deal — an old trick, but 
one which the Maderos were not suspecting. 

The nearest Guggenheim smelters were located at Mon- 
terrey, 260 miles east of Torreon, at Aguascalientes, 340 
miles south, and at Chihuahua, 290 miles northwest. Im- 
mediately this negotiation was called off, the Guggenheims 
bought a smelting plant at Velardena, fifty miles south- 
west of Torreon in the State of Durango, and equipped it 
for extensive operations. By 1908, they were in active 
competition with the Maderos for the business of the sec- 
tion. 

But by 1908 the Maderos had added to the contracts 
which the Guggenheims had examined in 1906, and when the 
new " Trust " smelter was ready for business at Velardena 
its principal occupation consisted in treating the ores of 
the Guggenheims' own mines at that point. From that 
time onward the Velardeiia smelter of the American Smelt- 
ing &. Refining Company, when not closed for lack of busi- 
ness, was operated at a steady loss, a state of things which 



132 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

the thrifty Guggenheim family discovered with astonish- 
ment to be beyond their power to remedy. Not in all their 
spectacular career had they encountered a similar experi- 
ence. 

The fact that relations between the Guggenheims and the 
Maderos were outwardly cordial did not alter the under- 
lying facts. The Maderos felt that they had been tricked 
by their big business rivals into a full disclosure of their busi- 
ness secrets, and the Guggenheims resented the position in 
which they stood of operating a losing venture in a rival's 
territory and spurring the rival to activity in spreading dis- 
content among their own patrons in adjoining districts, east, 
south and north. 

In the year 1910, when the Madero family's operations 
were embargoed by Poriirio Diaz, the Guggenheims saw 
light ahead. The Maderos would lose their revolutionary 
venture and the smelting business in northern Mexico would 
then be simplified. The outcry against monopoly had by 
that time ceased to give them pause, and the Guggenheims 
could plainly see the miners of that section contributing to 
recoup their losses. 

But the spring of 191 1 put a different face on matters. 
Madero's victory over the Diaz government indicated that 
the Torreon and Velardena smelting conditions would con- 
tinue indefinitely, and that certain plans the Guggenheims 
had formed for securing foothold in English and French 
mining camps further south would meet with opposition at 
the national capital. It was then that they offered to pay 
the price the Maderos had asked for their Torreon smelter, 
together with the overrated mines connected therewith, and 
their offer was smilingly rejected, — the property was no 
longer for sale. 

During the summer of 191 1, the Guggenheims along with 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 133 

others hitched their hopes to the possibility that de la 
Barra would be perpetuated in the presidential office; but 
when November came and with it Madero's inauguration, 
the smelting kings of the American continent saw check- 
mate written large across their plans for expansion in Mex- 
ico. They charged off the several millions of loss at Velar- 
defia and maintained the semblance of unbroken relations 
with the Maderos ; but their sentiments, adverse to the 
Madero ascendancy, were not concealed from their friends 
in Washington. 



CHAPTER VIII 

DIPLOMATIC supremacy at Mexico's capital is ac- 
corded to the United States, because no other nation 
distinguishes Mexico by making it a diplomatic post 
of the first class to which an agent of ambassadorial rank 
is accredited. Representatives of Great Britain, France, 
Germany, Spain, Italy and other nations are ministers, and 
their official residences are legations. The representative 
of the United States in Mexico is an Ambassador. His of- 
ficial home is an embassy. By virtue of this superiority 
of rank the American Ambassador automatically becomes 
dean or ranking diplomatic officer of the post. 

To him as dean are given a precedence and a right of 
initiative that may be developed into formidable powers 
which his home government expects its representative to 
assume tactfully and exercise with discretion. Therein lies 
the advantage for whose sake this scheme of statecraft 
was contrived. An Ambassador of the United States to 
Mexico, possessing the confidence of the Washington 
Government, becomes a definite challenge of the free agency 
of Mexico's president, if the ambassador is inspired with 
desire to demonstrate the range of authority which, in this 
way, has been conferred upon him. 

The office of ambassador to Mexico carries none of the 
pecuniary hardships which limit to wealthy men other 
diplomatic appointments of the first grade ; the salary is the 
same but the overhead and operating charges of the plant 
are much less. While $17,500 a year on the London, 
Paris or Berlin stations is little more than a cipher to ofif- 

134 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 135 

set the budget of costs, in Mexico City, converted into the 
normal equivalent which is 35,000 Mexican pesos, it leaves 
an attractive working margin in the hands of a thrifty 
man. Thus the range of choice, when the Washington 
State Department seeks a man for this position, is wider 
in the field of political expediency, because the property 
qualification of the candidate need not be considered. 

In 1910 the Taft Administration changed its diplomatic 
representative at Mexico's capital. It recalled Ambassador 
David E. Thompson, for reasons obvious to Americans in 
Mexico City, and appointed Henry Lane Wilson as Thomp- 
son's successor in a position which since that time has been 
as important as any other in the diplomatic service of the 
United States. 

Mr. Wilson was then fifty-three years old. He had 
served his country at foreign posts for thirteen years, seven 
or thereabouts as minister to Chile and six as minister to 
Belgium, when he was promoted to the Mexican ambas- 
sadorship. His arrival in Mexico was heralded as an aus- 
picious event. Americans there breathed a sigh of relief. 
The " too much Thompson " days, with their United States 
Banking Company and Pan American Railroad accompani- 
ments, were ended, and with them the era of misrepresenta- 
tion of American ideals. 

" A representative qualified to uphold American tradi- 
tion and carry with dignity his responsibilities as dean of 
the diplomatic corps," was the inspiring advance announce- 
ment made by the American newspaper in Mexico ; " a 
man of sense and fitness." All agreed that such a man 
was needed, and Henry Lane Wilson was received with 
enthusiasm. 

Among those who had awaited the arrival of Ambassa- 
dor Wilson with keen interest was a man who, during the 
last few months of the Thompson regime, had been in- 



136 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

volved in the enterprises which centered at the Embassy, 
and was now quite familiar with the field which the new 
ambassador was to enter. This man was Lebbeus Redman 
Wilfley. He was then forty-four years of age, had been 
Attorney General for the Philippine Islands from 1901 to 
1906, and Judge of the United States Court for China from 
1906 to 1909. But at the time of his arrival in Mexico, in 
the year last named, he was not visibly attached to any 
service except his own. 

It is necessary to effect a prompt placing of Judge Wil- 
fley, in sketching the operations of Ambassador Wilson in 
Mexico, because he was intimately connected with them. 

, On the day of Mr. Wilson's arrival, his association with 
Judge Wilfley began. From that day onward the ambas- 
sadorship was in reality a partnership. It resembled a law 
firm in certain particulars ; the ambassador was the man 
who appeared at court and carried the public honors, while 
the judge was the active counsellor in the office. He soon 
became known to the iconoclasts of the capital as the Em- 
bassy's " framer up." 

The Ambassador's adoption of Judge Wilfley as his 
friend and unofficial guide was a distinct shock to m.any 
resident Americans. The Judge had been quite diligently 
devoted to Ambassador Thompson and a helper in the 
Thompson schemes which were not looked upon with favor 
by the critical. The schemes were holding Thompson in 
Mexico after he had been superseded, but the Judge had 
dropped him like a hot potato, and had transferred his alle- 
giance to the new ambassador. Suspicion quickly spread 
among the Americans, and wherever three or four of them 
were gathered, this question in one form or another would 
be asked : " Are Thompson, Wilfley and Wilson tarred 
with the same stick ? " 

/ A systematic inquiry was instituted in the interest of " the 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 137 

Colony " to learn how the appointment of Mr. Wilson had 
been brought about, and who his political sponsors at Wash- 
ington had been. The result was not reassuring. The 
inquirers discovered that Henry Lane Wilson's brother, ex- 
Senator John L. Wilson, was Republican boss of the State 
of Washington, and that Richard Ballinger was associated 
with him in the management of political affairs of the 
Northwest in the interest of the Guggenheim family. They 
found also that INIr, Ballinger, then Secretary of the In- 
terior in President Taft's cabinet and under charges of 
ultra-Guggenheimism in Alaskan matters, had actively 
pressed the promotion and transfer of Mr. Wilson from 
Brussels to Mexico City. 

The new Ambassador was thus seen to have strong back- 
ing at Washington; he was one who would be sustained. 
Therefore, the nature of his connections in Mexico City 
was the more interesting to American residents. The 
prompt alliance with the Hon. Lebbeus Redman Wilfley — 
known to the jokers of the American Club as " Leb, the 
Red " — excited both surprise and apprehension. Presently 
an inquisitive person learned the disquieting fact that when 
Judge Wilfley arrived in Mexico, in 1909, he carried a per- 
sonal letter from President Taft to President Diaz com- 
mending its bearer to the latter's good will. Following this 
discovery a whisper went about that the Wilfley adjunct of 
the Embassy would be approved by the Taft Administra- 
tion, and that a povv^erful clique was forming which would 
dominate the American colony. 

It began to be known by various names, "The Colony 
Proper," " The Kitchen Cabinet," or, in allusion to the circle 
that had formed around Diaz in former days, " The Society 
of Friends of the Ambassador." The principal members 
besides Judge Wilfley, were a banker of American training, 
an American lawyer, an American newspaper publisher, an 



138 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

American representative of a large news-gathering associa- 
tion, an American official of the National Railways, an 
American business man who was outfitter of government 
offices, and several other American business men of minor 
importance. 

These arrangements were perfected during the closing 
months of the Diaz regime; there was indication that a 
change was coming in Mexico's government, and it seemed 
prudent to these Americans to strengthen the ambassadorial 
position. Whatever the situation called for, in their esti- 
mation, could then be undertaken by the ambassador with 
what was in fact the endorsement and approval of the 
" leaders of the American Colony." 

Thus the power of the Embassy by reason of its ranking 
diplomatic quality was materially increased through the ac- 
tive local cooperation of its own nationals. Through the 
lawyer and the banker and the newspaper publisher and the 
press correspondent, Americans in Mexico City could be 
well controlled. Whatever seemed expedient to Judge Wil- 
fley, to the Ambassador, and to the cabinet, would be likely 
to stand as the " sentiment of resident Americans." 

Under these conditions Americans in that section of the 
Lord's vineyard tempered their initiative with discretion. 
The business experiences of an active Gringo who did not 
fraternize with the Embassy were not uniformly felicitous 
but were never dull. 

The influence of the Embassy cabinet was not confined 
to Americans, but spread to wider range. The member 
who was president of the National Raihvays of Mexico — 
besides being a director in the Banco Nacional and in vari- 
ous other banks and enterprises — and the business man 
who dealt heavily in government supplies, were in close 
touch with the system of nerves which reached from the 
center of Mexico to every government connection at home 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 139 

and abroad. These two men held their own by virtue of 
qualities among which adroitness was as conspicuous as 
any, and whatever move of the Embassy seemed wise to 
them would very probably be made with, or without their 
open agency as they saw fit. 

It is necessary to look sharply at these two men because 
they were the most influential Americans resident in Mex- 
ico, and because the closeness of their business relations 
with Limantour made it practically impossible for them to 
take part in or countenance any movement which would 
tend to affect his interests adversely. They were Edward 
N. Brown, railway president, and George W. Cook, who 
did business as Mosler, Bowen and Cook. 

The business offices of these gentlemen were on oppo- 
site sides of a narrow street once called Calle Vergara but 
now known as Calle Bolivar. They were rarely found, 
however, on the opposite sides of anything else. The con- 
cerns of which they were the heads were housed in Liman- 
tour property and paid Sefior Limantotir nearly as much 
in rentals as all his other real estate holdings in Mexico 
combined. It was not necessary to go beyond Brown and 
Cook to find the actual " leaders of the American Colony." 

The influence of these two men in Embassy matters was 
in no wise diminished by their close business relations with 
Limantour, and the possibilities of confusion and cross-pur- 
poses in Mexican affairs are well shown by the effort 
made at the close of February, 191 1, by Ambassador Wil- 
son to induce thje Washington government to send troops 
into Mexico to protect American interests. The Ambassa- 
dor visited Washington personally to ask that this be done, 
carrying with him a supporting petition signed by a few 
men who styled themselves " the Committee of the Ameri- 
can Colony." The signers were members of the Ambas- 
sador's private clique, and Messrs. Cook and Brown were 



I40 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

among them. I am tolerably certain that these two would 
not have taken part in such a movement if they had be- 
lieved that in so doing they would displease Limantour, 

The project was not one in which chances could be taken 
and excuses offered for error. Diaz was then president 
and Madero was making trouble in the North. Liman- 
tour was just starting from Paris to return to Mexico via 
New York after his eight months' absence. The actual en- 
try of American troops into Mexico at that time would have 
amounted to intervention. The action of the Ambassador 
and his friends was hasty, and the meeting to decide upon 
it was secretly held in the private office of the newspaper 
publisher who was one of the Embassy cabinet. I sat in 
an adjoining room with no suspicion in my mind that any- 
thing beyond the usual incantations of the circle was tak- 
ing place within twenty feet of me. Certainly I did not 
dream that these persons were assembled for the purpose 
of urging Washington to order a military movement which 
might be construed as an invasion of Mexico. 

The sudden departure of the Ambassador on the follow- 
ing day caused surprise and inquiry ; and the cat came out 
of the bag. An indignation meeting of the larger Ameri- 
can Colony was held at once, and a counter petition was 
cabled to Washington in advance of the Ambassador's 
arrival. Intervention did not follow, but what seemed a 
preliminary step in that direction was the rush order of 
the Taft administration for twenty thousand regulars to 
entrain for San Antonio, Texas, the order which was being 
executed at the time of Sefior Limantour's arrival in 
New York on March 7. 

The favoritism shown by the Diaz government to Cook 
who supplied equipment at extravagant prices for offices 
and schools; the universal belief, now said to have been 
unfounded, that Limantour was his silent partner; the 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 141 

practical monopoly by Cook of Cientifico patronage in his 
line ; his intimate association with government officials ; his 
great establishment in Mexico City, all emphasize his im- 
portance in the Embassy clique. Cook plus Brown, whose 
relation to Limantour and the Mexican government was 
of necessity an intimate one, amounted to something very 
close to a dictatorship in Colony and Embassy affairs ; and 
it seems clear that the Ambassador's trip to Washington 
at their instance, on so questionable an errand, was a 
political move of notable significance. 

Ambassadorial activity during the de la Barra period 
was confined, aside from its social features, to routine mat- 
ters and formal presentment of claims. President de la 
Barra possessed a sense of humor; he permitted himself 
to be amused by Mr. Wilson's patronizingly protective atti- 
tude. Diligently graceful deference was shown by that 
polished Executive of Mexico to the Ambassador of the 
United States as he exalted him in his own esteem — and 
successfully procrastinated. Even the apparently urgent 
matter of Judge Wilfley's desire to separate an American 
named Hamilton from a valuable mine in the State of 
Oaxaca for a consideration which Hamilton thought inade- 
quate, failed of support from de la Barra as it had from 
Diaz. But de la Barra's exquisite manner was a caress, 
and in rather sharp contrast to that of Diaz who, having 
learned that the argument was between two Americans, told 
them to " Go ahead and fight it out." 

But when Madero came into office. Ambassador Wilson 
found his opportunity. Madero had regarded Washington 
friendliness to de la Barra as an indication of its attitude 
toward himself, and was quite unprepared for the contest 
with Washington's diplomatic agent which awaited him. 
It was a contest which began when Madero took the presi- 
dential chair, and it ended only with Madero's death. 



142 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Early in the Madero regime the contest became more dis- 
concerting and more menacing in its possibilities than any 
other element with which the new president was called 
upon to deal. 

Internal affairs threatened trouble from every quarter; 
heavy disbursements were reducing the treasury surplus; 
but Ambassador Wilson's crossfire of demand, with the 
ominous power of the United States behind it, produced a 
peculiar irritation from which the mind of Madero was 
rarely free. There was a persistence in It which Madero 
could not reconcile with any visible reason. He was un- 
willing to believe that Washington was ill-disposed toward 
him, yet evidence was not lacking that the Ambassador's 
acts had the approval of his home government. 

A man of deeper cunning and more subtle method than 
Madero could have laid plans to win over the Ambassador 
and profit by his power. But Madero was too simple and 
transparent for such a course. He was on the defensive 
toward Ambassador Wilson from the hour of that official's 
first demand upon him, and he manifested his sentiments 
so clearly that open personal antagonism promptly ensued. 
The contest over every item that arose for consideration 
soon ceased to be the argument of men representing great 
interests ; it was rather that of two children to whom favor 
on the one hand and fate on the other, had entrusted ex- 
plosive toys — a campaign of annoyance with progressive 
resentment as its result. 

It was as a presser of claims that Ambassador Wilson 
made his earliest contact with the Madero government. 
The large number of more or less legitimate American 
claims for damage during the Madero revolution which had 
been filed while de la Barra was President, but had been 
elbowed along by that genial procrastinator for action by 
the " constitutionally elected president," were now to be 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 143 

considered. These claims afforded the American Ambas- 
sador daily opportunity to make his appearance at the Na- 
tional Palace where his arrival and departure soon became 
a feature of entertainment scarcely less notable than the 
bugle-announced coming and going of the President him- 
self. The American diplomat's official calls were not con- 
fined to the National Palace, or to the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations, or to the President's official residence at Chepul- 
tepec ; they were made at whatever department of Mexico's 
government the Ambassador felt moved to honor with his 
presence, his business instantly halting whatever was going 
forward at the time of his arrival upon the scene. 

But it was not pressing legitimate claims of his country- 
men, even upon the harassed government, that aroused the 
deepest antagonism of Madero and his cabinet members 
toward the American official; it was his insistence upon 
early settlement of claims which were not regarded as 
within the limits of the American Ambassador's province 
— of large demands for damages which were not American. 

Two such claims in particular took prominence in the 
Ambassador's eyes as matters calling for quick adjudica- 
tion and settlement. The pressure he exerted upon these 
big outside affairs militated against progress of any kind 
with the smaller concerns of his own people. Also it em- 
phasized the influences which spurred him to excessive zeal, 
and rendered him conspicuous as a man whose undertak- 
ings might embrace a wide range of activity and receive 
the unquestioning support of his home government — a 
dangerous man to thwart. 

One of these claims had been handed down from the 
days of Diaz; it was that of an English corporation own- 
ing an immense cotton plantation in the Laguna Dis^ 
trict near Torreon. It set forth that the Mexican Govern- 



144 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

ment had permitted the change of a water course which 
irrigated this property and by shutting off the water had 
inflicted damages to the amount of some eleven millions. 
The other big claim was that of the Chinese Government 
which charged the massacre of three hundred and odd 
Chinese in the City of Torreon in the month of May, 191 1, 
was an act of wanton barbarity and that nothing less than 
ten thousand Mexican dollars for every Chinaman so killed 
would be considered a fair adjustment of the unpleasant 
event. 

The attitude of the American Ambassador in these two 
cases was unfortunate. It was declared by the Madero 
Government that there was no logical reason which de- 
manded his personal service in either the matter of the 
English corporation or that of the Chinese Government. It 
was true that there was an American, one James Brown 
Potter of New York, who was a stockholder of the English 
corporation, and it was also true that the attorney for the 
Chinese claim was L, R. Wilfley, chief advisor to the Am- 
bassador himself. 

But Madero held that to admit the American Ambassa- 
dor's right to press these claims would constitute a preced- 
ent which he could not take the responsibility of establish- 
ing. He said that to do so would give notice to claimants 
of all nations that if they secured an American attorney or 
possessed an American stockholder, the Ambassador of the 
United States could be made their active and acknowledged 
advocate before the Mexican government. He also urged 
that the claims were of extraordinary character and size, 
and involved lengthy and careful procedure. The Ambas- 
sador disagreed with all of this, and insisted that short-cut 
methods be employed to adjust the affairs with despatch, 
and the open friction which discussion of the matters in- 
duced brought Madero face to face with the only possible 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 145 

solution — the Washington government must be asked to 
effect a change in its representation at Mexico City. 

But demand for recall of an envoy of the United States 
as persona non grata is a serious matter. It is so serious 
that it has rarely been resorted to by even the strongest na- 
tions of Europe where the American representative has 
been outranked in diplomatic precedence. Madero, greatly 
as he desired to make a peremptory demand of this char- 
acter, was far from being in position to make so violent a 
move and face the grave consequences of an open quarrel 
with Washington. 

He procrastinated in the matter of the claims and caused 
a subterranean hint to be conveyed to Washington that all 
was not well in his relations with its diplomatic representa- 
tive, and left it for Washington to take such action as it 
saw fit. 

To Madero's astonishment and chagrin Washington saw 
fit to do nothing, and if Madero had required a declaration 
that the Taft Administration was not in sympathy with his 
attempt to establish democracy in Mexico he was now in 
possession of it. But it was not until later that he under- 
stood how Washington had been confirmed in its impulse 
toward inactivity in this matter by Manuel Calero, his own 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was Ambassador Wilson's 
close ally and intimate friend. 

This friendship was another and probably valid reason 
for Madero's dislike and distrust of the American Ambas- 
sador, because Calero, almost immediately he became for- 
eign minister, assumed a supercilious air which displeased 
Madero and offended the other cabinet members by whom 
he was cordially hated. Also Calero was an ambitious man 
and while quite openly and offensively displaying his impa- 
tience with the crudeness about him, yet was well pleased 
to remain foreign minister, because, as such, he stood in 



146 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

direct line of succession to the presidency when Madero 
and Pino Suarez, as seemed inevitable, should be forced 
to resign their offices as president and vice president, and 
the absurd attempt to make over a military dictatorship into 
a sentimental democracy should be abandoned. 

When the hints of Madero regarding his sentiment toward 
Ambassador Wilson were started for Washington it was 
not difficult for Calero to arrange a method of minimizing 
their effect on an Administration which was sustaining its 
Ambassador in all his acts, and was known to desire that 
he remain at Mexico's capital. And it is not unlikely that 
the Ambassador, duly warned by Calero, was in position to 
operate machinery at Washington in his own behalf to the 
end that Madero's effort by unostentatious means to rid 
himself of a diplomatic dean whom he tolerated with diffi- 
culty, reacted upon himself and caused the sentiment to be 
intensified, which President Taft later described in an of- 
ficial communication as " extreme pessimism " toward the 
man who had said that he would place the Mexican people 
on their honor and would get an honorable result, 

Madero's appointment of Manuel Calero as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs was a blunder which he soon had grave 
cause to repent. His advisers to a man were strongly op- 
posed to the appointment and urged its unwisdom upon 
him. But Madero would not listen. That Calero had 
been Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies under Porfirio 
Diaz, and was known to be in full sympathy with the old 
regime which Madero had been elected to destroy, were 
outweighed in his reasoning by the accepted fact that Cal- 
ero possessed one of the brightest intellects in Mexico, had 
experience in state affairs, and was a lawyer of position 
and fame. Nowhere in the ranks of the Maderistas could 
he find a man at the time whom he thought capable of 
creditably handling the Department of State. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 147 

But when Calero and Ambassador Wilson formed an 
alliance and made it part of their almost daily routine to 
dine together, Madero realized his error. He had volun- 
tarily placed an opponent in the most important post of his 
government to cooperate with and encourage an unfriendly 
influence outside of it. He knew, as did every one at 
all informed of Mexican politics, that Calero's ambition 
to become president of Mexico amounted to an obsession, 
but he also knew that Calero had little or no following 
even among the Cientifico affiliations of the Diaz regime, 
and he had regarded the ambition as natural but entirely 
harmless — until it assumed serious proportions through 
the minister's intimacy with the Ambassador of the United 
States. 

Nothing was clearer to Madero than that Ambassador 
Wilson hoped for his early downfall, and he did not hesi- 
tate to credit the Ambassador with willingness to expedite 
matters to that end, with Calero as his successor in office. 
When the Ambassador became so insistent in his efforts 
to carry through the two big claims, Madero saw that in 
these claims lay sufficient reason for the American envoy 
to welcome a change in Mexico's presidency, that would 
place a close friend in office whose attitude toward those 
matters might not be so persistently adverse. 

The Calero advantages in this combine were especially 
alluring to a man of dominating qualities. The ability of 
the United States Ambassador to facilitate presidential 
succession in Mexico — not yet practically demonstrated to 
the world at large — was even then a good venture in 
probabilities, and alliance with the man who carried such 
potentialities in his pocket possessed fascinations for a 
Calero whose leading characteristics were faith in himself, 
hope for his own future and charity for very few. 

The intimacy between Ambassador Wilson and Foreign 



148 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Minister Calero did not lessen, and Madero fretted and 
looked apprehensively on, awaiting the moment when he 
could rearrange his cabinet pegs. Discordant and spo- 
radic outbreak spread through Mexico. The press, from 
which Madero had removed the Diaz gag, challenged every 
act of the government, and the caricaturing weeklies per- 
petrated their obscenities against Mexico's President and 
all his works — and then, in the first week of February, 
1 9 12, less than three months from the day Madero took 
office, the Government at Washington dealt him a thrust 
which it is scarcely an exaggeration to number with the 
wounds that killed him. And it spilled a river of blood 
besides Madero's. 



CHAPTER IX 

ORDERS were issued by the War Department at 
Washington, on February 4, 1912, that all troops 
in the United States be prepared for field service. 
Commanders of the Departments of the Gulf, of the Lakes, 
of the East, and of California, were directed to hold the 
forces under their command in readiness for concentration 
on the Mexican border. 

No exigency of actual war could have evoked an order 
more comprehensive than this, so far as the regular army 
is concerned, for it included the entire force available be- 
tween the two oceans, 34,000 men in all branches of the 
service. But lest Mexico should entertain fallacious hope 
of issuing victorious from the impending conflict, an enor- 
mous reenforcement was provided for, from the more 
numerous establishment of the National Guard. Instruc- 
tions were transmitted to the commanders in the various 
states that they should be prepared to furnish quotas of 
volunteers aggregating 66,000, a grand total of 100,000 
American troops. 

Though the newspapers of the United States did not 
give appropriate attention to these proceedings, the im- 
portance of them was appreciated in Mexico immediately. 
Press despatches on the night of February 4 conveyed the 
menace of war, and on the following day the newspapers 
of the capital spread the information far and wide. 
Journals nominally conservative expanded their headlines ; 
those that were frankly " yellow " became hysterical. 
Vera Cruz dailies carried the news along the Gulf Coast. 

149 



I50 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

The press of Monterrey and of border cities on the Ameri- 
can side thrilled northern Mexico. 

The two million Mexicans who could read used that ac- 
complishment instantly to enlighten the thirteen millions 
who could not. By the evening of the sixth the entire 
Mexican Republic, barring the Yucatan Peninsula, -was in 
possession of the story magnified many diameters. The 
resulting sensation was electrical. The effect was cumula- 
tive, and it was extremely demoralizing as any person 
even moderately well acquainted with Mexico would easily 
have foreseen. 

The peons were moved not so much by the thought of 
American invasion as by the disclosure that the " Estados 
Unidas " was hostile to Madero. Their inconceivably ig- 
norant minds were dangerously excited. The middle 
classes gave their fears a voice in endless, ill informed dis- 
cussion. Many wealthy Mexicans were pleased ; some re- 
joiced openly, not without reason. For there is but one 
thing that the rich require in Mexico or elsewhere ; namely, 
settled conditions. In any society where the laws are com- 
prehensible and reasonably permanent, where order is 
maintained and the future may be counted upon, the rich 
will inevitably grow richer, and many of them understand 
it. If the United States should " come in," property would 
increase in value ; so reasoned Mexicans of large possessions, 
except the very few who were in satisfactory relations with 
the Madero government. 

A considerable number of European residents were of 
the same mind. Merchants whose trade was lessening be- 
lieved that " under the United States " it would improve. 
Dozens of them said this to the writer, by way of getting 
his confirmation of their opinion. Americans, as a rule, 
were dismayed; they naturally wondered how they should 
protect themselves while the troops were getting in. They 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 151 

showed very little confidence in the discretion of the Wash- 
ington authorities, seemed to expect mistakes, and to dread 
the early incidents of war. Few doubted that war was at 
hand. 

The bandits took prompt action, Madero's government 
must be weaker than they had supposed, and surely it had 
now upon its hands all that it could attend to. The United 
States was coming in with a very strong force, next week, 
next month, who knows when ? " Now is our time," said 
the bandits. 

This is not conjecture. Within a fortnight the hundred 
and eighty correspondents of the newspapers under my 
management reported brigandage on the increase in all 
sections. The marauders had been operating on a small 
scale, except the Zapata bands in the State of Morelos, 
south of the capital, and the Zalgada brigands in the State 
of Guerrero in the Southwest. Many others now appeared 
with magical suddenness, the obvious suitability of the occa- 
sion to their special industry stimulating them to deeds of 
unusual atrocity. Murders for loot, murders for no assign- 
able motive except cruelty gratified by indescribable tor- 
tures; crimes against women, the invariable accompaniment 
of Mexican brigandage — all these in a few days began to 
stain more broadly the page of history. 

The news of these horrors produced little effect in the 
capital. Mexicans are callous and imbued with a kind of 
fatalism. Always at the back of their minds may be per- 
ceived that conception of destiny which tends to weaken 
the sense of personal responsibility. In the days of Diaz 
there had been outrages, but the rulers, not the people, had 
committed nearly all of them. Nobody who knew Mexico 
expected men in power to take preventive or punitive steps 
from* motives of mere humanity. 

At this time, however, there was at the head of the Gov- 



152 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

ernment a man susceptible to sympathy, one that could be 
grieved by wrongs not personal. This sudden blast out of 
the north had blown Madero's house of cards about his 
ears ; he was harassed by a thousand anxieties that touched 
his own vital interests, but he had still a nerve in his body 
which could ache at the thought of what the same ill wind 
was bringing to his people, fanning every sullen spark of 
evil into quick flame of violence and outrage from the Rio 
Grande southward through the whole of Mexico. 

Madero believed that this unfortunate action and the atti- 
tude of the United States toward his government resulted 
from representations made by Ambassador Wilson, but 
neither Madero nor any other person was able to discover 
what that attitude really meant. It is easy to say that the 
disturbed conditions in Mexico had reached a stage where 
intervention by the United States seemed to be justified ; but 
the difficulty is that with the first step toward intervention 
the disturbances vastly increased. The warlike order was 
not in itself remedial, and nothing followed but vain at- 
tempts to explain. The threat remained, darkening the air, 
and in the shadow that it threw on Mexico much evil was 
done, but no lightnings came from the cloud. No honest 
man, no friend of peace and order, received encouragement 
or help, but the children of the devil ran riot as they always 
do in the excitement of a notable disaster. 

The deplorable treachery of Orozco was begun in this 
unfortunate time. Whether it would otherwise have come 
to maturity, whether Madero with a mind less burdened 
and under clearer skies would have perceived its serious- 
ness and checked it early, are questions hard to answer. 
But there is no doubt that whatever he meant to do or 
might have done toward the establishment of a solid gov- 
ernment not dependent for its preservation upon perpetual 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 153 

bloodshed was nullified in whole or in part by the ill con- 
sidered and unfriendly action of the United States. 

How painfully Madero was affected by his situation I 
had abundant means of knowing from persons in Madero's 
office and members of the Chamber of Deputies, but more 
than a week passed before I saw the President himself at 
close range. 

The interview took place in the innermost of the presi- 
dential reception rooms of the National Palace. It hap- 
pened that as I entered, there appeared at the opposite end 
the undersized, frock-coated figure of Madero coming from 
his private office. In my mind was the impression of the 
immense and ponderous building stretched across the 
Plaza's eastern boundary ; of the great stone stairway, its 
steps hewn for giants so that the knees of an ordinary 
person are lifted almost to his chin as he climbs panting 
in that rarified atmosphere; of the long corridor, and 
dwindling series of reception rooms ; and it seemed to me 
that I had walked down the diminished vista which one sees 
through a strong field glass reversed, and in the vanishing 
point of this perspective stood " the little man," dwarfed 
by his huge responsibilities, so desperately circumstanced, 
so pitifully doomed to failure and extinction. 

All illusions aside, he was greatly changed from that en- 
thusiast who was my neighbor so little while ago, and taught 
political economy to his curbstone pupils in the Calle Ber- 
lin. His cheeks which, used to curve smoothly from his 
broad forehead to his narrow chin were now sunken and 
lined ; his brow was wrinkled ; a dozen years had been added 
to his apparent age, a fair half of them in the last seven 
days. He showed loss of sleep and was extremely nervous, 
with the impatient manner of a man who is trying to do 
too many things at once, and knows in his heart that they 



154 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

are none of them done well, but he had not lost a grain of 
his courage nor an atom of his essential self respect. 

" Senor Bell," he said, after greeting me, " your papers 
have been printing some sensational matters." 

I said that there had been no desire to attract readers 
by exaggeration of statement or of headline type. What 
I had desired to attract was the attention of certain persons, 
in order that the true inwardness of the Washington policy 
might be disclosed. He seized upon this instantly, and re- 
sponded with expressions which will savor of melodrama to 
an American reader, but that is the way the Mexicans often 
speak, and what is worse they run to rising inflections at 
the ends of sentences, by which abuse the Spanish language 
is habitually deformed by them, and sometimes, as upon 
the present occasion, the English also. In any language, 
in any country, in any circumstances, there is but one even 
quality of utterance appropriate to a gentleman, and the 
extent to which Madero now abandoned this mastery to 
which the fibre of his soul abundantly entitled him, was an 
index of the injury he had suffered. 

" Why does your nation treat me like a worm ? " he cried. 
" Why does it place its iron heel upon me, and grind me 
into dust?" 

I answered that it was because himself and his aims and 
his environment were not understood. 

" That is true ; that is obvious," he said. " I find con- 
stantly, at every point, that the Government of the United 
States is misinformed, that the truth does not penetrate. 
Certainly in no other way can that military order be ex- 
plained." 

I replied that to the best of my information the order 
was already seen to have been an error. It had created a 
storm in Congress and was now a dead letter. 

" A dead letter, Senor," he exclaimed. " Already it has 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 155 

done its mischief. Thousands of Mexican lives will be 
sacrificed before the work of that military order is un- 
done." 

To attempt a contradiction would have been dishonest 
and futile. I expressed, however, the hope that the rela- 
tions between the two governments would adjust themselves 
more speedily than he expected, and that with the moral 
support of the United States won to his side, he would be 
able to carry out his policies for tranquillity in Mexico. 
He honored these empty phrases with no more attention 
than they deserved ; he moved about nervously, clasping and 
unclasping his hands, and I saw drops of sweat on his fore- 
head. 

" I do not want to kill my people to make them good," 
he declared in a shrill voice, at which a knot of Mexicans 
awaiting audience in a far corner of the room turned ques- 
tioning eyes upon me as one who was being roughly lectured 
in a tongue they did not understand. " I could have con- 
trolled them," he went on. " I am preparing to open lands 
to them. I am arranging employment at good wages for 
all Maderista soldiers and many other men, on public works. 
Does your government suppose that I have given no thought 
to conditions here, or that extensive plans such as mine can 
be carried out by magic in a day? I ask of no man or 
government anything but a reasonable chance. Why is this 
unfriendly effort made to force me to violate my pledges 
against the shedding of blood? What influence is at work 
secretly to accomplish this injustice? Surely the United 
States has nothing to gain by making me a tyrant and a 
madman ! " 

He strove for calmness, and attained a very creditable 
measure of it. 

" I am speaking to you more freely, Senor, than I should 
have done a week ago," he said. " You have questioned 



156 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

your government's act in your newspapers in such a way 
as to show that you possess unusual comprehension of con- 
ditions in Mexico, and of the difficulties under which I labor. 
I do not regret having spoken to you in this manner." 

I asked him whether he would be willing to make a state- 
ment for publication, and obtained in answer the only other 
significant utterance of the interview. 

" Alas, Senor, I cannot," he said. " I should merely make 
more enemies, and give another opportunity to your Am- 
bassador." 

Explanation of this remark was unnecessary with me, 
and Madero knew it. He smiled sadly, took me by the 
hand, and that was the end of it. The business which had 
taken me into his presence had not been so much as men- 
tioned. My sympathy for this well-meaning man, the 
victim of so grave injustice, the focus of a hundred treach- 
eries, had driven personal considerations clean out of my 
mind. 

On Sunday, February ii, 1912, two days before my call 
upon President Madero, I had cabled an account of Mex- 
ican conditions to the New York Herald. The following 
morning the cable despatch appeared on the first news page 
of that journal under the heading : " American Jingoism 
Blamed in Mexico for New Uprisings." 

This article had been prepared after several days spent 
in gathering the latest information by mail and wire as to 
conditions in Mexico, and after many conferences with un- 
biased and clear-thinking men at the capital. It is repeated 
here verbatim as a fair statement of the Mexican situation at 
that time : 

(By cable to the Herald.) 

Mexico City, Mexico, via Galveston, Texas, Sunday. 
— It is being openly charged here that big American 
business interests are fostering the present unrest in 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 157 

Mexico in the hope of intervention by the United 
States. Many American residents in this city declare 
such a movement would place lives in instant jeopardy. 

President Madero's statement, issued on February 
seventh, which, at first, was regarded as too optimistic, 
now is proving to be a fair estimate of conditions. Its 
appearance has helped public opinion, a most important 
factor. President Madero's endeavor to avoid harsh 
measures was mistaken for weakness, but now his re- 
lentless pursuit and slaughter of bandits indicates his 
desertion of democracy, and the iron hand is in evi- 
dence. 

The State of Morelos is nearly cleared of marauding 
bands, but in the State of Guerrero this task is more 
difficult as the region is mountainous and wild. How- 
ever, federal forces are giving no quarter and Zapata 
is being closely pursued. The States of Chihuahua 
and Durango are quieter and the Michoacan rebels are 
insignificant in numbers. The finding of Mauser rifles 
in the hands of Zapatistas indicates disloyalty of part 
of the army and points to hidden support for the upris- 
ing, in Mexico City. It is supposed that certain men 
here are acting in concert with prominent men in the 
United States to depress values. Otherwise no reason 
has been found for Washington's preliminary order to 
hold troops in readiness. It is thought that a big metal 
manufacturing association is aiding in exploiting Mexi- 
can troubles. Many reports are published in news- 
papers of the United States either wholly or partly 
false, and it is believed powerful interests are sending 
out " press agent " reports with ulterior designs. 

What is considered the most dangerous element in 
the Mexican situation is the Washington attitude, and 
the Taf t order is a deep mystery ; it is not considered 
justified by conditions, but is causing deep anxiety. 

Mr. Wilson, the American Ambassador, denies re- 
sponsibility for a statement credited to him in last Sun- 
day's New York papers that hostile journals here are 
exploiting the American attitude. The press is abso- 
lutely free, and La Prensa, strictly independent, which 



158 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

has been criticizing the Government for its ineffective 
methods, now recognizing the improvements in the situ- 
ation will to-morrow ask editorially : " What causes 
Washington to act prematurely?" Many Americans 
here are asking the same question and wondering if 
Americans at home understand the consequences of 
mobilization of troops along the Texas border with the 
implied threat of intervention. 

Hope is expressed that public opinion in the North 
will prevent an army movement. It is declared that 
one American regiment crossing the Rio Grande would 
place every American here in peril. 

Washington and New York despatches, both special 
and press association reports, printed by newspapers 
here this morning are a tissue of absurdities, showing 
how exaggerated is the view of conditions. Such de- 
spatches are doing untold injury and driving public 
sentiment here to extremes of discontent and distrust of 
General Madero's Government. Every day confirms 
the suspicion that the American press and the United 
States army are " j ingoing " to boost the commercial 
schemes of interested persons desirous of helping Mr. 
Taft. 

The projected trip of Mr. Knox, Secretary of State, 
is viewed with suspicion as confirming the idea that the 
present agitation is mixed up with " dollar diplomacy." 

It is suggested here that it would be well for Wash- 
ington to send disinterested men directly to different 
parts of Mexico to ascertain facts before complicating 
the situation further through ignorance of conditions. 

In an editorial that same day, February 12, 1912, the 
New York Herald said: 

Threatening as the Mexican situation is, the Admin- 
istration at Washington should bear in mind the fact 
that in one respect the demand for intervention is based 
largely on the same grounds that were disclosed in con- 
nection with political unrest in Cuba. 

American financial interests in Mexico, just as in 
Cuba, are clamoring for American intervention. Capi- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 159 

tal that went to Mexico well knowing the risks o£ in- 
vestments in a republic composed of such elements as 
those which go to make up the population of these 
Latin- American countries, wants the display of military 
power. 

Such demand should always be closely scrutinized. 
President Taft handled the last great Mexican revolu- 
tion which preceded the retirement of General Diaz 
with great skill, and good fortune attended him. But 
there must be some other argument than that American 
capital is in danger before the Administration will be 
justified in duplicating what it did in March, 191 1, 

A special cable to the Herald from Mexico City last 
night gives the view of the Mexican metropolis on the 
question of intervention. This is that the agitation 
comes from capital and not from Americans who are 
in peril. 

In the New York Herald of February 13, 1912, is a 
despatch from its Washington Bureau received the previous 
night. The item carried the headline : " The Herald's 
Mexican Cable Cleared Atmosphere of Doubt." Follow- 
ing is a quotation from it: 

The Herald's special cable despatch from Mexico 
City to-day, pointing out that Madero's adherents be- 
lieved special interests in the United States were foster- 
ing unrest in the hope of provoking American inter- 
vention is described here as killing two birds with one 
stone. It nipped in the bud a campaign of misrepre- 
sentation which has persistently found expression in 
a portion of the press, and at the same time delivered 
a knockout blow to the latest " intervention bugaboo " 
— a report that Germany and Great Britain had de- 
manded that the United States step in and protect their 
Mexican interests. 

This report was a myth, pure and simple, according 
to declarations from President Taft, Secretary Knox 
and other officials, and at the British and German Em- 
bassies it was characterized as pure fabrication. 



i6o THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

I paid in dollars and cents for the satisfaction which 
resulted from evidence that the right thing had been said at 
the right time; for while the foregoing items were being 
read by the people of the United States, the printing of 
similar sentiments in La Prensa and The Daily Mexican 
in Mexico City was causing cancelation of all advertising 
patronage of concerns holding close business relations with 
the American Smelting and Refining Company. 

My despatch to the New York Herald was an injustice 
to the Guggenheims to the extent that it seemed to single 
them out as trouble makers while, as a matter of fact, I 
do not know of any large interest in Mexico which was 
exerting its influence to strengthen the Madero government. 
All were critical of it. This applies not only to American 
but to Mexican and European concerns. Madero was on 
trial for his official life and every substantial business man 
with a Mexican connection was prosecuting attorney. This 
was a suicidal policy whose results have since been made 
manifest. 

But if I were to accept at face value and repeat in this 
place the statements made to-day by men of large affairs 
who were most critical of Madero when he was in power, 
the result would be a general whitewashing. Their acts 
and their motives would be cleansed of all unfriendliness 
to the Madero administration. I am deterred from mak- 
ing such a presentation by the fact that my necessary con- 
tacts with large and lesser business men at that time re- 
sulted in my knowing precisely what they were doing and 
saying. I was also in position to learn from members of 
the government the adverse effect of such influences upon 
the stability of the structure they were trying to erect ; and 
I cannot view the course pursued by men whose stakes in 
Mexico were heavy, as other than destructive. The influ- 
ence of the Guggenheims was harmful ; so was that of the 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO i6i 

concerns whose head is Lord Cowdray. To these must be 
added the influence of the men who were accountable to 
Limantour. 

I can see resentment and disapproval in the opposition 
of these men, but no business logic. The closest investi- 
gation fails to reveal a helpful word or deed contributed 
by them to preserve a government that certainly was con- 
stitutional, with a strictly honest man at its head. 

The Guggenheims were not open in their resentment; 
their moves were made through Washington and the 
American Embassy. Lord Cowdray's position was clearer. 
Of three large contracts placed by the Madero govern- 
ment he secured but one, the other two going to American 
concerns at prices and under conditions which S. Pearson 
& Son, Limited, would not accept. This was displeasing 
to the firm which had built Mexico's most notable works 
and which expected the quality of its service to dispose of 
opposition. 

In Lord Cowdray's petroleum operations also there was 
cause of controversy. In the concession given to him by 
Diaz the Mexican government reserved the right to have 
a representative accompany all prospecting expeditions and 
be present at all borings. Another clause gave the govern- 
ment the right of access to all reports from the oil fields. 
None of the rights of inspection and oversight had been 
exercised by the Diaz government. When they were in- 
sisted upon by Madero's Minister of Gobernacion, Rafael 
Hernandez, Lord Cowdray was displeased, and his subor- 
dinates continued to ignore the government's rights. The 
interventors who were sent to the fields were not per- 
mitted to inspect the works. Reports of operations were 
withheld. 

There was trouble also with the negotiations for sale to 
the Mexican government of the S. Pearson & Son. Limited, 



i62 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

interest in the Tehuantepec National Railway. The affair 
was dragging along while progress in constructing the 
Panama Canal, the railway's deadly rival, was hastened 
by urgency at Washington and efficiency on the scene. 
The result of all this was most decided unpleasantness. 

The pressure of the men who were commonly supposed 
to wait for Limantour's nod, was strong but it was not 
directly exerted. Mr. Cook, the merchant, found it less 
easy to do profitable business with the Madero government 
than he had with that of Diaz, There were reports that 
the Maderos were going into furniture and office fittings. 
The situation was far from agreeable to Mr, Cook whose 
establishment was costing him 80,000 pesos a month to 
operate, Mr. Brown, the railway president and bank di- 
rector, found management of the railway system hemmed 
about with difficulty. The Maderos were crowding Ameri- 
cans off the lines, and replacing them with inefficient men; 
the government's inspection was too rigid and its regula- 
tion of rates unbusinesslike. Government dictation in 
general was too pronounced. The government's attitude 
toward the Banco Nacional was not as considerate as it 
might have been. Mr. Brown was annoyed and apprehen- 
sive, as a result of these and other developments. 

The things which affected Mr, Cook and Mr. Brown, 
affected Limantour also. If the Maderos crowded Mr. 
Cook, the big Limantour building for which he paid 4,000 
pesos a month rental, might one of these days be vacant 
with no tenant in sight. If the Maderos handicapped Mr. 
Brown in operating the railways, the success of the merger, 
not yet strong on its pins, was threatened. The merger, 
Limantour's proudest achievement, was being closely 
watched by bankers; it had suffered already in the North, 
and prospects were not bright owing to lack of business 
confidence in Madero's government. Limantour's stand- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 163 

ing with the big financial men would be hurt if the merger 
should not do well. If actual disaster should befall it, 
the 5,500 pesos a month paid to Limantour as rental of 
his building — which he had erected for the general offices 
of the National Lines — would be subjected to hazard. 

The Banco Naclonal was going under French manage- 
ment but the deal was held up because of the government's 
attitude toward the institution. Mr. Brown's disgust was 
contagious. Senor Limantour resigned from the bank's 
directorate. 

These are a few of the items which account for dis- 
approval of the Madero government by Lord Cowdray 
and Limantour. Broader reasons may have existed but 
these were personal and pertinent. The surviving Maderos 
believe that Lord Cowdray used his influence against the 
permanency of their regime. They do not think that 
Limantour did. 

I am inclined to the opinion that neither of the gentle- 
men believes that he was trying to weaken Madero, but 
I have been unable to discover anything which either of 
them did to sustain him. That both were critical is cer- 
tain. That Lord Cowdray viewed Washington's strange 
maneuvers with composure, there is little doubt. That 
Cook and Brown were able to guide Ambassador Wilson 
at will was so evident that many members of the American 
colony referred to their influence as paramount. In so 
far as their advice contributed to the Ambassador's over- 
bearing and aggressive attitude toward Madero, the logic 
of the case is quite clear; they were serving their own 
ends, but they were not running counter to their under- 
standing of the wishes of Senor Limantour. 

There were elements of comedy in the use these diverse 
influences made of the Washington government and its 
diplomatic agent. Lord Cowdray is of the opinion that 



i64 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

he was embarrassed by the fact that his counsel, Henry 
Taft, was the brother of the president of the United States ; 
that his movements were less free on that account. Still 
he did not change his counsel. 

The Guggenheims and Senor Limantour were not bosom 
friends by any means. To Limantour's dislike of them, the 
mining and smelting kings quite justly credited many exact- 
ing features in the concessions they had been compelled to 
secure for the erection and operation of their smelters. To 
the same unfriendly source they charged the " monopoly 
talk " which had held them back from administering the 
last sad commercial rites to the competing smelters at 
Monterrey and the Madero smelter at Torreon. But all 
business men of northern Mexico held it to be a matter of 
common knowledge that friendship between Limantour and 
the Maderos had long existed ; and the Guggenheims joined 
with others in supposing that through this friendship Liman- 
tour hoped to increase his power. Madero's fall, they 
thought, would insure Limantour's permanent effacement as 
a factor in Mexican affairs, and would thus greatly facilitate 
the expansion of Guggenheim operations in Mexico. 

Various negotiations of the Guggenheims with the Diaz 
Government had bred in Limantour dislike of the mining 
kings, and a personal experience with Daniel Guggenheim 
in 1904 had developed the aversion into hostility. 

At that time a number of Mexican capitalists, headed 
by Limantour, held title to the immensely valuable Real del 
Monte Mines situated about seventy miles north of Mexico 
City and just over the mountain from the big British silver 
camp of Pachuca. The romantic history of these famous 
mines is of no special significance in the present narrative ; 
but two centuries of operation by the primitive methods of 
the Spaniards, followed by an over elaborate system of a 
French Company, had but prepared the properties for broad 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 165 

success under scientific management. The mines then fell 
into the hands of Limantour and his associates at so low a 
figure that they were offered for sale at four million pesos. 

It was an opportunity for the Guggenheims to enter a 
promising field four hundred miles southeast of Aguasca- 
lienties, their southernmost point, and Daniel came to the 
dicker with a thrill of business joy. Four million pesos 
was far less than the value of the mines, but Daniel was too 
close a bargainer to pay any man his asking price. He called 
upon Limantour in Mexico City and offered him three mil- 
lions. But he had mistaken his man. Without an instant's 
hesitation Limantour rose and walked to the outer door of 
his private office which he opened wide, holding the knob 
in his hand. 

" We are both busy men, Sefior Guggenheim," he said 
in his politest tones. " The mines are no longer for sale. 
I bid you good morning." 

As the bargain hunter, moving uncertainly toward the 
open door, attempted further speech, Limantour withdrew 
his hand from the dooi^knob, made his caller a courteous 
bow and passed from the room by another exit leaving 
Daniel to find his bearings at leisure. 

The mines were presently sold at four million pesos to 
the United States Mining and Smelting Company, a Boston 
concern closely allied with the United Shoe Machinery Com- 
pany, but they were sold under definite bond that neither 
directly nor indirectly should the Guggenheims be permitted 
to acquire an interest in them. It was the last chance of 
the Guggenheims to acquire a good foothold in southern 
Mexico; the eye of Limantour was ever afterward upon 
their movements and in the many ways at his command he 
caused his opposition to become a recognized element for the 
Guggenheims to reckon with. But in February, 1912, 
Limantour was so peculiarly situated that though he classed 



i66 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Ambassador Wilson with those likely to act in the Guggen- 
heim interest, Limantour's friends would not be deterred 
on that account from using the same influence to coerce 
Madero. 

Meanwhile the adrninistration at Washington continued 
to act in error, and the newspapers of the country to report 
current matters in a way which helped to conceal the under- 
lying facts. Turn to the files of that month of February 
and you will be surprised to find how little they contain 
as to the true effect in Mexico of the threatened military 
movement. The facts on the surface, the facts reported, 
were these, that trouble was increasing in Northern Mexico, 
and that Texans individually and by delegations were calling 
upon Washington to do something about it. Several regi- 
ments were actually sent to the border ; some thousands of 
soldiers were in San Antonio and El Paso before the end of 
the month. Various persons speaking with a strong Gug- 
genheim accent arose in Congress and elsewhere to declare 
the inadequacy of the Madero Government, and to tell in- 
spired tales of injuries sustained by Americans in Mexico. 
But even the least accurate accounts of those days do not 
fail to reveal that neither the threat of military action — 
practically repeated on the 24th of the month — nor the 
sending of a few troops to the border, nor the warnings and 
other messages transmitted through diplomatic channels to 
Mexico, accomplished the least good. 

The truth is that there was at that time only one power 
for peace and order within Mexico, and it was the estab- 
lished government of Francisco I. Madero. His scattered 
opponents in the field, and his open and secret enemies whose 
interests were personal or commercial, offered to a grown 
man's judgment no deceptive aspect. As material for the 
formation of an honest, stable and civilized government they 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 167 

were certainly no better than the Villas, Carranzas and 
Zapatas, the oil, the metal and the railway interests con- 
spicuous in the fall of 1913. There lay before the United 
States one plain and simple choice, either by all possible 
friendly acts and expressions to encourage Madero in his 
obvious efforts to restore order, or to give up hope of him, 
announce existing conditions to be intolerable, and ac- 
knowledge serious responsibility for them by beginning 
actively to set them right. Instead the United States took 
a third course; antagonized the administration in Mexico 
City while doing nothing to cure the ills of its imperfect 
rule; stimulated disorder by a thin show of force; and in- 
creased the contempt and hatred of the Mexican people to- 
ward Americans, a proceeding whose fruits were to be 
harvested in a grievous and inevitable day. 

The visible occurrences on the other side of the border 
were not pleasant to contemplate. In the north of Mexico 
bands of " rebels " under Salazar and Campa moved west- 
ward through Chihuahua plundering as they advanced in the 
holy name of revolution. They charged that Madero had 
not carried out the " Plan of San Luis Potosi " which was 
the Madero creed. For this he must be deposed. The 
bands called themselves " Vasquistas " or followers of 
Emilio Vasquez Gomez who after having been ousted for 
cause from the de la Barra cabinet, had gone to San Antonio, 
Texas, where he began to plan and plot. His brother, Doc- 
tor Francisco Vasquez Gomez, whose insubordination had 
caused his dismissal from the post of Minister of Public 
Instruction, had resumed the practise of his profession at 
his home in the Calle Rosales in Mexico City. It was be- 
lieved that he was associated with his brother's enterprise, 
but he was not caught in any overt act. His consulting 
rooms were popular, but suspicions that his patients were 



i68 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

not all in search of medical treatment could not be veri- 
fied. It was a novel method of recruiting, if such it was, 
and it amused the Madero Government more than it an- 
noyed. 

But the Vasquistas took several towns and on February 
2,^ occupied the City of Juarez without firing a shot, the 
Madero Government having directed the Federal garrison 
to evacuate in order to avoid a battle so close to the Amer- 
ican city of El Paso. Entering Ciudad Juarez ragged and 
half armed, the four hundred Vasquistas were promptly 
fitted out with full war regalia from supplies which had been 
waiting in El Paso and which were sent across the river 
immediately the " insurrectos " had secured possession of 
the Custom House, for at that time the United States openly 
permitted the sale and delivery of military equipment to 
all in Mexico who could pay for it. 

The following day, Pascual Orozco, Junior, turned traitor 
at Chihuahua. The money demand which he had sharply 
pressed upon Madero immediately after the American 
military order of February 4 had been followed by repeated 
threats of resignation. He would withdraw, he said, from 
the service of a government which was not keeping its 
pledges to its supporters and was discredited at Washington 
— unless he received two hundred and fifty thousand pesos. 
This sum, he declared, should have been paid him months 
before as an honorarium earned by invaluable services. 
Instead he had received but one hundred thousand. 

Madero would not grant Orozco's demand, but he did 
not take the threats seriously ; he had become used to men 
who placed a money appraisement on their loyalty. He had 
made Orozco commander of the most important division 
of the federal army, and now declined to be impressed 
by the evidence that this fully trusted man was an egotist 
whose conscience was in his pocket. Instead of deposing 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 169 

him from command of the northern forces, as many advisers 
urged, Madero permitted him to remain at his post until 
his traitorous plans were complete. 

With Orozco went six thousand seasoned troops and their 
officers, a great quantity of military stores and the State 
of Chihuahua — seemingly a leveling blow to the Madero 
Government. 

There was more behind the Orozco affair than Madero 
understood at the time ; the younger members of the wealthy 
Terrazas family had drawn the northern general from his 
allegiance to Madero and attached him to themselves. Pos- 
sessing enormous tracts of land with many thousands of 
cattle and horses, besides heavy business interests in Chihua- 
hua, the Terrazas clan ardently desired the United States 
to take charge of Mexican affairs. 

Undoubtedly the family had suffered severely, but the 
means they took to secure redress have not been blessed in 
the event. By way of justification, however, it is alleged 
that for more than a year Terrazas cattle had been the 
means of subsistence for bandits and revoltosos, and that 
nearly every cavalryman and freebooter of the North was 
riding a Terrazas horse. The Terrazas claims for live 
stock, for destroyed crops and for commandeered supplies 
of all descriptions were named in millions, and Madero did 
not manifest enthusiasm in giving these claims consideration. 
Possibly an itemized account might help to explain why, 
for a Mexican's bill of damages is always an interesting 
document. 

But the logic of the Terrazas position is clear enough; 
if the United States should take Mexico in hand, the depre- 
dations would cease, the properties would double in value, 
and some part of the claims would be paid. The Washington 
military order for 100,000 troops seemed the first step to- 
ward such a consummation, and the Terrazas family be- 



170 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

lieved that they would win the favor of the American 
Government by weakening Madero. 

Orozco was their weapon; his desertion would promote 
and solidify general disaffection. Madero, they thought 
in common with others, could not maintain his government 
against such odds, and if the United States did not come in, 
Orozco would succeed Madero, and the Terrazas family 
would be well recompensed for their losses and for any 
outlay they m-ight make. 

This then was the backing upon which Orozco depended 
in his treachery to Madero, — this, added to the peon senti- 
ment in his favor based on valorous deeds which he had not 
performed. His desertion cast a gloom over the Mexican 
Capital and the depression was deepened three days later, 
on March 2, by the Washington State Departm.ent, which 
wired Ambassador Wilson the following instructions : 

" Referring to all recent telegraphic correspondence : 
you are instructed in your discretion to inform Ameri- 
cans that the Embassy deems it its duty to advise them 
to withdraw from any particular localities where condi- 
tions or prospects of lawlessness so threaten personal 
safety as to make withdrawal the part of prudence, 
specifying localities, if any, from which withdrawal at 
any time seems advisable, and stating that in any such 
cases consuls may take such charge of abandoned ef- 
fects as may be possible under the circumstances." 

The Ambassador's discretion clothed itself with language 
and came forth as an announcement from the Embassy, 
which was printed by request in the two English newspapers, 
of the capital. It warned Americans to hasten from so 
many sections of the country that it was construed as mean- 
ing the whole of Mexico. 

The effect was demoralizing ; the more because the Wash- 
ington Government had shown, thus far, so little concern 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 171 

for its nationals in Mexico. Americans in trouble had 
formed the habit of appealing first to British influence, and 
they now glanced instinctively in that direction. The Brit- 
ish Minister was calm; no European nation was warning 
its people to flee. Therefore the danger which Washington 
had seen must apply to Americans alone. Did this mean 
that intervention, which the military order had fore- 
shadowed, was now imminent? Was the disturbed condi- 
tion of the country merely the nominal reason why Amer- 
icans should leave it, and impending war the secret behind 
the warning? 

The first and most notable stampede of Americans in- 
stantly ensued. Within twenty-four hours sleeping car 
accommodations on all trains to the frontier had been en- 
gaged for the next fortnight, and applications had far ex- 
ceeded the usual facilities. Additional cars were placed on 
trains. Trains were run in sections. Mexico City hotels 
were jammed with Americans who had abandoned property 
in the interior and were awaiting opportunity for escape. 
Bookings on the weekly liners to New York from Vera Cruz 
exhausted the capacity of the ships for a month ahead. 
Steamers for European ports, touching at Havana, were 
crowded with Americans hurrying to obey the bugles of 
their country which had sounded a retreat. 

Men of scanty means booked their wives and children 
first class and for themselves took quarters in the steerage 
or rode in third-class cars with the malodorous peons. 
Men who could not or would not leave the property or busi- 
ness which represented their livelihood and their hope sent 
their families and stayed behind. Men who had engaged 
passage or Pullman for themselves, gave their tickets to the 
mothers or daughters or wives of other men who could not 
secure quick transportation for their women folk at any 
price. 



172 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Anxiety did not cease with the departure of the trains 
from Mexico City. For half of the eight hundred miles to 
the border, the railway lay exposed to marauding bands, 
now greatly excited by the wave of feeling against Amer- 
icans. There was abundant reason to fear that trains might 
be attacked, in which case robbery would be the least of the 
crimes committed, and murder not the worst. Every morn- 
ing a great sheaf of telegrams reached the capital from 
Laredo, bearing relief to the minds of men : " Safe over 
the border. Don't wait. Come on." 

This must not be taken as a portrayal of unreasoning 
panic. Apprehension for the safety of women was well 
founded. Men showed anxiety as to their own skins in 
about the usual proportion. Those who decided not to be 
caught in Mexico by an outbreak of war lost no time in 
escaping. The others stayed, and behaved according to the 
dominant racial strain within them, as men always do, ex- 
cept when habitual or impulsive imitation modifies their 
conduct. 

While the exodus was at its height, the friction between 
the American Embassy and the General Consulate in Mex- 
ico City which had developed into personal rancor between 
Ambassador Wilson and Consul General Arnold Shanklin, 
culminated in the suspension of Shanklin from office by 
the Washington government. 

On the evening of the sixth of March Shanklin started 
for Washington, and his appearance at the crowded Colonia 
station to take the night train caused a stir which illustrates 
the tension then existing among resident Americans. Carry- 
ing his own hand baggage he came into the trainshed whose 
long platform was filled with those who were saying good- 
by to friends and relatives. 

The whisper, " Shanklin Is going home suspended," 
passed through the crowd ahead of him and quickly be- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 173 

came a roar of protest. No other American official in 
Mexico had so impressed his straightforward honesty upon 
his countrymen or been so uniformly helpful to them as the 
man now leaving under the disfavor of his government. 
The common thought was that he was being ground up in 
the mysterious machinery operated by the Ambassador 
whose ultimate purpose was then an unguessed riddle. 

Shanklin received an ovation which was a personal tribute. 
Those who were leaving experienced sharpened anxiety for 
the ones left behind. Those who were not going — myself 
among them — feared that with the departure of Shanklin 
the only dependable avenue of approach to the home govern- 
ment was closed. The twelve-car train was a quarter of an 
hour late in starting ; the Shanklin demonstration had lasted 
twenty minutes. Cries of " Good old Shanklin ! " and 
" Don't be smelted and refined ! " followed him as the long 
train drew out for the border. 

But though Consul General Shanklin came back, the 
particulars of his reinstatement, and the exact cause of his 
infelicitous relations with Ambassador Wilson were not dis- 
closed. The two men were of different types; it was im- 
possible that they should agree. 

In the ordinary course of business I learned much that 
was beneath the surface of this afifair, but the facts would 
not be relevant here. It is necessary, however, to touch 
upon the curious matter of that shipment of arms from 
the United States for the protection of Americans in the 
Mexican capital, because there has been misrepresentation 
which should be corrected. The shipment was of three 
thousand discarded Krag-Jorgensen rifles with cartridge 
belts and ammunition, and the details were arranged by the 
" Committee of the American Colony " through the Embassy. 
As the goods came in free of duty, by permission of the 
Mexican government, it was supposed that the cost of each 



174 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

outfit would not be much above the transportation charges ; 
but in fact the figure was forty pesos. 

Naturally there was criticism. It was not a pleasant 
thought that a man's home government was exploiting his 
need by charging him much more than current retail prices 
in the United States for an outfit of arms which was not 
to become his property and was not actually delivered to 
him, but held in storage to be used only upon occasion in 
the common defense. The Englishmen in Mexico found 
the affair amusing. For several weeks succeeding the ar- 
rival of the arms for the " American Guard " a favorite 
toast at the British Club, and at other places where the 
convivial assembled, was " to thrifty Uncle Sam." In fair- 
ness it should be said that no blame attaches to Mr. Shank- 
lin, who was not in any way responsible, but on the contrary 
was in sympathy with the great majority of the Americans 
who contributed to this total payment of $60,000 or there- 
abouts, and who believed that a more moderate charge had 
been within the possibilities of careful management. 

While the comedy of the American Guard was being 
enacted, the Madero government was making strenuous ef- 
forts to prepare an army for offensive operations against 
Orozco, but demands upon it for bandit warfare and minor 
revolts made this difficult. The capital itself was swept 
almost clean of soldiers and for a fortnight or more there 
was hardly an ofiicer above the rank of lieutenant in Mexico 
City. General lack of enthusiasm for the Government serv- 
ice made recruiting tedious. The executive order issued at 
Washington on March 14 prohibiting the shipment of arms 
to the rebels in Mexico failed to lift the gloom and Mexican 
officials were openly scornful; they understood the ease of 
illicit border traffic through the scanty patrol on the Amer- 
ican side. 

Orozco, with the Terrazas influence, made himself 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 175 

Governor of Chihuahua and was placing a bond issue of two 
milHons upon the state to maintain his army. Lloyds ac- 
cepted Mexican risks on terms which amounted to wagering 
that Madero Government could not endure for six 
months. Everywhere was criticism of Madero, Merchants 
and mining men who had thrived under the old Diaz regime 
were bitter in denunciation of Madero as a trouble maker. 
Banks discriminated more severely in their credits against 
those who were known to be strongly loyal to Madero. 
Daily information from the office of the President through 
private channels revealed a state of nervous excitement 
over general conditions and apprehension as to the next 
Washington move. Foreign Minister Calero and Ambas- 
sador Wilson dined regularly together, and those of us who 
knew Calero's real sentiments drew disquieting inferences. 
By a hundred indications all well-informed persons per- 
ceived that the situation was approaching a climax. 

News reached Mexico City on March 17 that de la Barra 
was in Paris, and preparing to return. He had been sent 
abroad by Madero soon after the latter's inauguration to 
carry the thanks of the Mexican Republic to Italy's 
sovereign for courtesies extended to Porfirio Diaz during 
the centennial celebration of September, 1910. Solemn an- 
nouncement of this mission had at the time convulsed the 
capital with laughter, but in the rapid march of events the 
jest had been forgotten. Such errands are the means by 
which distinguished citizens of Mexico are deleted from 
the scene when their absence is desired; and it is the pre- 
scribed etiquette that they shall stay abroad until invited 
by their Government to return. If de la Barra was ignoring 
the recognized rules there must be significance in his act ; 
and the news occasioned much speculation. The common 
belief was that conditions indicated opportunity and de la 
Barra thought it well to be on the spot. But in fact other 



176 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

men, then residing in Paris, had done the thinking, and 
were sending de la Barra home to await orders. 

It was on the 24th of that depressing month of March, 
1912, that the most vicious blow of all was dealt the Madero 
Government. This was the crushing defeat which met the 
army sent against Orozco in the North. The Minister of 
War, Gonzalez Salas, cousin of the president, took com- 
mand of this force in person, because of the importance of 
the enterprise. He was aided by the ablest of the Federal 
generals, Trucy Aubert, and Blanquet, and the country had 
been scoured for troops to make up the eight thousand men 
with which they advanced to attack Orozco who with seven 
thousand rebels was marching southward from Chihuahua 
toward Torreon. 

The tension at the capital was high while the battle was 
awaited. Many thought that the life of the Madero Govern- 
ment hung upon the result. Defeat of the Federal forces 
would leave the way open for Orozco to move rapidly 
southward along the Central railway to the poorly garrisoned 
capital in which were many sympathizers who would join 
him on arrival. 

The fight took place at Corralitos and Rellano, eight 
hundred miles distant from Mexico City. The Federal 
army was conveyed by troop trains to a point within a few 
kilometers of Orozco's position, and then formed in three 
columns with the center commanded by Gonzalez Salas, 
Blanquet and Trucy Aubert having taken charge of the 
right and left wings respectively. Meeting with the main 
body of Orozco's troops and being sharply repulsed, the 
center fell back in confusion. Gonzalez Salas took refuge 
in a train which by his orders was started at speed toward 
Torreon. Bridges were destroyed behind him. 

This left his army cut off from orderly retreat, and 
resulted in the complete demoralization of the Federal 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 177 

forces. Gonzalez Salas realized the magnitude of the 
disaster, with its probably vital consequences to the gov- 
ernment, and made the only amends that remained in his 
power. In the car which had carried him from the lost 
battle he committed suicide. 




CHAPTER X 

1HE first official message telling of the Federal rout 
at Rellano was dated at Torreon, a hundred miles 
from the scene of the battle, and it reached the 
government offices a little after nine o'clock in the fore- 
noon of March 25, the day following the defeat. Less 
than an hour later confirmatory details began to arrive. 
The cabinet was hastily called together in the President's 
wing of the National Palace, and the little man who sat at 
the head of the table read consternation in the faces of his 
advisers, for even those that were not loyal to his cause be- 
held the immediate future with alarm. What part of the 
army had escaped from this disaster, and might be rallied 
to oppose the advance of Orozco on the capital, no one 
then knew. The military situation doubtless seemed to offer 
the problem of the hour, but the danger of violent uprisings 
in the city was a matter too obvious to be ignored, too 
urgent to be postponed. No official statement was prepared, 
however, nor were any measures taken to prepare or calm 
the public mind. 

Flurries of rumor were whirling here and there in the 
streets, before midday, but they dissolved in an atmosphere 
of disbelief, for the people had not looked for a battle to 
be fought until some three days later. The regular noon 
edition of the only evening newspaper carried no mention 
of the affair at Rellano, and the business men of Mexico 
City went home to dinner at one o'clock, as usual, with no 
especial apprehension of impending riot to disturb them at 

178 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 179 

their meal or in the customary fifteen minutes of siesta 
afterwards. 

At half past two the clerks were on their way back to 
the stores and offices ; a quarter of an hour later came 
proprietors and managers. By this time the central part of 
the city knew that something serious was afoot ; everywhere 
about the streets were knots of people talking earnestly. 
An occasional shout of '' Viva Orozco ! " could be heard, 
and mounted police, in squads of twenty-four, were on 
patrol in the business section. 

A few copies of an extra edition of the evening news- 
paper had been circulated, but despite the bold headlines 
there was little in this issue more authentic and convincing 
than the rumors which had been discredited a few hours 
earlier; but the fact that these had found their way into 
print, and especially the uncertain, questionable nature of 
the report sufficed to stimulate the nervousness of the peo- 
ple into excitement. That same morning rudely lettered 
notices from the bandit chief, Zapata, had been found tacked 
to trees in the suburbs. Within forty-eight hours, the 
notices declared, Zapata would descend upon the city, and 
this threat assumed a more serious aspect when combined 
with the indefinite, perplexing rumors of disaster in the 
north. It was known that the capital was almost bare of 
troops. No one placed confidence in the valor or the loyalty 
of the three thousand police. The silence of the Govern- 
ment increased the alarm, but it was impossible to secure 
for publication a statement from any official whose name 
was worth • appending to his words. 

The situation of the capital with reference to armed as- 
sault merits a v/ord. There are neither natural nor arti- 
ficial defenses. The city lies in the center of the Federal 
District which occupies 579 square miles of the Valley of 
Mexico, and corresponds in political status to the District of 



i8o THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Columbia in the United States. Beyond the city's boun- 
daries at all points of the compass are small suburban 
towns, most of which are connected with the main plaza of 
the capital by the very complete electric tramway system. 
The edges of the city thin out to open country quite like an 
American town, and all sides are open to the approach of 
friend or foe. The plain extends to the hills which at a 
distance of twenty miles or so form the uneven rocky rim 
of what is said to have been the crater of an enormous 
volcano. 

The Zapata threat was very real and its fulfilment easy. 
If the bandit chief should come in with two or three thou- 
sand of his followers, his ranks would immediately be 
swollen to an enormous uncontrollable horde by eager pil- 
lagers within the city itself. 

Untold wealth for Zapata and his band awaited their 
attack. Millions of value in diamonds and pearls in the 
German and French jewelry houses, millions of gold and 
silver coin in the vaults of the banks, rich treasures of every 
kind in the department stores and in the residences of the 
wealthy — loot inconceivable to such men except as the 
horizon of desire, was probably theirs to be won by a bold 
dash. 

Dynamite was in daily use by these bands. Railway 
trains and bridges, stores and houses and banks in smaller 
towns had been wrecked with explosives and looted. Why 
not the Banco Nacional ? Why not La Perla or La Esmer- 
alda? 

The Mexican knows nothing of volunteer organizations 
for common defense; the system of Porfirio Diaz had not 
permitted it. To defend one's own house against the entry 
of a burglar was a crime under the laws of that ruler. Im- 
prisonment was the portion of any householder who shed 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO i8i 

blood in ejecting an intruder. The laws and the army were 
the means upon which Diaz ha.d taught the Mexicans to 
depend for their protection. With the army scattered and 
the public indifferent what could the 450,000 people of 
Mexico City now do except tremble for their own safety 
and rail at Madero for leaving them helpless? 

It required no unusual penetration to perceive that the 
conditions on that 25th of March were ideal for the devel- 
opment of a formidable riot. Business men, when they 
learned that the report of a serious Federal defeat was in 
print, and that nevertheless the truth remained unknown 
for every big and little alarmist to announce as his imag- 
ination and his terrors dictated, were not slow in acting for 
the protection of their property, in the only way available. 
Department stores and lesser establishments along the cen- 
tral avenues, San Francisco, 5 de Mayo and 16 de 
Septiembre were closed immediately. All over town iron 
shutters rattled down and wooden protective devices were 
set up at windows and doors. The capital was preparing 
for trouble. 

In the newspaper district there was rapid movement of 
events. El Heraldo Mexicano, the evening daily, had begun 
to print a sensational extra at two o'clock when a strong 
detachment of mounted police was placed on guard before 
the entrance of the building to prevent delivery of the papers 
to the crowd of impatient newsboys waiting for their mer- 
chandise. Unable to pass their papers out in regular 
method, and incensed at the Government for its interfer- 
ence, the management of the newspaper ordered bundles 
of El Heraldo carried to the roof from which they v/ere 
thrown to the loudly clamoring mob of newsboys below. 
In the melee which followed a few of the boys escaped 
between the horses of the police with copies of the paper 



i82 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

and rushed down Avenida Juarez to the center of the city 
where they promptly raised the price from two to twenty- 
five centavos each. 

That was the end of El Heraldo for the day. An attache 
of the Department of Communications invaded the build- 
ing armed with a formidable document which successfully 
stopped the press and confiscated every printed copy of the 
extra as " seditious " and maliciously incorrect. The news 
editor of the journal, being hustled to jail, passed the office 
of La Prensa where I was seated, and waved his hand de- 
risively. Behind him, with an ominous roar, came an army 
of newsboys. The news editor of the suspended paper 
and his guards passed on, but the newsboys, seven hundred 
strong, swarmed into the La Prensa building from all sides. 
They perched on the reporters' and editors' tables and 
desks, on the linotypes, on the rolls of paper and on the 
presses, yelling, singing, pounding, stamping, cat-calling and 
whistling in a deafening chorus of demand for an extra that 
would be " bueno." 

The news for such an extra was at hand, had that been 
all. Our Torreon correspondent had accompanied the 
Federal forces as they advanced to attack Orozco, and had 
been on the train which brought the body of Gonzalez Salas 
back to Torreon. From that city he had telegraphed an 
excellent account of the battle, the retreat and the death of 
the Minister of War. By discreet use of the facts in our 
possession we could do much to pacify the excited city. 

But it was then three o'clock in the afternoon, and as 
both La Prensa and The Daily Mexican were morning is- 
sues, very few men of the reportorial, editorial and mechan- 
ical staffs were about. The extra, however, must be pre- 
pared and printed even though we should incur the Govern- 
ment's displeasure. 

There could be no doubt in any sober mind that unless 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 183 

some plain and credible statement should be issued to the 
public within a few hours, there would be a riot; in fact 
conditions in and around the office of La Prensa at that 
moment very nearly justified the term. The seven hundred 
newsboys — many of them far beyond boyhood — had done 
much damage to a newspaper building on a recent occasion 
when they had lacked the reinforcement of sympathizing 
crowds which now stood ready to the number of some 
thousands. I had no desire to see my modern plant and 
building wrecked, nor to cause by lack of tact an outbreak 
of disorder at a time so charged with possibilities of far- 
spreading violence. Private and public interests seemed 
to address me in identical language, except for the question 
as to personal loss and peril which might lie in running 
counter to the Government's mistaken policy of silence. 

With difficulty word was conveyed to the ragged, howl- 
ing mob of news vendors that an extra would be ready at 
five o'clock, and when this promise had been made audible 
above the tumult, there ensued comparative quiet, and the 
invading barefoot army evacuated the premises by all 
exits. Outside the building they raised shouts of " Viva 
La Prensa " and scattered in various directions to beg, bor- 
row, and otherwise acquire capital for the unusual piece of 
business before them, and to advertise the forthcoming 
issue through the excited city. 

The La Prensa building stood at the end of a long block 
and faced three streets — Calles Nuevo Mexico, Humboldt 
and Iturbide. As five o'clock approached all the unrest of 
the city seemed to gather about us. Trolley lines in that 
region suspended operation. The streets in six directions 
were jammed with apprehensive people who, but for the 
announcement of our extra edition, would have massed 
themselves before the National Palace. So dense was the 
crowd that our messenger who, with page proofs of the 



i84 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

hastily-prepared extra, fought his way to police headquar- 
ters a hundred yards down Calle Humboldt, for the " Vista 
Buena " or O. K. of the Chief, could not return. 

The Chief waved his approval from the balcony of head- 
quarters to our editors in the upper windows, and the 
throng in the street expressed its sentiments in triumphant 
yells. Up to that moment no demonstration had been made, 
but the outburst on Calle Humboldt was echoed on other 
streets and became a menacing roar. Immediately the 
Chief of Police despatched a hundred and fifty mounted 
policemen, who forced back the crowd and formed a double 
cordon around the three exposed sides of our building. 
With this aid the sidewalk was cleared for the line of news- 
boys who held tickets entitling them to papers already paid 
for, the total then exceeding a hundred thousand. 

Printing from duplicate plates the output was fifty-five 
thousand an hour. The presses ran for four hours with no 
diminution of demand and slight lessening in the denseness 
of the crowd. All signs of rioting and ill-temper had, 
however, disappeared. At half past nine a second extra 
with fuller details was ready for the press when La Prensa's 
editor in chief, Francisco Bulnes, having forced his way in 
a taxicab from the National Palace through the thronged 
streets, came to me with the information that the Govern- 
ment had taken exception to some statement in the La 
Prensa account, and overruling the " vista buena " of the 
chief of police had issued an order of arrest against the 
news editor in charge. 

The news editor, whom the great Bulnes fondly loved and 
each day roundly cursed, stood with colorless face listening 
to the announcement, his knees perceptibly shaking at the 
prospect of imprisonment for " sedition " during a crisis 
of the Government. With a characteristically sardonic 
smile about his lips Bulnes watched him a moment in 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 185 

silence. Then he extended his hand — the daily admira- 
tion of manicures — and placed it upon the young Mexi- 
can's shoulder. 

" Fear not, my boy," he said, " I, Bulnes, will save you." 

Half a minute later the cab was bearing the rescued one 
to the beautiful home of Bulnes, at 108 Paseo de la Re- 
forma. Having thus moved his protege out of immediate 
danger, the cleverest manipulator of political intrigue in 
Mexico walked briskly to a telephone and in jfive minutes 
of discussion with the cabinet council still in session in the 
President's rooms, explained the facts already known to 
the Government, but perhaps not fully comprehended — 
that La Prensa had drawn away the crowds from the Na- 
tional Palace, and had probably averted an attack; that 
the publication of the truth had allayed to some extent the 
anxiety of the people, and had certainly occupied their 
minds during a critical time. The order of arrest was re- 
scinded, but we printed no more extras that night. The 
crowds quietly dispersed and the police withdrew. 

This first day after the great disaster had been lived 
through, but trouble now faced the Government on every 
hand. Qrozco, who had been a popular hero during the 
Madero revolution, was openly cheered on Mexico City 
streets. Traitor and ingrate though he was the lower 
classes thought him a valiant and resourceful fighter and 
as such he carried appeal to their primitive instincts. 

Zapata's threat to attack the capital hung over the city. 
Having no belief that the Government would offer effective 
resistance if the Zapata brothers and their bands of cut- 
throats appeared, the people made no secret of their hope 
that Orozco would follow up his victory in the North by a 
prompt southward movement to rescue the capital from the 
Zapatistas, whose atrocities were every day recounted at 
length in the sensational press. Madero was freely scoffed 



i86 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

at by the very peons who, a year earlier, had looked upon 
him as a god. 

Congress, which assembled on April i for its final ses- 
sion, was still composed of Diaz appointees who had held 
over. Many who had trimmed their sails to follow Madero 
were now hove to, not knowing what course to steer. 
Others who styled themselves " Independents," used their 
newly acquired privilege of free speech to assail the Gov- 
ernment with bitterness and charge it with crime. Bulnes, 
who had been a Deputy for many years under Diaz, repre- 
senting Lower California which he had never seen except 
as pictured on a map, hunted with the hounds and ran with 
the hare. In phrases which convulsed the Chamber, he 
joked with the Government. To preserve equilibrium he 
would occasionally flay Madero's prominent foes, in sen- 
tences whose logic stung like a whip. The " Independent " 
sheep in Congress followed as closely as they could where 
Bulnes, the bell wether, led. It was even betting between 
Madero and Orozco, and the cue of the Independents was 
to hedge. 

The caricaturing weeklies took this time to bring out 
their most offensive cartoons. In one. President Madero 
was pictured as tumbling headlong down a great stairway 
leading from the National Palace to a waiting ship bearing 
the name " Ypiranga," the ship in which Porfirio Diaz sailed 
for Spain. Again, in an elaborate drawing of " The Last 
Supper," a likeness of the President sat in the Savior's 
seat ; Gustavo Madero was Judas, and eleven other Maderos 
were at table receiving bread from the Master's hand. 
The traceable resemblance between Madero's face and that 
of Christ in the most familiar representations made this 
cartoon effective and deplorably notorious. 

There was a kind of wit in some of these crude pictures ; 
they raised a laugh not only amongst the unlettered rabble 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 187 

for whom they were especially intended, but in higher cir- 
cles also. Ridicule has a natural advantage, and in the 
present instance novelty was added. The Mexican people 
had been accustomed to see the ruler of their country pic- 
tured as a personage of the highest dignity,, The change 
to these indecent caricatures had been abrupt, and thus the 
insult was more gross, breeding more readily contempt for 
a president who tolerated such abuse. 

Widespread dissatisfaction arose from the condition of 
business. Projected enterprises of German, English, Bel- 
gian and American capitalists involving the expenditure of 
many millions in various parts of the country were sus- 
pended. The building of new steel works near the capital 
was stopped. The great water power scheme on the Con- 
chas River in the north was almost stagnant for the time. 
Construction of three hundred additional miles of the Fed- 
eral District tramway system * was placed on the waiting 
list, though the plans were complete, the rails and necessary 
equipment ready. Many projected spurs and connections 
of the National Railways were put off till more propitious 
days should dawn. There was decreased activity in mining 
development and in irrigation enterprises, and public works 
were almost at a standstill. 

There is no doubt that under peaceful conditions the 

* Electric power for the Mexico Tramways Company is supplied 
by the Mexican Light & Power Company from the great falls of 
Necaxa, about eighty miles from the capital. A syndicate of which 
Dr. F. S. Pearson, an American, is the head controls these com- 
panies and also the Mexico Northwestern Railway in Chihuahua. 
The electric tramway and power services of Vera Cruz and Puebla 
are controlled by S, Pearson & Son, Limited, a corporation of which 
Lord Cowdray, formerly Sir Weetman Pearson, is the dominant 
figure. There is no business connection between these two groups 
of capitalists, and no relationship between Dr. Pearson and Lord 
/Cowdray. 



i88 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

wiy would have been opened for an industrial movement 
in Mexico of broad proportions. How greatly those en- 
terprises would have stimulated business activity was not 
appreciated until the orders were issued which shut down 
all new works and held in abeyance the plans for operations 
not yet begun. But one railway to the border and but one 
line to Vera Cruz were open for traffic. The forward 
movement had stopped, and industrial retrogression was 
under way. 

The outflow of surplus funds of individuals, firms and 
corporations, which had been quietly proceeding for more 
than a year and had grown to serious proportions immedi- 
ately following the Washington military order of February 
4th, now again increased in volume. Attempts to realize 
on properties were depressing values of real estate and 
the market prices of Mexican securities. General trade was 
falling toward bare necessities; the best buyers had gone 
from the country. 

Government finances were drawing near the danger line, 
and there was difficulty about loans. The sixty-three mil- 
lions (Mexican) of cash balances left by the Diaz Govern- 
ment represented only about forty-five millions available 
for general uses. Parity funds under control of the Mone- 
tary Commission made up the balance. The forty-five 
millions of working capital with which the de la Barra 
Government began business had been reduced in the ten 
months to less than twenty millions by the extraordinary 
payments on account of the Madero revolution and by the 
drain for maintenance of armies on a war footing. Cus- 
toms and internal revenues though above the normal, ac- 
cording to official statements, were insufficient. The de- 
mand for successful loan negotiation was therefore urgent. 

Necessity for enlisting, equipping and maintaining troops 
to prosecute offensive operations against the Vasquistas, 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 189 

the Orozquistas, the Zapatistas, the Zalgadistas and the rov- 
ing bands of brigands, emphasized this demand. Every 
influence that could affect the money powers of the world 
must therefore be placated. News organizations which had 
been carelessly inaccurate in reports and were defiant under 
reproof must be tolerated. The American Ambassador, 
who was vigorously pressing claims exceeding in size the 
entire available treasury cash of the Government, could 
neither be silenced nor dismissed without an open break 
with Washington, which would effectively close the money 
chests of the world. 

Fifty millions of money was needed, but no one would 
lend it on acceptable terms. Mexico's fiscal agents, Speyer 
& Company, could see no ready market for Mexican Gov- 
ernment securities — which must compete, just then, with 
an unusual volume of more attractive offerings — and 
were not disposed to assume for themselves and their 
associates the burden of carrying them. After five months 
of rule Madero stood with his back against the wall, a tar- 
get for traitors, ridiculed by insolent scoffers, a victim of 
diplomatic persecution and political intrigue, and a bad 
risk in the credit schedules of Europe and the United States. 

In this critical situation his government suddenly de- 
veloped unsuspected powers of resistance. To secure 
treasury loans on any basis that would be accepted by the 
Mexican Congress it was necessary to bolster the nation's 
credit, and it was indispensable to strengthen the local posi- 
tion of the Government. Movements looking to these ends 
received careful consideration, and when the first steps in 
a more aggressive policy were taken they were not without 
evidence of a certain subtlety. 

Early in April, the Calero- Wilson alliance was broken up. 
An indiscretion by Calero's friends in New York had em- 
phasized the unwisdom of retaining him as head of the 



I90 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

cabinet; and Madero took the occasion to effect needed 
changes. Ample evidence existed that Mexico required 
at Washington a man of superior intelligence, and the 
definition fitted Calero. He was asked to lay aside the 
Foreign Office portfolio, and represent his country at the 
capital of the United States. 

However reluctant Calero may have been to do this he 
could not refuse, and he accepted the transfer with ap- 
parent good grace. Pedro Lascurain was appointed Minis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs in his stead. 

Lascurain was a great gain to the Madero Government. 
Forty-five years of age, a careful man of scholarly mind 
and sober bearing, he came to the difficult position with 
firm intent to give his best service. He was rich, but not 
from such transactions as were harmful to his repute. Men 
in all ranks admitted that he was both capable and honest, 
and his acceptance of office caused an immediate shift of 
local sentiment in Madero's favor. He was entirely un- 
schooled in statecraft, but his natural abilities were well 
suited to the task. Among his qualities was an asset 
Madero needed badly; he was loyal to the core. 

As Pedro Lascurain soon became a prominent figure in 
Washington eyes it is well to understand him. No Mexi- 
can was better known to Americans of the capital whose 
favorite phrase for him was " Good Old Peter," His real 
estate operations had been on a large scale in Mexico City 
where he had carried on the development of the modern 
residential section known as Colonia Roma. Opportunities 
without number had arisen for Lascurain to squeeze incau- 
tious Americans and others who were too ambitious in their 
undertakings, but he had never dealt unjustly. On the 
other hand he did not lack aggressiveness of the right sort, 
and he brought to the Mexican Foreign Office an undaunted 
spirit which was influential for good. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 191 

The second notable thing done by the Madero Adminis- 
tration in its uphill fight was to expedite negotiations with 
Lord Cowdray in the matter of the Tehauntepec National 
Railway. This move was good strategy. It tended to 
relieve the unpleasantness with Lord Cowdray, and to give 
him a motive for desiring that Madero's attempts at treasury 
financing should succeed. The Tehauntepec enterprise was 
covered by a contract between the Mexican Government and 
S. Pearson & Son, Limited, made in July, 1902, and pro- 
viding for the completion of the abandoned railway across 
the Isthmus, 200 miles, with the development of the ports at 
both ends, Salina Cruz on the Pacific, and Coatzacoalcos, 
now Puerto Mexico, on the Gulf of Mexico. The Mexican 
Government and Pearsons (Limited) each furnished half 
the capital and the latter undertook to operate the road 
for fifty-one years on a scheme of returns which shaded 
down from thirty-five per cent, of the net earnings at the 
beginning to twenty per cent, at the close. 

S. Pearson & Son, Limited, now had the road on its 
hands, and in itself it was a good property. Lord Cow- 
dray wished to sell the investment and be relieved of opera- 
tion to avoid the probable loss which the Panama Canal 
would inflict upon the Tehauntepec affair. Differences 
with Lord Cowdray in the matter of his oil interests were 
adroitly shuffled out of sight, and Madero entertained pro- 
posals in the Tehauntepec matter based upon Lord Cow- 
dray's accepting in payment part of a new issue of Mexi- 
can government bonds. Such endorsement of Madero's 
plan of . finance would amount to practical participation 
and materially aid negotiation for a substantial loan at fair 
rates. 

Any loan proposals by Mexico to banking interests of 
Europe or the United States would of a certainty be sub- 
mitted by them to Limantour upon whose judgment in all 



192 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

matters pertaining to Mexican finances they placed perfect 
reliance. If by means of the Tehauntepec negotiation 
Lord Cowdray's active support of Mexico's credit could be 
gained, Madero's anxiety as to the answer that Limantour 
would give to the bankers would be greatly relieved. 

The Madero Government was helped, besides, by the 
errors of its enemies in arms. The Zapatistas did not 
attack the capital, and Orozco did not push southward with 
vigor after his defeat of Gonzalez Salas. Had either of 
these men taken advantage of the opportunities that lay 
before them, the history of Mexico would have been dif- 
ferent. But these accidents of timidity or indecision were 
of negative quality; there was another accident which ac- 
complished positive results — the accident of Victoriano 
Huerta. 

In March, 1912, Huerta was almost a nonentity in 
Mexico, unknown except for a reputation he had earned 
under Porfirio Diaz as an officer who had helped to carry 
out the stern measures Diaz employed to pacify the coun- 
try. He hated Orozco as an upstart and believed him to 
be a coward. Also he hated him because Orozco, up to 
the day of his treachery, had occupied the best post in the 
army while Huerta, whose methods of warfare Madero did 
not like, was out of employment. When Gonzalez Salas 
met disaster, and the Government was in hard straits, 
Huerta went to Madero and asked for assignment to the 
desperate task of organizing victory out of defeat. 

The situation forced Madero's hand. He accepted 
Huerta's offer of service because there was no alternative, 
gave him authority to raise an army with which to wrest 
the State of Chihuahua from Orozco and even placed him 
over Generals Blanquet and Trucy Aubert in full command 
of the campaign, with power to secure enlistment in what- 
ever way he could. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 193 

^lore recent history has disclosed this man as one not 
easily discouraged, but in those April days of 1912 his 
resourcefulness was unsuspected, and the vigor with which 
he went about his task stimulated an enthusiasm for the 
government service that astonished all. He purposed mov- 
ing against Orozco with a dependable army and he de- 
clined to use any but his own pick of the men in the rem- 
nants that were gathered up after the great defeat. He 
demanded, also, a modern and sufficient artillery and ma- 
chine-gun equipment. 

In and about the capital he operated his schemes for 
enlistment and his success was rapid. He possessed no 
personal following but he employed men to aid him who 
could influence others, and in a fortnight he had three 
thousand men. This was half enough, but they were green 
troops and constant drilling was necessary. The drilling 
and the vague promises of reward encouraged others to 
join. The Huerta forces were soon the talk of the capital, 
and the Madero star was in the ascendant. The tide had 
turned. 

To this convalescing Mexico the Washington State De- 
partment on April 15 addressed a communication which 
deserves a prominent place in the long list of fruitless in- 
terchanges between the governments. Secretary Knox 
was then absent on his " dollar diplomacy errand " to Cen- 
tral America, and Acting Secretary Huntington Wilson, 
ostensibly impelled by reports of property damage and loss 
of life among Americans in Mexico, transmitted a note on 
the subject through the American Embassy. The "note" 
which ran to about a thousand words is of interest as show- 
ing that the pseudo ultimatum style of diplomatic address 
to Mexico did not originate with the Wilson Administra- 
tion, as many now suppose. Other demands upon Mexico 
for protection of Americans and their property had eman- 



194 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

ated from the State Department of the Taft regime, but 
none of them had been written in this key. A strain per- 
emptory but vague, the unconvincing and inconsequential 
threat with which the world has since become familiar, was 
audible then for the first time in the Mexican duet of dis- 
cords. 

The communication was resented in Mexico, though it 
was regarded as weak. " American bluff " was a phrase 
often heard in comments. It was difficult to discover justi- 
fication for its issuance unless the government from which 
it came had well considered the natural results and was pre- 
pared to enforce the demands it made. 

Americans whose knowledge of Mexican matters was ac- 
curate were sorely puzzled by its terms. The following 
extract will suffice: 

" The enormous destruction, constantly increasing, 
of American properties in the course of the present 
unfortunate disturbances ; the taking of American life 
contrary to the principle governing such matters among 
all civilized nations ; the increasing danger to which all 
American citizens in Mexico are subjected and the 
seemingly indefinite continuance of this unfortunate 
situation, compel the Government of the United States 
to give notice that it expects and must demand that 
American life and property within the Republic of Mex- 
ico be justly and adequately protected, and that this 
Government must hold Mexico and the Mexican people 
responsible for all wanton and illegal acts sacrificing 
or endangering human life or damaging American 
property interests there situated." 

It was signed by Huntington Wilson, Acting Secretary. 

To this demand the Mexican Government responded two 
days later, on April 17, 1912, in a note of considerable 
length signed by Lascurain. Its tenor may be gathered 
from these extracts: 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 195 

" The Mexican Government has a full consciousness 

of its duties and neither by acts, nor by the manifesta- 
tions of its functionaries has it given a reason to doubt 
the sincerity of its determination to cause to be re- 
spected the generally accepted principles of interna- 
tional law and the rules which govern the conduct of 
civilized nations." 

" For these reasons the Mexican Government finds It- 
self in the painful necessity of not recognizing the 
right of your Government to make the admonition 
Avhich the note contains, and for the further reason that 
it is not based on any incident that should be charge- 
able to the Mexican Government and which could 
signify that it might have departed from an observance 
of the principles and practises of international law." 

At the time this interchange of courtesies took place the 
newspapers of the United States were crowded with ac- 
counts of the Titanic disaster, and the diplomatic incident 
with Mexico received scanty attention. So meager was the 
space alloted to it that many diligent readers of American 
newspapers doubtless passed it by and have remained in 
ignorance of the entire affair to this day. But the Wash- 
ington document and the Mexican answer were published 
in full in the Mexican press with an effect similar to that 
of the answer returned in August, 1913, from the pen of 
Huerta's Foreign Minister, Federico Gamboa, to the de- 
mands of John Lind : it strengthened the Mexican Govern- 
ment in the minds of the Mexican people. 

In diplomatic circles of the United States and Europe, 
where Lascurain was then unknown, authorship of the 
Mexican reply was ascribed to Manuel Calero, who had not 
set out for Washington. It is difficult to understand how 
the State Department could have remained in error for 
more than a day or two ; yet the mistake persisted, and the 
Washington Government made no haste to receive Calero 
when he arrived in the latter part of the month as Mexico's 



196 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Ambassador. Official utterance was lacking, but the story 
of a coldness was extensively published in the newspapers. 
Calero's port of arrival was New York, and there he waited 
several days for his welcome to mend. The State Depart- 
ment with due deliberation issued a disclaimer of ill will, 
and the Ambassador proceeded to Washington where he was 
received with a studied consideration which was an official 
condonation of his supposed offense. 

But it was well known in Mexico that Lascurain and not 
Calero was the author of the reply to Washington, and the 
performance was applauded, to the very considerable ad- 
vantage of the Government. American residents in Mexico, 
many of whom believed that as intervention must one day 
surely come, it would better come at once, nodded their 
heads sagely, and looked toward Washington for some ex- 
tremely vigorous expression of resentment. European 
diplomats adjusted their long distance glasses and scanned 
the horizon for smoke of American war vessels steaming to 
sustain Washington's demand which Mexico had flouted. 
What really happened was that the United States communi- 
cated to Mexico the opinion that the answer which had been 
received was no answer at all ; whereupon Mexico replied 
that there was no other. So the incident closed with the 
State Department at Washington talking to itself in an 
empty room. Some one presently came in, however, with 
the information that Lascurain was the offender, and the 
Department made a note of it for use on a subsequent oc- 
casion. 

It was at this time that a climax was reached in the dis- 
agreement between the management of The National Rail- 
ways of Mexico and its American conductors and engineers, 
and it is quite certain that the irritation which had developed 
in the diplomatic situation was not without influence in 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 197 

the railway aflfair, the Mexican Government being in voting 
control of the system. 

The National Lines system consists of 7956 miles of 
railway of which 6003 miles are in the merger proper, while 
the remainder is controlled by lease. The various railway 
companies which entered the merger or leased their lines to 
it had begun business with American employees and the 
merger had retained them. The president of the great bil- 
lion peso company, several members of its board of direc- 
tors, practically all of the superintendents and general 
agents in all departments, and nearly all conductors and en- 
gineers, when Madero became President of Mexico, were 
Americans. There had been many American firemen and 
brakemen, but these grades, by that time, had been filled 
with Mexicans as promotions, deaths, resignations and 
discharges had made vacancies. In the grades of conductor 
and engineer there were, in April, 1912, about 1000 men of 
American birth. 

American railway men had long been a feature of the- 
American representation in Mexico. They had, for the 
most part, begun their railroad careers on the Western and 
Southwestern roads of the United States, and they carried 
the social atmosphere of these regions along with them 
across the border. In the larger towns which marked the 
terminals of divisions the American social position was built 
upon the foundation which the families of these railway men 
had laid. In Mexico City itself the railway element was 
well represented in the life of the American Colony. 

The merchants of the capital found the trade of the Amer- 
ican railway men most desirable ; it was liberal, not too dis- 
criminating, and strictly cash. American stores were es- 
tablished to cater to this patronage. Groceries, haberdash- 
ery, clothing, shoes, drugs, books, stationery and special- 



198 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

ties, imported from the United States, were dealt in by 
American concerns formed for the purpose of selHng these 
goods first of all to the railway men whose earnings, es- 
pecially those of the conductors, amounted in Mexican 
money to good figures. 

The railway men came to understand their commercial 
value to the colony and did not underestimate their impor- 
tance in the operation of the big railway system. They did 
not view with complacence the disposition of the merger 
management to advance the fortunes of Mexican employees. 
American engineers grumbled, not without reason, at being 
compelled to put up with Mexican firemen. American con- 
ductors jeered, with or without reason, at Mexican brake- 
men. Now and then a Mexican was promoted to be en- 
gineer or conductor, and the sentiments of the Americans 
were not politely expressed. 

Early in 1912 notice was given by the railroad manage- 
ment that all American employees must master the Spanish 
language; in a few months all train orders which had pre- 
viously been written in English, would be issued in the lan- 
guage of the country. This action, whatever may seem to 
be its justification, was quite correctly taken to be a move 
to thin the ranks of American employees. 

Protest in mild terms proved unavailing. The Americans 
held meetings and passed resolutions which were ratified 
all over the system, but the management, under orders from 
the Government, was immovable. On the seventeenth of 
April, 1912, while the diplomatic courtesies were being ex- 
changed between Washington and Mexico City, the entire 
body of American engineers and conductors, after having 
given notice of their intention, quit the service of the Na- 
tional Lines ; and they have never been taken back. 

During the remainder of that April of 1912, the Madero 
Government made substantial gains in strategic position. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 199 

Huerta moved his army to Torreon and prepared to advance 
against Orozco. Calero's departure for Washington effec- 
tually disposed of the daily conferences w^ith Ambassador 
Wilson; the Ambassador was finding it more difficult to 
make impression upon a government whose cabinet was now 
for the first time in full accord; his pet claims were stub- 
bornly hanging fire. 

Francisco Bulnes, whose disconcerting speeches in Con- 
gress had been a daily shock to Madero, was more or less 
discredited. De la Barra's return from the mission of 
thanks to Italy had made no stir; he was now a prominent 
citizen in private life. Opposition newspapers adopted a 
tone that was almost patriotic. Some of the indecent 
weeklies were suppressed. As April glided into May 
confidence in the Government rapidly increased throughout 
Mexico. Americans in the capital were saying that Madero 
" had got his second wind." 



CHAPTER XI 

THERE is no reason to believe that the improved posi- 
tion of Madero in May, 1912, was clearly perceived 
or rightly understood by the United States, by Eng- 
land or by any continental power. If truly sympathetic 
comprehension existed anywhere, its seat was in the minds 
of a few private persons, unrelated to one another, pos- 
sessed of no authority and of little influence. 

Beyond question the passing of the Diaz rule was re- 
gretted by all statesmen whose offices constrained them to 
take active interest in the Mexican situation ; and to say this 
is to close the debate. Those who would have wished to 
reestablish Diaz — or a younger ruler of the same type — 
were by this preference debarred from an intelligent opinion 
in the matter of Madero. The rule of Diaz was held to 
have been favorable to business development. Under his 
iron hand the alien seeking his fortune in Mexico enjoyed 
the opportunity to gain the whole world and lose his own 
soul without peril to his physical existence or his goods, 
and consequently without giving rise to troublesome inter- 
national complications. This constitutes good government 
in the eyes of diplomats and the conviction was well nigh 
universal that Madero would never establish it. 

The Mexicans, in the view of Europe and the United 
States, required a strong president, indistinguishable from 
a king, except by greater scope than is granted nowadays 
to most that wear a crown. The briefest period of Madero, 
followed by the closest possible approximation to Diaz — • 
so ran the sentence in the morning prayers of diplomats 

200 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 201 

kneeling before their antiquated idols. There is no indica- 
tion that the Americans were so much as one century, 
scarcely a day indeed, ahead of the others. 

There had been a certain period of anxiety among the 
European traders, following the accession of Madero, in 
which the possibility that the United States would see its 
opportunity and take advantage of it, had excited apprehen- 
sion. Thus far Mexico's trade with the Northern republic 
though heavy, had been confined to specialties. Europe 
secured the great bulk of the business in staples — dry goods, 
hardware, groceries and a good portion of the machinery. 
Europe also controlled the banking. These advantages had 
been held in face of the fact that the money investment of 
the United States in Mexico's industries was greater than 
that of England, France and Germany combined. That 
condition had existed under the Diaz autocracy, but could 
it endure if the United States should employ diplomatic 
finesse, shrewdly supporting the new order and making the 
best of it, for the sake of trade advantages which might 
accrue? 

Europe's anxiety, however, quickly passed away. With 
gratification it saw the inharmony between Madero and the 
American Government increase to dangerous irritation which 
found voice in threats embittering the quarrel. A well con- 
sidered silence was the policy of onlookers. No European 
nation made open demands for protection of its people resi- 
dent in Mexico, or of their property ; if an Englishman or 
a German, or a Frenchman was ill-used or his possessions 
damaged, his Government acted with vigor and despatch, 
but quietly. Always it was the United States which ad- 
vertised its complaints to the world, and accomplished noth- 
ing. 

The month of May, 1912, widened the breach between 
the two governments. On its first day Henry Cabot Lodge 



202 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

delivered his famous Magdalena Bay speech in the Senate. 
There were rumors that the Japanese had acquired or were 
about to acquire a holding in the Mexican Territory of 
Lower California on the shores of this bay in which the 
United States possessed treaty rights. Senator Lodge 
sounded a note of warning, very inopportunely, for there 
was no danger. 

Madero had not entertained and his Government had no 
intention of entertaining proposals from Japan of any lead- 
ing character whatever. This was not because Madero was 
held back by friendship for the United States, but because 
he saw peril in any deal with Japan which would place 
Mexico between two fires. If foundation existed for the 
Senator's fears, it lay in the projected operations of an 
American syndicate which had acquired property on that 
desolate coast and was said to be negotiating with the 
Japanese for its sale. 

The effect in Mexico of Mr. Lodge's remarks was to 
excite bitter ridicule as at a letting off of " American 
steam," but published everywhere in the United States the 
speech was harmful and excited feeling against Mexico as 
a potential ally of the little yellow men in their unproved 
but widely credited design to secure a foothold on the Amer- 
ican continent. 

On the third of the month two Russian Jews, the Ratner 
brothers, Americanized but not naturalized, were deported 
from Mexico as " pernicious foreigners " under the famous 
article thirty-three of the Mexican Constitution. These men 
managed a mail-order business under the name of the Tam- 
pico News Company in which at least two members of the 
American Ambassador's privy council were directors. The 
offense of which the deported men were guilty was ex- 
tremely grave; they were caught in the act of delivering 
arms and ammunition to the bandit chief, Zapata. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 203 

The accusation was not made public and no trial was 
held. This afforded opportunity for criticism of the sum- 
mary treatment they received. If it had turned out that the 
men were naturalized Americans, interesting developments 
might have resulted placing prominent members of the 
American Colony in a delicate position. Under a Govern- 
ment less forbearing than Madero's the Ratners might very 
probably have been executed and their American partners 
imprisoned for indefinite terms. 

One of the Americans associated with the Ratners in the 
Tampico News Company was Emin L. Beck, President of 
the strictly American Mexico City Banking Company, and 
chief backer of a daily newspaper printed in the American 
language ; the other was Burton W. Wilson, an American at- 
torney. Though there was no reason to believe that they 
knew anything of this sale of arms, they were to some ex- 
tent involved in the unpleasant atmosphere of the transac- 
tion by the mere fact of their business connection; and 
because they stood so close to the Ambassador, it was in- 
evitable that he should suffer, though unjustly, a further 
loss of favor with the Madero Government. 

The whole aft'air is an excellent illustration of the way 
in which business, and banditry, and international com- 
plications are related to one another in a disturbed country. 
The Ratners had moved their business from Tampico in the 
year 1909, and branched out on a larger scale in Mexico 
City, occupying one whole building on Calle Palma and a 
salesroom on Avenida 16 de Septiembre. While the in- 
dustries of Mexico were going at normal speed the mail 
order business thrived. Fifty young women were em- 
ployed as typists to attend to the correspondence, and 
dozens of clerks and employees were required for the de- 
tails of the business. 

Toward the close of 1910 the beginning of the Madero 



204 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

revolution curtailed the volume of sales. In the spring of 
191 1 the business was still further depressed, and the Tam- 
pico News Company found itself deeply in debt to Mr. 
Beck's bank. But the Ratners were sharp men. With Mr. 
Beck's liberal backing they had secured an enormous stock 
of American firearms — rifles, carbines, revolvers, auto- 
matics, with abundance of ammunition — picked up at bar- 
gain prices in the States. Shortly after it was received in 
Mexico City the de la Barra Government issued an edict 
under which consignments of arms to dealers were held in 
the custom houses. Dealers were permitted to sell the 
stock on hand but could not replenish it. The Ratners had 
already brought in their great supply and now they had a 
clear field with monopoly prices. They advertised widely 
and their profits were large. 

With the increase of reported and actual disturbances 
throughout Mexico, in the months following Madero's 
inauguration, the firearms sales of the Tampico News Com- 
pany grew steadily. In February, 1912, the Madero 
Government became suspicious, and caused two secret serv- j 
ice men to solicit and secure positions in the Ratners' { 
employ. Using their best vigilance the detectives were un- I 
able, for several weeks, to find positive evidence of traffic | 
with the enemies of the Government. But on the night | 
of May 2 their efforts were rewarded ; one of them was 
chosen as an aid to the Ratners in a delivery of arms. I 
After midnight an automobile was brought into an alley | 
alongside the Tampico News Company building on Callel 
Palma, the arms were placed on board and were conveyed! 
out of the city beyond Tacubaya where the car was met by 
Zapata and a body of his followers who received the goods, i 

The detective made his report immediately upon his re- 
turn. At daybreak the Ratners were taken into custody,' 
and their remaining stock was confiscated. That day they j I 




GENERAL VICTORIANO HUERTA 

Minister of Gobernacion and Provisional President of Mexico, from 
Feb. 19, 1913. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 205 

were sent to Vera Cruz, and thence to New York on a 
steamer. The Government discussed arresting the Amer- 
ican directors of the Company, but refrained, upon informa- 
tion that certain Mexicans of standing were also involved. 
After Madero was killed, the Ratners returned to Mexico, 
and resumed business at the old stand. 

In those early days of May, 1912, while the Madero 
Government was acting with some approach to harmony and 
not without efficiency in its administrative measures, the 
opera bouffe pretensions of the Emilo Vasquez Gomez ele- 
ment were much advertised in the United States. The 
movements and the fulminations of Orozco were also pic- 
tured in American newspapers, along with the operations 
of Zapata. Vasquez Gomez and Orozco sent separate re- 
presentatives to Washington, but the envoy of the former 
claimed that his chief was recognized by all as head of the 
revolutionary enterprise. The Taft Administration took 
sufficient notice of the assurances of protection to Americans 
volunteered by these men to make a statement that " until 
more headway was made in unseating Madero," no com- 
munications from insurrectos would be received. 

This statement was not well contrived; it was inter- 
preted as a spur to greater revolutionary activity; and it 
seemed to ignore, as the sharp note of April 15 had done, 
the material gains made by the Madero Government. The 
Vasquez Gomez people held some border towns, and cer- 
tain affiliated squads of bandits were moving about in 
northern Coahuila and Chihuahua. Orozco held the state 
government of Chihuahua. But the border press and cor- 
respondents dealt in exaggerated accounts of minor happen- 
ings which Mexico City regarded as of no moment; for 
there was confidence In the army sent north under Huerta. 

The achievements of that army are really notable. 
Genuine military and engineering ability were displayed in 



2o6 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

the course of Huerta's advance over the 294 miles between 
Torreon and Chihuahua, along the main line of the Mexican 
Central Railway. On the 2nd of May, Orozco, then at 
Jimenez, 150 miles north of Torreon, issued orders fo^^is 
army of 7000 men to move south to attack Huerta, whose 
forces amounting to 6000 were divided between Torreon 
and the town of Mapimi, twenty-five miles north. On the 
7th Huerta moved the Torreon force north to join the 
Mapimi division. On the 8th Orozco moved his head- 
quarters south from Jimenez, forty-six miles, to Escalon, 
and here he remained, though his army was near Berme- 
jillo skirmishing with the outposts of Huerta's forces 
seventy-five miles further south. 

On the 9th Huerta advanced in force against the main 
body of Orozco's army just north of Bermejillo and on the 
loth led a general attack which dislodged the enemy with 
considerable loss. And the retreat of Orozco's army which 
began that day steadily continued. On May 11, Huerta 
advanced to Peronal fifteen miles north of Bermejillo. 
On the I2th Orozco was driven north another fifteen 
miles, after twelve hours fighting in which five hundred men 
were killed. On the 13th Orozco's forces retreated north 
on the railway, forty miles, to Rellano, the scene of his 
great victory over Gonzalez Salas. Orozco now moved his 
headquarters back to Jimenez, thirty-three miles from his 
army. 

The Orozco rebels having destroyed bridges, Huerta's 
advance was slower. On the 14th he reached Yermo, four- 
teen miles north of Conejos. On the 15th he moved ten 
miles further, rebuilding bridges as he proceeded. Orozco's 
base was still at Rellano, but his troops were at various 
points in the thirty miles between that town and Huerta's 
front. On the 15th Huerta advanced to Ceballos, and on the^ 
i6th he reported to Mexico City that Orozco's losses in 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 207 

killed, wounded and prisoners thus far amounted to 2000 
men. 

The Government was calm; it had expected success. 
Huerta was cheered on capital streets; Madero stock was 
daily rising. The active aggression of the Federal cam- 
paign was a revelation of the Government's strength. 

Rebuilding bridges and relaying track held Huerta from 
rapid movement, and Orozco reinforced his army at Rel- 
lano. On the 20th Huerta occupied Escalon, within eleven 
miles of the rebels whose skirmishing parties inaugurated 
the practise of turning loose box cars, containing dynamite, 
and starting them down the grade to explode in the Federal 
camp. On the 21st the skirmishing columns of Orozco's 
army were driven further north. There was hard fighting 
at Asunsolo, six miles from Rellano. On the 22nd, the van- 
guard of the Federals under General Rabago attacked 
Orozco's main body at Rellano. On the 23rd the fight be- 
came general and was the fiercest of the campaign thus far. 

Led by Huerta in person, with Generals Blanquet, Tellez 
and Rabago supporting, the Federal army that day washed 
out the Rellano stain in rebel blood. The spirit of the con- 
queror was in the Madero forces. With irresistible mo- 
mentum they carried the Orozco defenses, occupied his base 
of supplies and put his men to such precipitate flight that 
they abandoned arms and ammunition and left six hun- 
dred dead. In twelve days Madero's army under Huerta's 
vigorous leadership had driven Orozco's troops north more 
than eighty miles and had defeated them in every engage- 
ment. 

The difficulties of the pursuit now multiplied. Orozco 
possessed the immense advantage of a railway in working 
order as a means of retreat through a section where the 
railway was the only means by which his adversary could 
advance. Also he knew that Huerta must rebuild the line 



2o8 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

to keep in communication with his base of supplies which 
still was at Torreon more than a hundred miles in the rear. 

Stung by constant reverses and desiring to gain time for 
recruiting before the battle which must be fought to decide 
the fate of Chihuahua, Orozco gave orders to turn the 
railroad behind his forces into as complete a wreck as 
dynamite could make. Not content with blowing up 
bridges, culverts and trestles, and tearing up track, his men 
destroyed the foundation and the grading upon which the 
track was laid. Ties were burned, the roadbed through 
cuts was piled deep with rock blasted from the sides, tun- 
nels were rendered impassable and the instructions to 
" make that railway as if it had never been " were literally 
carried out. 

Orozco prepared for the decisive contest at Bachimba, 
142 miles north of Rellano and but forty miles south of 
Chihuahua in which city he established his headquarters, 
for at all times during this campaign he kept himself well 
beyond the zone of danger. With 142 miles of indescrib- 
able railway wreckage between his army and the Federals 
he believed it would be months before Huerta could re- 
build the line and advance to the attack. By that time 
Orozco hoped to have an army of 10,000 men. 

But he underrated his adversary's ability. Whatever un- 
pleasing characteristics Victoriano Huerta later on dis- 
closed to the world, it would be idle to deny the merit of his 
leadership at this juncture. Compared with famous wars 
his operations were on a small scale, the number of men in 
active service under him during this campaign never ex- 
ceeding 7000; but for indefatigable energy, for ability to 
excite and retain the loyalty of his officers and men, and 
for resourcefulness in face of staggering difficulties, his 
record in that advance from Rellano to Bachimba may well 
be regarded as brilliant. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 209 

The Government at Mexico City supported him with 
constant reinforcements to hold the railway as fast as cap- 
tured, and protect Torreon in his rear. It was no longer 
difficult to obtain recruits for the Federal army ; enthusiasm 
for the military service came with success. Thus it was 
possible for Huerta to garrison the towns as they were oc- 
cupied, and protect every foot of the rebuilt railway from 
being tampered with by small bands lurking in the moun- 
tains to cut off communication between the Federals and 
their base. 

On June 26, one month and three days from the date of 
the Rellano battle, the vanguard of Huerta's army was 
within five miles of Bachimba, having advanced 228 miles 
in forty-six days since May loth, the date of the first bat- 
tle of the campaign at Bermejillo. 

Several days were now spent in preparing for the final 
test of strength. Orozco had 8000 men well supplied with 
ammunition which had been smuggled across the border, 
and been paid for by the state revenues of Chihuahua, sup- 
plemented, it is said, by heavy contributions from the Ter- 
razas family, Huerta had only 6500 troops; but what he 
lacked in numbers was more than compensated for by better 
equipment of machine guns and by the revengeful ardor of 
his men who under the guidance of competent engineers 
had been driven like slaves in restoring the railway which 
Orozco had wrecked. 

On July 3 the Bachimba fight began and on the following 
day Orozco's army was cut to pieces. Refugees scattered 
across the country. Panic reigned in Chihuahua City, 
forty miles distant. That night Orozco and such of his 
sympathizers as could crowd into the cars boarded trains 
for Ciudad Juarez, leaving the capital of the State of Chi- 
huahua open for Huerta's occupation the following day. 
The Federal victory was complete. 



2IO THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

The Huerta campaign against the scattered remnants of 
Orozco's army and the insignificant bodies of men calling 
themselves Vasquistas, continued for several weeks with 
sustained success. On August 20, Ciudad Juarez was re- 
captured by the Federals and shortly afterward the main 
Vasquistas bands were broken up, thus quelling organized 
rebellion in the north against the Madero Government. 
But these latter incidents of the campaign were of the com- 
monplace Mexican variety except that they were better 
done; it is the sweep from Torreon to Chihuahua that 
furnishes an exhibit of those qualities in this remarkable 
man, which, the following year, undoubtedly helped to raise 
him to an unenviable eminence. 

To belittle the service rendered by Huerta in this cam- 
paign would be to do him less than justice. That his army 
was superior to that of his adversary in equipment of artil- 
lery and machine guns is saying only that which was equally 
true of the army which previously, under Gonzalez Salas, 
went to defeat against the same enemy on the same ground. 
Dogged determination and inexhaustible energy were the 
qualities which made superior equipment effective against 
the obstacles Huerta was compelled _ to overcome. No 
other Mexican campaign during the preceding half century 
can be compared with this as a genuine military achieve- 
ment. 

The victories which history credits to Porfirio Diaz were 
never quite free of the suspicion of double dealing. Rare 
is the occasion when Diaz did not have soldiers in both 
camps. But the series of triumphs by Huerta over Orozco 
was a clear record of fair contests conducted with skill 
and concluded with credit to the commanding general, his 
officers and the Government that supported him. 

None was more astonished at the ability Huerta ex- 
hibited than the old line officers who regarded him as an 



\ 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 211 

excessive user of alcohol, and, therefore, unfit for an im- 
portant command. As in later days he surprised the world 
by the broad audacity of his methods so in almost equal 
measure his campaign against Orozco startled the Diaz gen- 
erals who had known him from his youth. 

Born of Indian parents in the State of Jalisco in 1852, 
Victoriano Huerta entered the military service at the age 
of twenty as a cadet. In the Diaz military operations 
from 1876 onward he was always a dependable but not 
conspicuous officer. The Diaz principle " shoot first and 
take no prisoners " was thoroughly instilled into him by 
this training. Opportunity for application of these military 
ethics was not lacking during the years in which the Diaz 
system of rule was making Mexico " safe as a church." 
Along with many other Diaz officers Huerta acquired the 
reputation of a man from whom no quarter was to be ex- 
pected. 

His abilities as an executive were recognized by Diaz who 
assigned him to departmental duty in organizing the gen- 
eral staff of the Mexican Army and in superintending the 
preparation of military maps. During this period he be- 
came an inveterate student of Napoleon Bonaparte, whose 
methods appealed to him as ideal for Mexico, He was 
made a brigadier general by Diaz in 1902. 

The Mexican army in the latter Diaz years deteriorated 
in efficiency through the development of a system of graft 
which profited most by clothing and arming soldiers who 
did not exist, and Huerta fell in with the general tendency 
among the officers to regard active service as of the past. 
He was considered the hardest and steadiest drinker in the 
Diaz army and in no way did he distinguish himself dur- 
ing the Madero revolution. 

Assigned by the de la Barra Government to the task of 
subduing the bandit, Zapata, Huerta by his methods dis- 



212 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

pleased Madero, who caused him to be removed from active 
service and placed on the waiting list, where he remained 
until the Madero Government found itself in hard straits 
in the month of March, 1912. Then Huerta discovered 
an opportunity to use Napoleonic methods against Orozco. 
He asked for the chance to " whip the traitor," and so ob- 
tained the prominence which enabled him eventually to 
succeed the man who set him in the way. 

When the campaign was over the Madero Government 
directed Huerta to return to the capital, but he made ex- 
cuses. The reason for this became apparent when he finally 
reached Mexico City: in accounting for the funds which 
had been sent to him to pay his troops and carry on the 
campaign, he was 1,500,000 pesos short in his vouchers. 
But he had received the popular applause on his arrival in 
Mexico City ; many banquets were spread in his honor, and 
when Madero called his attention to the discrepancy in his 
accounts, he disposed of the matter with grimly amusing 
nonchalance. " I am no bookkeeper," was the only answer 
he deigned to make. 

Manifestly there was nothing to be done. To prefer 
charges would seem to indicate jealousy. The Madero 
Government rose to the occasion ; it made him a major gen- 
eral. 

Victoriano Huerta did not lose his self command in the 
momentary enthusiasm which his victorious campaign had 
aroused. He had lifted a government, with whose de- 
clared principles he was not in sympathy, to a position 
which commanded respect, but he seemed entirely indif- 
ferent to the praise which he received. 

While the military operations of the Madero Govern- 
ment were making notable successes the Department of 
Finance was not idle. Reserving details for more extended 
treatment in a subsequent chapter attention at the momeni 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 213 

centers upon the loan that was effected in the early days 
of June. 

Revenues, according to Government statements, v^ere in- 
creasing in volume but extraordinary charges for " pacifi- 
cation " had made loan negotiations necessary. The fifty 
millions, gold, that was needed on long time to place the 
treasury in a strong position was not obtainable for reasons 
already indicated. It was not wise to ask for Con- 
gressional consent to such a plan until the matter could be 
laid before the new Congress to be elected in July and to 
convene in September; and it was not yet possible to ar- 
range with a new banking syndicate in Europe against the 
adverse influences that were at work. 

Rumors that Speyer & Company were making difficulties 
about a loan were denied by that house in a statement to 
the press on May ist. Rumors that Limantour was aiding 
in loan negotiation were denied by the Mexican Govern- 
ment on May 15th, On June 7th a loan was placed with 
Speyer & Company to the amount of ten millions, in one- 
year, 43^ per cent, notes at 98 " less banker's commissions 
in Europe." 

This short-time note financing for general treasury pur- 
poses was new in Mexico, and caused much comment. 
By some it was looked upon as a serious blow to the Mex- 
ican credit ; by the Mexican Government it was stated to be 
— and the Mexican Congress so authorized it — a 
special fund for " pacification." But the fact of the matter 
is that it was the only negotiation which, at that time, could 
be concluded, and the figure at which it was floated when 
all charges were deducted was much nearer 94^^ than 98, 
the surface price. 

The July elections for members of the Chamber of Depu- 
ties, the Mexican lower house, and for one-half of the 
Senate, were not quite of that open order which had distin- 



214 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

guished the Madero presidential election of the preceding 
October. Yet the time honored Diaz system of " tagging " 
a Congress into office can not have been followed strictly, 
for certain of the new members were not those which the 
Madero Government preferred. 

The Catholic Party developed unexpected strength, es- 
pecially in the Senate, where half the members still held 
over from the Diaz times. The new Catholic Party mem- 
bers when acting with the " old regime " men were suffi- 
ciently numerous in the Senate to block the operations of 
the Madero majority in the Chamber of Deputies. 

The Mexican custom permits one man to hold as many 
offices as he can conveniently lay hold of. One of the new 
Senators was also some months later seated as Governor of 
the State of Mexico, in a corner of which is the Federal 
District containing the capital. The man vv^as Francisco 
Leon de la Barra. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE notable thrashing of Orozco, the creditable mod- 
eration of procedure which marked the July elec- 
tions, and the vitality displayed by the Govern- 
ment during the summer, stirred the enemies of Madero 
into increased activity. Around this unfortunate man there 
was formed a network of conspiracies, interwoven at cer- 
tain points deliberately by men who understood what they 
were doing, at other points by blunderers ; and wherever 
there were two loose ends the fingers of the fates tied them 
together. 

Events upon the surface gave little indication of effective 
causes. It may fairly be said that the comprehension of 
Alexico affairs from outward appearances ceased to be 
merely difficult and became impossible in September, 1912. 
The situation at that time might be presented as a riddle; 
it was in fact so offered to the world, and very wild were 
the guesses. 

As an example of the grotesquely erroneous opinions 
which were held and widely disseminated it would be possi- 
ble to take the despatches from Beverly, Mass., printed in 
the newspapers of September 8, and disclosing to the public 
the alleged and probably the actual view of President Taft, 
who had just come to that town from the capital. 

When President Taft was in Washington on Wednesday, 
said these despatches, he had a conference, it is understood, 
with Senor Manuel Calero, the Mexican Ambassador to 
the United States, on which occasion the President made 
it more plain to the Ambassador that this Government was 

215 



2i6 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

dissatisfied with internal conditions in Mexico, and that the 
Government of Madero must take more drastic steps to pro- 
tect the lives and property of Americans and of other for- 
eigners in Mexico. " Mr. Taft," in the words of the ac- 
counts, " is opposed to intervention, except in the last resort. 
It is admitted, however, that conditions in Mexico have 
become much worse in the last few weeks, and if the Ma- 
dero Government is unable to check the attacks on Ameri- 
can citizens, the United States will be constrained to take 
some action." 

I am willing to believe that the conference referred to 
actually took place, and that Mr. Taft addressed himself 
to Seiior Calero in the strain described, and with entire sin- 
cerity. What puzzles me is that Calero kept his face 
straight. Possibly the Senor's natural regret that the Am- 
bassador of the United States to Mexico was not listening 
at the keyhole may have sufficed to steady his countenance. 
For my own part, in the long volume of the human comedy 
I draw a line beside this scene to mark it as among the 
most ridiculous, but if one newspaper or one man in public 
life, north of the Rio Grande, knew Mexico well enough to 
appreciate the joke, I have not found the evidence of it. 

Another example, in itself quite unimportant, will serve 
us well at this point. On a Sunday in that September, one 
of the more sober and reliable New York newspapers filled 
a page with an illustrated article by General Orozco, in 
which he stated with considerable violence his grounds of 
opposition to Madero, whom he denounced as a traitor to 
the liberties of Mexico. This publication implies, of course, 
that the newspaper in question, — and it was one of the best 
informed, — did not know the essential facts about Orozco, 
nor even suspect the nature of the considerations which 
impelled him to become a rebel. 

Moreover, this newspaper, in common with a thousand 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 217 

others, displayed on the same day and for many days suc- 
ceeding, the current stories of the weakness of the Federal 
arms in Mexico as disclosed by the activity of its enemies 
in the field. But Orozco himself was the conspicuous and 
sufficient evidence of Madero's military strength and of the 
fact that he required only a fair chance to develop and em- 
ploy it. Orozco had led the only formidable force against 
the Government and he had been beaten out of his boots. 
He was vox ef praeterea nihil, the lonesome leader of a 
vanished host, even his own whereabouts uncertain, for he 
was here or there, in Texas, Arizona or Mexico, as the 
dreams of the correspondents changed from night to night. 
There was not in Mexico at that time, really existing at the 
head of an organized band, a leader capable of standing his 
ground against a very moderate force, with the exception 
of Zapata; and Madero would never have had any perma- 
nent trouble with Zapata, as is well known by those who 
understand the heart of Mexican mysteries. 

It is not my intent to deny that there was grave disorder 
in Mexico, or that the United States had cause for anxiety 
as to the safety of its nationals on the other side of the 
border. The question turns upon a clear comprehension 
of causes and a right procedure in the circumstances as 
they actually existed, not as they seemed to be. 

Far too much importance has been assigned by critics to 
supposed spontaneous local sentiment, and to what has been 
made to appear as a universal savagery and love of strife 
in Mexico's lower classes. Active agencies were at work 
stimulating sentiment adverse to the Government and caus- 
ing it to develop into overt acts. It was the upper classes 
of Mexico which promoted and fostered this destructive 
work. 

The upper classes were of Spanish or mixed blood. The 
ingredients of the mixture had been Spanish and native 



2i8 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

or French and native, and the generation of the day looked 
down from a great height upon the Indian races from which 
it quite recently had sprung. The upper class families had 
been enriched by the means which Porfirio Diaz had em- 
ployed to create the feudal system called by the world a 
strong government, and they now greatly feared that Ma- 
dero would become powerful enough to attack their prop- 
erty rights. 

These " rights " were, for the most part, infamous 
wrongs. They were acquired through the remarkable Law 
of Survey of the Public Domain which was passed or pro- 
mulgated in 1884, in that interval when General Gonzalez, a 
tool of Porfirio Diaz, was permitted to hold the presidential 
office. Under this law the President could appoint sur- 
veyors who were entitled to one-third the land they sur- 
veyed and mapped, and to the privilege of purchasing the 
other two-thirds at a nominal figure. Favorites of Diaz 
were the surveyors appointed. They did little or no sur- 
veying. The maps they filed were designed in the City 
of Mexico. The titles created by the Law of Survey swept 
aside ancient boundaries and rights dating from the con- 
quest. Thousands of Mexican families were despoiled of 
their property which thus was parcelled out to men who 
became the bulwarks of the Porfirio Diaz system. 

Villages, farms, haciendas, waste lands ^ — more than half 
of the Republic of Mexico — were in this way wrested from 
families long in possession, or from the Government itself. 
Corrupt and subservient courts sustained the " surveyors." 
At the hands of Diaz the despoiled ones got no comfort, 
except the few who could bring influence to bear or show 
their power to advance his plans. Landholders became 
serfs of the great proprietors, who, with their sons, their 
wives, their sweethearts and their daughters, maintained 
elegant homes at the capital and spread the fame of Diaz 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 219 

in Paris, London and Madrid. Some of these men were 
Cientificos and some were not, but all were Porfiristas to 
the core. Terrazas and Creel, who held fourteen million 
acres in Chihuahua ; Corral, with immense holdings in Son- 
ora ; Escandon, landed baron of Morelos, were among those 
who benefited by the Law of Survey. 

The great landowners had confidently looked for Madero 
to meet with early disaster, but after the July elections 
they began to take alarm in earnest, for he now held con- 
trol of the Chamber of Deputies and might be able to coerce 
the few who made up the opposing Senate majority. A 
new and drastic law of land taxation, or one conferring 
power of condemnation upon unfriendly officials of the 
Government might accomplish dismemberment of the great 
estates, a move which would bring the millions of discon- 
tented peons crowding back to government support. 

The federal military victories had disposed of organized 
rebellion ; if the peons could be made to believe that Ma- 
dero's promises to give them land were approaching ful- 
filment, " the little reformer " would become too strong 
to be defeated, and the day of the land baron would be 
over. Any enterprise directed toward Madero's ruin could 
now command the haciendado's active aid. No time was to 
be lost ; in all the ways by which the men of extensive prop- 
erty could exert influence upon the ignorant, they secretly 
stirred the peons to revolt. 

It may be difficult to believe, but it is true nevertheless, 
that landed men aided and abetted bandits by whose fol- 
lowers the estates of those same proprietors were overrun, 
even though this result had been foreseen from the begin- 
ning. In many instances, of course, the marauders went 
far beyond what had been expected, lost control of them- 
selves or of their men, and were the perpetrators of out- 
rages having international significance. If this condition 



220 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

had been understood, the remedy would have been seen to 
lie in the encouragement and support of the central gov- 
ernment; for as long as it should seem to be unstable and 
to have no friends anywhere, these underhand proceedings 
must continue, but when its permanency should be reason- 
ably assured, the more discreet of the conspirators would 
seek to make some composition with it. At least there 
would no longer be anything to be gained by financing and 
inspiring brigandage. 

No sign of the times was more encouraging to the plot- 
ters of all stripes than the apparent attitude of the United 
States. Conduct calculated to increase the hostility of that 
country was the plainest business policy for those who 
wished Madero to be deposed, and this was well and widely 
understood. As to what would come after Madero's fall 
there was less clearness, in Mexico and elsewhere. The 
main thing was to pull away the props that held him up. 

The women of the " upper class " families aided this under- 
mining all through Mexico, and were at no pains to conceal 
their contempt for Maderista women, especially for the 
women of the Madero family. In their social circles they 
gossiped about them with a bitterness which disregarded 
veracity altogether. The mother of Madero, who in reality 
was a woman of high character, was called " La Diabla " 
and charged with inspiring her sons to all manner of evil. 
As the Madero women passed along the street, whether walk- 
ing or riding, the women of the old regime who met them 
hissed the opprobrious term " sin verguenza " — shameless 
one — through set teeth. The slanders of the Madero 
women which patrician ladies passed to their servants were 
spread through ever widening peon circles and blackened 
their reputations everywhere. 

Nearly all substantial business interests of Mexico, 
whether controlled by Mexicans, Americans or Europeans, 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 221 

remained solidly opposed to the Madero rule. This influ- 
ence extended through credits of wholesale and retail trade, 
through discrimination in the employment of labor and 
through the never-ceasing discussion of political afifairs. 

There was no support for Madero indicated by the at- 
titude of any European government or by that of the gov- 
ernment of the United States. All nations were coldly 
critical; all were waiting, some patiently, some fretfully, 
for the change which would dispose of Maderism and set 
up a government in Mexico, which to be successful must 
be the " iron hand " of the Diaz order. 

The secret efforts to promote and solidify opposition to 
Madero were guided from Paris through three streams of 
influence. One of these was Cientifico, artfully concealed 
and guided by the exiled Cientifico leader, Pineda ; another 
was military, managed by Mondragon. The third may be 
called financial ; it was also political, exerting a great power 
in the Mexican Senate. It proceeded in part from the 
Paris bankers who had been prominent in the loan of $110,- 
000,000 gold, in 19 10. The security for this loan, as has 
been stated, was 62 per cent, of the customs receipts. 
Mexico now desired more money, and these same bankers 
were willing to increase their underwritings of that coun- 
try's securities, if they could complete their hold by obtain- 
ing the pledge of the remaining 38 per cent, of the customs. 
They were decidedly opposed to any plan which would 
pass the control of that 38 per cent, to any other banking 
syndicate. Anti-Madero senators, for political reasons, 
were in accord with the sentiments of the Paris bankers, 
and were prepared to obstruct any competing financial 
legislation which would strengthen Madero's position. 

The Cientifico influence worked in harmony with the 
military ; it supplied the money. When the time should ar- 
rive for work in the open, the military must bear the brunt. 



222 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Porfirio Diaz, the aged ex-dictator, was not associated 
with any movement. He was finding life in Spain and 
France and Egypt a grateful relaxation after his long and 
strenuous career. 

The intrigues of the Cientifico exiles were secret and far- 
reaching. They were carried on in Mexico by the men and 
women of the upper classes as well as by those who had 
formerly affiliated less prominently with the society of gov- 
ernment beneficiaries. The wealthy landed proprietors 
were concerned in many enterprises of sedition, such as 
have been described, schemes which it would be flattery to 
call questionable. The anti-Madero sentiment which these 
men fostered was a steadily increasing menace ; it made 
bandits of many who were peacefully inclined. Every 
empty demand of the American Government for protection 
of its nationals supported the plans of the Mexicans of 
property whose object, all too well accomplished, was to 
prove to the world that Madero could not maintain order. 

The men of wealth whose haciendas were looted and 
burned, and the men of business who were robbed, were 
well assured that when " the little Madero " should have 
been disposed of, they would be reimbursed. The very 
men Madero had hoped to benefit were used as instruments 
to defeat his purpose. Probably no government in the 
world has ever been more systematically circumvented by 
its responsible citizens, though the situation is not novel 
except in its completeness. 

The military influence directed by General Mondragon 
from Paris, and afterward from Havana, operated through 
officers of the Diaz regime who were now either actively in 
the army of the Madero Government or on the retired list 
with plenty of time on their hands and deep animosity in 
their hearts. Disloyalty to Madero was made to assume 
the guise of patriotism to these men who promoted this 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 223 

sentiment in the army as rapidly as they found suitable oc- 
casion ; also " the good old days of Porfirio Diaz " were 
held up as ideal for army officers, for under a restoration 
of such rule, they could supplement their pay-checks with 
a share of " easy money " gained by carrying dead men on 
the roster. To this method of undermining Madero many 
failures of the Government arms were due. It was this 
systematic work through military channels which may be 
called the proximate cause of February's tragedy, though 
to speak of it as if it operated alone, as some have done, is 
highly absurd. 

The Paris financial influence above referred to was being 
opposed by government plans. During the period inter- 
vening between the elections of July, 1912, and the con- 
vening of Congress on September 16, Ernesto Madero, 
Mexico's Finance Minister, through Mexico's Minister to 
France, Miguel Diaz Lombardo, had been able to make a 
substantial advance in negotiations for a large loan with a 
group of French provincial bankers, quite distinct from the 
syndicate which had figured in the loan of 1910. 

For the first time since it was established the Madero 
government was making headway toward establishing bank- 
ing connections which had not been associated with the 
treasury operations of the Diaz regime. 

The surface movement of affairs in Mexico during the 
months of September, October and November, 19 12, was 
caused by systematic operation of the destructive influ- 
ences which have been described. Although the Federal 
army was, recruited to nearly 60,000 men, and was actively 
engaged in pursuit of bandits and small bands of rebels, 
brigandage increased upon the whole. No city or town 
of importance was attacked, but the looting of small vil- 
lages and isolated haciendas in the north and south was of 
daily occurrence. In all of these depredations there was 



224 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

more or less of bloodshed, accomplished with a brutality 
which spread terror through many regions. 

The field for such enterprises was very broad, for Mexico 
abounds in small hamlets and there are more than fifty 
thousand haciendas, all of which at that time offered a 
tempting mark for the plunderer. Some of the operators 
were very bold ; many bands were overtaken and summarily 
dealt with; but the Government was contending against 
no cause in arms, and the defeat of one brigand meant 
very little to another. The government forces in detach- 
ments of all grades, including the greatly increased rural 
guards, were moving everywhere against the peon bandits 
without lessening banditry. Not a single important 
brigand or rebel leader of consequence was taken; they 
were kept too well advised through secret channels, mili- 
tary, political or commercial. 

The relations of the American Ambassador with the 
Madero administration were at this period unfortunate to 
the last degree. A superhuman tact on his part would have 
been required for the establishment of a merely tolerable 
status, after the innumerable irritations of the past. 
Surely he should have restricted his contacts with the Gov- 
ernment to the unavoidable, and should have held himself 
to a careful observance of diplomatic etiquette in order that 
the personal element might be suppressed in the most ef- 
fective manner. But these obviously necessary measures 
he neglected, taking the contrary course of incessant and 
strangely various activity. He supplied advice to the Gov- 
ernment touching its negotiation of loans, tutored it in local 
policy, and interfered unwisely in the affairs of Americans 
whose enterprises were the subjects of departmental con- 
sideration, this interference being tantamount at times to 
the suggestion of practical discrimination between one and 
another. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 225 

Moreover, the Ambassador pursued an injudicious 
course in the matter of claims, taking up too many, and 
pressing them inopportunely with detriment to his own 
dignity, and with no benefit to the claimants whom he rep- 
resented. These demands reached an enormous aggregate; 
they ranged from the English plantation claim for eleven 
millions and that of the Chinese for three millions, down 
to the mere pocket-money of a quarter of a million asked 
by the American publisher of El Heraldo Mexicano, the 
evening daily whose edition had been seized on the 25th 
of March, after the defeat of Gonzales Salas. 

This journal died in the same manner as the Minister of 
War, by suicide, for no official word forbade it to continue. 
There were no issues subsequent to the one that had been 
suppressed, but the suspension was voluntary. The 
trifling misadventure of a day was hastily made final; the 
hopeful heirs of the deceased were prompt, and sods were 
on the grave of El Heraldo before the breath was fairly 
out of its body. Thus the publisher exchanged a spend- 
thrift enterprise for a claim against the Government, and 
El Heraldo' s ghost became a private in that spectral army 
which, under the Ambassador's command, beleaguered the 
treasury of Mexico. 

Madero and his advisers knew the truth; knew also that 
the publisher was active in that circle of amigos whose 
center was in the Embassy; and this affair, though empty 
of genuine importance, still contributed its part to aggra- 
vate the feeling of hostility. This claim appeared in that 
bill of complaints against the Mexican Government which 
was presented by the Ambassador under instructions from 
Secretary Knox, on the 17th of September, and though it 
was dwarfed by larger items its inclusion was significant, 
for Mr. Wilson must have known its history in full. 

The accusation took the form of a voluminous diplomatic 



226 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

" note " which was supposed to have been prepared by the 
Ambassador, from material carefully examined and sifted 
in Washington. Its text was not published, but there were 
innumerable references to it, in the newspapers of the 
United States, before as well as after its delivery. These 
references dealt, for the most part, with acts of violence 
against American residents in Mexico. The State Depart- 
ment was said to have investigated many murders, the num- 
ber being variously stated, from forty to " more than a 
hundred." Persons fairly well informed as to affairs in 
Mexico did not doubt that the list would be long, and that 
it would include notable atrocities, which, through the in- 
efficiency and partiality of the administration of justice in 
Mexico, had entailed no punishment of the perpetrators. 

There is no doubt that the list was as long as the com- 
pilers dared to make it, that it included every case in which 
the evidence might have validity under " crowner's quest 
law." And the true total was seventeen. Four of the 
crimes complained of were committed prior to the revolu- 
tion of 1910. In three instances there had been convictions 
in the Mexican courts, and the guilty persons were serving 
sentences in prison. 

An analysis of the seventeen cases seems to show that 
only two have any merit. In one of these the supposed 
perpetrator was a bandit who had not been caught in the 
month that had elapsed since the commission of the crime. 
In the other the difficulty seems to have been that the chief 
accuser would not identify positively the persons against 
whom he brought the charge. Upon vague grounds he al- 
leged that the court did not act in good faith. Investiga- 
tion was still in progress five months after the crime, a 
delay in securing conviction which will not seem long to 
any one familiar with the criminal courts of New York. 

The presentation of civil cases was not more impressive. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 227 

Great space was given to the British irrigation claim al- 
ready referred to. The Tlahualilo Company, whose capi- 
tal was mostly English, but whose manager was James 
Brown Potter of New York, sued the Mexican Government 
in the days of Diaz for damages resulting from the failure 
to receive a supply of water from the Nayas River suffi- 
cient to irrigate the company's property in the State of 
Coahuila. In regard to this matter no more need be said 
here than that the case is extremely complicated, and in 
ever}^ way suitable to illustrate the essential faults and fol- 
lies of legal procedure. It might drag interminably in the 
courts of any country unless expedited by the corrupt use of 
money or influence. 

A protest of certain American oil companies in Tampico 
against a tax on petroleum was an item in the complaint 
of the United States. The quarrel of a press association 
with the Mexican Government was included, and a dispute 
about the transfer of a packing company's concession. This 
corporation was financed by British capital exclusively, 
a fact which British investors had cause to lament. The 
packing company itself had been the center of a deplorable 
scandal ; and its failure — which resulted when several 
millions of its paper, kited on a triangle whose other two 
corners were in New York and London, went to protest — 
dragged down to ruin the United States Banking Company 
of Mexico City, and sent George I. Ham, the bank's presi- 
dent, to Belem prison under a twelve years' sentence. He 
was released in the jail delivery which was one of the early 
incidents ■ of the bombardment, in February, 1913. Here 
was a somewhat unsavory client for the United States; 
and moreover the packing company's claim had been set- 
tled in its favor before the American note was presented. 
El Heraldo, from its grave at four cross roads, marched 
gloomily in the procession — the whole a sorry spectacle, 



228 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

surely, when all the attending circumstances are taken into 
consideration. 

The Mexican reply was prepared by Lascurain, doubt- 
less with adequate legal advice. He refers to the American 
note as " dated in this city on the 15th and received on the 
17th of September" — which indicates that he supposed it 
to have been written by the Ambassador. 

" I must readily confess that the tone of the above-men- 
tioned note has been a source of great surprise to the Mex- 
ican Government," Lascurain writes, " because it never ex- 
pected from the Government of the United States re- 
proaches so much at variance with the spirit of amity in- 
voked in said note and so pessimistic in their conclusions, 
many of which are based on manifest error or on inexplica- 
ble preoccupation." 

He then proceeds to review the list of murders, and comes 
presently to this atrocious deed : 

"Case of Henry Crumbley, July, 1912. — His death was 
due to a fight had with a peon who wounded Crumbley 
because the latter was courting the peon's wife. Investi- 
gation has been concluded, but the defendant, Santiago Al- 
varado, is at large and his whereabouts is not known." 

It is to be presumed that following the domestic crisis 
in the life of Alvarado, another bandit was recruited for 
the light cavalry of the nearest leader. 

Ten cases are briefly touched upon by Lascurain, who 
then proceeds: 

" There is no data in the Foreign Office in the cases of 
Caradoc Hughes, Thomas Green and W. L. Randell. With 
reference to ten cases which have been reviewed, four of 
which occurred prior to the revolution of 1910, three in 
191 1 and three in the present year, judicial investigation 
has been instituted in each case. The culprits have been^ 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 229 

convicted in three cases. In two cases the accused have 
been released for want of evidence. 

" Therefore, the attitude of the Mexican Government 
with reference to the prosecution and punishment of per- 
sons guilty of violence against American citizens is ad- 
justed by law, and it cannot be made a subject for reproach 
except under the suggestion of eminently partial and ad- 
verse judgment, which is not in keeping with the proofs of 
amity previously received and with the course followed by 
the Government of the United States with reference to 
crimes committed within its territory against Mexican citi- 
zens." 

Taking up five cases in which the department alleges 
injustice the Minister says his Government earnestly re- 
jects the imputation that it acted with unfairness, or mani- 
fested hostility toward American interests, and denies the 
charge made by the Ambassador that local authorities had 
taken advantage of their position to satisfy their greed and 
animosity by persecuting and robbing American Interests. 
He says that the vagueness of the charge and Its enormity 
relieve the Mexican Government from taking the point se- 
riously. 

The civil cases cited In the note are then discussed and 
Minister Lascurain concludes with the following remarks 
upon what seems to have been a serious breach of diplo- 
matic etiquette: 

" I should consider the matter as closed if it were not 
that the note I have the honor to answer contains, princi- 
pally in its last paragraph, Interlined expressions concern- 
ing the personnel of the Mexican Government, which Is 
seldom given such treatment, by naming It as the adminis- 
tration which In Mexico controls business. Such treatment 
cannot be understood after the American Government has 



230 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

officially recognized the Mexican Government as able to 
legislate, and then addresses it as if it only governed in the 
City of Mexico, 

" Without any pretense to unusual consideration the 
Mexican Government thought it right to expect from a 
friendly government that the latter would not, as stated in 
the note referred to, depart from courtesy toward Mexico 
and seem to deem it necessary to refer to the personnel of 
its Government, a form probably without precedent to this 
day in diplomatic courtesy and so at variance with the 
always just, serene and honest spirit of President Taft, a 
recognized friend of Mexico. 

" The personnel of the present Government deplores the 
incident and forgets it, and as homage to its true friend- 
ship toward the American people and in consideration of 
the high esteem and respect it has for the American Presi- 
dent and its Government it prefers not to give reply to that 
portion of the note in the terms in which it is written." 

The text of the American communication was never 
given to the press, so far as I know. The most extensive 
publication I have discovered was made by the New York 
World, February 24, 1913. It would appear that a copy 
of the American note was not in possession of the World, 
but that it had a full and intelligent abstract of Lascurain's 
reply, from which the essentials of the document to which 
he was responding could be inferred quite easily. 

The withholding of the American note from the news- 
papers is much to be regretted. I know of nothing that 
would have been more influential in moderating the senti- 
ments of Americans toward Mexico, in those last months 
when it was perhaps not yet too late for popular expression 
to effect some change in the policy of the administration 
at Washington, whereby the nation might have kept its 
hands clean in the tragedy which followed, if indeed that 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 231 

tragedy could not have been averted. It is not impossible 
that by a proper course the term of a legitimate govern- 
ment in Mexico might have been prolonged with some re- 
sulting good, and even though its fall was inevitable, per- 
haps that event need not have been attended by the gratifi- 
cation of private vengeances through murder, nor have 
been followed by so much of loss in Mexico, so many hu- 
miliations to the L^nited States. 

It is necessary now to consider the causes which were 
actively operative against Madero, among them being the 
military conspiracy. Throughout the summer and fall, the 
corrupting of the Federal army, under the direction of Gen- 
eral Mondragon and his associates, proceeded through a 
hundred subterranean channels. The results were wide- 
spread, and the control was loose, as is the rule with Mexi- 
can conspiracies. In them we read whole chapters of the 
Old Testament over again, seeing revolts so sentimental- 
ized that they are as unstable as panics, cleaving along in- 
numerable planes of personal desire ; rashness and sudden 
spasms of timidity mingling in a manner incomprehensible 
to the colder Anglo Saxon ; and always some impatient 
person trying to make hay of half-grown grass lest another 
should secure the harvest in the day of its natural ma- 
turity. 

In the present instance the premature attempt was made 
under the banner of Felix Diaz, nephew of the ex-dictator. 
He had been an officer in the army, and chief of police of 
the Federal district in the days of his exalted uncle. Per- 
sonally, he had little to commend him as a leader. It seems, 
however, to have been the plan of Mondragon to put him 
forward, tentatively at least. His vanity had been stimu- 
lated by this real leader of the conspiracy, and by Rodolfo 
Reyes, son of the lately revolting General Bernardo Reyes, 
who was then in prison. With a force barely strong enough 



232 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

for his first move, Diaz seized Vera Cruz, the principal 
port of Mexico, on the i6th of October, hoping that his 
act would be a rising signal for disloyal officers and men 
throughout the country. 

Preparations for concerted action on a broad scale had 
been grotesquely inadequate. No considerable number of 
the conspirators knew what to do, and even those that were 
well disposed toward the attempt did nothing of conse- 
quence. The revolt was a fiasco, scarcely more respectable 
than that of Bernardo Reyes in the north, a year earlier. 
Diaz surrendered to General Beltran of the Federal army 
on October 23, and on the 27th was condemned to death 
by court martial. But Madero was unwilling to order the 
execution of Diaz, and he remained in the old Spanish 
prison of San Juan d' Ullua, in Vera Cruz harbor, till Jan- 
uary, 191 3, when he was brought to Mexico City. 

It had been the hope of Rodolfo Reyes that his father's 
release would result from the revolt of Diaz. The Govern- 
ment was to be overthrown, Bernardo Reyes installed as 
provisional president, and Felix Diaz elected subsequently 
under that constitution which all the rebels profess to love 
so dearly. Many pitfalls were in the path of this ambitious 
project beyond the point where the disaster actually oc- 
curred. Some of them were revealed by later events; the 
others are of no importance now. 

According tq accepted Mexican standards Madero 
gravely erred in refusing to send Diaz and Bernardo Reyes 
to death. It is possible that his own life might have been 
prolonged even to this day, and many grievous incidents in 
his country's history averted. But Madero, as the sequel 
will abundantly prove, did not awake until the very last 
moment to the danger that was in the military conspiracy. 
He fancied that his clemency would win applause and be 
regarded as an evidence of strength. More influential in 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 233 

his own tlioughts than any considerations of policy, was a 
personal distaste for the alternative course, the cold blooded 
killing of two men. 

In fact, he gained nothing by this moderation except the 
approval of a few private persons. The military con- 
spiracy was considerably encouraged; the Cientificos cared 
no more for Madero's virtues, such as they were, than for 
the amiable nature of the President's white horse. These 
men wished him out of the way, and they continued to 
intrigue against him with a persistency which could not 
escape attention. 

Madero was warned often, but in vain. He conducted 
his own fight very much in the open, and his enemies had 
no need of spies to find out what he was about. Even 
when Mondragon moved from Havana to Mexico City no 
steps were taken to interfere with his maneuvers, nor 
w'ere any effective measures devised to check the various 
cabals, political and commercial, whose operations were so 
plainly visible to a disinterested observer. 

Contrasts may profitably be drawn between Francisco 
Madero, plotted against on all sides and ignoring the plot- 
ters, and Porfirio Diaz arresting or mysteriously removing 
from the light of day those upon whom there fell suspicion 
of disloyalty. Madero, on his white steed, rode often un- 
attended through the streets where those who wished him 
harm were the most numerous, while Diaz was always the 
center of an elaborate system of personal protection, his 
carriage strongly escorted by his outriding guards; or in 
the later days he would use two or even three closed auto- 
mobiles, all driven at high speed, so that no stroke of ven- 
geance could be aimed with certainty against the car that 
really bore him through his capital. 

Possibly Madero was protected temporarily by his ene- 
mies' confidence that his downfall was at hand. They were 
playing a strong game and may have been content to wait. 



CHAPTER XIII 

BY December i the new Congress had developed an op- 
position which threatened to defeat the Govern- 
ment's plans of finance, and thus to disarrange 
the whole administrative program. As has been indicated 
the majority of the new Chamber of Deputies elected in 
July were Madero men, or Progresistas ; the Senate was 
adverse to the Government by a small margin, and must 
be whipped into line on important measures. These con- 
ditions seemed to involve difficulties not essentially insur- 
mountable, but the Government was not prepared for a 
minority in the Chamber so aggressive as that with which 
it soon found itself compelled to deal. 

The most troublesome member of the minority was 
Querido Moheno, who a year later became Minister of For- 
eign Affairs under President Huerta. Moheno had been 
elected to the Madero Congress in 1912 as a Progresista 
or Administration man ; but before his seat in the Chamber 
was fairly warm he abandoned Madero, flopped to the Inde- 
pendents, and vigorously attacked every Government meas- 
ure. 

No one charged him with serving the interests of any 
man but himself : there was a strain of the Irish in Mo- 
heno's blood which gave him an hereditary right to be 
" agin the Government." In fact, he was " agin every- 
thing " and he contributed so violent an opposition that on 
many occasions the sessions of the Chamber were stormy 
scenes in which orderly legislation could not be carried on, 
^n^ the spirit of strife within communicated itself to the 

234 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 235 

streets, causing mobs to assemble alongside the building, 
where they remained making noisy demonstrations until 
dispersed by the police. Moheno was undoubtedly his own 
man, but unconsciously he was performing heroic service 
for those who schemed to limit Madero's freedom of action 
in matters of finance. 

The Minister of Finance, Ernesto Madero, was the butt 
against which the sarcasm of Moheno and the others was 
directed. The Minister was not fortunate in his method 
of presenting his measures ; he laid himself open to at- 
tack. He proposed two loans of twenty million pesos 
each, then doubled the figures, and finally increased the 
total to one hundred millions. This progression in his 
calls upon Congress for authorization to borrow money oc- 
curred during the months of December, 1912, and January, 
191 3, while Miguel Diaz Lombardo was concluding nego- 
tiations with his group of French bankers, and the Finance 
Minister's course may have been due to uncertainty as to 
the amount of long time bonds which could be placed. 

Moheno, however, challenged the Finance Minister's tac- 
tics and his secrecy as to the bankers with whom he was 
dealing; he questioned the purposes to which the proceeds 
of the loan were to be applied, and by his boundless versa- 
tility in attack became a leader of the most various factions 
— the mere hotheads, the little, selfish opportunists, and 
those that were already marching under orders which hap- 
pened to coincide with some impulse of the trouble-maker's, 
so that his coat-tails were their ensign for the moment. 

Moheno's mischief greatly helped to waste the time so 
precious to the administration. The finance bill was de- 
layed till January 13, when a five per cent, fifty-year loan 
of one hundred million pesos at a minimum of eighty-five 
was sanctioned by the Deputies. If the measure had been 
promptly passed by a vote such as the Government was 



236 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

warranted in expecting, by the political balance in the 
Chamber, the indication of strength would have been val- 
uable, and must have had some influence in the upper house 
despite the intricacy and efficiency of the control which was 
being exercised in that body by the invisible powers. In 
fact, the acrimonious debates in the Chamber had aided 
the Senate leaders charged with the task of obstruction, 
and they felt confident of their ability to prevent the passage 
of a measure really helpful to Madero. 

For three weeks or thereabouts the bill was discussed in 
committee, where deft manipulation by de la Barra re- 
sulted in having the amount of the loan reduced below the 
mark of any real utility. Forty million pesos was the sum 
named in the committee's report submitted in the first week 
of February, 1913. Action on this report was deadlocked 
in the open Senate by a vote of twenty to twenty, and there 
was much criticism of the provisions of the bill. One 
senator declared that its vagueness was its most taking 
characteristic, and that it might be construed to authorize 
indefinite millions of indebtedness with no precise limita- 
tions as to maturity or cost ; and the purposes for which 
it was asked seemed to have been constructed of guayule 
from one of the Finance Minister's rubber properties in the 
North. The struggle between the Government and the 
Senate was in progress with little gained on either side, 
when, on the 9th of February, the table was overturned, the 
lights were extinguished, and the game was ended. 

The real merits of the contest, so far as it had pro- 
ceeded, are worthy of brief review. In the open forum of 
the Chamber of Deputies, no reason was observable why 
the Finance Minister should not have dealt more frankly 
with the legislators. All the available dirty linen of the 
Madero regime, and some brought down from earlier days, 
was publicly aired in the sessions of the Chamber, and there 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 237 

need have been no illusion on the part of inquisitive bankers 
as to the Mexicans' own view of their deteriorated credit. 
Charges of having deceived bankers with fallacious state- 
ments were freely made in that Congress, and one able 
statesman of the body likened its ingenuousness to that of 
the horse trader who painstakingly details the glaring de- 
fects of his own animal. 

But Ernesto Madero was in combat with more subtle 
antagonists than any in the Mexican Congress, He was 
pitting himself against a powerful financial group in 
Europe, and there was danger in disclosing certain essen- 
tial features of the Government's plan. 

The Mexican congressional method of bringing the Min- 
isters and legislators face to face in open session follows 
the European custom and is theoretically sound. Appar- 
ently its purpose is to expose all facts in important affairs 
before the public eye. But in the Madero Congress, as 
often in more dignified bodies, facts were of less conse- 
quence than the advantages gained by political tactics, and 
the grillings of the Finance Minister became a series of 
political and personal assaults. These led to a vast variety 
of conjectures in the city. " A big thing is coming off and 
the outs are trying to break in on it," is the way the situa- 
tion was confidently stated to me by an American who 
watched the proceedings with interest. Others made their 
guesses in my presence as to the figures of the division 
which Ernesto Madero would be forced to make with the 
obstructionist leaders before his bill would be permitted to 
pass. 

Whatever may have been accomplished in private, no 
outward sign appeared that any one had broken down the 
Finance Minister's guard. For weeks the loan measures 
were quarreled over with rough familiarity and sharp chal- 
lenge of motive, but Ernesto Madero kept his mask in posi- 



238 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

tion and fought the Chamber and the Senate as best he 
might. 

He had referred repeatedly to bankers of London, Ber- 
lin and New York, with great stress on London; he had 
insisted on latitude in the matter of price as low as 84 or 
85, and he had stood firm for the necessity of authorization 
to borrow on a basis of paVment in gold. The truth is 
that the negotiations being conducted were for a loan of 
one hundred million pesos from the beginning, that the 
Minister was not dealing with London, Berlin and New 
York but with the " Syndicat des Banquiers de Province " 
in Paris, that the price definitely fixed was 92, and that the 
fifty year bonds were to be payable in Mexican currency. 

Doubtless it was the Finance Minister's plan to report 
the actual placing of the loan on a basis much more favor- 
able than the minimum terms authorized by Congress, and 
thus to gain for himself and the government the prestige 
of able 'financing; and it was evident to those who under- 
stood the real nature of the fight that he was cloaking his 
movements in mystery so as to minimize the hazard of 
adverse influences upon his pending negotiations in Paris. 
But during the tedious passage of his measures through the 
lower house he was called upon to listen to much offensive 
reference to himself and his methods ; and the Finance 
Minister's attitude was supposed, even by impartial on- 
lookers, to imply that the loan affair was a supreme effort 
to acquire means by which the benefits of power could be 
bestowed upon the favored. 

Moheno's violent speeches in the Chamber and de la 
Barra's quiet maneuvers in the Senate were substantially 
aided, after the first of January by Manuel Calero, who 
was called home from Washington at that time for con- 
ference with the President. The conference was in fact 
to impress upon the Ambassador the advantage of dis- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 239 

cretion ; and Calero, taking mortal offense, resigned from 
the diplomatic service and took his seat in the Senate to 
which he had been duly elected. By the middle of Janu- 
ary he had publicly burned the bridges which connected 
him with the Madero government. 

He was an interesting figure, worthy of careful obser- 
vation, as he emerged from the cover of his ambassador- 
ship and became an open enemy of the administration 
under which he had held important posts. He possessed 
and still enjoys strong backing in the United States and 
may be marked for preferment in a propitious hour. We 
learned something of him while he was Madero's Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, and Ambassador Wilson's intimate 
friend. We know that during the time he was Mexico's 
Ambassador at Washington the relations between the two 
governments were marked by constantly lessening cordi- 
ality. When we come to consider his utterances after his 
return to Mexico, we see a certain logic in this. If Mex- 
ico's interests at Washington and Washington's interests in 
Mexico were in the hands of men who understood each 
other and were not well disposed toward Madero, how 
could cordiality, in those trying times, be maintained? 

" I feel that the Republic is approaching an abyss of 
miseries and humiliations," said Calero on January 13; 
and in the same interview he gave as his reasons for re- 
signing his office that he was " not in accord with the poli- 
cies of the Government." These policies he described as 
" hitting out at random like a blind man with a stick." After 
two thousand words of discursive and vehement criticism 
of the Government, and especially of its Vice President, 
whose influence he certainly exaggerated, Seiior Calero 
concluded the interview with this prophetic utterance : 

" I consider it blindness to work for the downfall of the 
President, for at the present moment, with Senor Madero 



240 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

deposed from office, there would be no alternative but a 
military dictatorship of whose disastrous effects we can 
judge only by what we have read of the last dictatorship 
of Santa Ana." 

On February 3, six days before the outbreak in the cap- 
ital, Calero made the most startling speech ever uttered in 
the Mexican Senate by a man of his prominence. " I lied 
to the American Government for ten months," he declared, 
during a discussion of the loan bill. 

Later in this speech he said: "In the face of the de- 
plorable failure of the public administration of our coun- 
try, all are calling for the fall of the present Government, 
some through the violent measures of revolution which 
may overthrow it, others through financial embarrassment. 
I am of the opinion that those who hold this view do not 
weigh the terrible consequences which this would have for 
the country." 

Senator Calero then attacked various features of the 
loan. " The truth of the matter," he asserted, " is that 
the Department of Hacienda (Finance) has not painted 
the situation as it really is. We should speak the truth 
though it destroy us. The truth is that the situation is 
desperate. The truth has not been spoken here. The 
condition of the country is terrible." 

The orator's impassioned plea for truth, following so 
close upon the announcement of his own astonishing 
achievement in mendacity, drew instant, uncontrollable 
shouts of laughter from all factions in the Senate, and re- 
lieved the tension which his speech had caused. The Min- 
ister of Finance may have been tempted to take advantage 
of the situation by intimating that Calero's sins of duplicity 
had not been committed upon foreign soil alone; but the 
open Senate was not the place to tell the whole story. 

" You were an indiscreet Ambassador and you are a bad 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 241 

financier," was the opening sentence of Ernesto Madero's 
reply, and he kept fairly close to the question of the loan 
throughout his address. 

There is, however, an interesting story which might not 
have been too remote from the subject to have figured in 
Ernesto Madero's address. It is appropriate here. While 
Calero was Minister of Foreign Relations and Madero was 
in hard straits after Orozco's defection, a banker of New 
York wrote a private letter to Francisco Alfaro, a promi- 
nent lawyer of Mexico City, to the effect that overtures 
had been made to him by friends of Manuel Calero. These 
overtures, so ran the letter, outlined a method of pro- 
cedure. If the revolutionists of the North could be suit- 
ably encouraged by means of financial backing the Madero 
government would be placed in a position where prompt 
action would cause its retirement. And if at the right 
moment the financial aid were shifted to Calero, Madero's 
resignation would be forced, and the Minister of Foreign 
Relations would succeed to the Presidency. 

Senor Alfaro who was not friendly to Calero, promptly 
handed the letter to Gustavo Madero who took it to his 
brother, the President. A copy was made, and the orig- 
inal was returned to Sefior Alfaro who doubtless still has 
it. President Madero, unlike his uncle, the Minister of 
Finance, was a man of directness. He called in his Min- 
ister of Foreign Relations and held a pointed discussion 
with him over his intimacy with the American Ambassa- 
dor, and the peculiar matter of the letter. Then he deposed 
him from the Foreign Office and sent him to Washington 
as Ambassador. 

At Washington, Sefior Calero for a time was more cau- 
tious in his methods. But toward the close of 19 12 he 
spoke quite freely to a friend who also was a friend of 
Henry Clay Pierce, with the result that a letter detailing 



242 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

the interesting features of the conversation was sent from 
Mr. Pierce's office to James Galbraith, manager in Mexico 
for the Waters-Pierce Oil Company. Mr. Galbraith made 
the same disposition of this letter that Sehor Alfaro had 
of the other; he turned it over to Gustavo Madero, and 
the result was the calling home of Ambassador Calero 
for the conference with President Madero which was fol- 
lowed by Calero's resignation. 

The employment of Calero as Ambassador to the United 
States after such a scene with the President as that which 
followed the disclosures by Senor Alfaro, seems a tech- 
nical error to those who do not understand Mexico's lack 
of able men. Calero was certainly one of the ablest, and 
in many ways the best equipped for the work in Washing- 
ton. He could not be ignored, and Madero did not wish 
him to be in the Senate. As Ambassador he could be 
called to account, but as a Senator he was above the law. 
His speeches hurt Madero but made few friends for the 
speaker. Like Moheno in his smaller belligerence in the 
Chamber, Calero in the Senate and elsewhere was his own 
man; but that his utterances helped the aims of the in- 
triguers there is no doubt. 

Manuel Calero had been closely identified with the Cien- 
tificos and was an intimate friend of Pablo Macedo, a 
leading spirit of the circle. He was also counsel for the 
Huasteca Petroleum Company, and the Mexican Petroleum 
Company, concerns well placed in the Tampico fields and 
headed by E. L. Doheny of Los Angeles. After the fall 
of Diaz, Calero believed that he himself was better fitted 
than any other man to rule Mexico, and was greatly vexed 
at the delay he experienced in realizing his ambition. 

Many of the statements he made in the Senate, on Feb- 
ruary 3, were founded on facts. Conditions were bad 
in Mexico and the Madero Government was making sad 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 243 

blunders. Also the loan matter, as previously stated, had 
not been presented with sufficient clearness to inspire con- 
fidence. Calero struck on the secret of Mexico's internal 
disorders when, in that speech he demanded, " How is it 
possible that while the rebels are continually routed by 
troops of the line and the rurales, the revolution does not 
end? How is it that peace is not restored?" He asked 
this question with confidence because he knew the answer, 
and knew that none within hearing would give it voice. 
Hundreds of influential men in Mexico were secretly pro- 
moting the disorders. To stop banditry it seemed necessary 
to shoot Mexico into small pieces as Diaz had done in the 
early eighties. 

But the fact is that peace in Mexico was in a fairer way 
to be restored at the time Calero asked that question, than 
ever before in the Madero rule, for a bargain had been 
struck with Zapata. The agreement had been made some 
weeks previously, and was to go into effect as soon as the 
loan measure should have been put through. This bar- 
gain with Zapata, in its terms and in the secret story of its 
consummation, bordered on the fantastic. Incredible as 
this may seem, it was made in the castle at Chepultepec one 
night in mid December. Emiliano Zapata, no less, was a 
guest of the President in that historic castle, and on that 
night Madero effected a trade with the outlaw chief for 
the pacification of the state of Morelos, and of all the terri- 
tory south of the capital which made up Zapata's field of 
operations. 

By the terms of this treaty, which if Madero had re- 
mained in power would have proved one of the most im- 
portant incidents of his rule, a new governor was to be 
named for the state of Morelos in the person of Don 
Miguel Olivares. Zapata was to be Jefe de Armes, or 
chief in command of the forces of that section. One hun- 



244 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

dred and fifty thousand pesos were to be distributed among 
Zapata's men who were then to be formed into a govern- 
ment body, under Zapata himself, to maintain order. No 
money was to be paid Zapata ; he had already enriched him- 
self in his own line of business which was banditry. 

The undertaking also included the turning over of cer- 
tain lands to persons who had been impoverished by the Sur- 
vey Law of 1884. Rather than attempt to accomplish this 
by harsh government measures, Madero intended to pur- 
chase the properties from the Spanish holders then in 
possession. This he could not well do until the treasury 
was replenished by means of the new loan. 

The incidents and the terms of this treaty, especially the 
fact that Zapata was at any time in conference with Presi- 
dent Madero in Mexico City or elsewhere, have been stren- 
uously and specifically denied. But the facts are as stated 
and were quite in order with precedents established by 
Porfirio Diaz. 

With Zapata on the government side, the bandit leaders 
of the South, Genevevo de la O., Zalgada, Miranda and the 
others, undoubtedly would suspend activity. The bandits 
of the North also would be disheartened by Zapata's 
" reformation," and progress toward peaceful conditions 
would be rapid, notwithstanding the influences at work to 
encourage defiance of law and government. With this 
vital matter and so many others hanging upon the floating 
of the big loan, the Government's anxiety to complete 
formalities was intense; but the uses to which some of the 
funds were to be put must be kept secret. 

Newspaper exploitation of banditry and rebellion was a 
definite aid to the development of disorder and the mold- 
ing of opinion adverse ta Madero in Mexico and in the 
United States ; it fed the vanity of bandits and it supported 
the pessimism of Washington. In Mexico City it was a 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 245 

poor day for news when a half dozen " scare heads " were 
not built in anti-government papers over reports of real or 
imaginary outrages. From border towns and from Mexico 
City similar items, always exaggerated, sometimes created 
from nothing, were despatched through regular press serv- 
ice and by special correspondents to newspapers in the 
United States. Special correspondents and Association 
men were not slow to catch the drift ; Mexican matter, un- 
less highly spiced with horror, would not be worth the tolls. 
The larger newspapers were receiving too much, and editors 
of every grade on the staff were wearying of the subject. 
The general tenor of instructions to correspondents on the 
spot was that only matter of a striking character was 
desired. 

The correspondent is a business man and the editor is 
his customer. The failure of Madero, the increasing dis- 
orders, and the outrages upon Americans were the goods 
most in demand, and they were sent to market. No 
well-informed person can read to-day the files of that time, 
and not perceive that the result of the influences described 
was a very serious misrepresentation. 

The Madero Government controlled three newspapers in 
Mexico City toward the close of 1912 ; one it had had from 
the de la Barra time, another it acquired in November, 
191 1, and the third was bought by friends of the Govern- 
ment about a year later. The first, El Nueva Era, was 
Gustavo's venture, with Sanchez Azcona, Madero's private 
secretary, as nominal owner. In this newspaper, which 
was presently capitalized at a considerable sum, many 
prominent men were invited to invest. Nothing could have 
been in worse taste than this, for among the stockholders 
of El Nueva Era were many Cientificos. The paper car- 
ried no influence whatever; its circulation averaged about 
10,000. 



246 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

The second newspaper picked up by the Government was 
El Diario which had a circulation of about 8,000 and was 
tottering on the edge of the grave when the Government by 
undertaking to pay the newspaper's monthly deficit, se- 
cured the doubtful return of its editorial suppo'rt. Under 
these conditions its circulation did not increase; no one 
believed anything that appeared in its columns. 

Finally the Maderos bought control of Mexico's leading 
newspaper El Imparcial which had been the Government 
organ under Diaz. Upon its staff were men of real abil- 
ity, and the new owners were enabled to put forward their 
version of current events in a better manner than before, 
but from the moment when El Imparcial became a govern- 
ment paper it lost prestige; its circulation declined from 
the 90,000 of its best days ; and its advertising fell off be- 
cause the best buyers of Mexico ceased to read it. 

I count the methods of the Maderos with the press of 
Mexico City among their vital blunders. In the beginning 
of the de la Barra regime the announcement of freedom to 
the press and no subsidies was made. In June, 191 1, I 
called upon Finance Minister Madero and congratulated 
him on this declaration. 1 told him that I was organizing 
a newspaper enterprise on the strength of it, and with a 
clear field would try to help make Mexico's free press an 
honor to the country. 

Ernesto Madero is one of the most successful listeners 
I have ever addressed. He sat that day on the red sofa in 
the inner office of the Finance Department — which Liman- 
tour had fitted up a la Touraine — and with a faultless, 
infinitely patient courtesy permitted me to expound the 
benefits of independent journalism. He was pitying me, 
but I had no suspicion of it, so deeply intent he seemed upon 
my words. 

Even when he asked me what concessions I desired, I 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 247 

did not realize that he was saying to himself : " This graft- 
ing Gringo has a smooth tongue, but let us come to the 
point, if there is one." 

I assured him that I had no concessions to ask for, but 
only a clear field for an independent newspaper. I wished 
to erect my building on an unoccupied lot owned by the 
Government, and would like a fair rental to be named. I 
hoped also that when my telegraph tolls should exceed 2500 
pesos a month, a special rate would be made. 

" You shall have them all," he declared, and his youthful, 
handsome face beamed with what I took to be enthusiasm. 
" I am in full sympathy with your views. Come and see 
me when you will." 

I know now that I had not impressed him ; that his agree- 
able interest was compounded of a natural suavity and a 
politic preference for my good will. He got it, and has 
never lost it. But I did not get the land that has been re- 
ferred to, because a brother of President de la Barra de- 
manded 8,000 pesos from my builder for " expenses," and 
I declined to pay. Nor was the special rate on press matter 
over Government wires ever granted to me, though the tolls 
that I paid, so they said at the Department of Communi- 
cations, exceeded those of all the other newspapers of Mex- 
ico City combined. And the clear field is best described 
by the suggestion made one day to my Board of Directors 
that a " vacation " be voted to the American manager, my- 
self. 

The intrusion of the Government into the newspaper 
field of Mexico by its purchase of El Imparcial spurred 
the opposition press to extremes of attack and caused Presi- 
dent Madero to employ repressive measures which he justi- 
fied in a public speech early in December, 1912. This was 
the signal for renewed hostilities. From that moment no 
quarter was granted in the war waged by the newspapers 



248 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

inimical to the Government. Attack and defense were 
nearly equal in the externals of dishonesty, but there was 
a hidden truth on one side, in the sincere convictions of the 
President, while upon the other there was nothing so re- 
spectable. Very moderate discernment only was required 
to see through the turgid rhetoric to the selfish interests 
behind. 

El Manana on December 3 in an article of interminable 
sentences set forth the attitude of the press toward Madero 
in these words : " The press says to you day after day, 
Mr. Madero, that you have not the qualifications which are 
necessary for the high position which you occupy, and that 
the fall of the fatherland is the consequence. The press 
which defends you runs to license, but it can hardly be 
called the Mexican press since it is nothing but a Maderista 
press." To read this rightly one must know that it ex- 
presses the personal feelings of the Cientifico Deputy, 
Oliguibel. 

In these crowded months while the disturbing elements 
which I have striven to describe were at work in Congress, 
and throughout the country, and beyond its borders, Presi- 
dent Madero regained the optimism which had always been 
characteristic of him, and had been for only a little while 
disturbed. The nervous irritation which had afflicted him 
in the days of the Orozco rebellion seemed to have disap- 
peared. To what extent he wilfully deluded himself after 
the manner of the various faith-cure cults, I am uncertain, 
but the result was very similar to their achievements even 
in the point of its ultimate fatality. He gained a more 
assured and cheerful attitude which had a value when he 
appeared in public, but he suffered the inevitable loss in 
judgment and in power to think honestly. It became more 
difficult than before to convince him by the plainest evi- 
dence against a preconceived opinion. He had posted a 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 249 

deaf and blind sentry at the gateway of his life to cry " All's 
well," and there were times when he would hear no other 
voice. 

It was impossible to make him take a reasonable view 
of the conspiracy within the army as an existing thing, but 
he dealt with it in the abstract when he addressed the 
graduates of the Chepultepec Military Academy, warning 
them that army men must not take part in politics. If 
he had followed up his own idea by practical investigation 
of the politics inside the army at that moment, or had coun- 
tenanced the efforts made in that direction by some of his 
advisers, excellent results might have followed. 

He spoke to the foreign diplomats with calm assurance, 
saying that if the nationals of their countries had suf- 
fered, they should accept their share of the common ills 
of the country to which they had come, and should be the 
more patient now, because in the past they had been bene- 
fitted. The crisis through which the country was passing 
was nearly over. It had been a wonderful awakening, and 
general prosperity would promptly ensue. 

And he was speaking the plain truth as he saw it. Point 
by point he had seemed to defeat his enemies. The meas- 
ures he had taken he felt sure would give him the upper 
hand of banditry. The matter of the loan would be 
thrashed out in Congress and presently would be carried 
through. Plots were idle gossip, and he declined to give 
his time to nonsense. The old Cientifico elements were 
arrayed against him, of course, but they were powerless. 
The United States was not so friendly as he could wish, 
but Mexico would survive its neighbor's unkindness, and 
the situation would improve. 

There was much visible support for these opinions, but 
unhappily the President would not see the other side of the 
picture. Those who pointed to details unwelcome to an 



250 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

optimist were sometimes laughed at and sometimes scolded. 
The President exercised, in this period, a more peremptory 
command over his assistants in the Government, and the 
members of his family seemed to be overawed by him at 
times — a strange thing, for he was at heart so gentle and 
so amiable. 

In the early part of December a slight effect for good 
was produced by the remarks upon Mexico in the annual 
message of President Taft to Congress, laid before the two 
houses on the 3rd. I quote as follows: 

" For two years revolution and counter-revolution 
have distraught the neighboring republic of Mexico. 
Brigandage has involved a great deal of depredation 
upon foreign interests. There have constantly recurred 
questions of extreme delicacy. On several occasions 
very difficult situations have arisen on our frontier. 
Throughout this trying period, the policy of the United 
States has been one of patient non-intervention, stead- 
fast recognition of constituted authority in the neigh- 
boring nation, and the exertion of every effort to care 
for American interests. 

" I profoundly hope that the Mexican nation may 
soon resume the path of order, prosperity and progress. 
To that nation in its sore troubles, the sympathetic 
friendship of the United States has been demonstrated 
to a high degree. There were in Mexico at the begin- 
ning of the revolution some thirty or forty thousand 
American citizens engaged in enterprises contributing 
greatly to the prosperity of that republic and also bene- 
fiting the important trade between the two countries. 

" The investment of American capital in Mexico has 
been estimated at $1,000,000,000. The responsibility 
of endeavoring to safeguard those interests and the 
dangers inseparable from propinquity to so turbulent a 
situation have been great, but I am happy to have been 
able to adhere to the policy above outlined — a policy 
which I hope may soon be justified by the complete 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 251 

success of the Mexican people in regaining the blessings 
of peace and order." 

Granting the sincerity of these expressions one can but 
deplore the existence of the something which prevented 
happier results than have been placed upon the record. 
" Your President means well toward us," said Foreign Min- 
ister Lascurain to me, " but he is misled by others." 

The visit of " Good old Peter " to the United States in- 
dicated greater anxiety over the relations with Washing- 
ton than any member of Madero's cabinet would admit. 
He was said to have gone to New York on private business 
but it was quite well understood that he was maneuvering 
to be officially received at Washington. The sharp retort 
of the preceding April which had marked Lascurain's debut 
as a Mexican statesman, and his later achievement in con- 
troversial eloquence were not to be readily forgiven, how- 
ever, and no official notice was taken of his presence in the 
country until he was about to return. Meanwhile there 
were persistent rumors of more strained relations between 
the two countries. The press agents of the trouble-makers 
sweated at their task. Their masters had detected a spirit 
of forbearance in President Taft's message, and were de- 
termined to drown in renewed clamor of discord any voice 
that spoke of peace. 

Ambassador Wilson had been called over from Mexico 
City; it was reported that he would have something very 
like an ultimatum in his pocket when he should return to 
Mexico. Associated Press despatches under date of 
December 20 described at length Washington's determina- 
tion to issue a " nearly unanswerable " demand upon Mex- 
ico. These despatches carrying four-column headlines were 
printed the following morning in the dailies of Mexico City. 
The next day the headlines were expanded to five columns 



^52 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

over another Associated Press despatch stating that "the 
American note is expected to be of historic importance as 
marking a distinct crisis between the two countries." 

But the note was not sent. Possibly the Christmas sea- 
son of good will to men may have exerted its influence 
upon President Taft and Secretary Knox; but I am more 
inclined to believe that they were dissuaded by the weak- 
ness of the case against Mexico as presented by Ambassa- 
dor Wilson. Be that as it may, there was a Christmas 
change of heart in regard to Pedro Lascurain, and he was 
called to Washington, where he talked with President Taft 
on January 2, and with Secretary Knox on the following 
day. They must have gained important truths from this 
moderate, sincere man, full of accurate knowledge of his 
country. The result, I am sure, was good; the wonder is 
that it was not decisive, that it did not lead to the adoption 
of a proper course. 

Lascurain's clear conception of American indifference 
and the attitude of the American Government, as well as 
the duty of Mexicans at that time, are disclosed in the inter- 
view he gave out on January 16, after his return to 
Mexico City. 

" The great mass of the American people," he said, " has 
so far taken no interest in the affairs of Mexico. 

" Certain political elements interested in an international 
conflict are the only ones trying to foment a state of feeling 
adverse to Mexico. Fortunately little has been accom- 
plished as yet. 

" The American Government and the classes which direct 
it, will be able to maintain the policy against intervention 
so long as the events in Mexico do not strengthen those 
who oppose this policy. For this reason the Mexican peo- 
ple should take serious thought on the actual situation and, 
inspired by the same patriotism which would make them 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 253 

shed all their blood in the event of an international war, 
should try by all means at their disposal to restore order, 
pursuing those who break it until complete peace is ob- 
tained. They may then take up serenely the social and 
economic problems which can never be solved by armed 
strength. They should do this because it is more meri- 
torious to be able to govern oneself as a nation than to 
stand face to face with a foreign enemy." 

The words of Pedro Lascurain are especially worthy of 
quotation because he was the best friend of Americans in 
Madero's cabinet, and because he was a member of that 
cabinet for patriotic reasons only. He had accepted the 
portfolio of state at a time when the Government seemed 
doomed ; in doing this he jeopardized his personal standing 
in Mexico. Never an active Maderista he was under no 
obligation to undertake what, in the beginning of April, 
1912, seemed a sacrifice of himself in a very doubtful cause. 
But in January, 1913, when this interview was printed he 
was confident that Madero would succeed. If the benefits 
of his clear vision had been utilized beyond his own De- 
partment of State in the management of local Mexican 
affairs, the evil which befell Madero might have been 
averted. 

There was another man whose vigilance would have 
proved a safeguard to the President if his warnings had 
been heeded; that man was his brother, Gustavo. Since 
the statement of the practical part he took in organizing 
and financing the revolution of 1910-11 he has had scant 
attention in these pages. This is not because of lack of 
activity on his part, but because of the necessity for cau- 
tion, lest references to him should seem to be unfair; for 
in all that puzzling Madero regime no figure is more dif- 
ficult to place with accuracy. 

Advertised the world over as the arch grafter of the 



254 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

period, and connected in local gossip with endless schemes 
for exploiting Government privileges, Gustavo Madero's 
name is spoken as that of the evil genius of his brother's 
rule; yet I know of nothing in which he greatly profited, 
no Government patronage in which he held a share. He 
may have been willing enough to participate in deals for 
Government supplies, but if so there must have been more 
able competitors, for very few of the good things fell to 
him. Like the unlucky boy in school he was nearest at 
hand when the teacher turned around, but the other boy 
had the apple. That Gustavo was heavily in debt when 
his enemies killed him is the best proof that others 
made the profits which the public believed had gone to 
him. 

The other Maderos, especially those of the elder genera- 
tion, managed matters more discreetly and with greater 
success. A person named Goodman in Mexico City sup- 
plied Government uniforms; he made them from cloth 
which came from Madero mills. A man named Jesus 
Aguilar carried on an armaria in Monterrey. He sold arms 
of various kinds to the Government. He was a nephew 
of Francisco Madero, Senior. A man named Antonio 
Zirion also furnished arms and other needful things. He 
was a son-in-law of Francisco^ Madero, Senior. 

I wish to state in this connection that I can see no im- 
propriety in these transactions, and I have never heard it 
charged that undue profits were made. It is certain that 
Gustavo had no share of them. 

He was a busy man, nevertheless. He was the active 
manager of the Progresista Party which used the four- 
story building at Number 75 Avenida Juarez as its head- 
quarters. The more private political affairs of the party 
were arranged at an office Gustavo maintained in his own 
home in Calle Londres, Number 14, just off Calle Berlin. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 255 

He was elected a Deputy in July, 191 2, and held a seat in 
the noisy Madero Congress in which Moheno baited the 
Minister of Finance, attacked the President, lamented the 
sad condition of the country, and made himself generally 
useful — to those architects of ruin whose work the world 
has since contemplated with horror. 

Gustavo was a favorite mark for Moheno's oratory. 
When no more convenient matter could be brought up for 
discussion, he demanded an accounting for the 700,000 
pesos which Gustavo had received in June, 191 1. It was 
Gustavo's business to steer political detail, maintain the 
equilibrium of the Chamber, watch the opposition, and keep 
a cool head. Every hour in the day he was sought by 
dozens of men with axes to grind or tales of distress to 
unfold. Unceasing demands for money were made upon 
him, the general impression being that the contents of the 
national treasury was at his disposal. 

Gustavo was the one man ever watchful of the under- 
mining movements that were being engineered through 
Cientifico and military channels, but his reports to the 
President of suspicious circumstances fell on the deaf ears 
of the optimist. Even when Mondragon and the arch 
Cientifico, Rosenando Pineda, came back to Mexico, the 
President could not be made to perceive the significance of 
their return. Gustavo insisted that these men meant mis- 
chief, and were actively plotting to set it afoot. 

In December, 19 12, Gustavo found his position almost 
intolerable. In some respects the President was what New 
England people used to call " a trial " to his intimates. He 
was accused of instability, not without reason. A series 
of his judgments carefully reviewed would usually show 
how innocent he was of that consistency which is the vice 
of fools. If he saw the truth at noon, he would not fail 
to proclaim it and insist upon it as a rule of conduct, 



256 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

though he had pledged himself to the opposite extreme of 
error over the morning coffee. 

This virtue was beyond the appreciation of the practical 
Gustavo v^ho saw nothing in it except that Francisco did 
not keep his word, a defect which made Gustavo's task as 
political manager extremely difficult. Yet he was loyal 
to his brother and had faith in his essential goodness, 
wherefore it was natural that he should always be relying 
just once more upon the President's promise, expressed 
perhaps in a form of words which seemed to be an author- 
ization to proceed with certain negotiations. But in the 
few days or hours necessary for the completion of the ar- 
rangements, Francisco would have progressed to a new 
position from which no argument could drive him back to 
where he had stood before. 

It would be necessary, therefore, for Gustavo to recall 
some part of his pledges or by the exercise of ingenuity 
devise a means to content the men on the other side of the 
bargain. Thus he was made to seem the unstable one, to 
the unjust detriment of his reputation. His father at this 
time was not in harmony with him on all points, and often 
interfered to prevent him from bringing the President to 
terms. Besides, there were, of course, a great number of 
jealous politicians who were working to destroy his power, 
much of which was mythical. He became a convenient 
scapegoat upon whose back were fastened many sins of 
others. 

He was too shrewd to entertain illusions as to his status 
in the capital. One day he asked a friend of his, an 
American, what was the general estimate of his character. 
Doubtless he had already answered the question himself, 
but he desired to hear the opinion of this man in whose 
judgment and frankness he reposed especial confidence. 

" You are called a damned thief," was the blunt reply. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 257 

Gustavo was silent for some moments, and then asked: 
" What do you advise ? " 

" I advise you to leave Mexico and be gone two years," 
said his friend earnestly. 

And no less earnestly Gustavo answered : " You are 
right. I can accomplish nothing here but discredit for my- 
self. Let them run the thing their own way." 

Without fully disclosing his intention, he secured per- 
mission to visit Japan to carry the thanks of Mexico to the 
Emperor for his courtesies during the Centennial of 1910. 
Early in December it was announced that Gustavo would 
soon depart. But there were many matters for him to 
arrange and no date was set for his journey, until January, 
when February 19 was named. As fate willed it, this 
was the day upon which he was shot to death. 

About half past four in the afternoon of the 4th of Feb- 
ruary, Gustavo Madero was at his home. Number 14, Calle 
Londres, in the room that was his office which overlooked 
the street. By a front window stood an American friend. 
Gustavo's automobile was at the curb, and standing a few 
steps away were two men. One was a colonel of the Mexi- 
can army in civilian dress, and the other a young Mexican 
named Saldana who had been doorkeeper for Gustavo 
Madero, but had been discharged for exacting fees from 
men who wished to see him. 

Saldafia had been endeavoring to secure entrance to the 
house, but had been excluded by the attendant; and now 
he made a gesture so despairing that it attracted the atten- 
tion of the American who, upon an impulse, went out and 
asked the men what they desired. Saldana's companion 
pleaded for an interview with Gustavo, and the American 
returned to lay the request before him. 

Gustavo refused. " These fellows all want money," he 
said. (It must be understood that he was a kind of politi- 



258 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

cal boss, subject to the importunities which the position 
entails.) 

But the American had been impressed by something un- 
usual in the manner of the colonel, and he urged upon 
Gustavo the wisdom of seeing him. 

" You can never be positive, old man," he said. " This 
fellow has a story to tell and it may be worth the price." 

" Oh, well," said Gustavo ; " I'll see him." 

For some minutes Gustavo and the colonel conversed in 
lowered tones, but the American by the window heard the 
officer's story which was really pitiful, and heard also the 
plea for one hundred pesos at the end. 

" A hundred won't do you much good, Colonel," said 
Gustavo, pulling out some money from his pocket. " Take 
five hundred, and get on your feet." 

The colonel, almost speechless with genuine gratitude, 
made the somewhat ridiculous exit which seems inevitable 
on such occasions, but he remained near the house; and a 
few minutes later when Gustavo and his friend had gone 
out, and were about to board the automobile, the officer 
came toward them. He was very pale as he begged Gus- 
tavo for five minutes more in private. Gustavo was late 
for an appointment at his office on Avenida Juarez, but the 
look on the colonel's face was compelling, and he led the 
way into the house leaving the American seated in the 
car. 

Ten, twenty minutes, half an hour, passed and the men 
did not return. When at last they appeared the colonel 
went slowly down the street and Gustavo came to the side 
of the car. The color was all out of his face, and every 
sign of agitation which is permissible to a gentleman was 
plainly to be seen. He gave his friend merely a glance and 
turned to the chauffeur whom he addressed in a low tone, 
yet with such a mortal thrill in it that the man instinctively 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 259 

drew his head down between his shoulders, as if dodging 
a blow. 

" Chepultepec," said Gustavo, " and drive like hell." 

Then he took his seat, and the car leaped ahead into the 
eye of the setting sun. Gustavo opened his left hand in 
which was a crumpled paper. The American took it and 
read a list of names. Perceiving that nearly all of them 
were men high in the army, he understood in part the 
meaning of the strange thing that had happened. He did 
not wonder that Gustavo had been stricken with terror. 
This must be a roster of chief officers in the military con- 
spiracy, and if it was authentic it spelled ruin, for they 
could control by far the greater part of the troops then in 
the Federal District. 

The American leaned forward and spoke to the chauf- 
feur: 

" Slow down," he said. " Keep to a usual speed." 

At this Gustavo nodded approvingly. Under the circum- 
stances it would not do for him to burn the dust on his way 
to see the President. The spectacle might set tongues wag- 
ging. With his finger he tapped the paper which his friend 
still held. 

" There are twenty-two of them," said he, " but one name 
doesn't count. The colonel's comes off." 

" Get the tragedy out of your face, if you can," said the 
American. " And don't forget to return the salute of those 
fellows," he added, as the car swung around the acute 
angle from Calle Londres to Insurgentes, and they saw a 
patrol of mounted police just ahead. 

Gustavo managed the salute very well, and a smile be- 
sides. And he sat there smiling like a galvanized corpse, 
staring straight ahead, and saying never a word while they 
bowled into the wide Paseo de la Reforma and along it. 
Several cars were encountered on the way, among them 



26o THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

that of Pimentel, a corporation-jobbing Cientifico ; and there 
were other men in the procession who had a keen eye for 
Gustavo as he passed, and could not have failed to note 
undue haste on his part. 

The car rolled through the Chepultepec gates, to the 
castle's porte cochere. Gustavo took the list of traitors 
from the American's hand, and went up to see the man 
whom they were plotting to depose. A very long hour the 
American waited for Gustavo. When he came, his face 
was not pale; it was flushed with the excitement of futile 
contention. 

" Pancho wouldn't believe it ; he laughed at me," was all 
he had to say till the men were back in town again, with 
four walls around them, and the doors well locked. 



CHAPTER XIV 

IT must not be imagined that Gustavo Madero had 
sought the President merely to communicate his fears. 
He was a man of action, the practical politician of the 
family. His gifts and experience explain why he believed 
the colonel's stor}% instead of rejecting it because of the 
deplorable revelation of the man's character. Gustavo saw 
nothing incredible in what had occurred — that this fellow 
should come whining for money to one whom he was con- 
spiring to destroy, and should then upon an impulse turn 
about and betray the other party from whose members he 
had obtained no help in his distress. Human nature in the 
raw will sometimes look like that. 

The colonel had convinced Gustavo that the list was 
authentic, that the men whose names appeared upon it — 
with one exception, still doubtful as was indicated by a 
question mark — had pledged themselves for the overthrow 
of the Government. The date set was March i6. Two of 
the names were of men then in prison, another was that of 
a civilian. The officers included could probably control 
about 12,000 troops, a great majority of the garrisons 
in and near the capital. Even the commandant of the 
palace guard stood ready to deliver up the headquarters of 
the Government at the demand of the conspirators. 

Eight men of the twenty-two were of commanding im- 
portance; the others were followers. The eight were: 

General Mondragon — On retired list. Active organizer 
of the conspiracy. 

261 



262 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Rodolfo Reyes — Lawyer. Counsel and guide of Felix 
Diaz. 

General Felix Diaz — Confined in the penitentiary in 
Mexico City under suspended sentence of death for treason. 

General Bernardo Reyes — Father of Rodolfo. Confined 
in Santiago barracks in Mexico City under suspended sen- 
tence of death for treason. 

General Blanquet — In active command of 4,000 troops 
of all branches. Headquarters at Toluca, capital of the 
State of Mexico, 46 miles distant from Mexico City. 

General Huerta (?) — Not in active service. Had not 
positively agreed to join the revolt. 

General Beltran — The man who " captured" Felix Diaz 
at Vera Cruz in October, 191 2. At this time commanding 
infantry at Tacubaya, a suburb five miles from the National 
Palace. 

General Navarette — Commanding artillery at Tacubaya. 

Gustavo perceived that in order to break up the con- 
spiracy it would be necessary to deal effectively with the 
eight men noted. The thing was not impossible, provided 
that the President would authorize vigorous measures. 
Felix Diaz and Bernardo Reyes already were in close con- 
finement. Blanquet, Beltran and Navarette could be trans- 
ferred to distant posts, widely separated. General Huerta, 
who for reasons not quite clear, had given only a qualified 
pledge to join the plotters, could be, as had previously been 
suggested, sent abroad to study military tactics. Of the 
eight there remained but General Mondragon and Rodolfo 
Reyes who might be arrested ; or, if the President was dis- 
inclined to take such a step they could be placed under such 
close surveillance that they would voluntarily leave Mexico. 

General Villar, ranking officer in the capital, and General 
Figueroa, Chief of the Federal District police, were faith- 
ful ; so was General Felipe Angeles in command of troops 




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THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 263 

at Cuemavaca, only seventy-five miles away. With An- 
geles placed in command at Tacubaya the beginning of a 
dependable military protection for the capital would be 
formed. But all these precautions depended for their exe- 
cution upon the President ; and it may have been chiefly a 
foreknowledge of what his brother would do in this great 
crisis which had shaken the courage of Gustavo for the 
moment. 

This foreboding had been abundantly justified, for the 
President had refused to take the matter seriously. The 
list, so he assured Gustavo, had been prepared for sale, and 
Gustavo had bought it. To base any stem procedure upon 
such evidence would be to make the Government ridiculous, 
and invite endless complications. The " not certain " after 
Huerta's name stamped the list as spurious, for Huerta in 
reality, w^as the officer most likely to be disloyal. He was 
not even taking the trouble to hide his sentiments from the 
public; within a fortnight he had spoken bitterly of his 
removal from command of the northern army. Huerta, 
with the unclosed gap in his vouchers staring him in the 
face, holding back against a general movement of this char- 
acter? It was too absurd to consider. 

Blanquet and Beltran, the President urged, had proved 
their loyalty beyond all question. Navarette was a creature 
of Mondragon, but would not be drawn into a move which 
would discredit the army. The whole thing was preposter- 
ous, and Gustavo might be better employed than in listen- 
ing to such tales from men who wanted to exchange them 
for money, Mondragon was a malcontent and a plotter, as 
everybody knew. But what of it? 

For an hour Gustavo had begged for some action to be 
taken, but the stubborn over-confidence of the President 
had been proof against any argument. Not for a moment 
could Francisco Madero see himself as others — and espe- 



264 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

dally the old Diaz officers of the army — saw him. In his 
own view he was Mexico; disloyalty to him was treason. 
In the view of Porfirista army officers, as well as many 
others, he was an intruder who was making trouble, and to 
force him out would be a patriotic act. This was Mondra- 
gon's doctrine which he had disseminated through the army ; 
it was Pineda's doctrine which had been made the creed 
of Cientificos, hacendados and business men of all nations. 
Gustavo understood the situation but he was helpless ; he 
was dealing with a convinced optimist who would not listen 
to reason. 

Far into the night Gustavo and his American friend dis- 
cussed the affair in all its bearings, but they were unable 
to devise any plan which could be carried out without the 
President's authorization. The only course open to Gus- 
tavo was to fortify himself with more information in the 
vain hope that he could succeed In convincing his brother. 

During the remainder of that week Gustavo was a busy 
man. He was here, there, and everywhere in the city and 
its suburbs; but the chief result seems to have been the 
alarming of the conspirators. His enemies were watching 
him. Why was he visiting every day the barracks at 
Tacubaya and the government ammunition works at Santa 
Fe? He had not been to either place for months. What 
caused this sudden activity ? 

His uncle, the Finance Minister, and his cousin, the 
Minister of Gobernacion, were inclined to view the warn- 
ing more seriously than the President was, but they were 
busy men just then in their own departments. The Finance 
Minister was fighting for his loan measures in the Senate 
against Calero and the hold-over Porfiristas cleverly mar- 
shalled in opposition by de la Barra. The Minister of 
Gobernacion in whose department were all dealings with 
the Governors of the States, and control of the entire sys- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 265 

tern of rurales (rural guards) was actively engaged in com- 
bating Cientifico activity over the broad area of the repub- 
lic. There was no time during those vital days from the 
4th to the 9th of February, for close attention to a plot 
which was not scheduled to mature until March 16. 

These reasons for lack of activity by officials of the cab- 
inet seem inadequate, but it must be remembered that the 
President's firm stand against recognition of this or any 
other conspiracy was a strong deterrent. So Gustavo was 
without aid. Even the cooperation of the faithful chief 
of police could not be sought, for President Madero had 
expressly prohibited it. 

The historical value of the warning which Gustavo re- 
ceived consists, however, not so much in its unheeded possi- 
bilities of salvation, as in the light which the names on the 
list shed upon subsequent events. Singularly vivid is this 
disclosure; it stamps the deadly combat that raged for ten 
days in the heart of Mexico City as wanton slaughter, as a 
terrorizing exhibit of destructive forces to mark the end 
of Maderism and destroy the appetite of the people for 
a voice in their Government. 

The colonel had warned Gustavo that the word for ac- 
tion might be spoken at almost any moment, but he was 
somewhat astray in the statement that plans were nearly 
complete ; there were several conflicting elements in that 
singular conspiracy which then had not been fully recon- 
ciled. Gustavo's constant moving about on Wednesday, 
Thursday and Friday of that week, the 5th, 6th and 7th of 
February, had resulted in scaring the leaders of the plot, 
but it also inspired the chief organizer to undertake a move- 
ment which in effect, was a plot within a plot. 

As has been disclosed already, the plan had been that 
when Madero and his Vice President should have been 
forced out, General Bernardo Reyes should become Pro- 



266 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

visional President, and hold office until Felix Diaz could 
be elected constitutional President for what remained of 
the six year term begun by Porfirio Diaz in December, 1910. 
Mondragon himself was to be Minister of War, Rodolfo 
Reyes, Minister of Justice, and Victoriano Huerta, Com- 
mander in Chief of the military forces. The other offi- 
cers in the conspiracy were to be advanced in rank and 
pay. 

General Huerta had not agreed to this arrangement. He 
did not approve of Bernardo Reyes as Provisional Presi- 
dent because Reyes had been disloyal to Porfirio Diaz whom 
Huerta greatly admired, and whom he had personally es- 
corted to Vera Cruz when the Dictator departed from the 
capital; also, he believed in common with others, that Ber- 
nardo Reyes had shown himself deficient in stamina when, 
having defied Diaz, he meekly accepted the order to study 
military methods in Europe. 

Huerta did not approve of Felix Diaz for President at 
any time because he thought him lacking in the necessary 
qualities. Porfirio Diaz, who greatly desired to perpetuate 
the Diaz name in Mexico's Government, had never consid- 
ered his nephew as a possible successor. Felix Diaz was a 
man to take orders, not to originate and issue them. 

So Huerta, disapproving of these arrangements planned 
by Mondragon, had not as yet consented to become actively 
concerned in the movement. Just what he would approve 
had not been stated in words, but subsequent history has 
made it sufficiently clear. 

Manuel Mondragon believed that his own best interests 
would be served by the stated program; he believed this 
because he knew that both Bernardo Reyes and Felix Diaz 
would be subject to his adroit manipulations. He knew, 
of course, that Rodolfo Reyes had achieved a mental 
ascendency over Felix Diaz, but he was confident of his 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 267 

own ability to cope with Rodolfo when the time should 
come. 

The stir in the conspirators' ranks which came with the 
suspicion that Gustavo Tvladero had learned something of 
the plot gave Mondragon an opening. If Gustavo had 
acquired any definite information, the date, March 16, 
must be part of it, and he would not be expecting the out- 
break for several weeks. By immediate action, the Gov- 
ernment would be taken by surprise and Reyes would be 
seated. Mondragon would then be in better position to 
deal with General Huerta. In this plan of operation the 
insurgent force at the beginning would be small, but with 
all the men in active command about the capital already 
committed to the main features of his program, Mondra- 
gon was confident that no really hostile opposition would 
be met. On the other hand, if action should be delayed 
for even a week, wholesale arrests might be made and the 
elaborately planned conspiracy come to an ignominious end. 

That many friendly eyes were upon his movements Mon- 
dragon was well assured, though none but his intimates 
knew the details of his plan. This knowledge gave him 
confidence. All through Mexico, among men of property, 
word had quietly been passed that something of importance 
was brewing, and in every state the Cientifico claque was 
ready to applaud any successful enterprise to overthrow the 
hated Madero rule. 

The military plotter knew that opportunity to do this 
could not rise from the ashes of a present defeat. Madero 
was more strongly entrenched than the world had been per- 
mitted to believe. His financial plan was being thwarted 
by a few votes in the Senate : his opponents feared daily 
that some deal would carry the measure through, and put 
one hundred million pesos in the treasury. With these 
ample funds Madero could make friends out of enemies. 



268 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

provide employment for the idle, arrange agrarian schemes 
for the peons he professed to love, and influence public 
opinion in the United States and Europe. 

The truth about the revival of business during the recent 
months had been kept from the world by means not wholly 
mysterious to Mondragon, yet he marvelled at the success 
achieved by those who managed the publicity for the solid 
men. The revenues of the Government for the six months 
to December 31, 1912, were seventy million pesos, twelve 
millions more than for any other six months in Mexico's 
history. Could the world be humbugged indefinitely into 
believing that all news from Mexico was bad news ? 

Mondragon was convinced that this systematic black- 
guarding of Madero's government could not be continued 
successfully after the loan bill should be passed. He did 
not arrive at this decision all by himself. Pineda helped 
him to see it, so did Calero and de la Barra. These men 
may not have known the details of Mondragon's plan, but 
they did know very well indeed that Madero's fall, if it 
should come, would be accomplished by the military, and 
they credited Mondragon with the proper qualifications for 
a prime mover. 

By considerations such as have been indicated, Mondra- 
gon was persuaded during those four days that prompt ac- 
tion was desirable. Never again would he find conditions 
so favorable to his own interests. But the arrangements 
for his personally conducted insurrection were far from 
perfect. Results were produced which shocked the world, 
and are yet to be dearly paid for, but Mondragon merely 
began the bad work; the course of events almost immedi- 
ately passed beyond his control. 

The revolt was a very uncertain affair as it struggled 
into action on Saturday night, the 8th of February, 19 13. 
Let no one doubt it. Francisco Madero had been close to 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 269 

truth when he had assured Gustavo that the captains and 
Heutenants of the army would not go on record as disloyal 
to their Government. The lack of coherence in the mili- 
tary plot was more than a division of interest among the 
leaders ; it was a positive disinclination of the lesser com- 
missioned officers to take part. 

The President had been notably wrong in that he had 
taken no efficient steps to sustain the right spirit in the 
army ; yet Mondragon could muster but eight hundred men 
and three batteries of artillery, in addition to the palace 
guard, for the opening scene of his drama, — an array that 
adds another fantastic touch to his effort. 

Of these forces, let it be recorded to their shame, six 
hundred were Aspiranfes or cavalry cadets from the mili- 
tary school at Tlalpam, a suburb of the Capital. On the 
other side of the account must be set down the loyalty of 
the cadets of the Chepultepec Academy, the West Point of 
Mexico. Not for a moment did these young men waver 
in fidelity to the established government until that govern- 
ment was definitely superseded under the contract signed 
In the American Embassy in the interests of what the trad- 
ers called peace. 

To follow easily the course of events in the small hours 
of Sunday morning, February 9, it is necessary to know 
the locations of a few important points in and around Mex- 
ico City. The castle and park of Chepultepec are about 
two and a half miles to the westward of the National Pal- 
ace. The Avenida San Francisco, the Avenida Juarez and 
the Paseo de la Ref orma really form a single highway from 
the Palace to the castle. Southward of the Paseo, at a dis- 
tance of perhaps three-eighths of a mile, another broad 
avenue leads from " Old Mexico " to the castle : this is 
Avenida Chepultepec, along which — well fenced in — runs 
one of the heavy trimk lines of the suburban tramway serv- 



2/0 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

ice. Beyond Chepultepec about four miles is the ancient 
village of Tacubaya, in which is a strong military post. 

East of the Palace three-quarters of a mile, beyond the 
solid blocks of ancient one and two-story houses, is the 
penitentiary in which Felix Diaz was confined. Bernardo 
Reyes was held in the Santiago barracks, a mile to the north- 
ward of the Palace. Tlalpam, the home of the Aspirantes, 
is about fifteen miles to the southward. 

Shortly after two o'clock on Sunday morning an ofificer 
of the Forest Guards of Chepultepec, who lived in a pretty 
brick villa in the park, was awakened by the rumble of 
artillery passing along the Tacubaya road. The hoofbeats 
of many horses, the clanking of sabers, told him that a con- 
siderable body of cavalry accompanied the guns, and all 
were moving toward the city. 

The officer of the Forest Guards did not believe that this 
force was upon any errand of the Government's despite 
the fact that it was waking the echoes of the night within 
a pistol-shot of the President's bedroom windows. Much 
more probably this was the military uprising which had 
been the theme of gossip during the past two days. 

The officer arose, and for some minutes looked from 
his window at the dark mass of the castle, but he saw no 
sign that any one had taken alarm. Adjoining it on the 
west was the Chepultepec Academy, and there, too, so far 
as he could discover, all was quiet. Was it possible that the 
President had not waked, and that amongst the great body 
of cadets there was not one to hear and understand these 
warlike sounds? 

It seemed that this was true, and presently there dawned 
upon the soldier the light which revealed his personal duty. 
Presumably he had the usual regard for his own life ; cer- 
tainly he was aware of the extreme risk of interference, 
and probably this consideration determined his course. He 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 271 

might have warned the President, or the Commandant of 
the Academy, but either of these acts would have been 
equivalent to publishing his connection with the affair. 
Moreover, it was probable that he would not be believed, 
and in fact he had no very solid ground for his conviction. 
The upshot was that he went to a man in whom he had 
personal confidence to discover the point where an attack 
would be made, if any were contemplated. The man was 
Adolfo Basso, intendente of the National Palace. 

It happened that Basso had attended a theater, seeing 
one of those late performances which are given in Mexico 
City. He had heard in the course of the evening abundant 
rumors of revolt, and as he was loyal to Madero it is to be 
supposed that his mind was not at ease as he walked home 
alone. It was past two o'clock when he came to the plaza 
that lies before the Palace, and there he met the officer of 
the Forest Guards and heard his story. 

The hazard of interference was now transferred to Basso, 
and he accepted it, but he too sought an individual instead 
of warning the Government directly. Doubtless he went 
to the man whom he thought most likely to know what to 
do, and safest to depend upon for prompt and vigorous 
action — Gustavo Madero. 

To Gustavo, at his home in the Calle Londres, Basso 
made his report. From the Forest Guardsman he had 
learned that the troops had proceeded eastward on Aven- 
ida Chepultepec. From the rumors which he had heard, 
Basso thought it probable that they would go on past Belem 
prison and connect with the aspirantes from Tlalpam on 
the street called Cinco de Febrero, several squares south of 
the Palace. Detachments would doubtless be sent to re- 
lease Felix Diaz and Bernardo Reyes, and these operations 
would consume time. The movement upon the Palace 
would probably be delayed some hours. 



272 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

With these opinions Gustavo Madero concurred. There 
would be no haste to occupy the Palace with troops from 
outside, because the guards already in possession were cor- 
rupted. Such being the unfortunate condition of affairs, 
what could be done? Gustavo knew no place to get a mili- 
tary force in time, and he was not sanguine as to prompt 
action on his brother's part if he should go to Chepultepec 
and lay the matter before him. It was obviously important 
to prevent the setting up of revolutionary headquarters in 
the Palace for the sake of the effect on the public mind, 
and if the house of Government were to be held, Gustavo 
would have to do it himself, so he decided. 

He seems to have been in rare form, on this Sunday 
morning. He was the Gustavo who with picturesque reck- 
lessness in the Diaz days had played a most unpromising 
hand in the game of revolution against an entrenched em- 
pire, and had organized Madero clubs throughout Mexico 
under the very noses of the Cientificos. He was Gustavo, 
the practical politician, who, as leader of the " Porra " or 
Progresistas, had developed the knack of cajolery to a fine 
art; who had studied the people and could call the Juans 
and the Miguels by their first names, and address them in 
the language which they understood. He was the gambler 
in long chances who had faced danger too often to be wor- 
ried about it. 

With his hat a little on one side, and a cigar between his 
teeth, he sallied forth from home upon his absurd and 
tragic task — to take the National Palace from four hun- 
dred traitors in arms, and hold it, heaven knew how, against 
the strong force which would advance upon it at the break 
of day or thereabouts. He rode in his touring car with 
Basso beside him, and with Tomas, his much-trusted chauf- 
feur, at the wheel. As to what happened afterwards, I fol- 
low an intimate, detailed account, reliable for all that was 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 273 

done and said. If it were desirable I could set down the 
challenges and orders, and could quote even more exten- 
sively from the extraordinary remarks of Gustavo, as he 
made a kind of stump speech for his own life and his 
brother's rule in the dim patio of the Palace, facing the 
rifles of four hundred men. 

Gustavo's car, though challenged by the sentries at the 
central entrance of the Palace, was not halted. It rolled 
into the patio where Colonel Morelos, the commandant, and 
all his force were assembled, waiting to admit the troops 
of Mondragon. 

" You are under arrest," said Morelos, and gave an order 
to his men so hastily that it included them all, not a small 
squad as he had probably intended. The ridiculous result 
was that the guns of the entire four hundred covered Gus- 
tavo simultaneously. He stood up in his car, the target for 
all those rifles, and burst into a laugh which may very well 
have been entirely genuine. There was smothered laughter 
in the ranks, and Gustavo was quick to seize his advan- 
tage. 

" You are a perfect host, my Colonel," he shouted, so 
that all might hear ; " never before have such honors been 
paid me. I was not an invited guest, but I heard of your 
little party here and I have dropped in. And see how you 
have welcomed me ! Let me stand by your side, I beg of 
you, to greet your brave friend General Reyes and his fat 
fighting partner, our own dear Felix." 

He knew what he was doing when he referred to Reyes 
and Diaz at a moment when he himself had taken the fancy 
of his audience by a picturesque display of courage. The 
" bravery " of General Reyes was a joke in Mexico, and 
Felix Diaz was called a lady's man. Moreover, Gustavo 
knew that he had private friends in that assemblage, for 
many a soldier of the guard had thanked him for a much 



274 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

needed cinco pesos. Possibly the insubordinate laughter in 
the ranks was kept going by these men ; at any rate, it con- 
tinued, encouraging Gustavo and proportionately disconcert- 
ing the colonel, who began, not unwisely, to doubt whether 
he could rely upon his troops. And while the command- 
ant was still uncertain as to his next move, Gustavo went 
on with his stump speech, treating the soldiers to the rude 
humor they appreciated. 

" It isn't fair to you, my dear Colonel," he said, " to keep 
these hard-working muchachos up all night waiting for our 
illustrious friends. The beds at Santiago are very com- 
fortable, and a fierce fighting man like General Reyes needs 
his rest. Tambien, he has to dress for the presidential part. 
Don Felix, too, you know, must curl his mustaches and oil 
his hair, and the boudoir arrangements in the bartolinas at 
the pen are sadly deficient. The escorts have come a long 
distance ; they are only now arriving in town from Tlalpam 
and Tacubaya. It will be a good seven o'clock before our 
guests arrive. Before that time they will have roused all 
the town with their trampings and tootings, and there will 
be a fine audience out in front. Keep the boys in condition 
for the big show ; let them rest their arms." 

The commandant gave the signal and the rifles came 
down with a clang on the cement. He did not, in fact, dare 
to do otherwise, for the continued laughter showed the dis- 
position of the guard. 

" While we prepare for the grand reception, my dear 
Colonel," Gustavo went on, " bring these handsome cabal- 
leros from Tlalpam over to the right side of the patio where 
I can talk to them like a father. I can't see very well with 
my left eye." 

A great shout of laughter went up at this, for everybody 
knew that Gustavo's left eye was of glass. The men of 
the regular guard understood the maneuver and were in 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 275 

sympathy with it. They resented the presence of two hun- 
dred Tlalpam students who thought themselves superior, 
and nothing would have pleased the regulars better on this 
occasion than to have the two parts of the force lined up 
on opposite sides. 

The commandant understood also, but he scented mutiny, 
and was afraid that the peon soldiers would obey Gustavo 
rather than himself, especially because Gustavo had been 
shrewd enough to enlighten them at the very outset in re- 
gard to matters which they had not understood. The move- 
ment toward separation had in fact been begun by the regu- 
lars before the colonel gave the order, and within a 
few seconds it was complete — Aspirantes on the right and 
the Guard on the left. Into the space between Gustavo 
walked, and he continued his harangue while the com- 
mandant stood looking helplessly on. 

In a few minutes Gustavo learned that neither the As- 
pirantes nor the Palace Guards had known the part that 
General Reyes was to play in the affair in which they were 
engaged. With this he whipped the Aspirantes, who were 
Felix Diaz men, into line, and within forty minutes from 
the time he rode through the Palace gate he had gained 
effective command of the whole guard. Morelos he per- 
sonally escorted to a room of the Palace, constructed for 
such purposes, and locked him in. At five o'clock he, Gus- 
tavo Madero, a civilian, was in active charge of the Palacio 
Nacional, and in ordering its guards about was committing 
one of the gravest of military crimes. 

The two hundred Aspirantes had been won over for the 
moment, but could not be expected to fire on their comrades, 
or even to remain neutral if a fight should ensue, so by 
common consent they stacked their arms in the patio and 
were marched to a large court in the far interior of the 
Palace and placed under a guard of ten men. The two 



Q.']^ THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

hundred men of the Palace guard were now quietly dis- 
posed for protection to the entrances and for manning of 
the machine battery of twelve guns on the roof, but the final 
measures for defense were taken by General Villar, the 
post commander, who came to the Palace at six o'clock. 

As Gustavo had jocularly advised the Commandant, Gen- 
eral Reyes and his escort of two hundred cavalry did not 
appear until nearly seven o'clock. When they came they 
moved forward with the confidence of a perfect under- 
standing ; the Palace gates were to be swung wide for them 
and General Reyes was to be shown at once to the presi- 
dential quarter from which he would immediately issue a 
manifesto to the nation, denouncing Madero as a traitor 
and proclaiming himself Provisional President pending the 
action of Congress. 

The awakening from this dream of a bloodless victory 
was violent. Instead of a welcoming salute, the advancing 
column was greeted at thirty paces' distance by a challenge. 
General Villar then came out of the Palace and warned 
General Reyes that the place was held against him, and 
that bloodshed would result if he advanced further. Reyes 
did not believe that the guard would offer resistance, and 
he pressed forward. There was a volley from the guard 
in the broad entrance of the Palace and Reyes fell dead. 
His men returned the fire, wounding Villar. Members of 
the guard dashed from the Palace, and took several pris- 
oners, among them General Ruiz, who had stood near 
Reyes. 

Promptly the machine guns on the roof began to sputter 
in all directions, inflicting some damage on the enemy and 
very much more on the crowd of peons which had gathered 
from all over that part of the town. It is said that three 
hundred persons were hit in five minutes of this firing. Then 
a few of the machine guns were turned upon the cathedral 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 277 

towers, in which a small body of Aspirantes had been sta- 
tioned to pick off any persons about the square who might 
feel disposed to interfere. The towers were promptly 
evacuated and the firing from the Palace stopped. 

While this sanguinary engagement was going on Felix 
Diaz and Mondragon with their six hundred Aspirantes 
and their three batteries of artillery came down Cinco de 
Mayo, and were about to deploy their force in the Plaza 
when they became properly aware of the hail from the 
machine guns on the Palace roof. Not caring to advance 
in the face of this fire, Diaz and Mondragon swung to the 
left at double quick, and turning into the Calle Tacuba 
moved rapidly back along this street, which is parallel to 
the one by which they had advanced. Continuing on this 
course they passed out of Calle Tacuba into the street 
called Hombres Illustres, which runs along the northern 
side of the Alamada. At Calle Balderas, one street west 
of the Alamada, they swung again to the left six blocks 
to the Arsenal, of which, after a short parley, they took 
possession. The Arsenal was the headquarters of Felix 
Diaz during the ten days of bombardment which ensued. 

At the Palace enthusiasm for the President, and espe- 
cially for Gustavo, had taken possession of the guard. They 
had been marshalled among the Government's enemies, they 
assured Gustavo, through no fault of their own, and had 
been determined to stand by him from the first moment 
of his appearance. He looked them over and believed them ; 
how could these ignorant ones understand the right and 
wrong of such affairs, and if they did, how could they op- 
pose their commanding officer without a leader? 

The status of the Aspirantes, however, was different; 
they were wilful traitors. It would probably go hard with 
them and with the Commandant of the Palace, who though 
greatly respected throughout the army, and above the sus- 



278 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

picion of having been bought, had done his best to hand 
over the Palacio Nacional to the insurgents. 

Many dead and wounded were in the Plaza. The body 
of General Reyes lay within a stone's throw of the central 
gates, but no orders were given for its removal or for the 
relief of soldiers or civilians whose injuries held them where 
they fell. Gustavo Madero was no longer in command, 
and he refrained from assuming any further responsibility. 
General Villar's wound explains his inaction and that of his 
men. The bullet which had hit him was a very choice 
missile from the cartridge box of fate. My own opinion 
is that the whole clan Madero fell at that shot. For Villar 
was a brave man, not without ability, capable of holding 
his ambition in check at the demand of honor. To his po- 
sition as commander of the post Huerta succeeded, with 
addition of authority such as might have been conferred on 
Villar but for his disablement; and it is not unlikely that 
he would have saved the State, winning an easy triumph 
where an abler soldier failed for lack of honest will. 

The loss was not immediately appreciated by Gustavo 
Madero, to whom it seemed that the first skirmish had 
ended very well. The strain of that extraordinary night 
was now relaxed. One round in the game of life and death 
had been played through, and the chief loser's stake paid 
out there in the Plaza. The hour had come when a man 
might stretch his limbs and seek a little refreshment; and 
Gustavo ordered his car and rode forth into the morning 
air, to the home of his friend. Angel Casso, in the Calle 
Marselle, and sat down with him to breakfast. 

Over the coffee there arose some question as to the kill- 
ing of the spectators in the square, and Gustavo explained 
it, saying that it was due to the zeal of the peon gunners 
who, excepting two or three, had never before fired ma- 
chine guns at a living target, and were curious to learn how 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 279 

much destruction they could work by the mere turning of a 
little crank. Upon the whole, however, they had done so 
well that no immediate renewal of the assault upon the 
Palace need be feared. 

It was not until nine o'clock that President Madero 
reached the center of the city. At that hour he appeared 
on Avenida Juarez on the southern side of the Alamada at 
the head of about one thousand men made up of Chepulte- 
pec cadets and mounted police. At the National Theatre 
he was urged to go no farther, and as he stood there in 
plain view he was shot at from one of the upper windows 
of the great unfinished theater building. Owing to a 
sudden movement of his horse the bullet missed him nar- 
rowly, and killed a negro on the sidewalk. 

Turning to the officer in charge of his body guard of ca- 
dets and police, Madero directed him to see to the capture 
of the enemy in the theater, and then to return to Chepulte- 
pec to await further orders. The officer ventured to ex- 
press astonishment. Was it possible that the President 
meant to ride the half mile through Avenida San Francisco 
alone, while the city was ablaze with insurrection? 

Madero smiled. He turned his big gray horse toward 
the Plaza and without further parley proceeded on his way, 
his only attendant being a colonel who rode at his side. He 
had, however, an unofficial advance guard in an American 
Jew named Blum, who was apparently seeking personal ad- 
vertisement. Blum was a dealer in horses and their pedi- 
grees, and it was said that in a trade he would often furnish 
a pedigree much better than the one to which the animal 
was entitled. His carelessness in the assortment of the 
two commodities, the horse and the pedigree, had resulted 
in frequent expulsions from the Jockey Club racetrack, but 
he would always come back again. And it is quite ac- 
cordant with the grotesqueness of this national tragedy, 



28o THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

that the well-known Blum — who afterwards sold milch 
cows to Felix Diaz at the Arsenal — should now precede 
the President who had just escaped by inches from assas- 
sination, and was inviting another attempt at every move- 
ment of his unguarded progress to the National Palace, on 
this Sunday morning. 

Not until he reached the Plaza strewn with dead did 
Madero realize the seriousness of what had occurred. Hur- 
rying to his official quarters he set in operation the work of 
succor and removal, personally directing that the body of 
General Reyes be brought into the Palace. Then the wheels 
of outraged government began to revolve swiftly. A cabi- 
net meeting passed sentence of death and immediate exe- 
cution upon the captured General Ruis, and Colonel More- 
los, the Palace commandant. The sentence was carried out 
that afternoon, and before night General Victoriano 
Huerta, who was on waiting orders in the capital, was 
summoned to the Palace and placed in chief command of 
all the troops in and about Mexico City. 



CHAPTER XV 

AFTER General Huerta was put in chief command of 
the Government's forces, on February 9, cannon and 
small arms were the instruments of pandemonium in 
the City of Mexico, much property was destroyed, and 
many persons w^ere killed, up to the time of the coup d'etat 
on the 1 8th. There were opposing camps, so to speak; the 
Palace and the Arsenal, the established government under 
Madero and the revolt nominally under Diaz, were at war. 
But all this was mere seeming, and differed from the truth 
in every essential particular. There was no warfare, and 
even of anything that could be called fighting there was 
very little. The affair was dishonest, root, branch and 
twig; dishonest as a squabble started by thieves in a crowd 
to draw attention from the picking of pockets. 

The mockery was plainly apparent to many who had no 
knowledge of military affairs ; it could hardly have deceived 
any person of intelligence who was not blinded by some 
prepossession. The usual version of this ten days' riot in 
uniform, this random bombardment with modern weapons 
in a densely populated city, is that General Huerta served 
the Government faithfully as long as he had any hope of 
success ; that the Arsenal in which the Felix Diaz forces 
were entrenched was found to be impregnable, and that to 
avoid further bloodshed, Huerta finally agreed to the de- 
thronement of Madero as a compromise for peace. In the 
process of bringing this about^ so runs the tale, his own am- 
bitions awoke to personal opportunity with results now well 
established in common knowledge. 

281 



282 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

This version does Huerta's moral nature too much honor 
and fails in fair credit to his clear Indian brain. The vari- 
ous bodies of troops subject to his orders exceeded ten 
thousand men, while at no time did the Diaz forces reach 
eighteen hundred. The artillery at Huerta's command in- 
cluded siege guns and other heavy cannon of the Schneider- 
Canet and Mondragon-Canet types, while in light batteries 
and machine guns his equipment was greatly superior to 
that of Felix Diaz. 

The report that the Arsenal was " impregnable " reflected 
credit upon the inventor of that fiction as a person of au- 
dacity and imagination. An attacking force which meant 
business would have operated from the south or southwest, 
and would have had no trouble in planting batteries in such 
convenient positions that the artilleryman who could not 
have landed every shot in the Arsenal's broad and fully ex- 
posed fagade would have been one who had mistaken his 
calling. The land south of the Arsenal is almost entirely 
open for the six hundred yards or so to Avenida Chepulte- 
pec, and for a like distance farther to Indianilla, the head- 
quarters of Mexico City's tramway service. Some of this 
region was alleged to be held by Diaz troops, a gentle at- 
tempt at humor considering the forces which, if their com- 
mander had been so disposed, could have swept the place 
clean by the simple expedient of walking into it. 

A force which was operating seriously against the Arsenal 
would have advanced by way of Avenida Chepultepec to 
the broad Calle Balderas ; and while a moderate assortment 
of cannon balls was being fired into the conspicuous stone 
building six or seven blocks distant, the force would have 
marched deliberately in wide column along the street named 
to the desired stations. In the thirty minutes which this 
advance would have occupied the operating batteries would 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 283 

have reduced the building and driven its garrison into the 
open. 

Except for the seriousness with which the military opera- 
tions of that ten days were treated in current accounts, I 
should regard it as superfluous to point out even to this 
moderate extent the astonishing features of the farce that 
was carried on. With one-tenth the bloodshed that actu- 
ally occurred, Felix Diaz and Manuel Mondragon could 
have been driven from their " stronghold " within twenty- 
four hours from the time Huerta was placed in command, 
and after that period, supposing that the proper dispositions 
had been made in the meantime, it could have been done in 
any designated half hour. 

The military operations which in reality were carried on 
during that historic ten days were of decidedly obvious and 
novel character. Huerta batteries were shifted from point 
to point in residence and business sections to the north, 
northeast and northwest of the Arsenal. From none of 
these points was the building visible. Solid blocks of 
houses intervened on every range. Diaz placed batteries 
near his headquarters, and always at points from which 
neither the Palace nor the opposing batteries "vyere in view. 

For several hours each day there was firing by both par- 
ties. Buildings were damaged or demolished, inoffensive 
persons were killed in their own homes, incautious non- 
combatants in the streets were shot down. Projectiles of 
various kinds were fired through streets in which no enemy 
had appeared. Machine guns discharged thousands of bul- 
lets without having any target except some mere unfor- 
tunate who might happen to be in range, the purpose of the 
fusillade being to excite terror and advertise anarchy. 

Isolated guns were set up by apparently irresponsible 
squads, and fired over and over again in whatever position 



284 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

the pieces happened to assume after the recoil of the previous 
shot. 

And during ten days of this terrorizing riot of blood the 
Arsenal was struck but once and the Palacio Nacional but 
twice ! 

The Madero Government all this time was bringing in 
troops and cannon from various points — Vera Cruz, To- 
luca, Cuernavaca, aind elsewhere. Madero himself gave 
out bulletins and reports of favorable progress, and spoke 
with confidence of movements that would bring victory. 
Under flags of truce, he made demands upon Diaz to sur- 
render. On Sunday night, February 9, he made a mysteri- 
ous trip in an automobile to an out-of-town destination from 
which he did not return until ten o'clock on Monday morn- 
ing. Whether he went to Cuernavaca, seventy-five miles 
over mountain roads, to summon the faithful General Felipe 
Angeles with his artillery and his thousand men, or to 
Toluca, forty-five miles, personally to beg General Blan- 
quet to hurry in with his forces — which of these things 
he did that night mattered not at all. Felipe Angeles came 
in with his troops and was afterward courtmartialed for 
exceeding his authority; and Blanquet moved his picked 
regiments part of the way to the capital and left them out- 
side while he went in alone to look things over. 

And all this time Victoriano Huerta was in close touch 
with President Madero, consulting him in all his plans, 
cursing the slowness of the movements, and the inertia of 
the various branches of the service, but promising, ever 
promising, the decisive blow which would end the revolt 
and leave the Government solid as a rock. 

He had for every question an answer technically cor- 
rect; the one great essential, he said, was to avoid further 
defections in the army, while welding it together into a 
really strong and reliable establishment. While the 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 285 

traitors still had so many friends in his own camp it would 
be unwise for him to force his officers to obey repugnant 
orders; In fact, this was at present impossible, but with 
prudence and patience the condition would be remedied. 
It was better that the Diaz force should remain where it 
was, receiving no accessions, than that it should be dis- 
lodged at the cost of further mutiny. 

This argument prevailed with the President, who was 
constantly occupied upon matters not military; and even 
Gustavo was to some extent deceived, against the evidence 
of his own eyes — for he was in all accessible parts of 
the city during this time, and must have seen much that 
could not be explained by Huerta's sophistries. How- 
ever, the fullest comprehension could hardly have enabled 
him to accomplish anything important, for he lacked the 
necessary authority. And so the noisy farce went on to 
the confusion of the world, and with many odd, significant 
scenes that passed unnoticed in the midst of the tumult. 
One of these, which has not yet lost its importance — to 
the United States especially — merits description here. 

In view of the precarious position of President Madero 
if treachery appeared again at the National Palace, the sub- 
Secretary of Communications, Manuel Urquidi, formed a 
plan to provide a body guard composed of one hundred men 
of standing and unquestioned fidelity who would remain 
constantly with the President until the situation should 
clear up. Urquidi made his list, personally saw as many as 
he could, and passed the word to the others for a rendez- 
vous. This was to be in the office of the sub-Secretary at 
two o'clock In the morning of Thursday, the 13th, and the 
password formula consisted of the inquiry addressed to the 
portero at the door : " Has my father arrived ?" To this 
the answer was, " Quien sahe?" and the rejoinder, "1 am 
his son." 



286 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

No more than twenty-eight out of the hundred men came 
to this meeting, the sub-Secretary himself faihng to ap- 
pear. But Gustavo Madero, with forty-six Mauser rifles 
and a Hberal supply of ammunition packed in the body of 
his automobile, was on hand. Among the faithful was a 
member of the Chamber of Deputies, accompanied by an 
attache of the Japanese legation, who calmly set forth to 
Gustavo that in twenty- four hours he could muster two 
thousand Japanese dressed as peons and armed with knives. 
In the darkness which reigned throughout the city, these 
men, approaching from various directions, would attract 
no notice, and as the Arsenal guards, at night when fighting 
was suspended, were invariably under the influence of 
pulque, the Japanese could quietly dispose of them with 
their knives, after which they would rush the Arsenal 
where the troops were sleeping and knife the entire force, 
taking possession in the interest of Madero and ending the 
revolt at once. 

The offer was rejected, Gustavo Madero announcing that 
the Mexicans would fight their own battles. From one 
who was present at the interview I have learned that the 
temptation to accept was strong, the feasibility of the plan 
being clear, but that Gustavo was held back by the fear that 
while the two thousand Japanese were taking the Arsenal, 
five thousand more which the attache had said he could 
produce in an additional day, might be occupying the Na- 
tional Palace by the same means and so hold the entire 
government at their mercy. 

Gustavo's declination of the Japanese offer is of value 
as reflecting the policy of his brother's government and 
demonstrating the lack of foundation for the fears of Sena- 
tor Lodge expressed in the United States Senate that Ma- 
dero might not be wholly unfavorable to Japanese aggres- 
sion on Mexico's Pacific coast ; but it is doubtful if Gustavo 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 287 

would have followed the course he did if he had seen en- 
tirely through the clever head of General Victoriano Huerta. 
The " gentleman's guard " of one hundred was not formed, 
which may be counted as unfortunate now that one looks 
back upon it. 

Day after day during that fatal period telegraph wires 
and cables were choked with despatches dealing with the 
desperate efforts of Madero to dislodge a formidable insur- 
gent from an impregnable position. Square miles of news- 
paper space were used in printing this nonsense. The truth 
is that the defense of the National Palace on the morning 
of February 9 was the only serious fighting that was done 
in Mexico City in the interests of the Madero Government. 
It may be admitted that a few honest but not very effectual 
shots were fired by the troops of General Angeles. All the 
others were empty noise, except to the unfortunates whose 
bodies or property happened to be hit. The cannonade was 
the long prelude to a bargain ; it served to put the terrorized 
city into a mood to accept what was to come; served also 
to bring the conspirators to a proper frame of mind, and 
to combine the various interests which they represented. 

Reverting for a moment to the attitude of Huerta, I will 
add a few details. He declared that the generals under 
him were lukewarm in the service; that Blanquet was ag- 
grieved because of the death of General Reyes as the result 
of an order said to have been given by Basso, a civilian. 
Possessed of these sentiments Blanquet was unwilling to 
push matters too hard against Felix Diaz. Huerta also re- 
ported that General Navarrette, who had charge of the ar- 
tillery, would not fire directly upon the Arsenal because he 
feared that he might kill General Mondragon, to whom he 
owed a debt of gratitude for advancing him in the military 
service. 

These statements of Huerta's were, in the main, truthful, 



288 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

as were others affecting less important commands, but the 
real fact behind all was that Huerta himself was secretly 
applauding and promoting these sentiments. He was not 
pursuing this course because he grieved for Reyes or loved 
either Diaz or Mondragon; he was doing so because the 
master he served was his own ambition. 

The natural question which here occurs to the surface 
observer is, if Huerta held the situation in his hand, why 
did he not take full advantage of it at an earlier date? 
Why did he wait until some four or five thousand persons 
had been killed and several millions in property destroyed? 

The question will not be pressed after a moment's con- 
sideration of the immense personal advantage which he 
gained by delay. At the time of the outbreak on February 
9, Huerta was not regarded as one to be seriously reckoned 
with. He had had no personal relations with the solid men 
of Mexico who were backing Diaz and Mondragon, and his 
knowledge of the remoter figures behind the conspiracy was 
incomplete. Up to that moment he had had his secret am- 
bitions, but he had never played politics. This he now saw 
that he must do, if he were to retain the presidency which 
he was certain he could grasp at any moment. To stand 
permanently against the Maderistas, of whose numerical 
strength he was well aware, he must secure the united back- 
ing of Mexico's strongest men and the moral support of the 
United States. To make a spectacular leap from obscurity 
to power and be sustained by these influences afterwards, 
he believed to be among the possibilities of the situation, 
should his own skill not fail him. 

When Madero placed him in charge of the Government's 
defense, it was a play directly into Huerta's hand. From 
this vantage point he could manage the military movements 
as a matter of obvious duty, yet with political ends always 
in view. He analyzed the situation, and chose with uner- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 289 

ring discrimination four of its components as the essen- 
tials. 

First, the general public of the capital, the resident Euro- 
peans and Americans, including diplomatic agents through 
whom the governments they represented would be influ- 
enced. To all these must be afforded a perfect demonstra- 
tion of Madero's inefficiency and of Mexico's emphatic re- 
jection of Madero's methods. 

Second, the men who were behind Mondragon and Diaz. 
These were to be convinced that the man who could mas- 
ter their favorites at all points was now in clear view and 
must be dealt with before their purposes could be accom- 
plished. 

The third political element seemed not especially impor- 
tant, but was one to which the Diaz managers were quite 
evidently catering. This was the element represented by 
Manuel Calero. While Cientifico in character it possessed 
little Cientifico strength because Calero was too openly 
supercilious and overbearing. But it carried a rather 
strong corporate influence in the United States not other- 
wise to be reached, and it enjoyed the advantage of being 
in close relationship to the American Ambassador, whose 
government sustained him in all things, and who was able 
to influence to a great extent the action of the European 
diplomatic representatives. 

The recognition which the Mondragon-Diaz combination 
was conceding to Calero was not direct ; it was applied, and 
cleverly, too, Huerta thought, through Jorge Vera Estafiol, 
who had been Calero's law partner and was still his warm 
personal friend despite the most radical difference between 
them on political issues. What Huerta did not know was 
that the Diaz-Mondragon managers were slating Vera Es- 
tafiol for a cabinet position without his consent. 

The fourth political element for present consideration 



290 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

was de la Barra who was understood to be a close friend 
of Limantour's and an active supporter of financial plans 
for Mexico emanating from powerful interests in Europe. 
Huerta knew that de la Barra was not strong in his own 
person, but he saw that Mondragon and Diaz were finding 
it wise to make surface peace with the former provisional 
president by including him in their scheme of a govern- 
ment which they hoped to set up. By this means also 
they were planning to add the Catholic Party, and what was 
more important, the Catholic Church, to their strength. 

Huerta saw the political wisdom of this very clearly and 
realized the benefits to follow if he could demonstrate that 
it was through a man like himself, and not a weakling such 
as Felix Diaz that the de la Barra element could find what 
appeared to be an easy way to accomplish the things it had, 
in view. 

Support of American and European corporations, and of 
bankers who ranked among the strongest in the world, was 
included in successfully combining the Cientifico, the mili- 
tary and the de la Barra influences under his standard. If 
he could accomplish this he would be invulnerable ; he would 
become a second Porfirio Diaz. 

Victoriano Huerto must be credited with a liberal en- 
dowment of mental agility because of the demonstration he 
has since then made before the world, but in nothing has he 
exhibited more marked political acumen than in holding a 
tight rein on his ambitions during the days when the Ma- 
dero Government lay helpless in his hands. With an in- 
difference to human misery upon which his military idol, 
Napoleon, might have deigned to compliment him, he per- 
mitted the wanton slaughter and terrorizing to go on until 
it had become evident to those whom he wished to impress 
that he and no other was the man of the hour. 

Overtures were made to him before two days had passed, 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 291 

and the first advances were made by de la Barra. From 
that time Hiierta knew that his reading and his count of 
the cards had been correct, and that the presidency of Mex- 
ico, with strong support already assured, was to be the re- 
ward for his manipulation of the trust which Madero had 
reposed in him. 

In all this callous calculation the pitiable figure is Fran- 
cisco Madero. Knowing how weak in actual military force 
was the Felix Diaz insurrection, he seemed every day to be 
on the point of suppressing it and yet was unable to silence 
the Arsenal guns. He understood that Cientifico influences 
were behind the Diaz movement, but the apparent strength 
of the Government forces indicated a broad margin of ad- 
vantage, even taking into account an element of disaffec- 
tion among the general officers of the army. And he was 
supremely confident of success up to the hour of the demand 
of General Blanquet that he resign. 

Before that point was reached, however, the same sug- 
gestion in milder and more courteous form had been made 
by the Spanish Minister, as representing himself and the 
American Ambassador. The latter could not well accom- 
pany the Spanish Minister, because his relations with Ma- 
dero had become so strained that a personal call at the 
President's office was out of the question. 

It was a fool's errand, and far from edifying. Both the 
dean of the diplomatic corps and Spanish Minister Cologan 
would have done better if they had presented their demands, 
well backed by their governments, to Felix Diaz, the man 
who most obviously was disturbing the peace; or, if they 
understood the inv/ardness of the matter, to General Huerta, 
who, for reasons of his own, was permitting the peace to 
be disturbed. Madero's remarks on that occasion reflected 
the bitterness of his resentment caused by the irritation he 
had ever experienced at the American Ambassador's hands. 



292 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

But Ambassador Wilson had taken that military insurrec- 
tion in Mexico City at a valuation which he thought a true 
estimate. He knew that the solid men of Mexico were 
backing it, and the interests o£ that country, as he viewed 
them, demanded that it should win. The Huerta over- 
lordship of the situation, however, was something he prob- 
ably had not, at the time of his colleague's call to ask for 
Madero's resignation, taken sufficiently into account. He 
had been an active figure during the insurrection, riding in 
his car within the field of that preposterous artillery duel, 
to the rescue of endangered Americans and others; and 
had doubtless acquired a belief in his personal as well as his 
official right to be heard on this vital subject. But his 
share in Cologan's mission seems to me to have been ill 
advised, like so many other proceedings of his which I have 
been compelled to criticize, in their official aspect, and with- 
out personal malice toward a man who, I believe, was sadly 
and often absurdly misled. 

On February 17 the terms of a bargain were arranged, 
the parties thereto being Huerta and the representatives of 
the various elements in the Diaz-Mondragon association. 
Involved in that bargain were the lives of four men, Fran- 
cisco and Gustavo Madero, Jose Maria Pino Suarez and 
Adolfo Basso. 

These men were subsequently murdered, all of them — 
for the form of a trial in Basso's case has nO' moral value. 

The world was shocked by the killing of Francisco Ma- 
dero and Pino Suarez because they had been the President 
and Vice President of the Republic, and their deaths were 
taken, not altogether wrongly, as an index of the civiliza- 
tion of Mexico. A government had been overthrown, and 
its chief had been killed, and this practise, familiar in his- 
tory, is supposed to have been outgrown by enlightened 
peoples. The crime was naturally charged against the con- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 293 

queror, the man who had risen to power in this wreck, Vic- 
toriano Huerta. 

Now what are the facts? I know far too much about 
Huerta to defend him as a merciful man, shrinking from 
bloodshed, governed in his acts by a nice sense of propriety, 
willing to lose the whole world for an ideal of right. But 
I know also what he was trying to do, what motives swayed 
him. He was entirely capable of feeling and yielding to 
revengeful impulses, but he was sane, requiring to be aroused 
to vengeance by adequate sense of injury. Toward none 
of the four men named had Huerta enough personal ani- 
mosity at this time to account for even a loss of temper. 

The President and Huerta had quarreled about the gap 
in the vouchers which has been referred to, and in addition 
there had been some jealousy on both sides. But Huerta 
knew the right and wrong of this matter, and cared little 
about it now. He had no love for Madero, and no real 
hatred. This is abundantly proved by his behavior at the 
conferences where Madero's life was demanded. 

He disliked Pino Suarez and would not have lifted a 
finger to save him, nor would he have made an equal efifort 
in the other direction, to kill him. 

He was far from having anything against Basso. On 
the contrary, he owed a debt of gratitude to the intendente 
of the Palace for his agency in preventing the entry of Gen- 
eral Bernardo Reyes. But Basso was not worth saving 
at any sacrifice. His demonstrated loyalty to Madero dis- 
qualified him for immediate usefulness to Huerta, and he 
was not ari important figure, like some other loyal men who 
represented parties and interests, and could be forced, 
through desire to save their country, into effective service 
to the new regime. Basso was a pawn in a bad position, 
and it is said that when his death was angrily demanded, 
Huerta answered with a grim and cynical smile. 



294 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

In the conference on February 17 already referred to, 
there was plenty of shrill anger and of genuine Mexican 
desire for vengeance, overruling sober judgment, and blind- 
ing men to the trick which was being played upon them at 
that very moment. But Huerta was the trickster; it was 
he that was weaving the emotions of the others into a robe 
of authority for his own shoulders, and any one who pic- 
tures him as a bloodthirsty soldier rudely gratifying his re- 
sentments in the hour of triumph is absurdly mistaken. A 
truer picture would be that of an able, crafty, half-educated 
savage, hiding in his breast the fierce hunger of ambition, 
and more anxious to devour the men with whom he was at 
that moment bargaining than to butcher adversaries already 
overthrown. 

He did not haggle over Pino Suarez, knowing that the 
man was unpopular with all parties and that his death would 
cause no stir. But toward the killing of Gustavo Madero 
the attitude of Huerta was very different. In the first place 
he understood thoroughly the motives which actuated those 
who clamored for Gustavo's death. Gustavo had stood in 
the way of men who had been making money through graft 
in army supplies and in other dealings with the Govern- 
ment. This was not the sole cause of animosity against 
him, but it was the principal one. 

Huerta was not in the least deceived by this anger of 
the trousers pocket. He himself was an unscrupulous 
lover of money. He did not believe that Gustavo's conduct 
had been unselfish or based upon honesty, — probably did 
not care whether it had or not ; but he respected Gustavo for 
his courage and despised many of his enemies as cowards. 
Personally, his opinion was that it would make less trouble 
and be in all ways much better for himself, if Gustavo 
should be sent out of the country with a whole skin. 

But those in the conference who represented the views 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 295 

of Rodolfo Reyes insisted that Gustavo Madero had been 
chiefly responsible for the death of Rodolfo's father, and 
ought to die. Certain military men, notably Manuel Mon- 
dragon, supported this view and argued that Gustavo de- 
served death for violating the laws of war by his assumption 
of command at the Palace. These accusations were ninety^ 
nine per cent, mere expressions of hatred, and Huerta knew 
it perfectly well, but the indictments were so numerous and 
disclosed a feeling so deep and so widely shared, that Huerta 
yielded, solely from motives of policy. 

He could not be made to believe, however, that a sound 
policy had any place in it for the killing of Francisco Ma- 
dero which he saw clearly to be an egregious blunder. He 
at first refused point blank to listen to the suggestion, and 
the conference was deadlocked on this matter. Argument 
was long and violent — that is, by the advocates of the 
measure; Huerta himself said little. It was urged that 
there could be no peace in Mexico as long as Francisco 
Madero should be permitted to live. This opinion was ad- 
vanced not only by the hot-heads, but by the more sober 
advocates of business interests. Unless this blood should 
be shed, the thirty pieces of silver in the form of renewed 
national prosperity would not be paid. 

Against Huerta on this point was arrayed the strongest 
combination that he had faced. Representatives of all in- 
terests seemed to be united ; and as Huerta surveyed the 
situation with his own ambition flaring up from his savage 
breast to light his clever brain, he foresaw the disfavor of 
many parties, should he stand out for what he knew to be 
the wiser course. The Diaz-Mondragon-Reyes-de la Barra 
combination, as represented in the conference, was solid 
for Madero's death and Huerta stood alone for the man's 
life. 

He finally opposed the policy in words, speaking with 



296 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

some freedom. The execution of Madero — for it must 
not be supposed that these acts were discussed as murders, 
but only in the manner of prejudgments of regular pro- 
ceedings — would hamper the provisional president in many- 
ways. Foreign relations which would be difficult enough 
at the best, would be seriously complicated by the trial of 
Madero for a capital offense — with the inevitable result. 
For his own part, said General Huerta, he would rather take 
the chances of success with Madero alive and conspiring, 
than to cope with the protests which would come from va- 
rious nations if Madero should be dealt with in the desired 
manner. Even in Mexico the execution, he predicted, would 
provoke strong, dangerous and lasting resentment. Nor 
did Huerta agree in so many words, at that conference, that 
Madero should be put to death. 

With the adroitness of a good bargainer he swung the dis- 
cussion to the cabinet, and quite readily accepted the one 
that was handed to him ready made, with Francisco Leon 
de la Barra, as its head, Manuel Mondragon as Min- 
ister of War, Vera Estanol as Minister of Public Instruc- 
tions, and Rodolfo Reyes as Minister of Justice. In fact, 
he was well pleased, believing that these four men coming 
into his Government would greatly strengthen his position 
with reference to three of the essential groups which his 
analysis had revealed. As to the other, largest of them all, 
his own immediate public and the world beyond, there was 
not much need for fear that they would fail to read the 
lesson which he had written in letters of blood in the streets 
of the capital. 

Two other members of the projected cabinet represented 
solid strength. These were Alberto Garcia Granados as 
Minister of Gobernaclon and Toribio Esqulvel Obregon as 
Minister of Finance. Believing himself to be the best sol- 
dier in Mexico Huerta reasoned that if he should assume 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 297 

the Presidency backed by this strong representation of 
wealth and power he could laugh at Maderism and the peon 
element which was its chief asset. 

And Felix Diaz, the man who stood in the limelight, who 
had taken all the chances of heading the uprising, and who 
had been cheered on by his friends and backers as their 
ideal for the presidential office — what of him ? 

That question already had been disposed of; Felix Diaz 
would be the candidate for constitutional president whom 
all, including Huerta, would support in general elections 
to be held later on — a most admirable arrangement. Let 
the election be set, in the privacy of Huerta's mind, for 
the first Tuesday after the first Monday following the Day 
of Judgment. 

For suggestion as to the outward and visible method by 
which the cessation of hostilities was to be brought about, 
and the general agreement of peace and amity officially 
concluded, the conference was indebted to Senator de la 
Barra. The American Ambassador was the proper per- 
son to carry on the negotiations, and the American Em- 
bassy the place. The Ambassador, in fact, had already 
agreed to act as mediator, if he should be requested. Let 
General Huerta make such a proposal to him in formal 
terms — after the preliminary steps had been taken at the 
National Palace, consisting of the arrest of the President, 
Vice President and the members of the cabinet. 

This suggestion received the hearty approval of all, as 
pointing to an arrangement of great strategic value which 
would secure full sanction of their course by the official 
representative of the United States. But it was urged 
that certain additional guarantees of Huerta's firmness 
should be forthcoming prior to such a meeting, namely, 
the arrest of Gustavo Madero and Adolfo Basso. 

To this Huerta did not demur; but when the previous 



298 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

question was called up to decide the fate of Francisco 
Madero he evaded it. Dispensing with all formalities and 
omitting the extravagant expressions of regard usual on 
such occasions in Mexico and elsewhere, he abruptly rose 
and departed, leaving the other gentlemen to interpret his 
action as they saw fit. 

This conference was held at the meeting place which had 
been used by representatives of the same interests during 
the preceding days of turmoil in the city. The meetings 
had begun on Monday, the loth, when de la Barra con- 
ferred with Huerta alone; they had continued, with other 
interests represented, during the succeeding days while 
progress was made in the general campaign, that strenu- 
ous campaign of popular education which also was to pre- 
pare the mind of Felix Diaz for the inevitable change of 
program. 

This meeting place was a room in the great white resi- 
dence building on Calle Bucareli at the corner of Calle 
General Prin which since the days of President de la Barra 
had been used as the headquarters of the Department of 
Gobernacion. It had been erected by a Mexican gentle- 
man who had found it too elaborate a residence for him- 
self, and had made earnest efforts to sell or lease it to the 
United States Government to be used as an Embassy. Not 
succeeding in this, the owner had disposed of the property, 
including its beautiful gardens reaching back to the quiet 
Calle Limantour, to the Government of Porfirio Diaz while 
Ramon Corral was playing the dual role of Vice-President 
of the Republic and Minister of Gobernacion ; but the im- 
posing mansion was not utilized as the headquarters of 
Gobernacion until Emilio Vasquez Gomez was placed at the 
head of that department by the treaty between the Mader- 
istas and the Diaz envoys in May, 191 1. 

The Department of Gobernacion was now, in February, 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 299 

1913, headed by Licenciado Rafael Hernandez, the Presi- 
dent's cousin, who since the 9th of the month had re- 
mained at the Palacio Nacional, thus leaving the coast 
clear, not by design, of course, for the unnoted coming and 
going of prominent men who might logically have business 
with the Department. 

The passing in and out of Senator de la Barra or Sen- 
ator Calero or Rodolfo Reyes would be regarded as peculiar 
by no one. Mondragon himself might have called without 
exciting remark. And as for the ubiquitous Huerta — 
who could challenge the movements or the motives of the 
Commander in Chief? 

The location of the Gobernacion building emphasizes its 
adaptability to these uses. It is isolated by many interven- 
ing city blocks from all other government offices, and it is 
not more than six hundred feet distant in an air line from 
the Arsenal which stands out in unobstructed view from its 
broad front porch. A battery, on the roof of Gobernacion 
could have torn the Arsenal to atoms, which is one reason 
why no guns were ever planted there. 

The events of the following day, February 18, succeeded 
each other with perfect precision of movement. At twelve 
o'clock General Aureliano Blanquet, tall, dignified, wearing 
an elegant black dress uniform and accompanied by En- 
rique Zepeda, a relative of General Huerta's, Lieutenant 
Colonel Jimenez Riveroll and several other officers of the 
so-called Government army, entered the private offices of 
President Madero without previous announcement and 
ranged themselves before his desk. With the President 
were several of his military aides and his cousin, Marcos 
Hernandez, brother of the Minister of Gobernacion. 

General Blanquet plunged at once into the business which 
had brought him. He told the President that he must re- 
sign, that the country had gone from bad to worse, that it 



300 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

was useless to attempt to take the Arsenal, and that Mexi- 
can soldiers were slaying their brothers in bloody and un- 
necessary combat in the streets of the capital. He said 
that a change was demanded and that he had come for the 
purpose of insisting that it be effected at once. 

The President replied that he could not consent to re- 
sign; that he was willing to arrange for the cabinet and 
the Vice-President to do so, but that as head of the Gov- 
ernment he should remain at the post to which he had been 
elected by the free voice of the Mexican people. 

Blanquet's answer terminated verbal negotiations ; it was 
comprised in the four words, " You are my prisoner." 

Instantly the military aides drew their revolvers and 
fired. Lieutenant Colonel Riveroll fell dead, one other of- 
ficer was mortally hurt, and Enrique Zepeda was wounded 
in the hand. 

Prompt return of the fire killed Marcos Hernandez out- 
right and wounded two of the aides. A hand to hand 
struggle followed in which the President and his party were 
'overpowered and made prisoners. Before one o'clock, 
Vice-President Pino Suarez and every member of the cab- 
inet except two were placed under arrest. 

At ten minutes of two Gustavo Madero was arrested at 
the Gambrinus restaurant on Avenida San Francisco, where 
he had been lunching with Huerta and others. Shortly 
before the time set for the arrest a messenger came to call 
the general away upon some business, real or mythical. 

" I have no revolver," said Huerta, turning to Gustavo. 
" Will you lend me yours ? " 

" Certainly," replied Gustavo, and obligingly disarmed 
himself. 

He was arrested a few minutes later; and at half-past 
two Adolfo Basso was taken into custody. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 301 

General Huerta returned to his office in the entresol of 
the National Palace which he had occupied as military com- 
mander of the capital. His first act was to despatch a note 
to Ambassador Wilson which began with these words : 

" I have in my power as prisoners in the National 
Palace, the President of the Republic and his Minis- 
ters, and having taken this course I beg that Your Ex- 
cellency will interpret my conduct as a manifestation 
of highest patriotism in one who has no other ambition 
than that of serving his country." 

The note ended as follows: 

" If Your Excellency would do me the kindness of 
putting the matter before the rebels who are in the 
cuidedela (arsenal) not only I, but my countrymen as 
well, would be bound by a new tie of gratitude to your- 
self and the ever glorious American people. 

" With the same respect which I have always enter- 
tained for Your Excellency, I remain, 

" Your obedient servant, 

" VicTORiANO Huerta." 

The Ambassador returned two notes, which were received 
by General Huerta at half-past four. He wrote one of 
them as American Ambassador, the other as dean of the 
diplomatic corps. The former concluded thus : 

" I have also unofficially communicated the events 
related in your note to General Diaz, and shall imme- 
diately send him a formal note. I have the honor to 
be Your Excellency's obedient servant, 

" Henry Lane Wilson." 

After despatching his note to the Ambassador, and be- 
fore the answ^ers arrived Huerta addressed communications 



302 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress, and 
received authority which he telegraphed at once to the gov- 
ernors of all the states and to the jefes politicos of the 
territories in these terms: 

" By direction of the Senate, I have assumed charge 
of the Government. President Madero and his Cab- 
inet are prisoners in my power." 

Meanwhile the news had spread throughout the city and 
crowds were gathering in the streets which opened on the 
Plaza. They were held back by guards until ten minutes 
past five, when the sixteen bells of the great cathedral rang 
out in a wild discord of sound which was generally in- 
terpreted as heralding the dawn of peace. The guards 
then drew back and that same " many headed monster 
thing" which had demanded the resignation of Porfirio 
Diaz and welcomed Francisco Madero as the savior of 
the people, now rushed tumultuously forward with vi-vas 
for the man who held Madero prisoner. At half-past five 
Huerta and Blanquet appeared on the balcony of the Pal- 
ace, and the Plaza quaked with peon joy as Huerta, the 
hero of the hour, greeted the multitude with the patriotic 
announcement : 

" Mexicans, brothers : there will be no more can- 
nonading. Peace has come." 

At eight o'clock that same night General Huerta met 
Felix Diaz in the American Embassy in pursuance of ar- 
rangements made by the Ambassador, and concluded a com- 
pact by which the cabinet agreed upon in the secret confer- 
ence of the previous day was mutually accepted, and Felix 
Diaz was formally placed on the presidential waiting list. 
When the document setting forth the understanding in de- 
tail had been duly signed by the contracting parties, they 
gave out to the press the following joint proclamation: 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 303 

''' To the Mexican People: 

" The unendurable and distressing situation through 
which the capital of the republic has passed obliged the 
army, represented by the undersigned, to unite in a 
sentiment of fraternity to achieve the salvation of the 
country ; in consequence the nation may be at rest ; 
all liberties compatible with order are assured under 
the responsibility of the undersigned chiefs who at 
once assume command and administration in so far as 
is necessary to afford full guarantees to nationals and 
foreigners, promising that within seventy-two hours 
the legal situation will have been duly organized. 

" The army invites the people on whom it relies to 
continue in the noble attitude of respect and modera- 
tion which it has hitherto observed ; it also invites all 
revolutionary factions to unite for the consolidation of 
National peace. 

" Felix Diaz. V. Huerta. 
" Mexico, February 18, 1913." 

The downfall of Madero had been accomplished. The 
influences which had tacitly or actively contributed to this 
end had now achieved their desires. The knell of Consti- 
tutional government in Mexico had been rung, and Vic- 
toriano Huerto, by virtue of his own adroitness, reigned in 
its stead. 



CHAPTER XVI 

IT has been shown how the new order of things in Mex- 
ico came into existence through a bargain by which 
the demands of various persons and groups were sup- 
posed to have been met. Among the considerations in the 
contract were the deaths of four men. Settlement began 
at once. The signing of a tangible document by Huerta 
and Diaz, in the American Embassy on the night of Feb- 
ruary 1 8, marks the completion of the intangible and in- 
visible contract that has been mentioned. Huerta and Diaz 
signed at 9:15 o'clock, according to the notation on the in- 
strument, but in fact the ceremonial was not completed 
till eleven. At that same hour Gustavo Madero and 
Adolfo Basso were taken from the National Palace by sep- 
arate escorts to the Mondragon-Diaz headquarters at the 
Arsenal. 

At half-past one in the morning, after being held in the 
Arsenal two hours, and subjected, it is said, to many in- 
sults and even to physical torture, Gustavo was marched 
from the building by an escort of twelve soldiers, who took 
him toward the Palace. The story subsequently told by 
the guards is that the prisoner made a dash for liberty as 
they were passing the little park close by the Arsenal, 
whereupon the commander of the escort, a former aide to 
General Bernardo Reyes, drew a revolver and fired. Gus- 
tavo fell at the first shot, and then the guard fired into his 
body, which showed twelve wounds, all from revolver bul- 
lets. Later it was carried back into the Arsenal and be- 

304 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 305 

came item number one in the fulfilment of the " peace pact " 
made in the conference of February 17. 

The next item was checked off with greater formality. 
At three o'clock that morning, February 19, Adolfo Basso 
was killed by a firing squad in front of the Arsenal. He 
faced his executioners bravely, tore his coat open to expose 
his breast, shouted " Viva Mexico " and called upon the 
men to fire. The first volley killed him, all the bullets en- 
tering his body. 

The other items of the pact, to wit, the death of Francisco 
I. Madero and that of Pino Suarez, were delayed in set- 
tlement but there was never a well-founded doubt as to the 
eventual closing of the account. Assurances from any or 
all of the opponents of Madero were valueless and to place 
reliance upon them was inexcusable folly. The two men 
were in Huerta's power ; it was probable that of his own will 
when sober he would not order them to be killed but it was 
certain that he would not effectually protect them from 
those who desired their death. The crime which shocked 
the world was in plain sight, just ahead. 

Huerta's chief interest lay in the matters directly con- 
nected with his own accession to power. For a little while 
the saving of Madero's life was one of these, and Suarez 
too was under the same segis of expediency. The resigna- 
tions of both men were to be obtained. 

Brief delays occurred in the preliminaries to the organi- 
zation of a government. The agreement signed in the 
American Embassy was not made public till late the next 
day, because Jorge Vera Estafiol, one of the cabinet named 
in the document, refused to serve. This had been fore- 
seen, however, and the others addressed themselves to the 
task of bringing him into line. The post of Minister of 
Public Instruction was not political, they argued, and his 
name carried weight. Senor Estafiol had held this port- 



3o6 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

folio, under Diaz and under de la Barra. Surely he would 
come in now to help at this, the gravest hour in the Repub- 
lic's life. 

But Estaiiol (who was counsel for more than forty 
American corporations including Phelps Dodge & Co., 
whose legal adviser had been Manuel Calero up to April, 
191 1 ) held out for hours. In that same white mansion 
which housed the Department of Gobernacion and which 
had been the meeting place of the men who pulled the politi- 
cal wires of the country, the issue with Vera Estafiol was 
fought to an end. To avoid invalidating the agreement 
which Diaz and Huerta had signed at the American Em- 
bassy, Senor Estahol finally consented. It was then that 
the document was published, and the members of Madero's 
cabinet who had been arrested were released, all excepting 
Pedro Lascurain handing in their resignations. 

At six o'clock in the evening of February 19, Congress 
was ordered in session to go through the formal process 
of setting up a new government. For three hours the leg- 
islators went through their paces deliberately, but at nine 
o'clock the proceedings were accelerated and the resigna- 
tions of Francisco I. Madero, Jr., and Jose Maria Pino 
Suarez as President and Vice-President were submitted to 
the Chamber of Deputies. 

There are persons who profess to know how these resig- 
nations were procured, but I do not; no reasonable doubt, 
however, can exist that they were obtained under pressure 
and therefore were invalid. But no one at that session of 
the Chamber thought it prudent to challenge their genuine- 
ness, and it is remarkable that any members should have 
voted against the resolutions of acceptance which, having 
been duly prepared in committee, were passed at 10:15 by 
a vote of 123 to 4. 

At 10:34 Pedro Lascurain, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 307 

succeeded to the Presidency, taking the oath before both 
houses of Congress. His only official act was to name 
Victoriano Huerta as Minister of Gobernacion and after 
this appointment was confirmed, Lascurain presented his 
resignation as President, which at exactly eleven o'clock 
was accepted by the Chamber with but one dissenting vote. 
He had been President of Mexico for twenty-six minutes. 
In regard to the compliance of Lascurain it should be said 
that he could not prevent the carrying out of these plans, 
and that he lent his aid in the interests of peace. He had 
no faith in the new regime, and he left the country as soon 
as he could do so safely. 

The proceedings in Congress placed General Huerta in 
direct line of succession, as there was no Minister of For- 
eign Affairs, and the Minister of Gobernacion stands next 
in the constitutional order. At 11:15 Huerta took the 
oath. He then held a short informal reception in the 
Green Room of the Chamber and departed for the Palacio 
Nacional escorted by Chepultepec Forest Guards, and 
tumultuously cheered by the throngs which were massed in 
the streets. , 

All formalities having been complied with Victoriano 
Huerta was now Minister of Gobernacion, acting as Presi- 
dent of Mexico. It has since been held that he could not 
resign the office of Minister of Gobernacion without de- 
stroying his title to the presidential seat, and that in con- 
sequence no other minister of that department could be 
legally appointed until, or unless, Huerta's right to the 
Presidency had been established by a legal general election. 
The case of de la Barra is cited in support of this. As 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, he acted as President when 
Porfirio Diaz resigned, but no other minister could be ap- 
pointed, and the foreign office was carried on by the sub- 
secretary. If this reading of the Mexican constitution is 



3o8 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

correct, the acts of Ministers of Gobernacion in Huerta 
cabinets are probably invalid. 

But no one was paying attention to such trifles that 
night, surely not Huerta, who had attained the seat of 
power which had been the goal of his endeavors from the 
moment when Madero entrusted to him the command of 
the troops on February 9. In ten days of bogus warfare 
and underhand negotiation — tricking not only the Gov- 
ernment which he was in honor bound to support, but that 
Government's enemies also; false toward all, and serving 
his own ambitions only — he had won the coveted emi- 
nence. 

Those with whom he had bargained did not yet suspect 
the truth; they seemed to be sharers in the triumph. The 
deluded city, after the mockery of strife, rejoiced in the 
succeeding mockery of peace. The foolish public shouted 
for Huerta, and almost as loudly for Diaz, who had so con- 
fidingly stepped aside in the interests of harmony. With 
the vivas for these patriots were mingled others for the 
American Ambassador who had helped to establish order. 
Many politicians after lean months hoped for an era of 
spoils ; many merchants took their narrow thoughts to bed 
with them that night and were not kept awake. A few 
men of broad mind, equipped with intellectual method, 
easily and accurately analyzed the situation, finding no 
solid merit in the new regime. They foresaw much that 
has come to pass, despaired of their country more com- 
pletely than ever before, and sorrowfully resolved to leave 
it at the earliest opportunity. 

I have spoken of the resignations of Madero and Suarez 
as having been secured by unjustifiable means. Among 
these should be mentioned the promise of permission to 
depart safely and immediately from the city. It is per- 
haps conceivable that Huerta thought he saw a way to save 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 309 

the lives of these men and send them out of the city. It 
is more probable that the bargain was all the time in force 
by which their lives were forfeited. Nevertheless ostensi- 
ble arrangements were made for their departure. While 
the crowds in the streets were cheering for Huerta, Diaz 
and Ambassador Wilson, on the evening of February 19 an 
anxious group was waiting in the Buena Vista Station of 
the ]\Iexican Railway for two persons who never came. 

In the station shed a special train of two Pullman cars 
stood ready. It had been there since ten o'clock, and by 
midnight the passengers for whom it was supposed to have 
been prepared had arrived, all but the two that may be 
held the most important. Mrs. Madero and Mrs. Suarez 
were there, and with them many members of both families. 
Their baggage was on the train ; the losers in the game of 
empire were that night to start for Vera Cruz and so to 
permanent exile. 

It is useless to speak of the mortal anguish which was 
endured in those hours of vain waiting. At two o'clock 
in the morning Pedro Lascurain arrived at the station, ac- 
companied by two lieutenants representing President 
Huerta. Lascurain brought the heart-breaking news that 
President Huerta had countermanded the order, and that 
the train would not leave that night. No explanation was 
forthcoming to comfort the stricken women, and Mrs. Ma- 
dero broke down for the first time since the revolt began. 
Unable to walk she was carried to an automobile and taken 
to the house of a friend of the family. 

In order to realize the full enormity of what followed, it 
must be borne in mind that the 20th, 21st and 22nd of 
February were still to pass before the tragic climax. It is 
true that the most lamentable error in this affair had al- 
ready been made, as will presently be explained, but there 
was still time for some intelligent effort at reparation. The 



3IO THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Foreign Offices of all important nations were advised of 
the probability that Madero and Suarez would be mur- 
dered. It was recognized, after a fashion, in Washington, 
and the Government of the United States placed itself on 
record as objecting in advance to the summary execution 
of the deposed President and Vice-President. News of 
this action was given to the Associated Press, with the com- 
ment that in so doing the Government did not feel " that it 
had departed from its policy of strict neutrality." 

There is no reason to believe that the timidity revealed 
by this expression was generally welcome^ in the United 
States, or that It was rightly understood by any consider- 
able number of persons. Various manifestations indicated 
that active measures to prevent an impending, deplorable 
crime would have won applause. Out of Texas always 
comes something new about Mexico, and now — on Feb- 
ruary 21 — more than forty members of the legislature pe- 
titioned their United States Senators, Culberson and Shep- 
pard, to use their influence to prevent the execution of 
Madero. 

" We believe," said they, " that Madero has been a credit 
to Mexico and far ahead of his people. His merciful, hu- 
mane government is universally recognized and because of 
his leniency the men have been permitted to live who now 
desire to destroy him." 

Meanwhile in Mexico City diligent efforts were made to 
blacken Madero's character. A copy of the " list of twenty- 
two " which had been furnished to Gustavo was found in 
the deposed President's possession, and it was said to carry 
the ominous title of " Those who should die." Press cor- 
respondents telegraphed this everywhere, and the inference 
was that Madero was a tyrant who had made up the list 
himself and labeled it for convenient reference. Madero 
was also charged with being an epileptic, with being insane 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 311 

and with having issued a general anti-American order to 
all governors of states. 

It was charged that he had fired the shot which killed 
Lieutenant-Colonel Riveroll when the latter entered the 
President's office with General Blanquet, and that the exe- 
cution of General Ruis, and Colonel Morelos, Commandant 
of the Palace, was by Madero's arbitrary order without 
formality. For these crimes he was to be placed on trial. 

On the forenoon of Thursday, February 20, Mrs. Madero 
and Mrs. Suarez were permitted to visit their husbands at 
the National Palace, where they were under guard in the 
offices long occupied by Intendente Basso, who had been 
killed in the early morning of the I9.th. It does not appear 
that the ex-President suggested to his wife any important 
course of action toward his own safety. He expressed 
hope, but it is extremely doubtful whether he really enter- 
tained any. If he did it must have been based upon the 
remnants of his peculiar superstitions. 

He was a spiritualist, and had come by it honestly, for 
his father indulged similar fancies. The younger Fran- 
cisco had believed from the beginning of his crusade that 
he was shielded, guided and enlightened by the Divine In- 
telligence working through beings in the world beyond. 
The inevitable crudity marked these imaginings, and Fran- 
cisco dealt with his Maker through the humble intermediary 
of a dead Indian's soul. A series of coincidences, helped 
by the usual forced interpretation of elastic oracles, had 
seemed to establish a high degree of credibility for this 
fantastic counsellor. The optimism which I have men- 
tioned was probably a cause rather than an effect of these 
revelations, and Francisco unconsciously dictated to his 
familiar spirit those promises in which he placed reliance 
— promises that his life should be preserved and his mind 
inspired for honorable and efficient service to his country. 



312 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Doubtless whatever portion of sincerity might be discov- 
ered in the charge that Madero was insane sprang from the 
story of his hearkening to the dead — which is amusing, in 
superstitious Mexico. And indeed on the whole face of the 
footstool there exist but a handful of human beings whose 
brains are not inhabited by superstitions baseless as his. 
Every question of the day, widely discussed, provides abun- 
dant proof. To commune with the ghost of an Indian on 
affairs of state, and to believe, for instance, that nature 
has an intelligent interest in the proper mating of the sexes, 
are equally absurd, both being mere survivals of a primitive 
demonology, but it happens that the former can be more 
sanely supported than the latter. 

Mrs. Madero was not a spiritualist, though the fabri- 
cators of Madero myths portrayed her as a medium, the 
central figure in the seances at her home. The truth is that 
she was unconvinced but not contemptuous, a moderate 
disbeliever, loving her husband, and naturally drawn toward 
anything in which he was interested, but restrained upon 
the other side by common sense. She had shared with 
fortitude Francisco's early disappointments, and his perils 
whenever this was possible. She had sympathized with his 
hopes, and rejoiced in his sudden and surprising triumph, 
though not without foreboding. What she had never 
shared was his conviction that he would be protected, super- 
naturally or otherwise, from the malice of his enemies. She 
had beheld him sitting in the presidential chair with a 
black curtain hanging just behind him, which might at any 
moment be pushed forward by invisible hands to enfold 
him and to hide him from her eyes forever. This long, 
vague anticipation of disaster intensified her fear for him 
after his fall from power. 

The murder of Gustavo, too plainly ominous to be mis- 
read, was known to her but not to Francisco. She did not 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 313 

tell him. She asked as to his discomforts and what could 
be done to ameliorate them; gave him such encouragement 
as she could, and promised to come again in the afternoon. 
This she did, but the guards refused to admit her. They 
told her that the prisoner was now held incommunicado. 

She then rightly regarded the situation as desperate to 
the last degree, and after consultation with such advisers 
as were available, she took the only course which seemed 
open toward any help. Comprehending Mexico she knew 
that it would be mere folly to rely upon the word of the 
men who had risen to power. Protection for her husband, 
if it were to have the least solidity, must come from outside 
the arena where prejudice, hatred and ambition had fought 
out their combat to its present stage. Her only possible 
resort was to the representatives of foreign powers in the 
capital, and the highest of these in rank was Ambassador 
Wilson. She knew perfectly well that he was no friend of 
her husband's, but on the other hand it was not to be sup- 
posed that he would countenance assassination. 

Accompanied by her sister-in-law, Sefiorita Mercedes 
Madero, she went to the Embassy, in the afternoon of Feb- 
ruary 20, and entreated Mr. Wilson to prevent the murders 
which were imminent. She pleaded for the life of Suarez 
as well as for that of Madero. Mr. Wilson told her that he 
had received assurances regarding her husband's safety; 
that the new government did not desire his death, but on the 
contrary would protect him. As to Suarez, the Ambassa- 
dor declined to express himself so confidently and clearly. 
Mrs. Madero understood Mr. Wilson to say that Suarez 
might " disappear," that there was strong feeling against 
him because he had been a leader of the Porro (contemptu- 
ous term for the Progressives), and that his fate was uncer- 
tain. 

The effect upon Mrs. Madero's mind was merely to re- 



314 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

inforce her conviction that there was no uncertainty as to 
the fate of either of the prisoners ; that both would be killed 
unless there should be immediate intervention in their be- 
half. She besought Mr. Wilson to give them a refuge in 
the Embassy, and to protect them under the flag of the 
United States, and by his own direct and powerful influ- 
ence with the persons who had overthrown the Govern- 
ment of Mexico. The Ambassador responded by repeat- 
ing his previous utterances. 

Mrs. Madero then begged him to send to the President 
of the United States a message which had been written by 
her husband's mother. As the telegraph and cable offices 
were now controlled by Huerta such a message would have 
small chance of being forwarded unless in code and with 
authority behind it. The Ambassador replied that this com- 
munication was unnecessary. He took the writing, how- 
ever, and put it into his pocket. 

These are the essentials of the interview. Mrs. Madero 
derived no comfort from Mr. Wilson's expressions because 
she appreciated the situation, and knew that the Ambassa- 
dor must be relying upon empty words if he really believed 
that her husband would be efficiently protected by those 
who had overthrown him. That he did believe what he 
had said to her there can be no doubt, though his error now 
seems to have lain at the most distant extremity of reason- 
able judgment, if not beyond. As to what may be called 
the basis of his opinion, there were assurances given when 
the resignations of Madero and Suarez were obtained, and 
upon other occasions, but it is unnecessary to discuss their 
value. 

It is possible that Mrs. Madero or some other member 
of the family would have been able to send a telegram to 
President Taft without the assistance of the Ambassador, 
for a message dated February 20, from Luis Manuel Rojas, 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 315 

a member of the Mexican lower house, seems to have been 
received in Washington. Sefior Rojas has exhibited a reply 
as follows: 

Mr. Luis M. Rojas, 

Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of Mexico, etc. 

Sir: The Department acknowledges the receipt by 
reference hither from the President to whom it was 
addressed, of your telegram of February 20 requesting 
that this Government do all it can to save the lives of 
Francisco I. Madero and Jose Maria Pino Suarez. 

In reply you are informed that this Department had, 
as a matter of course, several days prior to the death of 
Madero and Suarez, and immediately after their ar- 
rest, informed the authorities of Mexico City, through 
the Embassy, of the unfortunate effect which would 
be produced in this country by an unjust or improper 
treatment of the deposed President and Vice-President. 

I am, sir, etc., 

(Signed) Knox. 

No response was ever received to the message asking 
President Taft to save the life of Madero — that message 
written by the unfortunate prisoner's mother, and intrusted 
by his wife to the Ambassador of the United States for 
transmission two days before the murders. On March 2, 
eight days after her appeal had been justified by the crime 
she had striven to prevent, the widow of Madero sent from 
Havana a letter of inquiry addressed to President Taft, 
begging to know whether the message of February 20 had 
ever come to his hands. This also remained unanswered. 
Doubtless it reached Washington after the accession of 
. President Wilson. 

These vain pleas have only a passing sentimental inter- 
est. It is not to be supposed that the Washington Govern- 
ment could have been stirred to greater activity by any- 
thing except a better view of the situation in Mexico City, 



3i6 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

interpreted by some peculiarly enlightened patriot who could 
foresee what price the United States would have to pay for 
those two lives which might so easily have been saved. 
Merely to predict their doom required no major prophet, 
surely not after the murder of Gustavo Madero. Neither 
should it have been difficult to form an opinion that Wood- 
row Wilson, who was to succeed to the presidency a few 
days later, would not recognize Huerta stained by the blood 
of his predecessor. But these matters fall to be consid- 
ered later. 

What happened in Mexico City is somewhat obscure as 
to detail, but is in its essence very simple. Madero and 
Suarez remained prisoners in the National Palace, and 
their situation was unchanged by anything that occurred 
on February 21. On the following day Provisional Presi- 
dent Huerta issued his declaration of iron rule in the fol- 
lowing 

" MANIFESTO TO THE NATION 

" In assuming, through the operation of the law, the 
office of Provisional President of the republic, by virtue 
of the resignation of the President and Vice-President 
I must make an appeal to the patriotism of all good. 
Mexicans that they will come forward to cooperate 
with the new government in the reestablishment of 
public peace. The country, in the terrible crisis 
through which it is passing, needs the united effort of 
all its sons, in order to be saved from the anarchy 
which menaces it. 

" In order to assist me in my administrative labors, 
I have called to my side men of good will without 
distinction of political parties. They come without 
animosity for the past, without desire for revenge, 
without any other aspiration than that of putting an 
end to the fratricidal strife which is destroying us and 
of restoring guarantees for the lives and properties of 
nationals and foreigners throughout the republic. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 317 

" I trust that all Mexicans will aid me in this patri- 
otic work which aims at saving- our very nationality, 
which may be jeopardized, and of restoring to the 
country the tranquillity which it so much needs for the 
development of its resources, and I also hope that the 
methods of conciliation which the Government is initi- 
ating will suffice for the end which I propose to myself ; 
but if, unfortunately, bad citizens, blinded by passion, 
insist on prolonging the strife or opposing obstacles to 
the Government by violent means, I shall not hesitate 
an instant in adopting the measures of rigor that may 
be necessary for the rapid restoration of public peace. 
The welfare of our country demands it. 

" General Victoriano Huerta. 
" Mexico, February 22, 1913." 

A few hours later, on the night of Saturday, February 
22., 1913, the two remaining items of the " peace pact " 
were checked off as settled in full. Just before midnight, 
with some attendant mystery rather crudely contrived, 
Madero and Suarez were slain. 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE newspapers of Monday morning, February 24, 
19 1 3, carried an official statement by the new Mexi- 
can Government which had been issued at three 
o'clock on Sunday morning, February 23, three hours after 
the deaths of Madero and Suarez were alleged to have oc- 
curred. The statement was signed by Provisional President 
Huerto and began as follows: 

"At 12 :30 o'clock this morning, I called together my 
cabinet to report that Madero and Pino Suarez, who 
were detained in the palace at the disposal of the De- 
partment of War, were taken to the penitentiary in 
accord with a decision as a result of which that estab- 
lishment was placed yesterday afternoon under the 
charge of an army officer for better security. When 
the automobiles had traversed about two-thirds of the 
way to the penitentiary, they were attacked by an 
armed group and the escort descended from the ma- 
chines to offer resistance. 

" Suddenly the group grew larger and the prisoners 
tried to escape. An exchange of shots then took 
place in which one of the attacking party was killed, 
two were wounded and both prisoners killed. 

" The automobiles were badly damaged." 

The document then described the means which would 
be employed in investigation of the affair, and closed with 
these words: 

" The Government promises that society shall be 
fully satisfied as to the facts in this case. The com- 
manders of the escort are now under arrest and the 
facts above recorded have been ascertained so as to 
clear up this unhappy event." 

318 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 319 

The British press on Monday morning, February 24, 
called upon the United States for intervention. The Stand- 
ard stigmatized the kilHng of Madero and Suarez as '' an 
indefensible crime, imposing a load of infamy on the new 
Mexican administration," and added that " American in- 
tervention can hardly be longer delayed." The Express 
urged the British Government to press for immediate ac- 
tion by Washington, saying that " revolution and anarchy 
do not wait on presidential etiquette." The Chronicle de- 
clared that IMadero was done to death by Huerta and asked 
what the United States would do. The Times was more 
explicit in its treatment. It said: 

" Civilized nations will put their own construction 
on the lame and halting story which the successful 
conspirators now ruling Mexico have chosen to issue. 
Unless it can be proved to the hilt, foreign observers 
will retain the opinion that the removal of the two 
Maderos and Suarez is only fresh proof that the innate 
ferocity of Mexican politicians and military adven- 
turers remains untamed. 

" The most for which the unhappy country can hope 
is the restoration of a rule not worse than that of 
Diaz." 

The last six words were a genuine contribution to critical 
history which should not be overlooked by any student. 

For an accurate view of the event which had caused so 
much noise in the world it is natural that the people of the 
United States should depend upon their Ambassador whose 
situation was so favorable to correct vision. He expressed 
himself publicly as follows : 

In the absence of other reliable information I am 
disposed to accept the Government's version of the 
manner in which the deposed President and Vice-Pres- 
ident lost their lives. Certainly the violent deaths of 
these persons were without Government approval, and 



320 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

if the deaths were the result of a plot it was of re- 
stricted character and unknown to the higher officers 
of the Government. 

Mexican public opinion has accepted this view of the 
affair, and it is not at all excited. The present Gov- 
ernment appears to be revealing marked evidence of 
activity, firmness and prudence, and adhesions to it, as 
far as I have been able to ascertain, are general 
throughout the republic, indicating the early reestab- 
lishment of peace. 

The Government as constituted is very friendly to 
the United States and is desirous of affording effective 
protection to all foreigners. 

For the present, American public opinion should deal 
with the situation calmly and accept with great reserve 
the lurid and highly colored stories which are being 
furnished by some few correspondents. The great 
majority of the correspondents here are endeavoring 
to deal fairly with the situation. 

Within doors at the Embassy, however. Ambassador 
Wilson was less optimistic. On the afternoon of February 
24, during a call from Senor de la Barra, who was now 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new cabinet, the Ambas- 
sador's voice was raised to an unusual volume in denuncia- 
tion of the crime and of the men who either had encour- 
aged or permitted it. 

Disregarding the presence of persons in adjoining rooms 
of the Embassy, to whom his words were distinctly audible, 
the Ambassador upbraided de la Barra personally for this 
incident which he said " smelled to Heaven as the blackest 
of infamies " and would " place the brand of murder upon 
the brow of every man of authority in the new govern- 
ment." Especially discrediting, he assured the polite Mexi- 
can statesman, would this bloodshed prove to de la Barra 
himself. 

Aside from other considerations, the Ambassador declared 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 321 

a personal grievance against his caller because of solemn 
assurance given by de la Barra that Madero's life would 
be spared. Eloquence and emphasis were so combined in 
this outburst of wrath that de la Barra, as he left the Em- 
bassy, shrank from the gaze of those who had been drawn 
from the other rooms by the noise of the encounter and 
who watched him go away. 

The call of Senor de la Barra had followed an official 
communication which he had issued on Sunday, as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, addressed to Ambassador Wilson and 
the other diplomats, setting forth at length the measures 
which the Government purposed taking to discover and 
chastise those who might be found guilty of the deed, and 
promising to supply the diplomatic corps with minutes of 
the judicial proceedings. The luncheon to which the Min- 
ister had invited the diplomatic corps for that Monday did 
not take place. 

Sensational accounts of the death of Madero and Suarez, 
at variance with the Government's report, spread through 
the capital and were telegraphed to newspapers everywhere. 
One such account declared that both Madero and Suarez 
were killed in the Palace early in the evening, after having 
been subjected to torture; and that their bodies were car- 
ried in the automobile to the penitentiary, where shots were 
fired to give color to the story of attack. The statement to 
the press by Major Francisco Cardenas, who commanded 
the escort, differed somewhat from the official account. 
The two automobiles had been fired upon, Cardenas said, 
as they were crossing the railway, by men lying down. 
He had returned the fire with his revolver and had ordered 
the chauffeurs to put on speed, and the ambush had been 
passed with no harm done to guard or prisoners. But 
when the cars approached the penitentiary another band of 
about twelve men had opened fire and in the resulting 



322 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

confusion both Senor Madero and Senor Pino Suarez had 
descended from the automobile and run toward the attack- 
ing party. Thus they had come between two fires and had 
been shot to death. 

The body of Madero, Major Cardenas said, disclosed 
wounds which must have been received in the manner de- 
scribed; that is, by a fire from front and rear. He said 
further that three of the assailants were dead on the field 
after the affair. 

This story was contradicted by the report of the autopsy 
made at the order of the Government, for it was therein 
stated that the body of Madero showed only one gun-shot 
wound, the bullet having entered at the base of the skull 
and lodged in the brain. There were abrasions on the fore- 
head, doubtless due to a fall. No member of the Madero 
family was permitted to be present at the autopsy. 

The account furnished by de la Barra on Sunday to the 
diplomatic corps, mentioned that one person, other than 
the prisoners, had been killed and two wounded, but that 
he had not been informed whether these had been of the 
assailants or of the escort. 

After painstaking effort to learn the truth I am inclined 
to discredit the report that the deposed President and Vice- 
President were killed in the Palace. I have examined va- 
rious accounts which place the crime there, some of them 
plausible, but none convincing. It is said that a man named 
Ocon was the chief of the assassins, and that an appropria- 
tion of 30,000 pesos, afterwards asked of the Mexican 
Congress, was the price of the deed. The hour is set early 
in the evening, when Huerta was attending a banquet given 
by the American Ambassador, who had the diplomatic corps 
as his other guests, the occasion being the birthday of 
George Washington. As Huerta is not charged with hav- 
ing an actual hand in the murders the alibi is- unimportant. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 323 

Moreover, I decidedly favor the theory that Madero and 
Suarez were taken from the Palace alive. 

Certain defenders of the Government have said that Mrs. 
Francisco I. Madero, Jr., knew that her husband was to be 
taken from the Palace to the penitentiary, and that she in- 
stigated an attempt to rescue him. They say further that 
Madero asked that a certain route be followed. This is 
supposed to indicate his knowledge of the plot; but the 
trouble is that the indication is so clear that it could not 
have escaped the notice of Major Cardenas, who, unless 
he desired to meet the rescue party, would certainly have 
chosen another way. In fact, he said that he did. 

Even to one who feels deeply the shameful nature of this 
tragedy it is difficult to deal seriously with the Mexican 
Government's defense. If the story of Major Cardenas 
is believed, the theory of a rescue must be dismissed, for it 
is obvious that the rescuers would never have fired upon a 
moving automobile containing the persons whom they de- 
sired to save. They would have put an obstacle in the 
way of the car, and would have rushed upon it, after it had 
stopped, in sufficient force to overawe the armed men whom 
it contained. I cannot imagine Mrs. Madero's trusting to 
any Mexican marksman to pick off the chauffeur and miss 
her husband; and this is not the worst of it, for there re- 
mains the even more forbidding chance that, at the first 
shots of an assault so ill arranged, the escort would kill the 
prisoners. 

A party of twelve men might have had some hope of suc- 
cess at the penitentiary, where the necessary halt could have 
been counted upon, and the affair managed with sufficient 
suddenness to snatch the captives away before their guards 
could shoot them. The difficulty is that Madero and Suarez 
were killed on the far side of the penitentiary, at a point 
beyond the entrance. Why they were taken to that spot 



324 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

at all, except to murder them more conveniently, has never 
been explained, but the fact is established, and the question 
arises, how did the rescuers know where to lie in wait? 
If they received intimations from Madero's enemies, it 
would seem that Cardenas must have been in the plot, or 
he would not have let the car go past the prison. But if 
he were a party to the attempt, why did it fail ? 

It is not well to waste words upon this matter. The 
theory of the rescue will not stand examination from any 
point of view ; the theory of deliberate murder Is supported 
by every probability. As to the place and time I have the 
testimony of two young Mexicans of my acquaintance who 
lived not far from the penitentiary, and who visited the 
scene about five o'clock in the morning. They saw blood 
upon the ground, and viewed it closely. I think they are 
not mistaken in their belief that the bodies of Madero and 
Suarez had lain upon the spots examined, and that the 
blood was theirs. Its quantity and appearance negatived 
the theory that the men were brought there dead, having 
been killed In the Palace. 

Except for the fact that the prisoners were carried be- 
yond the penitentiary, it would be easy to acquit Major 
Cardenas of blame. Pie would hardly have cared to lead 
the escort, if he had known that the party was to be fired 
upon. The etiquette in use for such affairs in Mexico would 
not have been strained by sending him upon such an er- 
rand unadvised, and stationing a squad to shoot prisoners 
and guard with one volley or as many more as might be 
necessary. His escape from injury is rather against him. 
At last accounts he was alive, and possibly the sole reposi- 
tory of the truth, for the three men who served under him 
in this expedition are dead. 

My own opinion is that there was no attack at any point, 
but I do not pretend to know exactly what took place. The 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 325 

details would be a proper subject of police inquiry, in a 
better ordered state. The single fact of importance in the 
present record is that Madero and Suarez were killed after 
the whole world had been warned of the probability, the 
practical certainty that such would be their fate. The 
L^nited States has paid, is paying, and will pay for this 
crime, a price which might appear to be sufficient expiation 
if exacted from the guilty. The cost of it, the shame of it, 
might have been avoided easily. 

Ambassador Wilson should have known, shortly after 
February 9, that the warfare in Mexico City was a farce, 
that Huerta had betrayed Madero and was in negotiations 
with the Mondragon-Diaz-de la Barra coalition probably 
with personal designs upon the Presidency. He should 
have suspected that Madero must soon fall, and that he and 
Gustavo and Suarez and others would be in danger. Per- 
haps the Ambassador might not have felt constrained to 
protect Gustavo, whose death was not likely to disturb the 
peace of nations, but he should certainly have foreseen that 
serious evils would follow the murder or summary execu- 
tion of the President and Vice-President. 

The exercise of common judgment and the use of his 
peculiar influence and advantages would have enabled Mr. 
Wilson to comprehend the bargaining that was under way 
and the passions and intents of the interested parties, and 
to perceive that at any moment he might successfully insert 
a stipulation of his own ; to wit, that when the President and 
Vice-President should be seized, they should immediately 
be sent unharmed to the American Embassy, there to re- 
main until such time as they could leave that refuge safely. 

If the Government at Washington had understood the 
situation and had looked into the future prudently, the Am- 
bassador would have been directed to take this course. 
Ponderous arguments may be made upon the other side, 



326 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

but they will be nonsense to any one who knows where the 
Ambassador really stood; and if his chief in the State De- 
partment did not know, let him now divide the responsi- 
bility for his ignorance with ex-Ambassador Wilson, upon 
any arithmetical basis that may suit them both. 

As to the effect of such a request or demand upon the 
negotiators in Mexico City, there can be no uncertainty, 
Huerta might have filled the circumambient air with curses, 
but inwardly he would have been delighted. His hand 
would have been strengthened to carry out the very policy 
which his own mind had formulated. The others in the 
conspiracy would have been unable to resist, at that critical 
hour when the fortunes of all of them hung in the bal- 
ance. 

To sum up, it matters little in precisely what way this 
blood was shed. The evidence against the actual assassins 
is not likely to be called for in any court. But it matters 
very much that the crime was not prevented ; that Madero 
and Suarez were not protected by the American flag. 

It would be unjust to Mr. Wilson to omit all mention of 
the praise which he won for his activity in protecting Amer- 
icans and others during the time of the terror In the Mexi- 
can capital. I will say frankly, however, that I think a 
greater injustice was done him through the foolish exag- 
geration of his heroism and efficiency. The plain truth 
about this matter would have been much better. Some of 
his relief work was well inspired and thoroughly done. He 
was greatly assisted by his wife, who had already won the 
regard of resident Americans, and who gained deservedly 
in their esteem by her intelligent, sympathetic and very val- 
uable services in this crisis. 

The Embassy became a relief center. An idea of what 
was done may be gained from the following translation of 
an account in El Diario of February 23 : 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 327 

" The American colony in Mexico City gave a new 
proof of the practical ability of the race during the 
days when firing was in progress in this city. 

" Opposite the United States Embassy the Ameri- 
cans established what may be called a city within a 
house. They there organized an asylum in which per- 
sons of American nationality having their homes in the 
danger zone might take refuge and at one time there 
were about locx) refugees. They founded a provisional 
bank by means of which they made remittances to the 
United States. They arranged a red cross hospital 
for the care of the wounded, in which the best Ameri- 
can surgeons of the city rendered their services, and 
they improvised a telegraph service, also handling 
cablegrams. 

" On the last day of the firing, the American colony 
were going to receive cablegrams from New York, sent 
free by the Sun for a small English daily for which a 
small printing office had been established. 

" Besides the American refugees there were many 
persons of other nationalities and even a fair number 
of Mexicans who were opportunely received into the 
curious institution in question. 

" It is said that in the American refuge everything 
needful was supplied, and no end of persons have 
thanked the American colony for its timely helpful- 
ness." 

In this work the Ambassador and his wife were natu- 
rally the leaders. Mr. Wilson went about the city in his car, 
risking his life within the danger zone, and rendering as- 
sistance to many persons. And because I believe that this 
work was in itself creditable, I regret the more that it should 
have been exploited in ways worse than questionable, for 
political ends by those who were determined not to lose an 
ambassador committed to the support of the newly risen 
Huerta administration, if they could possibly retain him. 
This is not to say that the Ambassador had no friends, no 
sincere admirers. He had both, and it is much to be regret- 



328 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

ted that those among them who possessed some grains of 
discretion did not succeed in controlling the conduct of the 
political and business combination which took the lead. 

At a special meeting of " the colony," held at the Ameri- 
can club on February 28, a committee on resolutions was 
appointed, the most influential member being George W. 
Cook, the merchant heretofore mentioned. The commit- 
tee's report contained 300 words in praise of the Ambassa- 
dor, fifty words for Mrs. Wilson, and 200 for all the other 
workers. Consul General Shanklin, who had been less 
conspicuous but no less serviceable than the Ambassador, 
was grouped with the Rosario Dairy and other objects of 
gratitude in a vote of thanks which held an average of six 
words for each. 

The committee's commendation of the Ambassador was 
cheered to the echo ; it consisted of an elaborate preamble 
with these appended resolutions: 

" Resolved : that the American colony recognize the 
fact that to the American Ambassador, the Hon. Henry 
Lane Wilson, they owe a debt of gratitude the magni- 
tude of which cannot be expressed in words, but which 
shall remain with them a cherished memory of the 
noble and patriotic services rendered under most try- 
ing conditions, which stamp him as an American of 
whom his countrymen may well feel proud, and to 
whom the American colony extends this humble token 
of appreciation. 

" Resolved : That a copy of these resolutions be 
engrossed and presented to the Honorable Henry Lane 
Wilson, American Ambassador, and that a copy also 
be sent to the State Department in Washington." 

The last line disclosed the object of the meeting. In 
four days a new administration would be inaugurated at 
Washington. The resolutions were the signal guns of the 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 329 

campaign to be waged for the Ambassador's retention at 
the Mexico post. 

On Monday, February 24, the bodies of the murdered 
President and Vice-President, which had been placed in 
coffins in the penitentiary with no member of either family 
present, were buried — Madero in the French cemetery and 
Suarez in the Spanish. The members of the immediate 
families were allowed to attend the ceremonies. Directly 
afterward the Maderos made all possible speed to leave 
Mexico City for Vera Cruz, whence they sailed for Ha- 
vana, accompanied by the Cuban minister, Manuel Mar- 
quez Sterling, who declined longer to represent his country 
at the Mexican capital. In due course the Maderos reached 
New York, in which city and its suburbs several of them 
now reside. On that February 24th the portraits and busts 
of General Diaz and the former ministers and presidents 
of Mexico which Madero had removed were restored to 
their original places in the Palacio Nacional. 

The Governments of Europe afltid the United States were 
now perplexed over diplomatic etiquette ; there was no official 
way in which they could give adequate expression to their 
sympathy. Neither Washington nor any of the European 
chancelleries found itself equal to the task of framing offi- 
cial condolence in terms that would not prematurely dis- 
close the condoler's attitude toward the vital subject of rec- 
ognition. 

The Washington Government had telegraphed Ambas- 
sador Wilson on February 19, commending the part he had 
taken in ending the Mexican trouble, and that day the As- 
sociated Press described the Washington attitude in the 
following terms : 

" If the constitutional forms are observed and Con- 
gress is freely allowed to elect a provisional President 



330 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

and take steps for providing for free general elections 
then the Washington Government will cordially and 
sympathetically support the efforts to establish a per- 
manent government." 

But the killing of Madero complicated matters and no 
one could be found north of the Rio Grande who was in- 
discreet enough to forecast what Washington's position 
would be. The Taft administration, however, was well 
placed for recognition, because its Ambassador had prac- 
tically committed it to such a course by his acts, and by 
his official statement on February 24, which has been 
quoted. 

It is idle to speculate as to the course which the Taft 
administration would have pursued, if it had remained in 
office. What it did do was to place some 9,000 troops con- 
venient to the Mexican border and despatch four battle- 
ships into Mexican waters. In deference to the Wilson 
administration, which was to succeed it nine days after the 
culmination of the Mexican tragedy, it declined to commit 
itself on the subject of recognition. It is said, in fact, that 
this logical method of dividing responsibility in the aggra- 
vating Mexican matter went far to reconcile President Taft 
to giving up the presidential office. The personal letter of 
Mr. Taft, written several weeks after his term had closed, 
to Ambassador Wilson in Mexico, and promptly published 
by the latter, seems to indicate that the incident of Madero's 
death had in no way affected Mr. Taft's generously favor- 
able judgment of the Ambassador and his acts. 

In Mexico itself the killing of Madero gave strong im- 
petus to movements adverse to Huerta, and justified that 
gentleman's judgment that a dead Madero was the worst 
of enemies. Venustiano Carranza, governor of Coahuila, 
and Abram Gonzalez, governor of Chihuahua, strong parti- 
sans of Madero, had been superseded by military officials. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 331 

and on February 28 the first real battle of a new and ap- 
parently endless war was fought a few miles north of 
Monclova in the state of Coahuila, and the Carranza forces 
were defeated. The northern belt of Mexico then sprang 
promptly into action and insurrectionary bands were soon 
operating in the states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, as 
well as in the states of Chihuahua and Coahuila. 

Governor Abram Gonzalez of Chihuahua was a man of 
character, ability, and jtidgment. To avoid plunging his 
state into war he had, after a short delay, accepted Huerta 
as Mexico's president. But his loyalty to Madero was too 
well known, and General Antonio Rabago, Huerta's mili- 
tary commander for that section, was directed to supersede 
him. Armed with credentials from Mexico City, Rabago 
threw Gonzalez into prison, and took possession of the gov- 
ernor's office. A few days later Gonzalez was placed on a 
train at night for transfer to another point. When the 
train had gone a few miles Gonzalez was dragged from the 
car by seven men, and killed in a manner too brutal for 
description. 

In the record of wholesale executions of prisoners that 
were reported from various quarters, Abram Gonzalez 
seemed to the general public but one unfortunate among 
hundreds who fell victims to the revival of the old tyranny ; 
but many Americans on both sides of the border who had 
known and greatly respected the man, were decisively in- 
fluenced by this conspicuous instance of brutality on the 
part of the new government. If helpless prisoners of such 
quality who had committed no crime were to be killed at 
the pleasure of their guards, the future of Mexico was dark 
indeed. 

The development of affairs in the far off northwestern 
state of Sonora soon became the greatest menace to Huerta's 
rule. The incidents which placed that state in opposition 



332 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

have never been fairly sketched in any printed record. 
They are of value in tracing American responsibility. 

General Huerta, on February i8, telegraphed to the gov- 
ernor of Sonora that he held Madero prisoner. Two days 
later he telegraphed again, announcing his elevation to the 
provisional presidency and demanding instant acceptance of 
the new order. To refuse meant war with consequent loss 
to many important American interests in that state, and 
with this in mind Louis Hostetter, United States Consul at 
Hermosillo, the capital of Sonora, used his strong personal 
influence to induce the state government to yield to 
Huerta's demand. He had succeeded in this when the as- 
sassination of Madero and Pino Suarez aroused resentment 
and overthrew the agreement. 

At this stage Mr. Hostetter received a telegram from 
Ambassador Wilson directing him to do everything in his 
power to induce Sonora to accept Huerta as president, and 
telling the consul that the majority of the Mexican states 
had already done so. Hostetter at once applied himself 
with increased vigor, and made such progress with the 
authorities that they directed him to request a list from the 
Ambassador of the states which he positively knew had 
accepted Huerta, promising that if this list showed an actual 
majority, Sonora would not hold out against the new ruler. 
The consul telegraphed this request with its assurances in 
the full belief that he had accomplished that which the Am- 
bassador had requested him to do; that the list would be 
immediately forthcoming, and that all would be well. 

Receiving no reply, Consul Hostetter telegraphed again 
urging the necessity for detailed information. Still there 
was no answer, whereupon the officials of Sonora declared 
themselves unwilling to wait for a trap to be sprung which 
would find them unprepared. The state congress or legis- 
lature then framed a resolution refusing allegiance to 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 333 

Huerta and also voted a leave of absence to Governor May- 
torena, who was believed to be too complacent toward the 
attempt of Huerta to reduce the state to a dependency of 
an absolute military dictatorship. Governor Maytorena de- 
parted for California, and Rafael Pesquiera was made act- 
ing governor in his stead. 

But Consul Hostetter did not give up his efforts to preserve 
the peace of the state. For several days he labored with 
the officials, and finally the legislature passed a resolution 
which the consul telegraphed to the Ambassador. It pro- 
vided that if Huerta would guarantee to Sonora state rights, 
withdraw the few Federal troops then stationed there, and 
permit the state to elect its own officials, a commission would 
be sent to Mexico City to arrange details. The legislature 
was strongly influenced toward caution in these negotia- 
tions by the fate which had overtaken Governor Gonzalez 
of Chihuahua, whose acceptance of Huerta had not been 
forwarded so promptly as was desired. 

In his telegram to the Ambassador, Consul Hostetter in- 
formed him that unless the Huerta government could at 
once send 5,000 troops to Sonora it would be best to accept 
the terms, as the people of the state, excepting the Cientifico 
element, were of one mind and would fight hard for their 
rights. 

Neither to this telegram nor to several subsequent ones 
of an urgent character did the Ambassador make answer 
of any kind then or afterwards. It was Huerta who fur- 
nished the response to these telegrams addressed to the 
Ambassador by Consul Hostetter, and it was Colonel Gar- 
cia, bearing Huerta's credentials as military governor, who 
delivered it, backed by a strong force of Federal troops. But 
when Colonel Garcia arrived, Sonora was waiting for him, 
and the result was war as bitter and brutal as any that has 
sprung from these troubles in Mexico. 



334 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Ambassador Wilson's course in this matter invites crit- 
icism. American enterprises in Sonora supplied its life 
blood, and this is true of the state of Sinaloa, which lies 
next to it on the south, and which promptly joined Sonora 
in revolt. None of the Americans who have suffered loss 
in those states as the result of their Ambassador's strange 
attitude can regard his management of the affair with com- 
placence. 

The Ambassador cannot well say that he was unwilling 
to meddle, for his record in Mexico City shows him very 
prone to interfere in local affairs. Moreover, he had al- 
ready meddled in Sonora when he asked the consul to sup- 
port Huerta by every means in his power. 

The Ambassador's relationship to Huerta from the night 
the compact was signed in the Embassy was very close. If 
he had induced the dictator to guarantee to Sonora the au- 
tonomy which the Mexican constitution provides, that state 
would have remained peaceful, Americans and Europeans 
there would not have been despoiled, and the backbone of 
Mexico's revolt against Huerta would have been broken. 
Also this action on Huerta's part would have acted favorably 
at Washington and elsewhere. The only possible conclusion 
which can be drawn is that Huerta stood for absolutism 
pure and simple, and that the Ambassador was unable to 
dissuade him. 

While the North and Northwest of Mexico were get- 
ting into action in various ways to demonstrate repudiation 
of Huerta by force of arms, Zapata and the other bandit 
leaders to the southward were treating with the new gov- 
ernment. The negotiations came to nothing, but they aided 
the newspapers of the capital in their diligent efforts to 
support the new order of things. The press was by no 
means untrammeled and it was uniformly laudatory of the 
Government as was extremely fitting when arbitrary im- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 335 

prisonment was due to follow sharply upon the utterance of 
a critical word. 

]\Iexico City had cleared its streets as rapidly as possible 
of the debris resulting from the bombardment. Most of 
the dead, whose number is variously estimated between 
three thousand and five thousand, had been carried in carts 
to vacant fields outside the city, and there soaked in pe- 
troleum and burned. No official attempt was made to 
ascertain the names of the unfortunates thus disposed of. 
Persons who possessed the means and could identify their 
dead could give them private burial, but for the most part 
wholesale incineration in heaps was the method employed. 
Very few Americans or Europeans had been killed, and the 
losses of the Federal and revolutionary forces were small. 
The great majority of the victims were of the poorer classes 
of citizens who were drawn into the line of fire by curiosity 
or by mere stupidity. 

Almost immediately after the new government was or- 
ganized the matter of finance was brought forward and its 
pressing nature was emphasized. It became current talk 
everywhere that the Maderos had looted the treasury, and 
many declared that killing was too good for them. Cen- 
sure of Huerta was expressed for permitting any of the 
family or the members of the Government to escape. A 
report gained credence that only 892 pesos remained of 
all the Government funds ; and I think the belief still exists, 
throughout the part of the world which interests itself, that 
Mexico was bankrupt when Madero was deposed. Let us 
therefore enter with exactness at this point the report of 
balances in treasury offices and banks, made by the Huerta 
Government on February 21, 19 13, two days after that 
Government was officially installed. This is the account in 
detail, signed by Huerta officials: 



336 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

National Bank of Mexico : 

Special account 4% $5,000,000.00 

Current account 874,524.48 $ 5,874,524.48 

Mexican Central Bank: 

5% 1,600,000.00 

3% 2,000,000.00 3,600,000.00 

Banque de Paris et des 

Pays Bas 37,5o8.i6fr. 14,521.16 

Bank of England 26,000.00 253,822.50 

Commission of Money and Exchange. . . 18,821,829.43 
Financial Agency of 

Mexico in London. .. .33,7943s. id. 329,912.30 

Treasury of the Federation 432,363.89 

National lottery 392,044.46 

National mint 9,720.76 

Direction of the stamp 672,973.52 

Stamp printing office 28,822.86 

Direction of taxes of the Federal district 20,884.85 

Treasury of the national Congress 34,910.23 

Direction of the post office 533,080.54 

Sundry offices of the Federal district. . . 304,410.92 

Agencies of the treasury department. . . . 277,079.66 

Tax office in Tepic 15,280.06 

Custom houses 435,231.11 

Provincial branches of the treasury (es- 
timated) 500,000.00 

Legations and consulates (estimated) . . . 300,000.00 



Total amount $33,078,641.60 

This statement was signed by treasury officials and by 
T. Esquivel Obregon, Minister of Finance. 

The bonded indebtedness of Mexico on June 30, 191 1, 
was $440,186,566.25 (Mexican), To this debt, during 
Madero's administration, were added $20,000,000 (Mexi- 
can) for general treasury uses, and $20,000,000 (Mexican) 
for maintenance of the parity fund in New York. 

In fairness to the Madero Government it must be urged 
that in view of its effort for months to secure permission 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 337 

from Congress to make a loan, and in view of the fact that 
it had been maintaining an active army of nearly 60,000 
men, this showing is decidedly to its credit. In no way 
does it justify the criticisms that have been made. The 
financial record of the Madero Government cannot be ana- 
lyzed to sustain the random and reckless charges that the 
treasury was looted or that undue profits were made by 
Madero favorites. On the contrary, the distribution of 
available funds among the depositaries, and the operation 
of fiscal affairs indicate wise financial management. 

Freely as I have set forth the peculiar and at times wholly 
disconcerting- features of Francisco Madero's method of 
government, quite as freely do I accord to it a degree of 
financial honesty which few governments can safely boast. 
Thirty-three million pesos was too low for its treasury 
balances while the Government was under extraordinary 
army expense, but it was far from bankruptcy, far from 
furnishing ground for the attacks in Chamber and Senate. 

The reason for those attacks is fairly clear ; the misrepre- 
sentations that have been made with regard to the finances 
are of a piece with those that were press-agented broadly 
before Madero's fall to prove his unfitness to the world. 
Mexico's revenues, as stated elsewhere, were at the highest 
point when the end came, and it is my firm belief that if 
Madero had found a way to defeat the loose- jointed mili- 
tary-Cientifico conspiracy of February, 1913, Mexico to- 
day would be prosperous, and many of those who were 
most persistently hostile to Madero would be crowding 
about his standard with professions of loyalty. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

MEXICO and the United States experienced a 
change of administration about the same time. On 
February 24, Madero, the unsuccessful progressive, 
went to his grave, and on March 4, Taft, the unsuccessful 
conservative, departed toward a college professorship and 
a round of lecturing upon pleasant commonplaces, ex- 
pounded to the taste of the educated simple, and designed 
to reestablish popularity along safe and sane lines. 

Two strong and resourceful men had taken the highest 
seats in the two countries — strong in different ways, con- 
trasted rather than similar in their acumen, widely unlike 
in experience, and as far apart as possible in their morality. 
They have been the conspicuous actors in the drama, dwarf- 
ing all others in the popular view, except perhaps the 
comedian, Pancho Villa. The action of the piece has cen- 
tered on the duel between Huerta and Wilson, a contest 
much more real than that of a military aspect in which the 
formidable Indian had recently been engaged — the bom- 
bardment in Mexico City — yet not quite what it seemed, as 
will hereafter be made plain. 

The minor characters — Mondragon, Diaz, Calero, Vera 
Estanol, the survivors of the Madero party, etc. — had little 
set down for them but exits, which they made when their 
cues came. De la Barra had a quiet scene or two, and 
Henry Lane Wilson had the center of the stage for a mo- 
ment. A new personage, Venustiano Carranza, " first chief 
of the constitutionalists," appeared conspicuously, then got 
word from Washington and retired for a time. Upon the 

338 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 339 

whole the performance, as I have already said, had very- 
much the aspect of a duel between the two presidents. 

The world has been asked to believe that events in 
Mexico since the 4th of March, 191 3, may be accounted 
for by two causes; the unsettling effect of Madero's at- 
tempt to establish democracy in a country unprepared for 
it, and President Wilson's refusal to recognize the Huerta 
Government as de jure. 

The preceding chapters have been devoted to disclosing 
the influences which nullified Madero's honest efforts — 
the influences, not of twelve or thirteen million peaceful, 
unlettered Indians, but of educated and powerful men in 
Mexico and elsewhere. These had consented to the wreck- 
ing of the Government, as they might have consented to 
the wrecking of a corporation in the hope of bettering their 
own position through a reorganization. 

Most Americans and Europeans held this view, or at 
least had been greatly affected by the constant assertions 
that the Madero rule was not good for business — a kind 
of panic talk, that had been a weapon of the late President's 
enemies. The foreigners did not lament Madero's fall; 
most of them looked upon him as a disturber, and had ac- 
cepted the ten days' battle in Mexico City as a full demon- 
stration of his inefficiency. They w^ere shocked by the mur- 
ders, but hardly a man of them saw what must follow. 
Nearly all believed that the prospects for an enduring peace 
had been materially bettered by Madero's death, though 
the manner of it had been unfortunate. The new govern- 
ment, they supposed, represented all the most powerful 
cliques. There would be trouble for some time with the 
Maderistas and the bandits, said the resident foreigners, 
but they had considerable hope in Huerta as a man capable 
of reestablishing a Diaz rule — not under Felix, of course 
— and they were greatly influenced in the new dictator's 



340 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

favor by the attitude of the American Ambassador toward 
him. 

Severe losses already had been sustained by the foreign- 
ers, the largest, without doubt, falling upon Americans and 
American corporations. Of the 40,000 Americans, which 
my special canvass in 1910 had disclosed as permanent resi- 
dents, possibly 20,000 were in Mexico at the beginning of 
March, 1913. The number had been smaller directly after 
the great stampede of March, 1912, but the alarm had been 
false and many had returned. Practically all who had re- 
mained away were heavy losers, and so were many who 
came back, but the great majority of the English speakers 
who were in Central Mexico at the time the Huerta 
Government was set up preferred it to its predecessor, 
and hoped for better business conditions in the near fu- 
ture. 

In Mexico City the Americans saw their Ambassador as 
diligent for the new government as was any man connected 
with it, from Huerta down. All knew what his attitude 
had been toward Madero, and some of them understood the 
inwards of the matter fairly well, and were very glad of the 
change. A Mexican President pulling one way and an 
American Ambassador pulling the other make a bad, in fact 
an impossible, combination as regards governmental stabil- 
ity, and commercial advantages. Some of these men were 
well satisfied with Ambassador Wilson, personally, others 
were not. But in one thing they were thoroughly agreed : 
they did not wish to see another situation like that which 
they had just passed through, where the dean of the diplo- 
matic corps was hostile to the government. 

They therefore hoped devoutly, for business reasons 
which were the only potent ones with them, that President 
Wilson would retain his namesake, the Ambassador, that 
nothing would mar the latter's cordial relations with Huerta, 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 341 

and that the new administration in Washington would 
promptly recognize the man who had seized the helm in 
Mexico. 

Estimates of American investments in Mexico printed in 
newspapers of the United States were current about that 
time and were visibly incorrect in detail although not far 
from fair in total. Railway investments were overesti- 
mated by fully $200,000,000, as a large portion of the rail- 
way securities originally floated by American bankers had 
been sold to Europe. Moreover Mexican Government 
notes and bonds were named among American holdings, but 
nearly all of these had been disposed of in Canada and Eng- 
land and the European continent. On the other hand 
American investments in mining properties, rubber proper- 
ties, oil lands and haciendas were greatly understated, and 
when the small individual holdings of resident Americans 
are fairly figured, I consider the total estimate of a billion 
dollars, most of which represented actual cash, as not far 
from correct. These investments now had undergone a 
great shrinkage, which it would be futile to attempt to 
estimate. 

But the element which seems to have made little impres- 
sion upon the men who were inside of the game in Mexico 
City or the observers in Europe and the United States, was 
the release from active employment of peaceably disposed 
peons who presently became recruits for the bands which as 
" constitutionalists," or without attempt to dignify their 
occupation, preyed upon property. It is estimated that in 
1 910 fully 1,800,000 Mexicans were employed by American 
companies and individuals and that by March, 1913, not less 
than 500,000 of them were entirely idle, while as many 
more were without regular work. In addition to this the 
decreased patronage of Americans was seriously felt by a 
host of Mexican Indians who made a living from produce 



342 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

which they carried into the towns on their backs and sold 
to American families. 

Reduced to the starvation point the unemployed and the 
little traders made up a constantly increasing menace to the 
peace. Let no one permit himself to be impressed with the 
statement that all Mexicans would rather fight than eat, or 
would choose murder in preference to legitimate employ- 
ment as a means by which subsistence may be gained. Of 
the great body of Mexicans, totalling fifteen millions, no 
larger percentage were viciously inclined than of peoples 
in lands more advanced in culture. Let us be just to the 
ignorant peons; what precept of morality or righteousness 
would be likely to induce a million starving men in any 
country to die of hunger and permit their families to suf- 
fer the same fate rather than steal from those who have 
plenty ? 

Without entering deeply Into all the elements of the situ- 
ation, the Americans in Mexico addressed themselves with 
vigor to their home government in support of the new order 
of things which, viewed through the glasses of expediency, 
seemed to them roseate with promise. In every way by 
which Influence could be exerted at Washington It was 
promptly applied. Petitions were made up and mailed, 
delegations were dispatched, individuals of wealth and 
standing, and corporation men of financial power visited 
the American capital on this business, all pressing upon the 
Wilson administration the two vital decisions, recognition 
of Huerta and retention of Ambassador Wilson. 

A political campaign was Instituted In Mexico City In the 
Interest of Ambassador Wilson, with the Embassy as head- 
quarters. Americans, Englishmen and Europeans in general 
were gathered in to join the endeavor. The endorsement of 
resident Americans was to be made unanimous and the sen- 
timents of other foreigners who appreciated the Ambassa- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 343 

dor's efforts during the bombardment, were desirable as a 
testimonial of high personal regard. 

The work was overdone and the design which lay behind 
it could not remain hidden. It was known not only in 
Mexico City but in the United States, where versions of 
the story appeared in the newspapers. Doubt was then 
thrown upon the spontaneity of the movement. But these 
considerations merely emphasized the opinion which very 
early began to be voiced in the press of the United States, 
that the American Ambassador had meddled deeply in Mex- 
ican affairs, and had then endeavored to commit his home 
government without authority. If these acts of an ambas- 
sador were to be sanctioned, unlimited discretion amount- 
ing to usurpation of executive power would in effect be 
conceded to Washington diplomatic agents in general. The 
result might have been foreseen from the beginning, but it 
was so long in coming that its effect for good was lost. 

The problem which the Mexican tangle presented to the 
Wilson administration at the very outset was a severe test 
of its qualities if solution were to be found on a moral and 
entirely peaceful basis. Later on in these pages the subject 
will receive further treatment. What impressed the Ameri- 
can public, as indicated by the experience of interested in- 
dividuals and the occasional escape of steam in Congress 
and the press, was the resisting power of the new adminis- 
tration. For four months no man from Mexico could get 
a hearing. 

On March 6 a slip in routine at the Washington State 
Department resulted in cabling a note , of commendation 
bearing the signature of the Secretary of State to Ambassa- 
dor Wilson at Mexico City. Promptly given to the press 
by its recipient, it was cabled back to the United States and 
across to Europe. Three days later the Secretary cabled 
again withdrawing his generous words. 



344 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

On March ii President Wilson issued a statement of 
intent to cooperate with the people of Latin America, and 
to use the moral force of his Administration in the interest 
of electoral reform in those countries, to the end that their 
governments should be based on the consent of the gov- 
erned. He announced his lack of sympathy with revolu- 
tions that served personal ambitions. 

The statement was regarded in Europe as too vague to 
commit the Washington Government to non-recognition of 
Huerta while an Ambassador was held in Mexico City who 
was exerting all his power through the American consular 
service and the diplomatic corps at Mexico's capital to sup- 
port the Huerta rule. In the months of April and May, 
19 13, England, France, and Germany accorded recognition 
to the new Mexican government. This was the logical 
procedure from the European standpoint. Bankers and 
other interested persons could see no hope of settled con- 
ditions in Mexico, should any other course be pursued. 
If the advice of Sehor Limantour and Lord Cowdray was 
asked for, it was doubtless supplied — and heeded. 

Although Lord Cowdray 's name and his much misunder- 
stood oil concession in Mexico have figured prominently 
in news reports since the setting up of the Huerta govern- 
ment, he has said that he refrained from meddling; and 
Sefior Limantour, in July, 191 3, specifically denied having 
made " intriguing representations to the Powers." It is 
essential, nevertheless, to consider carefully the positions 
and the influence of these two men. 

They had long been regarded by European financiers and 
statesmen as the chief authorities on Mexican matters. 
They had been consulted in preference to all others. 
Limantour's opinion as to Mexican credits, and as to poli- 
tics also, was weighty beyond comparison. Lord Cow- 
dray's knowledge of practical business development in 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 345 

Mexico had been obtained from the closest contact, and 
from the control of large investments. Each of these men 
had gained in grasp of the situation by his relations with 
the other during fifteen years of intimate acquaintance re- 
sulting in mutual sentiments of profound respect. 

It may be confidently stated that neither would have 
chosen Victoriano Huerta to rule over the country in which 
both were so deeply interested. " What a spectacle before 
the world ! " said Limantour in referring to him. Yet 
Limantour could not view with any degree of tolerance 
whatever the armed revolt in the North, nor favor by his 
advice to bankers such action as would precipitate Huerta's 
fall and put the so-called Constitutionalists into power. 

The thing to be supported was Mexico; the thing to be 
averted was a sweeping financial disaster which would pile 
up the National Railways merger and the Mexican govern- 
ment obligations in a tangled mass of wreckage under 
which would lie the ruins of every considerable investment 
that had been made by private individuals. Whatever de- 
gree of reticence may have seemed proper to Limantour in 
his desire to avoid the appearance of participation in Mexi^ 
can politics, he could not have avoided giving to those 
who consulted him some disclosure of his conviction as to 
this matter which was uppermost in his mind. 

In default of any evidence of a constructive policy 
formed by the United States in recognition of its responsi- 
bilities toward Mexico, Limantour was compelled to regard 
a measure of support for the de facto government of his 
country as offering the only hope of staving off disaster. 

Lord Cowdray must have arrived at a similar conclusion 
through considering his own interests in the petroleum 
fields in the Mexican states along the Gulf of Mexico. 
The boring concession which he had secured in 1907, while 
not productive of direct results on government land, had 



346 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

led him to undertake extensive operations on areas secured 
from private owners by purchase and lease. These opera- 
tions had produced magnificent results, in sharp contrast 
to the slow progress he was making in the sale at retail of 
the refined product in Mexican markets. Production of 
crude petroleum for export and for fuel therefore de- 
clared itself as the wise business policy, and preparation 
was made by him to secure immense tracts in the most 
promising sections of the oil belt. 

For several years the plans to acquire proprietary or 
leasehold rights in the oil states were followed with vigor, 
and the actual area thus brought under Lord Cowdray's 
control reached, in 1913, the vast total of 1,600,000 acres, 
about half of which is owned in fee by him or his com- 
panies, and the remainder held under thirty-year leases. 
Two hundred and eighty thousand acres of land held in 
fee had been acquired by Lord Cowdray in 1902 as part 
of his Tehuantepec railway deal with the Mexican govern- 
ment. A tract of 418,000 acres adjoining this he bought 
from private owners subsequent to 1907. He bought 
100,000 acres more in northern Vera Cruz. 

The 800,000 acres acquired on leasehold necessitated 
nearly a thousand separate leases, some of them requiring 
the signatures of more than forty persons. This illus- 
trates the complications of land ownership in those sec- 
tions. The proprietors were of all classes, hacendados, 
planters, ranchmen, and even the unmodified aborigines 
whose ancestors had held the land from the days of Moc- 
tezuma. The enormous labor which this process entailed 
throws light upon the difficulties that will confront the 
framer of any equitable plan for redistribution of Mexi- 
can lands. 

While Lord Cowdray had been laying this foundation 
for producing oil in quantities beyond the previous record 




LORD COWDRAY 



Formerly Sir Weetman Pearson. Head of the world-famous English 
contracting firm, S. Pearson & Son, Ltd., and of the corporations which 
own 800,000 acres in the Mexican oil belt and control 800,000 acres more 
in the same regions through 1,000 leases. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 347 

of any individual, others had not been idle. The rights to 
bore on government land were possessed by him alone, but 
of purchase and lease of private properties in the oil belt 
he held no monopoly, and a host of strong competitors had 
arisen to demand a share of the wealth which flowed in the 
strata 1,800 to 2,000 feet below the earth's surface. 

Lord Cowdray's great unmeasured well, Dos Bocas (two 
mouths) which in 1909 had exploded and become unman- 
ageable, had startled the oil world. When it caught fire 
and burned for weeks, laying waste many square miles of 
property, the truth about Mexico's oil was a trade secret 
no longer. A year or so later Lord Cowdray's borers 
" brought in " the gusher Portrero del Llano, which held 
the world's record till November, 1913, its production for 
every twenty- four hours that it was permitted to flow 
Amounting to about 700 carloads — by actual measurement 
103,000 barrels of forty-two gallons each. 

In the spring of 191 3 the general development of Mex- 
ico's fields had advanced so far that the output of Lord 
Cowdray's locally organized company, the Mexican Eagle 
(La Aguila) was barely a half of the total. The heaviest 
oil concerns in the world were now in the field. The 
Standard Oil Company, the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, 
the Southern Pacific Railway Company were large hold- 
ers. The Rothschilds were said to be interested in the 
reorganization of the Waters-Pierce Company. 

Such individuals and firms as William R. Hearst, John 
Hays Hammond and J. G. White and Co. were prominent. 
E. L. Doheny, of Los Angeles, California, had made a sen- 
sation with his Mexican Petroleum Company and the 
Huestica Petroleum Company. Maximilian Whittier, 
Calvin Hunter and other Californians had formed corpora- 
tions. Richard Mestres, a former employee of Lord Cow- 
dray, had made lucky purchases of Indian lands at twelve 



348 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

cents to fifty cents an acre, and in association with Ham- 
mond and others had organized strong companies. No 
pumps were needed ; every well was a gusher. 

Other substantial men had pushed their way in, and 
many owned producing properties. London promoters 
were exploiting Mexico oil lands heavily. There were 
prospects of a boom in oil, approaching that in rubber 
which had swept through England in 1909. The Mexican 
Yearbook records the names of 165 corporations operating 
in the Mexican fields in 1913. Probably as many more 
had been formed but were awaiting settled conditions be- 
fore actually beginning work. 

The presence of these other interests, however, did not 
affect Lord Cowdray, so he says, in any injurious way; 
they were in fact helpful during the development stage. 
The possibilities of the region could not be less than 1,000,- 
000 barrels a day, a volume of output nearly equal to that 
of the entire world outside. Lord Cowdray's domination 
of the crude-oil trade depended upon his facilities for 
handling his own product and that of others in the belt. 
In 19 1 3 he made a contract with the British government 
to supply its navy with 7,200,000 barrels of fuel oil a year. 
With increase of equipment — pipe-lines, tanks, and tank- 
steamers — his way was open for rapid enlargement of 
this business to huge proportions, provided always that 
Mexico's internal disorders could be kept from spreading 
to the Tampico and the Tehuantepec regions. 

Here were grounds sufficient for desiring that the vis- 
ible government of Mexico — without regard to its origin 
or moral qualifications — should receive support, so long 
as it should be useful as a protective agency. 

The financial situation of the Huerta government was 
so serious in the spring of 1913 that all parties interested 
were compelled to give it their close attention. Luis de la 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 349 

Barra, brother of the Minister of Foreign Relations, was 
sent to Paris via New York to give information to those 
in the French capital whose aid and advice would be most 
helpful. Following this a representative of the interna- 
tional banking syndicate which had taken the loan of 1910 
and had considered favorably a further undertaking to be 
secured by the unpledged thirty-eight per cent, of the cus- 
toms, was sent to Mexico to confer with members of the 
government and report upon the situation. 

The one-year notes of the Mexican treasury for $10,000,- 
000 were maturing on June 10. The one-year notes of the 
Monetary Commission, endorsed by the Banco Nacional 
and the Banco Central (both now under French control) 
and amounting to $10,000,000 were due on August 31. In 
addition there were obligations of the National Railways of 
Mexico totaling $23,000,000, to be provided for. Of 
these obligations $10,000,000 fell due on June i and $13,- 
000,000 on November 10. 

The natural recourse at such a moment would have been 
to ask the bankers to renew, but a syndicate headed by 
Speyer & Company held twenty millions of the forty-three 
millions maturing, and they declined to carry the obliga- 
tions further unless they should be amply secured. The 
other twenty-three millions were due to bankers who were 
members of the new syndicate then negotiating. 

The crucial nature of this financial undertaking is empha- 
sized by the fact that if the National Railways should de- 
fault on its obligations, the corporation would fall into 
bankruptcy and $105,000,000 of its outstanding bonds which 
bore the guarantee of the Mexican Government would be- 
come a demand obligation upon the treasury of the guar- 
antor. The time may arrive when this default will come, 
but June or November, 1913, was premature. Before this 
important financial event occurs affairs must so shape them- 



350 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

selves that prompt reorganization may be safely and profit- 
ably effected. 
y The negotiations were conducted with the international 
syndicate of bankers whose principal members are Morgan, 
Grenfel & Co., and Henry Schroeder & Co. of London; 
Banque de Paris et Pays Bas, Credit Lyonnaise, Societe 
General, and Banque Francaise of Paris ; Bleischroeder of 
Berlin; J. P. Morgan & Co., Kuhn, Loeb & Co., National 
City Bank, First National Bank, and Guaranty Trust Com- 
pany of New York. 

Arrangements for a National Railways loan and a Mexi- 
can Government loan were rapidly consummated with the 
international syndicate. The Railways loan consisted of 
$27,000,000 In two-year notes. The Mexican Government 
loan was a ten-year obligation of 20,000,000 pounds 
sterling, of which 6,000,000 pounds sterling was a firm 
underwriting by the bankers at 90, and the balance 
optional. Speyer & Company were compelled to subscribe 
to the loan in a sum equal to the maturing notes 
which they then held. Thus the control of Mexico's cus- 
toms by the international syndicate was made complete, 
and Speyer & Company exchanged the maturing obliga- 
tions for ten-year bonds secured, as stated, by the customs. 
They had, however, surrendered their position as fiscal 
agents of Mexico. 

Out of the 6,000,000 pounds which the bankers posi- 
tively accepted in the closing days of May, 1913, less than 
$7,000,000 reached the Mexican treasury for general 
uses, the greater part having been devoted as described. 
No difficulty was experienced with the Mexican Congress in 
securing authorization of the loan, although the pledge of 
\ 38 per cent, of the customs receipts was a feature of it. 

The effect of the flotation of this loan on any terms was a 
distinct gain for the Huerta government at home, and as a 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 351 

triumph over the United States was greatly reHshed at the 
Palacio Nacional. It was a correspondingly distinct shock 
to the press of the United States, which had sturdily de- 
clared that Mexico could borrow no money until Washing- 
ton accorded recognition. When the administration was 
interrogated about it no reply could be elicited. Rumors of 
Lord Cowdray's deals in oil in association with the 
loan were stamped by him as falsehoods. Rumors of Li- 
mantour influence brought equally emphatic denials. No 
one could be found, excepting routine Mexican Government 
officials, who had assisted in any way in the transaction ; the 
loans had been effected in the ordinary course of business, 
no deals had been made, no influence used. Where and by 
whom the most effective persuasion was exerted may be 
gathered from the fact that, of the loan so far as floated, 
Paris took one-half and the remainder was parceled out to 
bankers in Germany, England, Belgium, Switzerland, and 
New York. 

While financial arrangement for Mexico had been going 
forward, Mexico itself had steadily retrograded in stability. 
Practically all the North, including the states of Coahuila, 
Durango, Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, and Sonora were lost 
to the Huerta Government. The capitals of all these states 
except Sonora were still held, and certain posts of entry on 
the border, but the states were overrun with bands and 
armies calling themselves Constitutionalists. Murder, 
pillage, torture, outrage, all the crimes that barbarous war- 
fare stimulates, were committed daily in these states and 
in sections of other states both adjoining and remote. 

The general head of the Northern and Northwestern re- 
volt against Huerta was Venustiano Carranza of Coahuila, 
to whom most of the bands acknowledged allegiance as 
" first chief," but the quality of the men who admitted his 
leadership was such that little faith was placed by most ob- 



352 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

servers in any real cohesion when the test should come, 
and still less in the legitimacy of any enterprise in which 
they were engaged. 

■ Many pitched battles were fought with Federal troops 
and it must have puzzled the devil to know which side to 
favor, their ethics being undistinguishable. Wounded men 
were killed. Prisoners were executed by a firing squad un- 
less they changed allegiance, and many were shot who were 
willing to fight against their comrades. 

In the South the Zapata bands overran the state of More- 
los and made frequent excursions into Puebla and Mexico. 
Frequently their operations were carried on within twenty 
miles of the capital itself. The general adroitness of these 
bands was now established and Madero was cleared of 
charges of lukewarmness in their pursuit. Victoriano 
Huerta could not be accused of hesitation for sentimental 
reasons, and he was the best strategist in Mexico besides. 

In Sonora the war was prosecuted with bitterness. The 
state troops were joined by the Yaqui Indians to repel fed- 
eral invasion and they nearly always won. The state forces 
in Sonora were better armed than were the Constitutional- 
ists further east. Border smuggling of munitions of war 
from Arizona in the United States seemed a far easier mat- 
ter than from Texas into the Mexican states immediately 
south ; from Arizona the " gun running " was carried on 
with little or no regard to Washington prohibition. The 
patrol at this part of the border was too thinly spread out 
to be efifective. Hermosillo, in Sonora, was repeatedly 
threatened but never taken by Federal forces, a distinction 
which dignifies it among insurgent capitals. 

All this was destructive to legitimate business operations 
in agriculture, cattle raising, mining and all industries in 
the states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo Leon 
and the northern part of Tamaulipas. In Sonora there was 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 353 

much interference with mining interests except those under 
the control of the Phelps-Dodge Corporation at Nacozari 
and Canannea which, except for slight troubles at the be- 
ginning, were not molested. The Southern Pacific Rail- 
way of Mexico, upon which nearly $70,000,000 had been 
spent and which was nearly completed to Guadalajara to 
connect with the National Railways, suspended all but tun- 
nel work upon its line and left nearly 1000 miles of com- 
pleted track to the mercy of events. This railway skirts 
the Pacific coast through Sonora, Sinaloa and a part of 
Tepic to a point where it swings abruptly into the state of 
Jalisco of which Guadalajara is the capital city. The 6000 
Mexican laborers and operatives whom the company em- 
ployed were discharged. 

The system of the National Railways of Mexico was dis- 
organized in all the northern states, being used chiefly by 
Constitutionalists or Federals for the moving of troops. 
The damage to its lines and its rolling stock by July i 
totaled an enormous sum in addition to loss of income from 
traffic. No railway line was in operation from Mexico City 
to the LTnited States border. The only exit from Mexico's 
capital was by way of the Mexican Railway to Vera Cruz, 
and thence by steamer. 

Damage to property belonging to American and Euro- 
pean companies and individuals was of discouraging dimen- 
sions. Injury to Americans was constantly being reported 
in despatches ; now and then an American was killed, not 
apparently because he was an American, but because he 
happened to be blocking the course of events. 

The Wilson administration was doubtless greatly per- 
turbed, but it made no sign. The Secretary of State was 
absent from Washington the major part of the time lectur- 
ing, the State Department and the Executive Mansion estab- 
lished a quarantine against information on the Mexican sub- 



354 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

ject and held their peace. As the middle of July approached 
conditions grew worse steadily. There were signs of in- 
subordination in Congress which, for the most part, had 
heeded with meekness the President's request for a free 
hand. Newspapers in the states along the Mexican border 
broke out in violent expressions, and newspapers further 
east were finding it difficult to construct editorial matter 
which would bear intelligently upon the news despatches in 
their columns, and yet be sufficiently inoffensive to Wash- 
ington to avoid displeasing the President. 

The signal for action came from Europe. Various na- 
tions were mentioned as taking the initiative, but the re- 
ports were surmises. The nation from which the inquiry 
came as to to the course which Washington intended to 
pursue is a secret of the State Department as yet unre- 
vealed. But it stirred President Wilson ; and many Ameri- 
cans at home and abroad congratulated the unknown chan- 
cellery for its achievement. It was on July 15, that this 
mysterious stimulus became effective at Washington, and on 
the following day the step which seemed to be four months 
and twelve days overdue was taken — Henry Lane Wilson, 
Ambassador of the United States to Mexico, was recalled. 



CHAPTER XIX 

SO great had been the dechne of his importance in the 
Mexican problem that the removal of Henry Lane 
Wilson from one side of the primary equation did not 
change the answer. The apparent policy of the United 
States was still found to be equal to zero. 

There was a plentiful lack of haste in the elimination of 
the Ambassador. He was summoned to Washington on 
July i6; he arrived there on the 26th. Nine days after- 
ward, the resignation which he had tendered according to 
the diplomatic custom, at the change of administration on 
March 4, was accepted to take effect October 14, an ex- 
tension of the usual sixty days to ninety. 

His public criticisms of the policy of the United States 
produced no result. If my estimate of that policy is cor- 
rect, the Ambassador did not know what it was. His at- 
tacks were fervid, and perhaps injudicious ; his view of the 
recent chapter of history in which he had figured, seems 
to me erroneous and his argument unconvincing. These 
things matter very little. Though he had spoken with the 
tongues of men and of angels, he would have been just as 
unsuccessful in affecting the President and the Secretary 
of State. 

It is probable that dissatisfaction with his performance 
as Ambassador to Mexico was not the determining cause 
of his deletion from the diplomatic service. He was of no 
use to the administration ; the influence behind him had 
ceased to have political value. With reference to the prob- 
lem as it stood, Henry Lane Wilson had nothing to offer 

355 



356 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

which was acceptable. He expressed his opinions with be- 
coming moderation before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations and made a favorable impression upon some of 
the members, but there is no evidence that the President or 
Mr. Bryan was brought to see any way in which the Am- 
bassador could be of the least service to them in what they 
wished to accomplish. From that time forth Henry Lane 
Wilson was hardly more influential than Cassius M. Gil- 
lette. 

What the world saw at this period was the struggle 
between Woodrow Wilson, in the White House, and Vic- 
toriano Huerta in the National Palace. It seemed to 
progress slowly, but some of the moves were very unusual 
and very interesting even to those who did not comprehend 
the strategy. Mexico was bleeding to death, in the mean- 
time, and shrill cries often drew away the attention of 
spectators, yet the contest went on. 

Huerta was at first embarrassed by some of his own offi- 
cial family, and he proceeded to dispense with them in 
order to secure more freedom of action. His ideas as to 
the importance of certain men, and of the political factions 
which they represented, and of the influences behind them, 
had greatly changed since the days of the terror, when he 
was reckoning up the elements of strength which must be 
combined in support of his rule. No bestowal of political 
patronage, no possible assembling of individuals in govern- 
mental positions under him, could now secure the solid 
backing of the largest interests. He could not bargain 
satisfactorily with those interests because he could not give 
the necessary guarantees. The failure to secure recognition 
from the United States had greatly weakened him. He was 
in a position somewhat analogous to that of a business man 
who is in straits and heavily indebted to his bank from 
which he cannot now get the accommodation that he needs, 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 357 

lacking the requisite security, yet the bank will lend him a 
few dollars from time to time, not quite daring to let him 
fail. 

In these circumstances it was natural that Huerta should 
see the best chance for himself in the concentration of 
power in his own hands ; and it is quite possible that some 
of the better men around him either estimated this situa- 
tion with their own brains and found it hopeless, or were 
enlightened by the superior personages whom they served. 
Be this as it may, the exodus began and those who were 
comparatively strong went out with some that were weak 
and useless yet not wholly tractable. What Huerta now 
desired was a government all Huerta. 

In June Garcia Granados resigned as Minister of Gober- 
nacion and Aureliano Urrutia, a full-blooded Xochimilco 
Indian, was appointed in his place. Urrutia was a surgeon, 
able and well instructed, a wholly self-made man who had 
risen to eminence and wealth from the lowest of levels ; but 
he knew nothing of statecraft or politics, and was looked 
upon by the Cientifico influences which Garcia Granados 
represented, as a potentially dangerous ally of Huerta's. 
As Urrutia came in, Vera Estafiol resigned from the De- 
partment of Education, and with him went the active repre- 
sentation of the great American corporations for which he 
was counsel. 

On June 23 Manuel Mondragon was disposed of after a 
manner quite Huerta's own. A banquet of army officers was 
held, at which War Minister Mondragon and President 
Huerta were guests of honor. At its conclusion General 
Huerta informed Mondragon that his presence in the United 
States was required at once and that a train with his lug- 
gage aboard was in waiting to carry him to Vera Cruz. To 
Mondragon's expostulations Huerta gave humorous an- 
swers, and calling half a dozen officers from among the 



358 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

banqueters, he joined them in escorting Mondragon to the 
station where he embraced him cordially in farewell and 
assured him that it was " all for the good of the Father- 
land." General Blanquet was immediately made Minister 
of War, vice Mondragon resigned. 

In July, Felix Diaz was sent away, ostensibly en route 
to Japan on the famous mission of thanks which Gustavo 
Madero had arranged to undertake, and at the close of the 
month de la Barra was accredited to Paris as Minister. 
Ambassador Wilson had already been recalled to Washing- 
ton. Rodolfo Reyes, though shorn of power, held to his 
seat in the Cabinet until September in the vain hope that 
Felix Diaz would rise again to a conspicuous place in Mexi- 
can affairs. Thus were the ties severed which had seemed 
to bind certain influences to Huerta. His cabinet was made 
up of men whose own wills counted for little ; he could look 
into a hand-mirror and behold the sardonic visage of the 
whole Mexican Government. And the same view was more 
and more clear to observers in other parts of the world, 
notably in Washington where the obstinate Indian's chief 
adversary played the odd, dilatory game against him, to the 
perplexity of all nations. 

President Wilson's first conspicuous move was made on 
August 4 when he despatched to the Mexican capital as 
his personal representative ex-Governor Lind of Minnesota. 
It was announced that Mr. Lind had gone on a peaceful 
errand for Mexico's good. August 9 he sailed into Vera 
Cruz harbor on a warship, with the eyes of the world upon 
him and the big journals of the United States very anxious 
about their news facilities, lest these should not operate fast 
enough to cover the brisk performances of the envoy. 

On the following day, despite rumors that danger lurked 
in the tunnels and bridges along the ascent to Mexico City, 
Mr. Lind made the journey without mishap. His message 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 359 

to Huerta was delivered by Mr, O'Shaughnessy, the Ameri- 
can charge d'affaires, and was politely received. Its sub- 
stance was presently cabled back to the United States where 
it created more perplexity than in Mexico. Neither the 
partisans of President Wilson nor his adversaries knew 
what to make of it. Not that the language was in the least 
degree obscure ; on the contrary it was as clear as a mirror, 
and as difRcult to see through. In the minds of thoughtful 
editors it begot the question, why should Mr. Lind be sent 
to Mexico upon a mission that had no chance of success? 

The communication which he transmitted to Huerta was 
a summons to surrender, its demands being covered in four 
items : 

First. Complete cessation of hostilities (that is, an im- 
mediate peace, or at least a truce, in Mexico). 

Second. That President Huerta resign in favor of a 
President ad interim. 

Third. The fixing of an early date for the Presidential 
elections. 

Fourth. That General Huerta should not be a candidate 
for the Presidency. 

The task of replying seriously on behalf of Huerta to 
these suggestions that he expunge himself, fell to Federico 
Gamboa, who was the Mexican Minister of Foreign Rela- 
tions at that moment. He had been Minister to Belgium 
for several years, but had been called home by Huerta when 
de la Barra was accredited to France. Sefior Gamboa was 
personally unacquainted with Huerta who had sent for him, 
relying upon his reputation as a successful lawyer in Mexico 
City and' as sub-secretary of the Foreign Office under Maris- 
cal, who for many years held that portfolio in the Diaz 
regime. 

The status of John Lind as confidential agent of Presi- 
dent Wilson operating under indirect credentials might have 



36o THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

been challenged, but Seiior Gamboa made no difficulty over 
trifles. He possessed the gift of language and the theme 
invited his muse. Under date of August i6 he responded 
in a document of seven thousand words. 

The paper was summarized for quick transmission of its 
tenor to Washington. The full text was then translated 
and forwarded in sections during the three succeeding days. 
Close study of the English version disclosed obvious and un- 
assailable reasons why none of the four proposals could 
be acceded to, one of them, the cessation of hostilities, being 
manifestly impossible. It also revealed a suggestion which 
was not far from a demand that Huerta be recognized and 
his Ambassador received at Washington. But the most 
striking feature of this document was its calm expression 
of belief that the people of the United States were not of 
the same mind as His Excellency, their President. 

Meanwhile Mr. Lind had gone to Vera Cruz to await in- 
structions. These he received on August 24, and the follow- 
ing day he submitted a new set of proposals, substantially 
modified as to their terms, but holding firm to the demand 
that Huerta should not be a candidate for the Presidency. 
Twenty-four hours were allowed for consideration and an- 
swer. 

By request the time limit was extended one day further, 
but before the reply was received. President Wilson, on 
August 27, read a message to Congress on the Mexican situa- 
tion. As it was the first time in a hundred years that an 
American President had personally addressed Congress on 
an international subject, the occasion was a decided event, 
emphasizing the seriousness of the questions at issue. 

Naturally it was supposed that the President would de- 
clare a more vigorous and definite policy in the Mexican 
dispute. There was nothing in the United States that might 
be called general information on the subject, nothing that 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 361 

resembled a common sentiment, but probably a majority 
of those who formed an opinion were inclined toward the 
belief that coercive measures were contemplated and that 
intervention would follow. This was the easiest inference 
from the fact that the proposals which had been made to 
Huerta were obviously such as he would never willingly ac- 
cede to. Some of the newspapers printed estimates of mili- 
tary strength, and pictures of battleships and generals; but 
this display meant little because what the President would 
say was already known in editorial rooms. 

His address to Congress was an argument for patience, 
very impressively delivered. " The steady pressure of moral 
force," he said, " will before many days break the barriers 
of pride and prejudice down, and we shall triumph as 
Mexico's friends sooner than we could triumph as her 
enemies — and how much more handsomely, with how much 
higher and finer satisfactions of conscience and of honor." 

But by way of assurance that the retarded fulfilment of 
his prophecy of peace should not endanger American lives 
he added that " all Americans will be urged to leave Mexico 
at once, and will be assisted to get away by the United States 
Government through all the means at its disposal." 

Something notable was omitted from the address, a few 
words which might have supplemented President Wilson's 
description of the moral force whose steady pressure was 
to be relied upon. The omission consisted of a sentence in 
the amended proposal to which Mr. Lind was that day re- 
ceiving his answer. 

" If Mexico acts immediately and favorably upon the fore- 
going suggestions," the sentence read, " President Wilson 
will express to American bankers assurances that the Gov- 
ernment of the United States will look with favor upon an 
immediate loan to Mexico." 

The answer returned by Sefior Gamboa was not so long 



362 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

as his former paper. It declined the proposals as to the 
Presidency and the elections, and withdrew the request for 
recognition. It then disposed of the loan suggestion in 
these words : 

" Permit me, Mr. Confidential Agent, not to reply for the 
time being to the significant offer in which the Government 
of the United States of America insinuates that it will 
recommend to American bankers the immediate extension 
of a loan which will permit us, among other things, to cover 
the innumerable urgent expenses required by the progres- 
sive pacification of the country; for in the terms in which 
it is couched, it appears more to be an attractive antecedent 
proposal to the end that, moved by petty interests we should 
renounce a right which incontrovertibly upholds Us at a 
period when the dignity of the nation is at stake. 

" I believe that there are not loans enough to induce those 
charged by the law to maintain that dignity, to permit it to 
be lessened." 

Senor Gamboa's reply had the effect of strengthening con- 
siderably the position of Huerta. Influential men who had 
been displeased with the dismissal of their representatives 
from the cabinet were reconciled, more or less ; some of 
them spoke out in favor of the new regime. Evidences of 
popular enthusiasm were not lacking; the number of vol- 
untary enlistments in the army was increased, and in many 
ways the general apathy was broken by sentimental out- 
bursts. Senor Gamboa was loudly praised, and Huerta also. 
The ill will towards Americans was deepened; the reviling 
and ridiculing of President Wilson began to give promise 
of the monstrous lengths to which it went a little later. 

Mr. Lind returned to Vera Cruz to await further orders. 
His movements from the day of his departure from New 
York were a subject of keen interest to American news- 
papers. The episode was the strangest journey in diplomacy 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 363 

with which editorial writers of the United States had been 
called upon to deal, surpassing the Hawaiian expedition of 
Paramount Blount. 

It is improbable that after the publication of the first 
demand made by Mr. Lind any extravagant hopes for the 
success of his mission were entertained by citizens of the 
United States whose knowledge of Mexican affairs fitted 
them to form an opinion. But the attention of editors and 
the public had been drawn to him, negotiations were seen 
to be in progress between the two countries, and the talk 
of intervention naturally subsided. By the 28th of August 
the unpleasant topic had been almost dropped. 

There was much praise of President Wilson as a guardian 
of the peace of nations. Certainly he himself showed no 
irritation as a result of General Huerta's refusal to abdicate. 
The stubborn Indian might stick to his capital and the cares 
of office, but that was no reason why Mr. Wilson should 
do the like. On the contrary he departed from Washington 
on the 29th for his vacation in Cornish, New Hampshire ; 
and at the same time Secretary Bryan resumed his lecture 
tour on the Chautauqua Circuit. The Mexican matter was 
shelved. 

But the Americans in Mexico — those outside of Mexico 
City where little attention was paid to Washington's warn- 
ing — were in sad straits. Urged by President Wilson's 
speech and spurred by Secretary Bryan's announcement, 
supported by the activity of American consuls, the Ameri- 
cans began a new exodus from all points of departure on 
Mexico's coasts and borders. Their personal belongings 
that could not be carried in a hand bag they registered at 
the nearest consulate and abandoned. 

Those who had no money made their way in one fashion 
or another to ports on the Gulf or on the Pacific, and looked 
about for the transportation which had been promised. In 



364 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

due time they discovered it. On the Gulf Coast it con- 
sisted of steerage passage on merchant vessels to the south- 
ernmost ports of the United States ; on the Pacific a trans- 
port traveled along the coast to gather in straggling refugees. 
These unfortunates were carried a few miles beyond 
Mexico's Pacific coast line and were set ashore at San Diego, 
California. 

President Huerta was distressed at the poverty of the 
arrangements which President Wilson had referred to as 
" all the means at the disposal of the Government of the 
United States." The men who had contributed to Mexico's 
prosperity, the grim old Indian humorist said, should not 
travel in the steerage ; Mexico would provide first-class ac- 
commodations for all who wished to return to their native 
land. And many Americans, be it said in passing, accepted 
his ofifer. On September 7 the Department of State at 
Washington reversed itself; consuls throughout Mexico 
were ordered to stop the exodus. 

On the night of October 10, President Huerta emulated 
the example of Napeoleon Bonaparte by a coup at the Cham- 
ber of Deputies. The Chamber had angered him by insur- 
gent resolutions following the disappearance of Senator 
Belisario Dominguez, who had delivered a speech violently 
denouncing Huerta and charging him with responsibility 
for Madero's death. The Mexican Congress seems to have 
lost its temper in the matter of Dominguez, and when Huerta 
perceived this, he lost his own. While Congress was in ses- 
sion on the evening of the loth, the building was surrounded 
by a large force of troops. A detachment then invaded the 
Chamber and one hundred and ten deputies were arrested, 
leaving only members of the Catholic Party exempt. 

For two hours the uproar within the building continued, 
after which the one hundred and ten men were taken 
through crowded streets to the penitentiary and placed in 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 365 

cells. The populace sided with the deputies, and attempted 
to cheer them but were driven into cross streets and hustled 
out of the way, many persons being injured and a few 
killed. 

As soon as the deputies were arrested the Senate which 
was in sympathy with the Chamber adjourned sine die. Be- 
fore midnight Huerta dissolved both houses by decree and 
assumed their function in his own person. By the same 
convenient method he took to himself the supreme judicial 
power, and completed his dictatorship by absorbing the 
powers conferred upon the Departments of Finance, War 
and Gobernacion. The following morning, while Mexico 
City held its breath not knowing what arbitrary act might 
follow. Sir Lionel Carden, the newly arrived Minister of 
Great Britain, presented his credentials to the dictator and 
assumed the duties of his post. 

The selection of that moment to complete England's recog- 
nition of Huerta by the formal presentation of documents 
was decidedly unfortunate. The incident indicated a new 
attitude of British representation in Mexico, and it seemed 
to suggest a forward move at England's Foreign Office. 
This impression w^as strengthened ten days later when Sir 
Lionel was quoted at length in despatches. Much that he 
said was void of offense, but in one sentence he intimated 
that Washington was dealing with the Mexican situation 
superficially, without full knowledge of the real causes of 
the trouble, and in consequence was complicating affairs 
rather than contributing to their solution. 

The fact that many Americans at home, not directly in- 
terested in Mexico, recognized in these remarks a just criti- 
cism of President Wilson's endeavors in the Mexican field, 
did not soften the Minister's offense. But it presently de- 
veloped that London believed there was an error in the 
report, an opinion which Sir Lionel sustained a little later by 



366 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

denying that he had uttered the words which caused the 
flutter. The episode passed by with no alarming signs of 
damage, yet a shock had been felt. The statement that Sir 
Lionel was a close friend of Lord Cowdray's was declared 
to be without significance, but it was noted by the discerning 
few. 

The Mexican Constitution of 1857 is a remarkable docu- 
ment. It provides more safeguards for those who abide 
tinder the shadow of its wing than any other Government 
charter in the modern world. But somewhere in its tortuous 
and carefully amended course is successfully concealed the 
fact that a Mexican ruler, guarded by a careful student, can 
issue a decree depriving persons of the right to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness, and still keep within constitu- 
tional bounds. Deputies are constitutionally exempt from 
arrest, yet here were one hundred and ten jailed at one 
stroke; and no power short of overwhelming armed force 
could release them but the Dictator alone who put them in 
prison. No law could operate because the Dictator had 
decreed to himself the supreme judicial power of the State. 
The student who had guided the Dictator's acts in this af- 
fair was no other than Querido Moheno who had been made 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs when Federico Gamboa re- 
signed to become a candidate for the presidency, and an 
object of Huerta's distrust. 

It grieved General Huerta to inconvenience these gentle- 
men among whom were such old friends as Rodolfo Reyes, 
who had resigned from the Cabinet on September 12, and 
Jorge Vera Estahol, once a valued member of the same 
circle. The dissolution of Congress, Huerta said, was the 
greatest sacrifice he had been called upon to make, but he 
could not hesitate because it was for the good of the Father- 
land. He earnestly hoped, he said, for the support of the 
people, and he called upon them to elect worthier representa- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 367 

tives. To provide them with an opportunity for this, he 
proclaimed a new election of Senators and Deputies to be 
held on October 26, the date that had already been set for 
the presidential election. 

On the day following the publishing of these expressions 
of policy (October 12), forty of the deputies were re- 
leased; later the doors were unlocked at different times 
for others, among them Rodolfo Reyes and Vera Estanol 
who with all convenient speed proceeded to New York. At 
the time these pages were prepared for the press about 
thirty of the deputies were still in prison. 

On October 14 President Wilson invalidated the Mexican 
elections in advance by informal pronouncement at Wash- 
ington. In no sense could the elections now to be held be 
regarded as " free " and " in accordance with the Mexican 
Constitution," which had been the condition President Wil- 
son had insisted upon as pre-requlsite to his recognition of 
the results. President Huerta was not greatly disturbed 
and his simple election program was not altered in the 
smallest item. 

In what may be called the advance puffery, that election of 
October 26, 1913, was monstrous in volume. The multiply- 
ing of descriptive phrases appropriate to a legitimate con- 
test, passed the limits of common sense and went into ab- 
surdity. The Madero election was the only one ever held 
in Mexico which could be called " free," and even that was 
without effective safeguards. The election carried on by 
Huerta was of the old Diaz order and consisted of an 
elaborate system of appointments. 

In certain places a vote was manufactured by signatures of 
soldiers and of peons gathered in to make up a minimum. 
In most instances these men made their crosses for few 
could write; none of them knew what they signed. Voting, 
in short, was a negligible quantity in an election where the 



368 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

result was made up in advance. A certificate bearing the 
correct signature was election, whether it was preceded by- 
voting or not. When this certificate had been issued in ac- 
cordance with the will of the chief, the constitution was 
supposed to have been suitably respected. 

The Huerta officials in recognition of the broad interest 
in this election determined that no slip in consistency- 
should mar so solemn an event. " Returns " were reported 
as coming in slowly, and much uncertainty was expressed as 
to the result. While the calculations were being made Felix 
Diaz, who had ventured into Vera Cruz in order to be con- 
stitutionally entitled to receive votes, found it advisable to 
depart. Helped by the American consul at the port, he was 
hustled, in the night of October 27, aboard the American 
gunboat Wheeling lying between the Vera Cruz wharves and 
the island prison of San Juan d' Ullua. The next day he 
was placed on board the battleship Louisiana. Some days 
later he made his way to Havana. 

An election report was given out early in November at 
Mexico City and Generals Huerta and Blanquet were said 
to have been elected President and Vice President. When 
the new Congress, chosen at the same time, assembled on 
November 20 it declared its own election valid, but nullified 
that of Huerta and Blanquet " as a rebuke to the over- 
enthusiastic people " who in definance of the constitution 
had insisted upon voting for these men. The constitutional 
prohibition of a provisional president's being a candidate 
to succeed himself applied only to Huerta, but Blanquet was 
included in the nullification act to simplify matters. By this 
maneuver Huerta had " tagged " a Congress into office and 
renewed his lease of the dictatorship until July, 1914. 

Meanwhile President Wilson in a speech at Mobile, Ala- 
bama, on October 27 had made the important declaration 
that the United States would " never again seek one foot 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 369 

of additional territory by conquest." In the same address 
he dealt at length (and quite incorrectly) with concessions in 
Latin America. Mexico was not named, but as it had been 
conspicuous for months, and just then was most promi- 
nently in the public eye, it doubtless stood for the Latin 
America to which his remarks were addressed. He con- 
gratulated Latin America on its coming emancipation from 
the concession evil, a trammel upon true progress from 
which the United States had long been free. 

President Wilson did not distinguish between concession 
and monopoly which, in Mexico, are terms by no means 
synonymous, and his lack of clearness on this point must 
have obscured the meaning of his remarks for Mexicans 
familiar with affairs in their country. They supposed that 
the President meant to warn them particularly against grant- 
ing oil concessions to Englishmen, and to advise them to 
seek prosperity by heeding the counsels of the United States. 
But it is a common argument in Mexico that the Latin 
American countries furthest removed from the influence of 
the United States are the most prosperous and best gov- 
erned, and that Mexico should hesitate before she turns a 
deaf ear to all other counsellors, and heeds only the voice 
of her great neighbor on the north. 

On the next day after President Wilson spoke at Mobile, 
Secretary Bryan made announcement that England, France, 
and Germany had agreed, at the request of the United States, 
to take no further action with regard to Mexico until the 
Washington Government should declare its future policy. 
When the statements of the President and the Secretary 
of State were pieced together they seemed charged with full 
assumption of responsibility for Mexico and for all Latin 
America, on a basis of altruism broader than any hitherto 
conceived. Also they seemed to prepare the way for armed 
intervention at any moment. 



370 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

There was no sign, however, of any but a verbal aggres- 
siveness in Mexican affairs. Week after week went by 
without announcement of a Washington policy. Europe 
held to its bargain and permitted the United States full en- 
joyment of the Monroe Doctrine without official protest. 
On December 2, President Wilson, in his first annual mes- 
sage to the regular session of Congress, definitely relegated 
Mexican matters to the doldrums. 

" Little by little," he said, " Huerta has been completely 
isolated. By a little every day his power and prestige are 
crumbling, and the collapse is not far away. We shall not, 
I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of watchful wait- 
ing." 

It was officially out at last : watchful waiting In the Mexi- 
can affair was the policy of the United States. En- 
thusiasm was hardly to be expected; the American 
people were not keen for watchful waiting or for any 
alternative; they had no common opinion on this subject. 
The press was inclined to ridicule the Wilson policy, but 
there was no determined attack of such a nature as seriously 
to disquiet the President. The secret of his procedure in the 
Mexican affair from the outset of his Administration, though 
it lay open to every eye, was never seen by friend or foe, if 
I may judge from my own reading of editorial comment 
published in the United States and Europe. 

The London Times in its issue of December 3 contained 
expressions worth quoting. Under the heading " Mexico in 
Chaos " the Times dealt editorially with the message in 
these words : 

" There is no need, said President Wilson, to alter 
his policy of watchful waiting. It is just that policy 
to which opinion in Mexico City ascribes^ the recent 
aggravation of the situation and the rapid spread of 
anarchy accompanied by every sort of horror. If, says 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 371 

the despatch from our correspondent in Mexico City, 
the present tactics continue there are no words too 
strong to paint the disastrous results which will ensue. 
'' We are convinced that these dangers are realized 
as fully in Washington as in Mexico City and we shall 
be surprised if, when Huerta is gotten rid of and the 
moment for reconstruction has arrived, President Wil- 
son is not found to have thought out and to be ready 
to apply a plan for restoring order and decent govern- 
ment in the neighboring republic. Presidents, like 
other heads of States, are not given to betraying their 
policy in public utterances." 

It was not possible for all to be so patient and so confident. 
There were many interested persons not so near Mexico 
that they could hear the bullets whistle, who found watchful 
waiting for Huerta to crumble and collapse a joyless ex- 
perience. The United States had shut up Huerta in a 
supposedly air-tight closet, but he was receiving a little 
oxygen by the help of local bankers with European connec- 
tions, and foreign corporations which dreaded chaos to 
follow his extinction. Besides there was more air inside 
than had been noted in President Wilson's original esti- 
mate. To be explicit, the resources of that part of Mexico 
over which the Dictator exercised a species of control were 
very large. 

In a broad zone across the middle of the country business 
continued to be done, and the inhabitants could not look 
to any one but Huerta for protection. They were com- 
pelled to pay for it in various ways. For example, the 
general commanding Federal forces in a district would call 
together the representatives of important business interests, 
and announce that the central government was unhappily a 
little short of funds, wherefore it devolved upon the general 
to announce with regret that he must withdraw the troops 
on the following Tuesday unless $250,000, or some other 



372 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

amount appropriate to the particular place and occasion, 
should be provided by those who were to benefit by their 
retention. In most instances the money was forthcoming. 

It must be remembered that though the revolt in the 
North overran a vast territory, the percentage of inhabitants 
thus brought under the Constitutionalist banner was com- 
paratively small. If Mexico in the winter of 1914 be 
thought of as two nations, the one over which Huerta ruled 
was enormously richer and more populous than that of 
which Carranza was the reigning prince and " Pancho " 
Villa the military genius. Conceiving of the two parts as 
at war, under fair conditions, there would seem to be no 
doubt as to which would win, or which in peace would be 
the more affluent. 

This is not to say that in the circumstances as they really 
existed, there was any hope for Huerta, unless he could 
get support from outside his borders. His situation was 
worse than precarious. The financial system, that solid 
structure of the Limantour days, began to totter early in 
the Huerta regime. The Mexican peso which contains 
forty-seven American cents of intrinsic value as silver metal 
in any broad market, declined from its parity of 493/2 that 
had been fixed by decree and sustained by deposits in New 
York and London. Steadily down the grade the exchange 
and purchasing value slipped. 

In June, 1913, the peso bould be exchanged for gold at 
a valuation of forty-five. In August it had fallen to forty. 
In November it dropped to thirty-six. In January, 1914, it 
was down to thirty-four, and early in March it reached 
twenty-nine cents. The history of the exchange market 
during this decline is one long tragedy for merchants and 
others compelled to convert their silver into gold. The 
banks of issue which had made use of their circulation 
privileges, and had put out bank bills to something like the 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 373 

limit allowed by the Limantour law, were unable to redeem 
in coin on demand. The result was a violent shock to credit. 

In December, 1913, Huerta came to the rescue of the big 
banks and decreed holidays; three days first, then ten, then 
a month. Between Christmas, 1913, and the first of the 
March, 1914, no bank in Mexico was compelled to meet its 
obligations on demand. The banks, as a matter of fact, 
met all the obligations that were actual items of legitimate 
routine, but checked every attempt to deplete their reserves. 
No man could present a demand for one thousand or five 
hundred or even two hundred pesos and receive peso coins 
for it unless he could prove that the sum was asked for to 
supply a legitimate need of his business. The half-peso 
coins, carrying much less proportionate value than the pesos, 
could be more readily secured, but the days of abnormal 
financial insecurity were upon the nation, and the result was 
demoralizing to all honest effort. 

The every-day-a-holiday-system caused monstrous de- 
rangement of ordinary business relations. Rents in Mexico 
City were almost impossible to collect ; interest on mort- 
gages and similar obligations went unpaid, and creditors 
found it virtually useless in most cases to take legal action. 
It is folly to displace a tenant who does not pay and substi- 
tute another who has no money nor means of getting any. 
Pecuniary distress absurd and cruel afflicted thousands of 
men and women who were not rightfully poor. 

Graft and commissions in government supplies were the 
only healthy and going industries. The commissions and 
profits of the traders were scaled to bottom levels, but the 
graft never lessened. War is very favorable to dishonesty 
in the best ordered nations, and Mexico under such a rule 
as I have described, was in the throes of civil war. A big 
army requires arms and uniforms. In Mexico, except about 
the capital, they are not so particular about shoes, and food 



374 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

is left for the women to gather as they can. But forage for 
horses, and essentials for military service furnished business 
for dealers who knew the methods. 

Two of Huerta's sons were supposed to have controlling 
influence in these matters. If any man had arms or am- 
munition for sale he must see Don Jorge ; if it was uni- 
forms, he made his proposition to Don Victoriano, chico. 
These young men were said to drive hard bargains and to 
leave a narrow margin of profit for the dealers, after all 
commissions were paid, but the money was sure. Ac- 
cording to current reports the General and his sons went 
over the figures of these transactions every morning. 

Early in the year 1913, a gambling house was opened 
which was known in Mexico City as " The President's 
House," and was said to be conducted upon capital fur- 
nished by Huerta himself who each day called for the win- 
nings. Later on there was a chain of houses, and the sons 
took charge of the business. There were establishments for 
all classes of trade distinguished by the minimum wager 
permitted — the centavo houses for the peons and the peso 
and five-peso resorts for the opulent. Soldiers lacked their 
pay sometimes, but the graft and the gambling went merrily 
on. 

The bull ring at the capital seats thirty thousand persons. 
Half of the seats are in the shade. The charge for these is 
three pesos. The other half are in the sun and the price is 
one peso. Each Sunday the ring was filled- where the 
money came from is a mystery which has been observed 
before but never adequately solved in cities similarly cursed 
with idleness and empty stomachs. 

For another aspect of the widespread Mexican disaster 
we must look to the northward. What may be called the 
Constitutionalist capital was Hermosillo, chief city of So- 
nora. Here Carranza maintained his headquarters for sev- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 375 

eral months, providing himself with a cabinet and other 
features of an actual government. Hermosillo was a wise 
selection because the northwest state, Sonora, was the solid- 
est part of the Constitutionalist territoiy, and the least likely 
to be attacked. There was a federal army holding the Pa- 
cific port of Guaymas, less than a hundred miles away, but 
a much larger force hemmed it in. 

The selection was wise also because Sonora possesses cer- 
tain revenues which have been available for the Constitu- 
tionalist cause. The State made an issue of fiat currency in 
July which was followed by a larger issue of Constitu- 
tionalist currency whose recognized trading value in Con- 
stitutionalist territory on the first of March, 1914, was 33% 
cents on the dollar. Three such dollars were regarded as 
a fair trade for an American coin of the same name. An- 
other argument in favor of Sonora as the headquarters of 
Carranza was the ease and convenience with which arms 
were run across the border from Arizona before the em- 
bargo was lifted. 

The border is but an imaginary line and for several 
months the American patrol was lamentably *insufficient 
along the stretch from El Paso westward to the Pacific. 
The " gun running " industry in that section thrived mightily 
and it was not conducted under a bushel, or by the story- 
book variety of smugglers. The deliveries were made in 
automobiles and the most important concerns in that section 
were engaged in it. The Phelps-Dodge Corporation and 
the Dodge Mercantile Company were among those accused. 
There is. no evidence that they were carrying on this busi- 
ness for profit; rather it was thought that they were doing 
it to assist the Carranzistas, and in the interests of the 
preservation of order by the only means available. 

Despite some facts which will be presently set forth, it is 
not possible to say that the alleged " gun running " for Car- 



376 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

ranza by Mr. Dodge's companies was winked at by the 
United States. In September they, along with others, were 
indicted for the offense in the United States Courts in 
Arizona, and although the first indictments were declared 
faulty, new ones were found. The defendants were dis- 
charged without fine or imprisonment, but the proceedings 
seem to have been regular. 

Much of the help which Carranza received from Ameri- 
cans came in the course of plain business. He was a good 
customer for munitions of war, and there was a combina- 
tion of dealers engaged in supplying the demand. The com- 
bination did what it could and all that it dared to increase 
the sales and reduce the difficulties of transportation and 
delivery. Persons profiting in this way will exert influence 
in fomenting and maintaining disorder in northern Mexico, 
as long as the possible market seems to justify the effort. 
There is no sentiment here, no conscience. 

I do not think it is proved that Carranza is much of a 
fighting man himself, but he is not a bad manager. Com- 
fortably settled in Hermosillo, with an active junta in Wash- 
ington, he could await the reduction of Chihuahua by 
Pancho Villa and be prepared with solemn explanations of 
any departure from modern standards in Villa's military 
ethics. It is not credible that Carranza evolved this policy 
unassisted. 

After Villa captured Juarez and the City of Chihuahua 
and drove the remnants of the federal army across the Rio 
Grande at Ojinago, thus making himself master of the larg- 
est state in Mexico, the question frequently arose as to 
whether a man of Villa's successful fighting record and 
disposition to be nervous under restraint, would long 
consent to be second to Carranza. If there had been only 
Carranza in the problem, it is likely that Villa would have 
thrown off the yoke, light as it doubtless actually was. But 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 377 

Carranza plus Washington was a different matter, and Villa 
was restrained by the obvious advantages that lay in keep- 
ing within the charmed circle which the light of Washing- 
ton's countenance threw around the First Chief of the Con- 
stitutionalist movement. 

The understanding between Washington and Carranza 
was maintained partly by means of United States Consuls, 
notably George C. Carrothers. Another route of communi- 
cation between the State Department and Carranza led 
through the Maderista headquarters at No. 115 Broadway, 
New York. Francisco Madero, whose office was at No. 
32, had fallen out of favor with Mr. Bryan. The recognized 
spokesman of the Maderos was Rafael Hernandez, the mur- 
dered President's cousin, a negotiator of remarkable gifts, 
courteous, cool, and very hard to read. I am speaking now 
of February and March, 1914, when a coalition of monied 
interests was formed for the purpose of restoring peace in 
Mexico. Enormous capital was represented, and the plan 
proposed was apparently the best of fifty that had been 
laid before Mr. Bryan. I say " fifty " because that was his 
own hasty estimate on an occasion when there was no need 
to be accurate. He preferred this plan to the others, and 
seriously inclined his ear to its advocates. 

Congress had been controlled during all these months by 
a maximum of skilfully exercised authority combined with 
an irreducible minimum of real information; upon the 
whole a miracle of management made possible only by a 
lack of coherent opinion in the legislative body. There had 
been ebullitions of jingo sentiment, but no appearance of 
anything solid in the shape of a Mexican policy in either 
house. 

On July 22, 1913, the Senate talked Mexican matters in 
the open, but that night the leaders were counselled, and 
there was no immediate repetition of the offense. On 



378 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

July 31, the House developed symptoms of acute distress 
over Mexico, but the trouble soon quieted under palliative 
treatment. On August 8 Senator Bacon declared that the 
Mexican situation was one of the gravest problems which 
the United States had ever been called upon to face. 
After that statement Mr. Bacon subsided and did not again 
offend. On August 15 Senator Penrose, stirred by the 
first hand reports of injury to Americans, used strong 
terms in the Senate Chamber. He promised to resume the 
following day but was dissuaded. 

On August 19 the Senate endeavored to press a resolu- 
tion demanding a full account of Mexican matters from the 
President, but Senators Lodge, Bacon and Stone caused 
it to be postponed. On November 16, an attempted revolt 
in the House against the censorship was fought down by 
Administration men, and on January o.'j, the Senate, though 
greatly alarmed over Mexican affairs, was brought into 
line, and the subject was dropped. 

Viewed as a political performance it is entitled to rank 
high, that holding back for months of the floods of ora- 
tory on a subject so inviting, so full of opportunity to stir 
America with authentic stories of wrong done to its citi- 
zens, of vast pecuniary loss, of insult, dire hardship, and 
atrocious murder; so full, too, of potential European com- 
plications which always tempt a certain class of orators. 
The Senators and Representatives who held their peace 
under such provocation were untrammeled men; many 
were of the opposition. Never before had a Congress at 
Washington been so well controlled; never had a Congress 
bowed to such a master. 

The foregoing summary is not to be taken as a table of 
reference; it is designed merely to give an impression. 
The tale of horrors in Mexico was not told as it would 
have been if a superior power had not prevented the sub- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 379 

ject from being thoroughly opened up. In fact nobody in 
Congress knew the truth. Certain Senators and Repre- 
sentatives were equipped with lists of outrages, but the lists 
were not accurate. The State Department may have had 
better information but it was not available ; the records of 
1913 on this subject were closed to all. When by chance 
a resolution calling for the data was passed, the Depart- 
ment met it with a refusal. 

Close following of Mexican events through private chan- 
nels, supplemented by a not too credulous reading of press 
despatches, led me, early in March, 19 14, to set the number 
of Americans who have lost their lives by violence in 
Mexico since January, 1913, at one hundred and fifty. Of 
these not more than thirty were killed because they were 
Americans; the others fell victims to a condition which 
the American Government might have prevented. 

There have been exaggerations in accotmts of Mexican 
troubles, but much has been missed altogether. What can 
the comfortably situated readers at a distance comprehend 
of the suffering and insult barely hinted at in vague re- 
ports of isolated cases or described so crudely that the 
exaggeration destroys all feeling of reality? What esti- 
mate can he form of the twenty-four days' reign of terror 
in Durango, of the looting and the re-looting of Torreon, 
of the flight of American refugees on foot two hundred 
miles in mud and rain to Saltillo, of the evacuation of 
Chihuahua, and the entry of Pancho Villa, the bandit con- 
queror of the north? Who can sit in security and grasp 
the horrors of the Cumbre Tunnel? 

Washington was moved by the well authenticated cases 
of distress ; it issued demands on Huerta and on Carranza 
and on Villa that the perpetrators of crimes against Ameri- 
cans must be punished. The State Department made a 
long record of those whom it would hold personally re- 



38o THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

sponsible for acts of violence. Ever since the awakening 
which caused the despatch of John Lind, a well supported 
and clearly meritorious story of mortal injury in Mexico 
could command a hearing. But with the demand started 
on its endless journey, the record made, and the hearing 
over, the incident was closed. 

The Americans are a patient people. Many thousands 
of despoiled refugees from Mexico who could get no re- 
dress have found that out. These refugees and their rela- 
tives and friends wondered what dimensions this record of 
disastrous wrong to Americans must reach before a stir 
would be caused which resembled purposeful action. 

On February 17, 1914, they supposed that their question 
had been answered. The death of one man seemed for a 
few days to have strained the resistance of the Washing- 
ton Governmicnt to the breaking point. 

The individual in question was William S. Benton, an 
Englishman. He was killed by the order, if not by the 
hand, of Pancho Villa, whose immediate chief was Car- 
ranza, over whom was no superior but the Government at 
Washington. 

The early accounts of this crime which made it out to 
have been an execution following a court martial, were 
hardly more credible than the Huerta government's ac- 
count of the killing of Madero. There had been no one to 
punish Madero's murderers ; it was obvious that Carranza 
would not and could not punish Benton's. But the formi- 
dable reputation of the British Government for protecting its 
citizens seemed to make some action necessary on the part 
of the United States, which was the guardian of Mexico, 
and in a very special sense the guardian of the Constitu- 
tionalists whose nominal chief was Carranza — now for 
good cause as truly an impossible as Huerta, unless Villa 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 381 

should be brought to book, an outcome not included in any 
sane man's forecast. 

It seemed, then, that the United States was cut off from 
any peaceful contact with Mexico, and was hopelessly In- 
volved in trouble inside its borders. What alternative re- 
mained but intervention? Yet it did not come. Inquiry as 
to Benton's death brought fiction after fiction, and a tangle 
of falsehood and mockery, absurd and offensive. Yet the 
weeks dragged away, and England waited with unexampled 
patience, while the United States did nothing that the eye 
of man could discern, " and did it very well," to quote ap- 
propriately from a familiar lyric of W. S. Gilbert's. 

Five weeks after the murder of Benton, Villa was still 
at the head of his army, about to lead it in what promised 
to be a critical engagement of the civil war in Mexico. 
And aside from the forthcoming battle at Torreon the chief 
news from Mexico was that John Lind had resumed nego- 
tiations with Huerta, in the hope that the usurper would 
consent to eft'ace himself in favor of a new provisional 
President. 

Surely this is a remarkable page of history, requiring for 
its explanation some very careful reading between the lines. 



CHAPTER XX 

TORREON fell to Pancho Villa on April 2. From 
that day the Washington authorities declined to 
listen to plans for the elimination of Hiierta on a 
cash basis. They pinned their faith to Villa as the man 
whose destiny it was to drive out the usurper. Much more 
than had been generally understood they had encouraged the 
fighting Constitutionalist leader who had been permitted to 
gain such ascendency that he had become the alternative to 
intervention. To depose him from command of his army 
— if that were possible — or even to permit him to be de- 
feated would eventually force an invasion of Mexico, not 
only from the Gulf ports but from the North. His victory 
at Torreon was essential. 

I do not suppose that the Wilson Administration knew 
what were Villa's plans for subsequent campaigning or how 
he expected to pay his troops. I prefer to think that the 
President and his advisers were imperfectly informed as to 
the character and motives of the leader, and as to the in- 
centives of the great majority of his officers and men. A 
kind of patriotism, easily exaggerated and misunderstood, 
animated a few, and all seemed to be fighting for a cause 
not unworthy. Ample evidence has been furnished that 
Washington did not believe Villa to be so black as he was 
painted ; that he was thought to be amenable to control. I 
firmly believe that President Wilson would have been 
shocked to learn that the rebel leader would rather fight his 
way across Mexico to the National Palace in the capital 

382 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 383 

than to have full possession of the government delivered to 
him without a struggle. 

There was a deal of mystery about the Torreon fight 
which was carried on mostly in the districts north and west 
of the city itself. At first the attacking force suffered re- 
verses, but after several days of battle they turned the tables 
and the Federal General Velasco evacuated the city. 
Losses were very heavy on both sides. Villa's army num- 
bered about 12,000 and Velasco's 9,000. Estimates which 
are not to be relied upon place Villa's loss from all causes 
at 5,000, and that of the Federals at 3,000. It would seem 
that Velasco should have held the city, but he failed, 
whether from bad tactics, poor troops, deficient ammuni- 
tion, or the superior skill of his opponent. The victory was 
Villa's and his conquest of Mexico was fairly under way. 

Torreon is seven hundred miles from the capital, and the 
richest section of Mexico lies between. Four armies were 
required to make a lasting success of the southward move- 
ment, and three of them were already in the field. To the 
east, in the Gulf of Mexico state of Tamaulipas, one large 
force had been operating for several weeks. It had taken 
Victoria, capital of the state, and had seriously menaced 
the port of Tampico which Villa now needed more than 
ever, for reasons which will presently appear. 

In the West a Constitutionalist force was active in the 
Pacific Coast state of Sinaloa, and the territory of Tepic. 
In the center, under Villa himself, was the remainder of 
the army which had captured and was now occupying Tor- 
reon. 

Another army must speedily be raised to act in concert 
with Villa's own forces in their campaign for possession of 
the cities on the two trunk lines of railway in Central Mex- 
ico. Recruiting seemed surprisingly easy for Villa. Im- 
mediately after Torreon he was able to send a force toward 



384 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

Monterrey in pursuit of the Federals, and start another 
southeastward in the direction of Saltillo. 

In addition to these forces pressing east and south there 
were smaller armies and garrisons in all the border states of 
the North and in the northwest state of Sonora. I think 
it fair to estimate that on April 5 the Constitutionalists 
had 40,000 men in the field, well armed and many of them 
fairly well equipped. The only visible means of support 
for this very considerable military establishment was the 
country in which the various detachments operated. The 
only discoverable brain directing the widely separated 
bodies of men and keeping them supplied with arms was 
under the hat of First Chief Carranza. I can but think this 
a remarkable showings not wholly devoid of mystery. 

Fiat Constitutional currency, well backed by force, ac- 
counted for such of the equipment as could be drawn from 
local sources. Force alone took care of wages and food for 
men, and forage for horses. But rifles, sabers, revolvers, 
automatics, machine guns, cannon and ammunition, to say 
nothing of cartridge belts and other such necessities for 
40,000 men, must come from a source which demands real 
money. Let us not attempt to answer this riddle other- 
wise than by crediting Carranza and Villa with financial 
ability of a high order. 

Doubtless it would be better to say plainly that I believe 
Carranza and Villa received advice and assistance in mat- 
ters of finance. The propriety of this depends, perhaps, 
upon the method employed, in regard to which I have no 
trustworthy information. Certainly Carranza was advised 
in the matter of withdrawal from active participation in 
conspicuous military operations, and this resulted in rais- 
ing Villa to such an eminence that some outward alteration 
in the man became a necessity. After the Benton aflfair 
he was constantly under tutelage, by which he was clever 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 385 

enough to profit. In the Torreon campaign he also bene- 
fited by advice in miHtary matters. The allegation that 
American troops fought with him is wholly unsupported, 
and should require no denial ; but there were a few Ameri- 
can soldiers of fortune under his banner, and three of them 
were artillerists. 

Villa had learned something about publicity too, perhaps 
from his experience with the moving-picture men for whom 
he had posed at Juarez. A good press agent had been 
added to his staff, and the official reports to Washington 
were made by George C. Carothers, confidential agent of 
the State Department. Thus there were various presenta- 
tions of Villa before the eyes of the world, and various ex- 
ternal sources now contributed to the sum of his apparent 
qualities. Like other famous men he had become several 
persons in one. He was no longer a mere individual, he 
was a syndicate. 

But in spite of all surface amelioration Villa and his sol- 
diers remained much the same as they had been at Durango 
and at Juarez. A recital of their crimes would have no end. 
I do not think the newspaper reports of their cruelties were 
materially exaggerated; more probably, taking into account 
the limitations of language, they were less than the truth. 
From what I have seen and heard I believe that a more 
accurate mental picture would be gained by magnifying the 
printed reports some four or five diameters. But it should 
be remembered that Villa and his men were not created 
by the government of the United States ; they Vi^ere found 
upon the, scene, and whatever has been done to influence 
their behavior toward the proprieties of civilized warfare 
may count as meritorious. 

It remains to be said that on April 5 Villa was acquitted 
of all blame in the Benton affair, by Carranza's court of in- 
quiry whose verdict was in accord with Secretary Bryan's 



386 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

frequently expressed belief. Though this decision carried 
little weight, it helped somewhat to make Villa a more pos- 
sible figure in the design of the Washington government for 
the expulsion of Huerta. 

As has been intimated the cover of Villa's military code 
had been cleansed, and he had been taught to keep the 
volume closed in public, whenever he could remember to do 
so. This saved some lives after the fall of Torreon, but 
there are other punishments than death. In the captured 
city there were good and bad persons, in Villa's estimation, 
and he drew the line between them with quick decision. 
The good were inconvenienced but not despoiled. The bad, 
consisting of Spaniards and every variety of Huertista, 
were subjected to a forfeiture of goods without delay. 

More than six hundred Spaniards were driven at the 
bayonet point into box cars and shipped five hundred miles 
to El Paso. Their property, both real and personal, was 
seized. Several thousand bales of cotton valued at about 
$4,000,000 were among the items which Villa appropriated 
as spoils of war. 

The deported Spaniards endured great suffering on the 
journey to El Paso. Scantily clothed and stripped of every- 
thing negotiable they had been crowded like sheep into the 
cars, and during the forty-eight hours in transit they had 
little water and less food. Their condition at the end of 
their journey was pitiable. The Spanish government asked 
the United States to look after the interests of its subjects, 
and accordingly a protest was addressed to Carranza who 
solemnly replied that the Spaniards had been dealt with 
very leniently considering their offenses. 

The spoil from this proceeding must have been large for 
some of the deported men were rich. Efforts were im- 
mediately made to sell the cotton which had fallen into 
Villa's hands, but negotiations for its sale in the United 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 387 

States failed. Two agents were sent to Europe to find a 
purchaser, but there was a serious obstacle in the way of 
closing a bargain. This was the difficulty of transportation. 
About four hundred cars were required, and so much of 
the rolling stock of the railways had been destroyed that 
no such supply was available. 

Even should the cars be got, and the cotton be carried to 
El Paso, there would be many chances yet to be taken. 
The United States government might fear complications 
Avith Spain, if it should allow the goods to pass through its 
territory to the Gulf Coast for shipment abroad. And the 
railway which should haul the cotton under the known cir- 
cumstances would be in an unenviable position, if the right- 
ful owners should present claims. There was but one al- 
ternative; the purchasers of the goods must take delivery 
at a point in Mexico and that point must be the port of 
Tampico. The distance from Torreon was only five hun- 
dred and fifty miles but the port itself was in the hands of 
the Federals, and the railway route to it led through Mon- 
terrey, a city of eighty thousand people, which had resisted 
rebel attacks. If the cotton were to be carried to tidewater 
both Monterrey and Tampico must be captured. 

The movement against Monterrey was promptly begun. 
Federal General Velasco with about 2,500 of his men had 
retreated in the direction of that city after evacuating Tor- 
reon on April 2, the remainder of his forces having fled 
toward Saltillo. Two days later he was overtaken at San 
Pedro by General Rosalio Hernandez of Villa's army, and 
many of Velasco's command were killed. Hernandez, co- 
operating with other generals of the Constitutionalists, then 
pushed on for Monterrey. 

The force threatening Tampico was spurred forward, and 
the city destined to be the greatest oil center in the world 
was more closely invested. The Federal garrison which 



388 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

had held its ground for weeks, was cut off by rail from its 
base of supplies at San Luis Potosi and had been supported 
from Vera Cruz, two hundred miles south, by means of 
vessels plying between the two ports. Great anxiety was 
felt by the oil interests in the neighborhood. A miracle had 
saved the Lord Cowdray and Waters-Pierce refineries at 
Tampico from destruction during the days when the rebels 
were actively attacking. The same army, substantially re- 
inforced, was preparing for assault, and any day a great 
disaster might befall the stores of inflammable wealth to- 
gether with the equipment for industrial operation. 

Threats were made by the rebels against Lord Cowdray's 
properties because he was suspected of having aided Huerta 
in negotiations for loans. None of the companies doing 
business in the oil fields took sides however. If the 
Waters-Pierce interests hoped for Constitutionalist su- 
premacy they made no sign, and the Huerta forces did not 
single them out for attack. The Dutch-Schell managers 
were also painstakingly neutral. Their great well. La 
Carona, had flowed more than 150,000 barrels in a single 
day when it sprang into life in November, 1913, distancing 
Lord Cowdray's famous Portrero del Llano and succeed- 
ing to the world's producing record for a single well. If 
the course of war should lead over their property the loss 
would be incalculable. 

Active business in the oil fields could not continue with 
skirmishing between the rebels and the defenders going 
on, but no outside government cared to take the step of 
landing troops to protect its nationals or the property 
they owned. The Federal garrison awaited the attack and 
the besiegers threatened continually. Foreign residents 
understood that the next vigorous move of the Constitu- 
tionalist forces would place them in great peril and they 
prepared to take to the ships at short notice. Affairs at 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 389 

Tanipico were in this state when the incident occurred 
which brought the United States into armed clash with 
Huerta to the material benefit of the Constitutionalists' 
plans. 

On April 9 a whaleboat from the United States gun- 
boat Dolphin lying in the Panuco River before Tampico, 
was sent ashore for gasoline, and put in at the Iturbide 
Bridge. The boat was manned by a crew of nine sailors 
in charge of an assistant paymaster of the United States 
navy, and displayed American colors at bow and stern. 
The men were unarmed. While part of the crew were 
still in the launch Colonel Hinoza, commanding a detach- 
ment of Mexican Federals placed the American officer and 
the whaleboat's crew under arrest. Immediately afterward 
he paraded them through the streets to jail amid the jeers 
of bystanders and cries of " Death to the Gringos." 

The American Admiral Mayo, being promptly informed 
of the occurrence, demanded instant release of his men, an 
apology in due form by General Zaragoza, the Federal com- 
mander at Tam.pico, and a formal salute to the American 
flag, consisting of the firing of twenty-one guns in its 
honor before six o'clock the following evening, April 10. 
The men were at once released and the apology offered, 
but the matter of the salute was referred by wire to Mexico 
City, Admiral Mayo at the same time forwarding an ac- 
count of the aft'air to Washington. 

It seems quite clear that the right procedure would have 
been instant direction from Washington to Admiral Mayo 
to enforce his demand to the letter, as this would have 
tended to restrict the affair. But Washington temporized; 
directed the Admiral to extend the time one day for the 
salute to be fired, and took up negotiations with Huerta 
through the American Charge at Mexico City with the re- 
sult of aggravating the incident. 



390 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

The history of Washington's previous demands upon 
Huerta repeated itself. Temporizing argument was the 
only response which could be elicited, and day after day 
the time for firing the salute was extended. What seemed 
like a division of sentiment among high government of- 
ficials at Washington was indicated by the statements given 
to the press. Hesitation there certainly was for three days 
at least. Suddenly on the 14th, the Atlantic war fleet of 
seventeen battleships was ordered to proceed with haste to 
Vera Cruz and Tampico. 

On the i6th formal notice to salute was served on 
Huerta, and this was followed on the i8tli by an ultimatum 
demanding that the twenty-one guns be fired by 6:00 p. m. 
on the 20th. On the 19th Huerta made flat refusal to 
comply, unless the salute should be answered gun for gun 
which would have condoned the offense and have been con- 
strued as a recognition of his government. That day more 
ships were despatched for Mexican waters. 

On the 20th President Wilson laid the case before both 
houses of Congress in a personal address, reciting the 
Tampico incident and supplying the additional information 
that a uniformed orderly from the U. S. S. Minnesota had 
been detained in the city of Vera Cruz while ashore on mail 
service for his ship, and also stating that government de- 
spatches from Washington to the embassy in Mexico City 
had been withheld from delivery until the American 
Charge d'Affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, had gone in per- 
son to demand resumption of the service. 

President Wilson, in view of these offensive acts — the 
two latter being in natural sequence to that at Tampico — 
asked for quick joint action of Congress in support of his 
demands upon Huerta. 

" I therefore come," said he, " to ask your approval that 
I should use the armed forces of the United States in such 




RAFAEL HERNANDEZ 

Miuistei- of Fomento (Promotion) in the Cabinet of Provisional Presi- 

dent de la Barra. Minister of Gobernacion m the 

Cabinet of his cousin, President Madero. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 391 

ways and to such an extent as may be necessary to obtain 
from General Huerta and his adherents the fullest recog- 
nition of the rights and dignity of the United States, even 
amid the distressing conditions now unhappily obtaining in 
Mexico." 

The House, after a stormy session of four hours, passed 
the following resolution by a vote of 337 to 37 : 

" Resolved, By the Senate and House of Repre- 
sentatives, in Congress assembled, that the President 
of the United States of America is justified in the em- 
ployment of armed forces of the United States to 
enforce the demands made upon Victoriano Huerta 
for unequivocal amends to the government of the 
United States for affronts and indignities committed 
against this government by General Huerta and his 
representatives." 

The Senate in a session that same night objected to the 
naming of one man as an enemy against whom the Army 
and Navy were to be used. The Tampico affair was called 
a pretext, in the course of the debate. Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge proposed a resolution which recited the 
wrongs suffered by American individuals, in person and 
property. Debate was heated. The Senate adjourned 
over midnight; then reassembled and passed a substitute 
resolution. The House concurred. This is the text of 
the resolution as passed by both bodies : 

" Resolved, By the Senate and House of Repre- 
sentatives of the United States of America in Con- 
gress assembled that the President is justified in the 
employment of the armed forces of the United States 
to enforce his demand for unequivocal amends for 
certain affronts and indignities committed against the 
United States ; be it further 

" Resolved, That the United States disclaims any 



392 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

hostility to the Mexican people or any purpose to make 
war upon Mexico." 

In one respect the President's address was similar to 
that which he had made to Congress in August, 1913: it 
was notable for an omission. On the former occasion he 
had refrained from mentioning the financial offer which he 
had authorized John Lind to make to Mexico as a reason 
why Huerta should resign. The second address contained 
no reference to the true cause of haste in the despatching 
of the warships to the Mexican gulf ports. The urgency 
was due to information that a large shipment of munitions 
of war was on its way from a German port to Vera Cruz. 
The cargo included some thousands of rifles, a number of 
machine guns, and a large quantity of ammunition ; and 
the receipt of these supplies by Huerta would greatly 
strengthen him against the Constitutionalists, and perhaps 
against the United States, should war result from the in- 
creasing complications. At the moment, however, this was 
a move against Huerta and in favor of the Constitutional- 
ists who had been receiving all the arms for which they 
could pay. 

On April 21, when the Senate and House agreed upon 
the resolution, the German ship Ypiranga, carrying the 
munitions of war, arrived at Vera Cruz. To prevent the 
cargo from reaching its intended destination a large body 
of American marines was landed at that port and the cus- 
tom house was seized. The landing party was under or- 
ders not to fire unless fired upon, and to occupy only a small 
portion of the city in the immediate neighborhood of the 
custom house which is on the water front. 

The marines met resistance of a scattering and irregular 
sort. The opposition gathered strength as the movement 
swept up the broad, open pier, and it presently became nec- 
essary for one of the smaller warships lying within easy 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 393 

range to shell some of the positions of the enemy, includ- 
ing the naval academy building. Before actual possession 
of the custom house was secured, four American marines 
were killed and twenty wounded. The number of Mexi- 
cans killed was about two hundred. 

'' Sniping " or isolated fire from concealment picked off 
Americans for the next two days. The entire city was oc- 
cupied by the American forces on the 22nd, the Federal 
troops having retreated several miles to a point on the 
Mexican raihvay, a mile of which they tore up. In all, 
seventeen Americans were killed and sixty-two wounded. 
" Sniping " being punishable by death according to usages 
of war, it was reported that forty Mexicans were sum- 
marily executed for this offense. 

Meanwhile the republic of Mexico was becoming an un- 
fit place of residence for Americans, and in Monterrey 
violent demonstrations were being made. On April 21 a 
Huerta captain commanding a detachment of Federal 
troops, acting no doubt under orders, tore down and 
stamped upon every American flag in the city including 
that over the United States general consulate in which 
many Americans had taken refuge. That night the con- 
sulate was surrounded by Federal troops and the lives of its 
inmates were threatened. 

On the following day, the United States Consul General, 
Philip C. Hanna, was taken before a military tribunal, 
charged with aiding Constitutionalist generals, and thrust 
into prison where he remained incommunicado until April 
24, when the Constitutionalist army under Generals 
Villareal and Castro entered the city in triumph, the Fed- 
eral forces evacuating the place. The conduct of the Con- 
stitutionalists after this victory, as reported by the grateful 
consul general, was a decided improvement over that which 
they had exhibited elsewhere. 



394 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

On April 22, Charge O'Shaughnessy of the embassy at 
Mexico City received his passports, and the same service 
was rendered in Washington to the Mexican charge, Senor 
Algara, who notified the State Department of his intention 
to leave the territory of the United States. O'Shaughnessy 
and his family, with the attaches of the embassy excepting 
interpreter d'Antin, arrived in Vera Cruz on the evening 
of the 24th, accompanied by Consul General Shanklin and 
the attaches of the Mexico City consulate. No other 
Americans were permitted to leave the capital, it having 
been reported that Mexicans were being detained in Vera 
Cruz against their will. 

Two days later, however, Huerta learned that he had 
been misinformed, and all Americans who desired to do 
so were allowed to depart. Some were conveyed to Tejera, 
the Mexican camp near Vera Cruz, whence they were 
escorted on foot to the American lines under flags of truce. 
Others were sent to Puerto Mexico, the eastern terminus of 
the Tehuantepec railway. 

Excitement throughout Mexico was intense. Americans 
were everywhere insulted. As fast as possible those in the 
interior made their way out, the majority going to the 
capital and thence to Puerto Mexico or Vera Cruz. The 
United States Government chartered the Ward line 
steamers to carry refugees to Galveston and New Orleans, 
and expectation of immediate war was general. 

Huerta prepared to destroy the railways from Mexico 
City to Vera Cruz. The United States sent an army 
brigade of 5000 men under General Funston to Vera Cruz, 
and the control of the city passed from the navy to the 
army, the sailors and marines returning to the ships. 
Fifty -two American war vessels of all classes were now in 
Mexican waters. Washington denied that war existed, but 
prepared to supply large bodies of troops at short notice. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 395 

In Tampico the demonstrations against Americans were 
violent, and the American warships in the river and harbor 
were said to be a menace rather than a safeguard to their 
nationals in the city. There is some dispute about this, 
but none at all about the withdrawal of the ships, leaving 
the Americans to be protected by the German and English 
vessels. More than five hundred Americans were taken 
aboard these warships, and transferred to a merchantman 
which conveyed them to New Orleans, without their previ- 
ous knowledge or consent, as some of them have alleged. 
The refugees declared further that the American warships 
had brought down the trouble upon them and had then de- 
serted them while they were in great danger. It was a 
peculiar incident, not the first of that class experienced by 
Americans who have lost everything they possessed in 
Mexico and have found themselves without a country. 

While these events savoring of tragedy were in progress, 
Washington's relations with Carranza were disturbed by 
complications in the vein of comedy. On Wednesday, April 
22, the day after the marines landed at Vera Cruz, Mr. 
Carothers, the State Department's representative with the 
Consitutionalists, transmitted to Carranza at Juarez, by re- 
quest of Secretary Bryan, a note of explanation of the Vera 
Cruz incident. The note stated that the landing of troops 
and the seizure of the custom house " was made necessary 
by Huerta's refusal to make proper amends for the arrest 
of unarmed American sailors." The secretary suggested 
that the " proper attitude " for the Constitutionalists was 
to " stand aloof," and concluded with the hope that they 
would " not misunderstand President Wilson's position or 
misconstrue his acts." 

This communication I take to be one of the most unusual 
productions of the State Department, even in the incum- 
bency of Mr, Bryan; but the true comedy resides in the 



396 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

unexpected results to both parties. At that time the United 
States was on the very point of recognizing the belligerency 
of the Constitutionalists ; the documents, so to speak, were 
already drawn up ; and the communication which has been 
mentioned was in a sense the forerunner of the recognition. 

But Carranza had not been advised of the good things in 
store, and Secretary Bryan's conciliatory despatch took him 
unawares. In less than three hours after receipt of the 
message the First Chief of the Constitutionalists sent a 
communication to President Wilson through Mr. Carothers 
which amounted to a threat that if the United States did not 
retire at once from Vera Cruz the Constitutionalists would 
join in an effort to expel them. He also suggested that after 
withdrawal of its forces, the United States should recog- 
nize the Constitutionalists as the actual and permanent 
Mexican government, which courtesy would be requited 
with as much saluting as might be desired. 

Pancho Villa was then at Torreon pushing forward his 
plans for campaigning against Saltillo and San Luis Potosi. 
Advised of Carranza's action by telegrams from that gentle- 
man and from Mr. Carothers, Villa hurried to Juarez, and 
at dinner with the State Department's agent quite pointedly 
reversed the First Chief. Talk of strained relations be- 
tween Carranza and the military genius of the Constitu- 
tionalists was revived. An open break was declared to be 
imminent, if it did not already exist. 

This was a situation which Washington viewed with 
alarm as indicating a lack of cohesion in the Constitutional- 
ist enterprise. But the tactful Carothers restored harmony 
between the two leaders ; and Carranza slowly shifted his 
position until it became evident that he and Villa, on the 
surface at least, were in accord. 

In the United States there was a disposition to look upon 
Carranza's reply as prearranged with Washington, but this 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 397 

seems to be an error. The truth is that the State Depart- 
ment had put the First Chief into a place where he was 
compelled to be haughty, in order to preserve his hold upon 
the Mexicans. He had already gone as far as he dared in 
obedience to Mr. Bryan's instructions, and his reputation 
in Mexico was in danger. Thus he was compelled to re- 
ply to Mr. Bryan's note in some manner which should com- 
port with his professions of independence. This was per- 
ceived in Washington, after patient study, and the anxiety 
was relieved. It was not thought necessary to restore the 
embargo on arms at the Mexican border, though in regard 
to this traffic certain precautionary measures were taken, 
as will hereafter be noted. 

The actual gain to the Constitutionalists by the Vera Cruz 
operations was too clear to be ignored. The revenues of 
Mexico's principal seaport had been cut from Huerta's 
visible means of existence, and the cargo of war munitions 
had been turned back to the high seas. Villa certainly per- 
ceived all this, and he was satisfied with the assurances of 
Carothers that the United States did not desire to advance 
inland from Vera Cruz. There can hardly be a doubt that 
Carranza's irritation, if he had really felt any, yielded to 
the same arguments. 

But Carranza's vigorous pronouncements had excited the 
Texans, the Arizonians and the New Mexicans, and 
preparations for a state of war along the 1800 miles of 
Mexico's frontier were speedily under way. The War De- 
partment at Washington urged upon President Wilson the 
necessity for immediate restoration of the embargo on 
traffic in arms across the border, and adduced evidence to 
show that in the eight days which had elapsed since April 
14, when the war fleet was ordered to Mexican waters, 
8,000,000 rounds of ammunition and 10,000 rifles had gone 
into Mexico from the United States. But the President de- 



398 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

dined to replace the embargo in full force. There were 
several thousand rifles, ten machine guns, and 500,000 
pounds weight of ammunition in El Paso ready for de- 
livery across the river. These the War Department was 
permitted to order withheld. The conversation between 
Carranza and Villa which resulted from this would, I 
fancy, throw a bright light on many matters at present 
wofully obscure. And on the top of it all they had lost, 
for the time, their recognition as belligerents. 

On April 25 the Ambassador of Brazil and the Minis- 
ters of Chile and the Argentine Republic at Washington 
tendered their good offices to the Wilson Administration to 
bring about a peaceful solution of the Mexican troubles. 
After consultation with Secretary Bryan, their proposal was 
formally tendered as follows : 

(Translation) 
Legation of the Argentine Republic, 

Washington, D. C, April 25, 1914. 
Mr. Secretary of State: 

With the purpose of subserving the interests of 
peace and civilization in our continent, and with the 
earnest desire to prevent any further bloodshed, to the 
prejudice of the cordiality and union which has always 
surrounded the relations of the governments and peo- 
ples of America, we, the plenipotentiaries of Brazil, 
Argentina, and Chile, duly authorized thereto, have the 
honor to tender to your Excellency's government our 
good offices for the peaceful and friendly settlement 
of the conflict between the United States and Mexico. 
This offer puts in due form the suggestions which 
we had occasion to offer heretofore on the subject to 
the Secretary, to whom we renew the assurances of 
our highest and most distinguished considerations. 

D. Da Gama, 
R. S. Naon, 
Eduardo Suarez Mujica, 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 399 

The offer was accepted by the Washington State Depart- 
ment in a response whose most significant paragraph ran 
thus : 

" This government feels bound in candor to say that its 
diplomatic relations with Mexico being for the present 
severed, it is not possible for it to make sure of an unin- 
terrupted opportunity to carry out the plan of intermedia- 
tion which you propose. It is, of course, possible that 
some act of aggression on the part of those who control 
the military forces of Mexico might oblige the United 
States to act, to the upsetting of hopes of immediate peace; 
but this does not justify us in hesitating to accept your 
generous suggestion." 

On Monday, April 2"], the Spanish ambassador at Wash- 
ington, who had acted for Mexico since the breach of 
diplomatic relations with the United States, announced to 
the State Department General Huerta's acceptance of the 
mediation proposals of the "A. B. C." powers of South 
America. In the interval before the gathering of the dele- 
gates at Niagara Falls to open the conference on May 20 
specific charges were made by Huerta that the government 
of the United States had violated the armistice which had 
been agreed upon. There seemed to be no tangible founda- 
tion for the charges, but they were annoying. 

The Huerta delegates, Sefiores Elguero, Rabassa and 
Rodriguez, arrived at Washington, May 16, accompanied 
by their families and immense quantities of luggage. All 
of the gientlemen were important lawyers of Mexico, of the 
group which once flourished under the name Cientifico, 
The United States government provided for their use two 
private cars from the Florida coast and elaborate suites at 
hotels. The delegates utilized the cars and the hotel suites, 



400 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

but insisted upon paying the charges. One of the dele- 
gates, Senor Luis Elguero, was a director of the National 
Railways of Mexico and also of Lord Cowdray's Aguila 
Oil Company, prominent in the Mexican fields. 

Mediation as a means of settling the differences between 
the United States and General Huerta need not be consid- 
ered seriously. It was accepted for the sake of advantages 
which each party perceived. The United States welcomed 
the chance to strengthen its position by dividing the gen- 
eral Latin-American sentiment, so that subsequent action 
with regard to Mexico, if anything forcible should be 
necessary, might not antagonize all the southern nations 
of the hemisphere. The move tended to satisfy the 
numerous advocates of peace, and gave the Constitutional- 
ists more time to overrun Mexico and dri^ Huerta out, 
while the United States forces sat quiet at Vera Cruz. 
Carranza was invited to suspend hostiHties and send repre- 
sentatives to Niagara Falls, but it was not within reason 
that he should accept at that juncture. If he had done so, 
it might have been a distinct disappointment to the United 
States. 

Huerta saw his own importance increased, and the price 
of his abdication raised. A truce with the United States 
was valuable; it eventually enabled him to get the ship- 
ment of munitions of war ashore from the Ypiranga while 
Washington looked on ridiculously helpless. Moreover 
there was strong pressure upon him to send delegates to 
Niagara Falls, for mediation inspired the survivors of the 
old Diaz circle with hope. A prominent Mexican exile 
described the mediation congress to me as " the last stand 
of the Cientificos " — with which body he himself had been 
affiliated. 

The mediators were all favorable to property rights, and 
it was unthinkable that any plan of government which they 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 401 

might devise would satisfy the desire of the radical Con- 
stitutionalists and the feeling of the masses behind them 
that the rich ruling class of Mexico should be killed or 
driven out, and the Catholics oppressed and despoiled. The 
Huerta delegates, very keen negotiators, went to the con- 
gress for the purpose of tying the United States up in a 
hard knot. The whole proceeding was manifestly absurd 
as long as the Constitutionalists were not represented. 
Without their concurrence no result could be reached which 
a few more victories by Pancho Villa would not upset. 
Meanwhile the United States might easily be committed 
to the plans of the mediation congress so far as to be in 
honor bound to back them, even to the extent of armed 
invasion. And it is conceivable that this was the true goal 
toward which ''the Cientificos and the other business inter- 
ests represented by the participants in the congress were 
striving. 

On May 13 Tampico fell to the Constitutionalist forces, 
the garrison withdrawing to Tuxpan after suffering seri- 
ous losses. Comparatively little damage was done to for- 
eign interests. The Dutch warship had landed a guard to 
protect the great La Carona well ; but from no other vessel 
of the foreign fleet were troops sent ashore. 

The fall of Tampico still further weakened Huerta's 
position, and the gain of this port completed the Constitu- 
tionalists' line of communication from the interior to the 
Gulf. 

The great properties controlled by Lord Cowdray escaped 
serious damage when Tampico passed into the hands of the 
Constitutionalists, but that change introduced new com- 
plications for the Englishman. From the advent of 
Huerta, in February, 1913, to May in the following year, 
Lord Cowdray's investments in the Tampico oil fields 
steadily increased at the rate of £50,000 a month — a total 



402 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

of about £750,000 added to the great capital already en- 
gaged there. His continued enlargements of operations in 
the oil field had been regarded as evidence of his confidence 
in the stability of the Huerta government, and as corrobora- 
tion of the reports that he had aided its financial negotia- 
tions. He was not in good odor with the Constitutional- 
ists, and if they were to have anything like a free hand in 
setting up a new government, its attitude would certainly 
be hostile to him. 

Another important item of Lord Cowdray's relationship 
to the Mexican government was his interest in the 
Tehuantepec Railway of which mention has already been 
made. Unknown to the Mexican people and the Mexican 
Congress his negotiations with the Madero government for 
the sale of this railway interest had been concluded, and 
the agreement covering the transaction was to have been 
signed on February 10, 1913. The outbreak of February 
9 with its fatal consequences to Madero prevented the 
signing of the papers. This left the Tehuantepec pro- 
posals to be presented to the government of the usurper. 
Efforts were constantly made during the early months of 
Huerta's rule to effect a bargain, but a plan was formed by 
Lord Cowdray, looking toward an alternative, if negotia- 
tions should fail, as they actually did. 

This plan was intended to enable the Tehuantepec Rail- 
way to do a profitable business despite the competition soon 
to be introduced by the Panama Canal. The disadvan- 
tages of the Tehuantepec route for Hawaiian sugar lay in 
the necessity of transhipping from vessel to train at Salina 
Cruz, and from train to vessel at Puerto Mexico on the 
eastern coast. Lord Cowdray's idea was to do away with 
one of these handlings by the use of seagoing barges upon 
each of which sixteen of the cars could be run, at Puerto 
Mexico, to be delivered at Galveston or New Orleans. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 403 

Orders for eight of these barges were placed, and four 
were nearly ready for delivery on April i, 1914. 

But the partnership of the Mexican government in this 
railway makes it indispensable to Lord Cowdray that he 
shall be on fair terms with its officials who, on their part, 
must be affected by similar considerations. The Constitu- 
tionalists, looking forward with confidence to the control 
of Mexico, might well hesitate to make an enemy of Lord 
Cowdray, whose favorable influence would be of so great 
help to them in operations of finance, and whose an- 
tagonism would work powerfully against them in the money 
markets of the world. For this reason too serious oppres- 
sion of Lord Cowdray in the oil fields by the rebels who 
at this hour control that region, will be a grave tactical 
error. 

The United States on May 18 added two nations to its 
highest diplomatic grade, thus increasing its embassies to 
thirteen — which is said to be the President's lucky number. 
The nations were Chile and Argentina. Ministers to the 
capitals of those countries were promoted to Ambassador- 
ships. The inevitable result of this would be reciprocal 
action by Chile and Argentina in favor of their Ministers 
at Washington. Previously Brazil was the only one of the 
" A. B. C." nations enjoying this distinction in the Wash- 
ington scheme of statecraft and it was agreed that it would 
be well if all the mediators were of equal rank. 

Argentina, with its eight millions of people, and Chile 
wdth four and a half are prosperous nations. There is no 
doubt that the United States would welcome a larger por- 
tion of their trade, and all the usual benefits which recog- 
nition of one nation's worth brings to another. But selec- 
tion of that particular moment to confer these honors carry- 
ing personal benefits to two of the mediators called forth 
unfavorable criticism. 



404 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

The sustained successes of the Constitutionalist arms in 
April and May did violence to the hopes of two aspirants 
for Mexico's presidency both of whom had secured backing 
in New York, including the advice and guidance of eminent 
counsel. One of these ambitious men was Felix Diaz, well 
known to fame and misfortune. The other was General 
Fernando Gonzales, the son of that president of Mexico 
who held the office from 1880 to 1884 by the permission 
of Porfirio Diaz. 

The Felix Diaz enterprise need not be considered at 
length, although $100,000 was wasted upon it by men who 
should have known better. But the scheme of General 
Gonzales, formerly governor of the State of Mexico, was 
more formidable. Early in April Gonzales left New York 
for Mexico city with a proposal to lay before Huerta which 
involved the payment of three million dollars to the dicta- 
tor and certain of his generals in consideration of the ap- 
pointment of Gonzales to a place in the cabinet from which 
he would succeed to the presidency. Huerta's resignation 
was to be handed in before the money in the form of drafts 
on Paris should be paid. Seated as provisional president, 
Gonzales was to announce an open election in which Car- 
ranza, Felix Diaz, and all and sundry aspiring to the posi- 
tion, should have a fair chance to win on their merits. 

Gonzales reached Mexico's capital, laid his proposal be- 
fore Huerta, and was not shot ; at least he had escaped that 
fate as late as May 9, when a cablegram in code was re- 
ceived from him by s counsel in New York. The cable- 
gram conveyed the intelligence that matters seemed to be 
progressing favorably and might be concluded without 
violence, but that if violence proved to be necessary, the 
arrangements for its successful application had been made. 
If the transaction should be consummated on aj peaceful 
basis, General Huerta was to leave the country unostenta- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 405 

tiously via Puerto Mexico, taking passage in a vessel carry- 
ing the French flag. 

Some thirty milHons was to be supplied by loan to Mex- 
ico's treasury to start the Gonzales government. The 
three millions of cash had been provided for by negotia- 
tions of a large block of an old issue of bonds similar in 
appearance to those which Gustavo Madero had endeavored 
unsuccessfully to negotiate on a five-for-one basis in 1910, 
but of a better quality. These bonds to the amount of 
$15,000,000, face value, were to be passed over in return 
for the three millions in money, and were to be acknowl- 
edged by Gonzales when he should have achieved the presi- 
dency. The thirty millions to be loaned to Mexico was to 
be provided by men of large interests in that country in 
association with men of New York who hoped by this plan 
to stave off intervention by the United States with its shock 
to the security market. The market already was stagger- 
ing under the heavy strain of the tariff and currency meas- 
ures, and intervention in Mexico might break it down. 

This story, fantastic as it seems, is sober fact, and demon- 
strates the lack of information and judgment among men, 
otherwise sane, regarding the actual trouble in Mexico and 
how to remedy it. Pancho Villa's victories and those of 
other Constitutionalist leaders which have been recorded 
made the Gonzales scheme impracticable from every point 
of view, especially the financial. Carranza loomed larger 
and larger as a presidential possibility, even taking into ac- 
count the lack of adequate provisior ".'or Villa in any new 
government which might be set up. 

Carranza's platform has been a rather startling one, but 
I do not find that it has seriously interfered with Washing- 
ton's attitude toward him. Carranza is a Constitutionalist 
to the l^'ckbone and this is the foundation of his creed: 
every man who has voluntarily aided Huerta must be shot. 



4o6 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

To some minds this may seem objectionable, but if rele- 
gated to the realms of purely academic discussion, by the 
operation of sufficient restraints, it might not matter. 

Be Carranza's merits what they may, he was fortunate 
in having a good laywer which is often better than a good 
cause. The Constitutionalists were ably served in this re- 
spect at Washington, having a lawyer more successful than 
Mr. S. G. Hopkins, who had acted for the Maderos. The 
new attorney, Mr. C. A. Douglas, smoothed the way of the 
latterday revolutionalists of Mexico over many difficult 
places. 

But the elevation of Carranza or any other man of the 
Constitutionalist party to the presidential chair will be no 
more than a beginning of the Mexican task. The pressing 
and vital problem is the finances of the government and of 
the railways. Few realize the harm that Huerta has done 
in nullifying the solemn pledge of Mexico's customs re- 
ceipts to bankers as security for loans. It is hard to see 
how the great sums needed can be borrowed in Europe or 
America unless arrangements are made to place such 
pledges beyond the possibility of violation. This will de- 
mand a collector at every port to act as trustee for the 
bankers. The trustee must be powerful enough to enforce 
the rules. The United States can permit no other nation 
to undertake this business. 



CHAPTER XXI 

FOR many months the Mexican policy of President 
Wilson had been the theme of jests, or of serious 
discussion which was even more amusing. It had 
been treated by the world as a peculiarly difficult and en- 
tertaining riddle; it had been supposed to hide mysterious 
and menacing international relations ; it had been scoffed 
at as the mask put on to hide mere indecision. There is a 
sense, however, in which editorial comment in the United 
States, with few exceptions, had been constantly favorable. 
The dread of war, of trouble and expense, of injurious 
effect on business was constantly in evidence, and as Mr. 
Wilson's policy seemed to be safe, it may be said to have 
been praised in all these utterances. 

Before he took his seat — in the days of the overthrow 
and murder of Madero — leading articles in thousands of 
papers began with statements of the Mexican situation 
which read like the most earnest arguments for interven- 
tion, but almost invariably there was a paragraph or two 
at the end which deprecated any action on the part of the 
United States tending toward invasion of Mexico or costly 
interference with her lamentable condition. 

When the developments recorded in the preceding chap- 
ter had disclosed the relations of the Washington adminis- 
tration with the Constitutionalists, and had caused the Presi- 
dent to use the armed forces of the United States against 
Huerta, the tone of criticism speedily became adverse and 
the President was censured for too much energy and haste 
by the same pens that had mildly ridiculed him for endur- 

407 



4o8 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

ance of the antics of an intolerably bad neighbor. It 
seemed that the true inwardness of Mr. Wilson's Mexican 
policy was not understood, even so late ; that it was not seen 
to have been a perfectly simple device to meet a very ob- 
vious requirement of his situation. 

There is no doubt that in the latter part of February, 
1913, the Mexican question presented itself to the Presi- 
dent-elect in the form of a riddle which, as a public man 
and as an earnest, intelligent and humane individual, he 
would have been very glad to answer. But the situation in 
which he conceived himself to stand with reference to his 
interests and his highest duty seemed to demand that he 
should ask not, " How shall I solve that problem ? " but 
rather, " How long will it wait unsolved ? " 

The public which he had been chosen to serve was ex- 
cited by the ten days' bombardment in the Mexican capital 
(a performance not detected as a farce) and by the sub- 
sequent murders, and the peril to American lives and prop- 
erty ; but as to what should be done, the public had no con- 
viction. The tone of the press was decidedly against war- 
like measures. There was no clearness anywhere as to 
their justification, as to the cost and difficulties that would 
have to be met, or as to the essential truth that intervention 
in some form was inevitable, the only real question being, 
shall the thing be done now or later? Above all there was 
no sentiment against delay as a policy in itself, harsh and 
bloody. 

The absurdity of private comment in high places at that 
time is beyond belief to-day. It was almost openly said in 
Washington by influential men that the overthrow of 
Madero was fortunate for Mexico, that his death though 
regrettable would make for peace, and that Huerta was the 
strong man needed to bring back the days of Diaz. These 
views are of no importance except as indicating the prev- 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 409 

alent mental confusion. There was no unified public 
opinion tending to influence Mr. Wilson in his choice of a 
policy, except such as was expressed by the general depre- 
cation of war at a time when the business situation was so 
unsatisfactory. 

A\'hen President Wilson took office he encountered or- 
ganized pressure exerted for the recognition of Huerta. 
Ambassador Wilson advocated that course, and went be- 
yond the bounds of propriety in his efforts favorable to 
the usurper's interest; but the President was unalterably 
opposed to recognition. He saw Huerta for what he was, 
vicious, unreliable, treacherous, bespattered with the blood 
of his predecessor. Personal distaste for such a man was 
mingled with considerations of another sort, and there was 
never a chance that Huerta would receive the least support 
from the government at Washington while Woodrow Wil- 
son was at the head of it. 

Among the other considerations was the desire to safe- 
guard American interests in northern and northwestern 
Mexico. Revolt against Huerta was under way in Sonora, 
Chihuahua and other states. Already some of the more 
important industrial corporations controlled by Americans 
were preparing to make terms with the rebels in order to 
save valuable property from destruction, and avoid the 
great loss which would result from enforced suspension of 
operations. Whatever would enable Huerta to carry war 
into those states would threaten irreparable damage or even 
confiscation ; but so long as the areas should be securely held 
by one party to the struggle, business might go on, at the 
cost of moderate tribute paid to the Constitutionalist 
leaders. 

The best way to keep Huerta's armies out of the north- 
ern states was to cut down his pecuniary resources. This 
was the immediate necessity in President Wilson's view, 



4IO THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

and it could be met without taking the active measures 
which he desired to avoid as long as possible. To withhold 
recognition from Huerta, to prevent foreign nations from 
giving him aid, to damage his credit in every way that 
seemed proper under the circumstances — these expedients 
would suffice to prevent such injury to American interests 
in northern Mexico as would compel the United States to 
interfere. 

The President hoped and expected to solve the Mexican 
problem, but his first desire was to postpone it. The 
policy of watchful waiting looked forward rather vaguely 
to the defeat of Huerta by the Mexican rebels and to the 
setting up of recognizable government by the Constitu- 
tionalists; but its transcendent merit in the President's 
mind was that it would enable him to baffle the uncertain 
and divided advocates of quick action in Mexico, and would 
give him time to force through Congress those measures of. 
economic reform to which he was pledged. Revision of 
the tariff, banking and currency legislation, and the anti- 
trust bills were the matters upon which he was determined 
to focus his own energy, the services of his party in Con- 
gress, and the attention of the country. He believed that 
these enactments were essential to the nation's welfare, and 
that the time was ripe. His political future and his place 
in history seemed to depend upon his success along the 
lines that have been mentioned. It would have been ex- 
tremely bad strategy to permit the Mexican question to 
push in ahead of those domestic issues which were, in his 
opinion, more momentous and more urgent. 

Any immediate action, even a definite declaration in the 
Mexican matter would have excited antagonism in Con- 
gress, would have jeopardized the President's authority 
over the party leaders. His margin of control was narrow 
and he was well aware of it; he could afford no quarrels. 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 411 

And the event has amply proved his sagacity ; the policy of 
watchful waiting was too bare to be a bone of contention. 
It could be explained privately, where that was unavoid- 
able, and to each man according to his special need ; but for 
the most part it excused a mighty silence. 

From March 4, 1913, until the end of that year it was 
nearly impossible for any man who had interests in Mexico, 
and desired light upon the future, to get a single ray of it 
from the State Department in Washington. It was diffi- 
cult to approach Mr. Bryan on that subject, and the Presi- 
dent was wholly inaccessible. There was a channel of 
communication open between Washington and Hermosillo, 
after Carranza had established his headquarters there, and 
it may be said that from the outset the influence of the 
United States was exerted in favor of the Constitutional- 
ists ; but the policy of giving them direct and undeniable 
support against Huerta developed slowly. All action in 
the Mexican matter was postponed, retarded or suppressed, 
by every possible means, while President Wilson struggled 
with his Congress for the enactment of those laws which 
he had set himself to procure. 

Business in the United States did not improve; the tariff 
and the income tax had yet to disclose their capacity for 
revenue. There was trouble with the banks, and with the 
railroads. The manufacturing interests were suffering 
serious depression. The tolls exemption repeal, with its 
veiled threats of international complications, and open as- 
sault on harmony in the Democratic party, presently in- 
truded to make matters worse. The first year of President 
Wilson's administration was a hard one at home, giving ex- 
cuse for doubt whether time could be spared for setting a 
neighbor's house in order. 

But the excuse lost its value through the disclosure that 
the United States had been meddling with its neighbor's 



412 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

affairs for many months. There was war in Mexico, and 
the United States seriously hampered one of the contend- 
ing parties while giving important support to the other. 
It would appear, at the date of this writing, that nothing 
more need be done to insure the triumph of the Constitu- 
tionalists ; and that, when this shall have been achieved, 
the United States must interfere to deprive Carranza and 
Villa of the usual rewards of victory, or must permit a gov- 
ernment to be set up by them and their adherents. Hav- 
ing gone so far with these men President Wilson can hardly 
turn his back upon them. The obligations incurred can- 
not be evaded by mediation. By supporting the Constitu- 
tionalists the United States has become responsible in part 
for their fortunes and their behavior. Despoiled Euro- 
peans are recognizing this ; so are their home governments. 

It is a very grave responsibility. What pledges have 
been given by Carranza and Villa I do not know, but as to 
the value of those pledges I have a very definite opinion, 
which is that they are upon a par with those given to Am- 
bassador Wilson in the matter of the lives of President 
Madero and Vice President Suarez. If Madero and Sua- 
rez had been efficiently protected by the United States they 
would not have suffered death ; and the same may be said 
prophetically of many a Spaniard and abhorred Huertista 
who will come into Villa's power during his military 
operations, and afterwards. Those whom the United 
States succeeds in protecting, whether by arms or threats or 
promises, will live, and those whose fate depends upon 
the inward reformation of Pancho Villa will be fortunate 
if they suffer nothing worse than death. 

The mediation at Niagara Falls may result in an ex- 
cellent plan for the government of Mexico, but if this shall 
exclude Carranza and Villa from high office, it must in- 
volve a questionable bargain with them, or must leave them 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 413 

cheated by the United States. For something must have 
been promised them in the course of these prolonged rela- 
tions, otherwise the bare encouragement would have 
amounted to a promise that they should rule their country 
when their armies should have conquered it. 

If a Constitutionalist government shall be established, its 
chief claim to favor will reside in the projected reform of 
land tenure. This seems to be President Wilson's convic- 
tion. Samuel G. Blythe, in the Saturday Evening Post, 
May 23, 1 9 14, gives a long account of a conversation with 
the President on April 27, and the following sentences 
occur in that article: 

" He (the President) sketched the conditions in 
Mexico under Diaz and came to the underlying cause 
for all the unrest in that country for many years. 
This, he said, was a fight for the land — just that and 
nothing more." 

A considerable assortment of other causes for unrest — 
causes which the land question can not be said to underlie, 
and which no reform in that matter alone can remove — 
were visible to me during my residence in Mexico; but 
that is another story. The land question, as I have already 
said, depends for its equitable solution upon a proper 
method, not to mention the means of putting it honestly 
into practical operation. This reform was the chief plank 
in the platform of San Luis Potosi, and Francisco I. 
Madero believed in it very sincerely, to which fact I bear 
witness .from personal knowledge. But under the circum- 
stances and in the time allotted to him, he did not find an 
answer to the problems which it presented. No safer 
wager could be made than that Carranza, Villa and all their 
domestic counsellors will prove equally inadequate. 

If the United States is truly committed to that reform 



414 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

in Mexico, it must provide the method, and will be ex- 
tremely fortunate if not called upon to provide the power 
also. But, to speak of the plan alone, Madero would have 
been devoutly grateful for it; and since land tenure is al- 
leged to have been for many years the sole underlying 
cause of Mexico's unrest, it seems a pity that the United 
States did not work out a scheme for the removal of the 
landless peon's discontent, and give the use of it to the 
predecessor of General Huerta, thus solving the Mexican 
question which has cost so many lives, and so much money. 

For the inauguration of a Constitutionalist president will 
be the completion of a blood-red circle drawn on the map 
of Mexico. There may be — though I doubt it — a brief 
time of quiet afterwards in which to balance the books of 
the transaction. On the credit side will be the favorable 
difference, if any may be discovered, between the stability 
and merit of the new Mexican administration and that of 
President Madero. I put emphasis on stability, for in de- 
fault of it no land tenure change can be of any value. The 
peon will not have much profit of his land, if it becomes a 
battlefield between seedtime and harvest, nor will he dwell 
upon it, even though the fighting may be miles away. He 
will have learned to prefer looting to the dull pursuit of 
agriculture. 

Let this instruction be the first item on the debit side of 
the account covering the last two years. There must be 
added many thousands of Mexican lives sacrificed in bat- 
tles, massacres of prisoners, and incidental murders ; the 
wreck of cities and the devastation of rural districts ; the 
killing of Americans in numbers which it is too early to 
estimate; the hardships suffered by a multitude of others, 
and their property loss, very large in the aggregate. 
Hatred of Americans will be bitter and enduring, and will 
tend to retard the business recovery of the country, even 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 415 

under the best possible conditions. It is an item not to be 
overlooked. 

Many of these evils might have been prevented, I be- 
lieve, by more judicious action on the part of the United 
States after the accession of Madero. He had come to 
the presidency after a revolution very mild and brief, yet 
violent impulses had been in some degree stimulated, and 
it was not easier to predict that night would follow day 
than that anarchy would follow another revolutionary over- 
turn in Mexico. Peace, and some degree of permanency 
for the new government, were the first essentials, and this 
fact seems to have been recognized in Washington, 
Madero, though he came unwelcome, treading on de la 
Barra's heels, was recognized in due time, with kindly ex- 
pressions. 

I have no doubt that it would be possible to trace the 
diplomatic relations of the two governments, and find evi- 
dence on which to base a very plausible contention that 
President Taft was the great and good friend of President 
Madero. It seems to me that he was hasty and ill advised 
in his action relative to the disorders which presently ap- 
peared in Mexico, of which the most conspicuous was the 
wholly mercenary revolt of Orozco. I have asserted for 
example, that the threat of military interference did great 
mischief and no good; that it tended vastly to increase the 
evils which were supposed to have been its justification; 
that it hurt Mexico's credit, embarrassed Madero in many 
serious ways, and needlessly excited enmity toward the 
United States in Mexican bosoms. 

Yet it may be shown that President Taft's attitude was 
friendly throughout, that his language was temperate and 
courteous even when it conveyed threats, and that he never 
ceased to express a hope that the sister republic would 
emerge triumphant from her troubles. Along this line I 



4i6 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

will concede all that reason will allow ; but afterwards there 
will remain one matter in which the United States was per- 
sistently and fatally unfriendly to MexicO' from the begin- 
ning of Madero's rule until its tragic end. In regard to 
this particular matter I assert that there can be no differ- 
ence of opinion, but only of information ; that two or a 
thousand right-minded men will inevitably agree, if they 
know the facts. 

President Taft maintained in the capital of Mexico an 
ambassador who should not have been there; who was 
lamentably misplaced, unsympathetic, injudicious, and dis- 
astrously harmful. Knowing as I do how narrowly 
Madero missed a triumph over the extraordinary diffi- 
culties and deadly enemies that beset him, I am constrained 
to believe that the least value which can be assigned to the 
unfortunate influence of the American ambassador is still 
sufficient to have turned the scale. The right man in the 
place, tactful, well disposed, keenly discerning, a man who 
earnestly desired the established government to continue 
because he had the foresight to perceive what must follow 
its violent overthrow — such a man as dean of the diplo- 
matic corps and representative of the most influential na- 
tion, could have lent enough support to Madero to keep 
him up until the wave of violence had subsided and the 
revival of prosperity had turned the minds of the masses 
toward peaceful means of living. And he could have done 
it without offensive interference, without going beyond the 
bounds of diplomatic propriety. 

If the reader doubts this let him think upon a single 
phase — upon the situation when Calero was in Washing- 
ton and Henry Lane Wilson in Mexico City. How was 
President Madero then placed with regard to diplomatic 
relations? If there was any help that might have been 
given, what chance had Madero of getting it? Much help 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 417 

was possible, at that time and before and afterwards, but I 
know that it was not forthcoming. 

The brevity of Madero's term in office, the manner of 
his fall, and the murders that followed were in the highest 
degree deplorable. They were evidences of inherent in- 
stability and incitements to all who saw personal profit in 
such conditions. It was inevitable that there should be a 
season of violence more serious than any that had gone be- 
fore. I believe that the conditions in Mexico City and in 
many parts of the country amply justified intervention by 
the LInited States, and that the day on which it should have 
been declared was February 18, 1913, when Huerta seized 
control of the government. It seemed to me then that, 
sooner or later, it must come, and I have never changed my 
opinion. The situation has not improved but has become 
worse, and intervention as the ultimate answer to the Mexi- 
can question has never been more probable than it is to- 
day. It might come before this book is off the press, and 
not surprise me in the least ; but should it be delayed a long 
time I shall still believe that nothing has been gained. It 
would have cost less time, less money, and fewer lives if 
it had followed as speedily as possible the events of the 
day I have just named. The resistance would have been 
inconsiderable compared to that which will be encountered 
when the thing is done. 

Though Ambassador Wilson worked for the immediate 
recognition of Huerta, such action would have been mani- 
festly improper. President Taft did nothing of importance 
in the matter, and the Mexican problem was passed on to 
his successor as it stood, a scandal to the world. 

President Wilson let it be known immediately that his 
attitude toward Huerta was unfriendly, yet he retained 
Ambassador Wilson in Mexico City, and thus gave his 
administration the appearance of facing both ways, for 



4i8 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

all the world was aware of the Ambassador's efforts in 
Huerta's interest. It is probable that Huerta's position was 
strengthened by this dubious procedure, and that he re- 
ceived more aid from interested persons abroad than would 
have come to him if the Ambassador had been recalled 
immediately. 

There was no serious pressure exerted by European na- 
tions, either then or afterwards, to influence the Mexican 
policy of the United States. There was a certain amount 
of bluffing, but that was all, despite persistent reports to 
the contrary. It was believed in Europe, if not in America, 
that the United States would be compelled to intervene; 
that its credit would be engaged to ensure payment of 
Mexico's obligations, including all damage claims. Noth- 
ing better was desired ; no suasion was necessary to bring 
on the fortunate result. Jealousy of one another, and the 
hazard of their own trade interests were sufficient to deter 
European Powers from action. 

Except for the fateful nature of the situation which 
had come to exist during the administration of his predeces- 
sor. President Wilson was free to answer the Mexican 
question in various ways. Real non-interference, however, 
was not within the scope of his choice. There were too 
many Americans in Mexico, and too many interests inter- 
locking the two countries. It was strictly impossible to 
contemplate indefinite continuance of disorder in Mexico 
as endurable by the United States. I believe that the 
proper course would have been the restoration of peace 
by the speediest practicable use of the armed forces of the 
United States; but this action was not favored by the 
President, for reasons which I have attempted to deduce 
and set forth. After some months of apparent hesitation 
he began to accept with gradually increasing definiteness a 
policy of depending upon the Mexican revolutionists to 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 419 

accomplish the pacification of the country through a series 
of miHtary triumphs. 

He might have taken sides with Huerta instead. There 
are those who still believe that if this had been done the 
rebellion would have been put down promptly; but this is 
an error. The circumstances under which Huerta had 
come to power were such that the greater his resources, 
the longer would be the war in Mexico. It would have 
been brought to an end only by the intervention of the 
United States, never in any other way while Huerta lived, 
and held his seat. 

There was, however, another procedure possible to Presi- 
dent Wilson. To my mind it was the only acceptable al- 
ternative to immediate intervention. He might have at- 
tempted to solve the Mexican problem peaceably with the 
help of men who were deeply, vitally interested in the wel- 
fare of the country, and^vho could exert a powerful influ- 
ence toward satisfactory readjustment even in a situation 
so difficult. Beyond question the man to be consulted first 
was Limantour. It would not have been easy to gain his 
confidence, but it would not have been impossible. If his 
advice had been sought, accepted, and followed, and his 
efiforts toward the establishment of a stable government in 
Mexico had been tactfully and strongly supported, a credit- 
able success might have been achieved. My criticism of 
Limantour's course in the spring of 191 1 will be recalled, 
but no contradiction will be seen by those who have read 
with comprehension. 

I think that so far as the President neglected any oppor- 
tunity to secure information and advice on the Mexican 
problem, it was a grave error; and that a continuance in 
this course would be unfortunate. With the deepest re- 
spect I wish to say that the President's published utterances 
on the Mexican question do not reveal a full understanding 



420 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

of it. The Mexican people are not fitted for self-govern- 
ment, in the sense in which he seems to use the expression. 
To stand by willingly while some millions of uneducated 
Indians, vastly outnumbering the cultivated inhabitants of 
the country in which they live, try to evolve a working 
democracy from a state of demoralization only to be re- 
lieved by the exercise of the most highly developed judg- 
ment, would be as cruel and absurd as to wait for a sick 
child to grow up and evolve the theory and practice of 
medicine. What the Mexicans really require is a business 
government much better, much more modern than that of 
the United States, a business government equipped with 
every device of science, and above all with the method. 

There is no doubt as to the duty of the United States ; 
it is the same as that of every organization and every in- 
dividual in relation to the general welfare, and consists in 
unremitting effort to extend the gains of scientific research 
and the use of the scientific method into all the details of 
human life, governmental, industrial and personal. That 
is what the United States ought to do for Mexico, so far 
as may be practicable. 

The idea that ignorance plus liberty plus providence is 
the formula for a commonwealth is no more respectable to- 
day than Rousseau's theories of a return to nature and the 
golden age. And it will be well for the United States to 
consider in all the long future of the Mexican question that 
what is really desired is the welfare of the Mexican people, 
not their mere momentary gratification. The aspiration 
for liberty has often seemed to come from below, though its 
real source has usually been in a few elevated minds. The 
scientific principles upon which, at some future time, the 
first truly free state will be organized and conducted are 
just now beginning to come down from above, from the 
brains of men trained for methodical research. The more 



THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 421 

diligently this fact is remembered in connection with the 
rehabilitation of Mexico, the better it will be for all con- 
cerned, including the humblest peons who will never be 
able to understand the source from which will come their 
help. 

These remarks seem to me pertinent because I believe 
that the United States will be compelled to take control of 
Mexico. At the date of this writing it seems certain that 
President Wilson will find it necessary to thwart Villa and 
Carranza, and that war will result. Although the Consti- 
tutionalists have been permitted to become a formidable 
host, their power will be registered only in the number of 
the invaders who will be slain, not in substantial military 
successes. In the end they will be dispersed and driven 
to the mountains, and the United States, for a space, will 
rule Mexico. It is then that I shall wish to see politics 
and all antiquated methods forgotten, and the public affairs 
of that country administered with real enlightenment. 

Whoever doubts the eventual restitution of Mexico to its 
own people, questions the honor of the United States. 
The obligation will be explicit; the American public will 
indorse it, and will make it good. If that public will con- 
demn, while the occupation lasts, every worn-out device of 
politics and every foolish tendency towards sentimentalism, 
the incident will be brief and the results beneficial. The 
Mexicans do not need another dictator, domestic or im- 
ported. The era of Diaz is closed. What they need would 
be better described as a good board of directors to manage 
the corporation of which they are the stockholders, and a 
reformed policeman strictly under the orders of the board. 
If they have an experience of this rule, they may like it 
so w^ell that they will gladly undertake its perpetuation. 
That will be self-government. 

Whatever may be done in Mexico, there will be the same 



422 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 

need as heretofore that the United States should have a 
definite and continuous policy toward Latin American coun- 
tries, not one that varies with political changes, or mere 
shifts of sentiment, in the great northern republic. The 
questions to which that policy will be directed will be busi- 
ness questions, and should be handled by business men. 
To permit the development of trade with Latin America to 
be further retarded through neglect of this plain fact is 
manifestly unwise. A self perpetuating commission of 
representative business men should be established to deal 
with all Latin American relations. Their recommendations 
would not be final, but radical departures from them would 
be very infrequent. 

If such a board had been in existence in 1912 there would 
probably have been no Mexican revolution in February of 
the following year, because the men composing the board 
would have known what was being hatched, and what was 
to be looked for in Mexico if the mischief should be left 
unchecked. It is hardly possible that the President and 
the Secretary of State would have been deaf to the repre- 
sentations sure to have been made by watchful men of 
sound business training and adequate foresight, serving the 
government at that time in the capacity suggested. 



THE END 



3II.77 



